

THE
CHURCH QUARTERLY REVIEW.

N^o XCVII. OCTOBER 1899.

ART. I.—RIVINGTON ON THE ROMAN
'PRIMACY,' 430-451.

The Roman Primacy, A.D. 430-451. By the Rev. LUKE RIVINGTON, M.A., D.D., formerly Demy of Magdalen College, Oxford. (London, 1899.)

THIS volume had not long been published when the newspapers announced the almost sudden death of the author. *Requiescat in Christo.* The event does not relieve us of the necessity of criticizing his last contribution to the cause of Papalism; but we shall remember, throughout, the special consideration due to a name that has become a memory, the name of one who has passed out of the arena of controversy

'To where, beyond these voices, there is peace.'

His literary services had been recompensed by Leo XIII. with the degree of Doctor in Divinity; and it is the more regrettable that he should have stamped his very title-page with the character of ambiguity. What is meant by 'the Roman Primacy'? The term is notoriously elastic, therefore indefinite, therefore misleading. An arguer does not promote, but rather hinders, a just perception of issues involved, if he summarizes his thesis in a word which opponents may use in diverse senses—one may say, in this case, which suits his opponents' thesis considerably better than his own. Dr. Rivington shows repeatedly in this book that he is well

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aware—indeed, he could not possibly be unaware—of the fact that Anglicans acknowledge a ‘primacy’ in St. Peter, and a ‘primacy’ in the Roman See of primitive times. But the point to be emphasized is that, while there are primacies and primacies, while a ‘princeps senatus’ has a secular ‘primacy’ in one sense, and a Diocletian in another, while Athens of old had by right a ‘hegemony,’ but was resisted when she asserted a ‘dominion,’ the polity which a Roman writer pleads for, as *jure divino* essential to Church life, is a primacy of a dominant and practically absolute kind. Why, then, should he not frankly entitle his book ‘The Papal Monarchy in 430–451’?

But this brings us to the consideration of his reiterated disclaimer of the notion of an ‘autocratic’ power in the Pope. He says that on becoming a Roman Catholic, he ‘never submitted, nor was asked to submit, to any “ecclesiastical absolutism;”’ and again he says that the ‘Catholic’ thesis does not regard the Pope as absolute, and that ‘no one who accepts the Vatican decrees claims for him such a position,’ &c. Yet he gives us ample means of estimating the worth of such softening explanations. He tells us that although the Pope is ‘morally bound to rule the Church in accordance with’ Church laws (p. xii), and ‘must act in harmony with’ them, so as to allow ‘a real . . . authority in the Episcopate’ (p. 308), those laws have ‘no coactive force’ against him if he chooses to govern otherwise.¹ That is to say, the

¹ In p. 240 he cites ‘a writer who received the special approbation of Pius IX.’ as saying that ‘the power of the episcopal body was not intended by Christ to control the government of the supreme ruler.’ In *The Primitive Church and the See of Peter* our author had illustrated the relation of the Pope to Church laws by observing that a king was bound to respect the laws, ‘not because they were superior to him, but because he was bound to set an example’; and on this Dr. Bright had remarked (*The Roman See in the Early Church*, &c. p. 208) that Lingard had blamed Richard II. for ‘placing himself above the control of the law.’ The Anglican writer (specially attacked in this volume) is now charged with omitting to quote Lingard’s context, which shows that he was dealing with Richard’s ‘attempt to overthrow the constitution’ (p. 13). Just so; and Dr. Bright had summarized this in the words (cited by Dr. Rivington), ‘It was part of Richard’s despotic policy.’ But the point is that Richard, as king of England, had relations with a ‘constitution’ which, if not systematically formulated, included at any rate, as Macaulay says, ‘three great principles which limited’ the royal power, and by means of which the king could be brought, as Richard was at last most effectively brought, under ‘the control of the law.’ But the Pope’s power, as things now stand, is exempt from all ‘constitutional’ restraints. Dr. Bright drew no ‘parallel between the British government and the constitution of the Church’; he simply deprecated any parallel between the Papacy and ‘kingship as understood by Englishmen.’ And when our

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members of his Church, bishops, clergy, and laity, are, under its constitution, simply incapable of constraining him to do his duty as here set forth. If he thinks fit to ignore the opinion of his bishops, or to set aside any number of canons for reasons satisfactory to himself, the vast Latin communion has no remedy; 'he is responsible to God only and his conscience' (p. xii). He cannot be called to account, or arrested in his course of misgovernment, or deposed, as the Council of Constance deposed John XXIII. In short, he is master, and the Church subject to him is helpless. Can anything be more futile than to say that a constitution which allows such a state of things is *not* a system of 'absolutism'? Is not the differentiating characteristic of absolutism precisely this, that the subjects must depend for good government solely on the personal goodness of the sovereign for the time being; that no checks external to his own will, or, if we prefer so to word it, his own 'sense of duty,' are provided by the system for the prevention of despotic action on his part? ¹ Is Nicholas II., *qua* Tsar, *not* an autocrat because he is religious and amiable? True, a sovereign thus uncontrolled may be practically restrained by a network of officialism, and the Italian proverb sardonically recognizes the 'black Pope' (the Jesuit authorities) as stronger than the 'white Pope'; ² but we are concerned with the idea or principle of the papal polity, and we say that it is essentially despotic.³ Dr. Rivington, to be sure, is not wholly

author now says that an English sovereign is still, in a sense, above the law, in that he 'cannot be indicted for its violation,' he forgets that this inviolability is correlative to the transfer of governing power from the Crown to a Ministry representing a majority of the House of Commons.

¹ 'There exists no law wherever a living ruler, an executive head, claims and exercises, and is allowed to possess, a power of annulling or a power of dispensing with the law . . . By absolutism we in England mean the supremacy of a personal will to law, for the purpose of putting aside or changing law . . . Now *that* power is precisely what the Pope possesses' in and over his Church—Gladstone, *Vaticanism*, p. 99. Dr. Rivington ventures to assert that 'the constitution of the Roman empire did not of itself involve despotism.' Under Diocletian it certainly did (Gibbon, ii. 93 *sqq.*), and such power was distinctly ascribed to Valentinian II. by his high officials (Ambrose, *Ep.* 20. 19).

² For recent instances see Canon MacColl's *The Reformation Settlement*, pp. 521-36. 'There interferes,' says Scott, 'some check of one kind or other in the most despotic government' (*A Legend of Montrose*, ch. xii.).

³ One of the most high-handed acts in the papal history was extorted from Pius VII. by Napoleon I. That unfortunate Pontiff was very loath to stretch his authority to the extent of suppressing all the existing French sees in order to a readjustment of the hierarchy; but, with whatever reluctance, he did it by the Bull *Qui Christi* in 1801. The

consistent in his use of language. In one passage of his preface he speaks in a subdued tone, that might be called Gallican: 'What we might expect to find in history' (*i.e.* the history of the Church) 'is a certain peculiarly authoritative guardianship of the canons exercised by the supreme Pontiff,' &c. But this comes in after he has denied, as it were *ore rotundo*, the existence of any control on the Pope's conduct *ab extra*; and, some pages earlier, he has contended that if the Church recognized an 'ecclesiastical monarchy' of 'divine institution' in 430-51, she must have done so from the beginning (p. ix); on which view all evidence to the contrary is peremptorily ruled out of court. 'Primacy,' then, with him means confessedly 'monarchy,' and such a monarchy as he has described; for he holds, as he *must* hold, that the papal 'primatus' is a 'full and supreme power of jurisdiction' which is 'ordinaria' et immediata' over all churches, pastors,

prelates, says Mr. Jervis in *The Gallican Church and the Revolution*, were thereby formally 'deprived of all canonical jurisdiction' (p. 377). Doubtless Dr. Rivington regards those few French bishops who denounced the arrangements made between Pope and Emperor, and those clerics and laics who with them formed the 'petite église,' as involved in rebellion and in schism. Yet he refers Dr. Bright to Lyndwood, and says that he held 'that there were cases in which the Pope might be rightly resisted' (p. xiv). We are not surprised to find that the modern controversialist refrains from saying that he agrees with the old canonist on a point of such delicacy, or from pointing out cases in which such resistance would be 'right.'

¹ See the terms of the Vatican decree 'De Vi et Ratione Primatus Romani Pontificis,' which, as Mr. Gladstone said four years after its promulgation, has been somewhat cast into the shade, among Anglicans, through the special attention bestowed on the decree 'De Romani Pontificis Infallibili Magisterio.' Dr. Rivington explains 'ordinaria' as 'attached to the (papal) office' (p. xii). We do not pretend to be experts in the interpretation of the technical terms of Roman Church law; but we should have thought that the context of the decree gave a much more distinct sense to the word 'ordinaria.' It seems to us to say in effect, that while every bishop has an ordinary jurisdiction (of course derived from the Pope) in his own sphere, the Pope himself has this jurisdiction in fulness throughout all dioceses, and over all bishops, so that he is the one universal 'ordinary,' or 'ordinarius ordinariorum,' and can act 'immediately,' *i.e.* not necessarily through the several bishops, in the affairs of every diocese or parish; and his intervention can never be an interference; his rights are all-pervading, and may become all-absorbing. In Dean Church's 'Notes on the Constitutional System of the Gallican Church,' included in the *Ecclesiastical Courts Commission Report* of 1883, we find that 'the claim of the Pope to judge in the first instance, or *omisso medio*, was always resisted,' on the ground that, if it were admitted, 'the Pope would be the universal bishop of the Church, and the other bishops (who hold their power immediately from Jesus Christ) could only be regarded as *his vicars*.' Ultramontanes, no doubt, regard the words which we put in parenthesis as heretical.

and faithful, and the exercise of which may be questioned by none. We are told, indeed, that to represent the bishops of the Roman Church as, 'in effect, no more than his vicars,' is contrary to the 'terms' of a passage in the decree, which describes the bishops as successors of the Apostles, and 'real pastors governing their respective flocks'; and that the relation of the Pope to 'apostolic vicars differs enormously' from his relation to diocesan bishops (p. x). But if at any moment, and for any reason that he thinks sufficient, the Pope can overrule the action of diocesan bishops by virtue of his supreme and irresistible 'immediata jurisdictio,' these bishops are, in effect, wholly dependent on his will in the exercise of their diocesan authority; he can, we believe, withhold 'faculties' which are necessary for their diocesan action;¹ he can require them to resign, and deprive them if they decline compliance. Is a subordinate in this position much better off than a mere deputy? Further, the decree from which we are quoting expressly anathematizes those who would reduce the Pope's jurisdiction to a mere 'officium inspectionis vel directionis,' or restrict it to matters of 'faith and practice,' to the exclusion of matters of 'discipline and government,' or assign to him only 'potiores partes, non vero totam plenitudinem, hujus supremæ potestatis.'² It is necessary to keep these terms well in mind, so that the reader may remember what the author has to maintain—namely, this Vatican doctrine of papal supremacy; nothing more, indeed, but nothing less. If the evidence which he adduces from the period in question proves less than this—and Anglicans hold that it proves very much less indeed—then he has proved, for his own purpose, nothing.

And now as to his account of the Third General Council: we are happy to be at one with him on the strictly fundamental character of the doctrinal issue then raised. We say with him that Nestorianism did really 'cut at the root of the Christian faith';³ and the line taken in this Review on the 'Kenotic' question will show that we consider it to be, for English Christians in general, a greater danger than its Eutychian opposite. But let us look at the first appearance made by Celestine, Bishop of Rome from 422 to 432, in this momentous contest. Remember what, on Dr. Rivington's

¹ See Quirinus, *Letters from Rome*, E. Tr. p. 64.

² This stringent form of the decree was due to Pius IX.'s own command. French bishops said that it involved 'absolute papal monarchy'—'a change of the constitution of the Church.'

³ So Dr. Salmon says it was 'practically equivalent to a denial of our Lord's Divinity' (*Infallibility of the Church*, p. 303).

principles, was his position. He had, in the most unqualified sense, the care of all the Churches; he was the universal Apostle, the Vicar of Christ, acknowledged as such by all Christians; he was, by every right, as much at home in the Church affairs of Constantinople or Antioch as in those of his own Lateran basilica, not to say of Tusculum or of Portus; he was also charged with the task of instructing the whole Church as to what was, and what was not, to be taught and believed, and in the discharge of that function he was invested with infallibility.¹ In the spring of 429, about six months after the outbreak of the controversy, he received copies of some of Nestorius's sermons; he gathered the neighbouring bishops about him, and informed Cyril of Alexandria that they had been 'greatly scandalized' by what they had there read: could such discourses be really the work of the Bishop of Constantinople? Cyril did not answer this question; and one does not see how, on papalist grounds, he can be acquitted of a strange neglect of loyal duty. But some time later, Nestorius wrote to Celestine, professedly asking for information about the Pelagians, and also referring to the Christological question; and soon afterwards he sent to Rome a good many of his own sermons. There is not a word in the letter to indicate that he regarded Celestine as his judge; he writes simply as brother to brother; and Celestine took no further action until Cyril wrote to him² in the summer of 430. He begins by saying that 'the long-standing customs of the Churches' persuade him to communicate to Celestine such matters as are now in question; he writes, then, under a sense of obligation. But the point of this sentence is best seen by a reference to the traditional relations between the Alexandrian See and the Roman, involving a certain, though somewhat indefinite, dependence of the Church 'of St. Mark' on the Church 'of SS. Peter and Paul.' Julius I. makes the most of this relation, when rebuk-

¹ We are well aware that the decree on infallibility falls short of what such extreme papalists as Dr. Ward, not to say Pius IX. himself, had wished for; but on the other hand, its terms will include papal utterances not explicitly addressed to the 'Catholic' world. There must, however, be an implied intention to address it. The decree claims to represent 'a tradition received from the very outset of Christianity.' On the large scope assigned by many Romanists to 'speaking *ex cathedra*,' see *Church Quarterly Review*, xxv. 352.

² Mansi, iv. 1012. This was about five months after he had written, with the approval of his own synod, that second letter to Nestorius which has received fuller 'œcumenical' sanction than the third letter, or even than the letter to John of Antioch. If he regarded Celestine as the appointed oracle of truth, why did he not consult him before thus writing?

ing the Arianising Easterns for their persecution of St. Athanasius¹; and now Cyril, being naturally anxious to enlist Rome on his side against Constantinople, lays stress on it, describes the mischief caused by Nestorius's teaching, and asks Celestine to 'be pleased to formulate his opinion'² on this question. Should he, Cyril, continue to be in ecclesiastical fellowship with Nestorius, or denounce him as heretical? Having already, in the main body of his letter, given Celestine a pretty distinct 'lead' as to the answer which he expected, he can well afford to say in effect, 'Tell me what you think I ought to do, and I will do it.' Celestine was willing enough to comply. He held a synod, and delivered an address of which a fragment still remains; and the result was a synodical letter (August 11, 430), expressing great satisfaction on account of the doctrinal unanimity between Alexandria and Rome, and also a Christianlike hope that Nestorius might even yet be reclaimed from his errors; but if not, 'then let him know that he can no longer retain communion with us.' Then came the critical words to this effect: 'The authority of our See having been associated with yours' (lit. 'with you'),³ you yourself, acting authori-

¹ Cf. Athan. *Apol. c. Arian. c. 35*. Tillemont refers to 'the obligation of all bishops to communicate their needs to each other,' xiv. 345.

² *Τυπῶσαι τὸ δοκοῦν*, no doubt, suggests a direction carrying some regulative authority; but the question is, how much? It is natural for Dr. Rivington, with his dominant preconception, to assume that all such terms, when used in relation to the Pope, should be taken in the most absolute sense which they can bear, although in p. 66 he says that 'the meaning of "sententia" varies from "decision" to "opinion."' But the document by no means suggests that when Cyril thus wrote he contemplated what, in one word, we may call Ultramontanism, that he regarded all bishops everywhere as subjects of the single bishop of Rome. That Cyril's genuine language, however stringently interpreted, cannot be brought up to that mark, and is *pro tanto* unsatisfactory to Papalists, is proved by Aquinas's treatise 'Contra errores Græcorum.' The Angelic Doctor was fairly taken in by certain alleged extracts (in a Latin version) from Cyril, e.g. 'As Christ received from the Father . . . the fullest power, so He committed it in all its fulness to Peter and his successors;' 'That we may remain as members in one head, the apostolic throne of the Roman Pontiffs, *a quo nostrum est querere quid credere et quid tenere debemus* . . . Ipsius [*i.e.* this throne] solius est reprehendere . . . statuere, solvere, disponere, et loco Illius ligare qui possumus ædificavit,' &c. Another choice bit is a so-called 'canon of Chalcedon,' that every incriminated bishop may appeal to the bishop of Old Rome, 'et ipsi soli libera potestate loco Dei sit jus discernendi,' &c. Does the reader want an explanation of these quotations? They are exercises of the same craft which long before had interpolated the text of St. Cyprian *De Unitate*: they are impudent forgeries in the interest of Rome.

³ Dr. Rivington tries to make out a difference between 'you' and 'yours,' so as to suppress all recognition of any authority in Cyril's own

tatively as our representative, will carry out this sentence,' to this effect that 'unless, within ten days from the date of this monition' (meaning, from his reception of the monition), 'Nestorius condemns in writing his heterodox assertions, and positively declares that he holds this faith which the Church of the Romans, and your Holiness's Church, and Christians in general, hold as to the nativity of Christ our God,' he must understand that he must in every sense be separated from our body.' Celestine adds that he is writing also to the Bishops of Antioch, Thessalonica, Jerusalem, and Philippi, so as to make known what he calls 'our sentence, or rather the divine sentence of our Christ,' words which involve no 'assumption of infallibility' as Dr. Rivington assumes, but simply mean that Christ's own teaching condemns the heresy in question.² In a long letter to Nestorius himself, Celestine warns him that unless he retracts, he must 'know that he is cast out of all communion with the Catholic Church;' and again, at the end of a letter to the Constantinopolitan clergy, 'is excommunicated from the whole Catholic Church.' Again, writing to John of Antioch, Celestine says that Nestorius must either accept the terms proposed, or 'know that he is excluded from the assembly of bishops.' Does this language mean that Celestine claimed to hold in his sole hands the keys of Catholic communion? Dr. Rivington, of course, understands it thus; but the contexts show that Celestine is throughout assuming that all the Churches will agree with the Roman and Alexandrian on the merits of the case, and will treat Nestorius as a violator of the general and received doctrinal tradition.³

see. But *συναφείας* excludes this interpretation: an authority associated or combined implies an authority with which it is associated. Celestine supposes that Cyril will speak with his own authority for his own Church, and with delegated authority for the Roman.

¹ In the scrap that remains of Celestine's address to the Roman Council he approves the term 'Theotocos,' as supported by a hymn which he remembers Ambrose to have made the people sing at Christmas, and by the language of Hilary, and of his own predecessor Damasus. But he does not ascribe to Damasus's words any unique or supreme authority. We must distinguish the Celestinian fragment from the preceding 'memorandum,' given by Cyril to his own envoy, Posidonius. Mansi, iv. 548.

² So in his letter to John: 'or rather, by Christ Himself,' &c. He had already said, 'the faith which, in accordance with the Apostles' teaching,' &c.

³ Thus, to Nestorius: 'Among many things which you impiously assert, and which the universal Church rejects.' . . . 'Count up the heretics who in old time introduced such questionings into the Church.' Here he mentions Paul of Samosata, and adds that all the 'inventors

But a letter of Cyril's to John is somewhat embarrassing to Papal arguers. He says that 'the synod of the Romans' has published a formulated conclusion, to which 'those must needs conform who intend to retain the communion of the whole West.' Dr. Rivington contends that as this 'synod' was not a representative of the whole Western episcopate, it could have no authority for Cyril or for John, except as the mere 'instrument' of a purely Papal judgment. But although Cyril was not likely to be punctilious, at such a crisis, as to the exact relation between this synod at Rome and the Western bishops in general, it is remarkable that he lays repeated stress on a plurality,¹ and never mentions the individual Roman bishop—although he does so in a parallel letter to Juvenal of Jerusalem, in which, while speaking of 'the formulated direction prescribed,' he urges (not obedience to Rome as such, but) 'unanimity' in zeal for Christian souls. John himself, writing to Nestorius, mentions Celestine as having 'prescribed' a certain term of days, but speaks in the same breath of a 'letter from the most holy bishop Celestine' and 'letters from the most pious bishop Cyril;' and his plea, also, dwells (not on any special claim on Rome's part, but) on the serious risk of a new breach with 'the West, and Egypt, and perhaps Macedonia.' Why so, if Antioch knew itself to be ecclesiastically subject to Rome?

We need not pause over Cyril's by no means precipitate action in regard to the instructions of Celestine, or the immediate results of the despatch of his 'third letter to Nestorius,' with its appended Anathematisms. Before this ultimatum of Rome and Alexandria was delivered at Constantinople, Theodosius II. had taken (on November 19) a step which cut across their programme: he had summoned a General Council to meet in Ephesus at the Pentecost of

of evil teaching have been expelled by the same rigorous sentence from their Churches.' (Paul was excommunicated, not by Rome, but by the great Council of Antioch.) 'Unless you proclaim as to Christ our God what the Roman, and the Alexandrian, and the whole Catholic Church hold, and the holy Church in great Constantinople held nobly up to your time.' In the letter to the clergy, when Nestorius is addressed: 'according to the mind of the Roman, and the Alexandrian, and the whole Catholic Church.'

¹ 'We shall follow the decisions given by them, *for* we fear to lose the communion of so great a number.' Here *παρ' αὐτῶν*, followed by the Latin, must be the right reading, for *παρ' αὐτοῦ*, which Dr. Rivington insists upon, would in that sentence refer to 'Juvenal bishop of Ælia,' (a point which Dr. Rivington appears to have overlooked). A little above *παρ' αὐτοῦ* is right, as referring to Rufus of Thessalonica. The second *παρ' αὐτοῦ* in the Greek text is an iteration. Mansi, iv. 1052.

431.¹ That the right to summon such an assembly belonged to the Roman bishop never entered the mind of this devout Emperor. It is true that he had, as yet, no official knowledge of the correspondence between Cyril and Celestine; but of course he knew what was in preparation, and he resolved, in Tillemont's phrase, to 'arrest its effect.'² The result of his action was to suspend the Roman-Alexandrian resolution. Celestine never protested that 'Rome had spoken, and the cause was settled'; Cyril never demanded that Celestine's 'formulated' judgment should be respected by an orthodox emperor. And when the Council met, on June 22, Nestorius was still regarded as a bishop in the Church, not as a deposed heretic, so that even if, according to 'Church principles in A.D. 431' (p. 117), the Roman bishop in his sole person had 'right to depose a bishop of Constantinople,' that 'right' was superseded by the assembling of an Œcumenical Synod. And this brings us to a point of some interest.³ Did Cyril, when presiding in the Council, act in virtue of the commission of delegation given him by Celestine in the preceding August? That commission was necessarily ex-

¹ Some orthodox monks had asked for such a Council in 429; it was now granted at the instance of Nestorius.

² Dr. Rivington criticizes Dr. Bright as following Tillemont in the remark, 'L'empereur . . . défend absolument de rien faire de nouveau jusqu'à l'assemblée et au jugement du concile' (*Mém.* xiv. 364). Μηδεμίνας . . . καινοτομίας ἰδίᾳ παρὰ τινων γενομένης, in the circular of summons, refers, he thinks, not generally to any new proceedings, but to 'doctrinal innovations' either on the side of Nestorius or of Cyril, but particularly on that of Cyril. Καινοτομία, doubtless, often has this limited sense, but does not require it; and the context does not suggest it here. Theodosius means, 'Let no one take any course which would defeat my purpose of having the question thoroughly considered and settled in Council by the bishops,' whom in a letter to Cyril he calls 'its judges, those who preside over the priesthood everywhere' (*Mansi*, iv. 1112). Not a word about any special judicial right belonging to the see of Rome.

³ Dr. Rivington for once (p. 31) relies on Milman (*Lat. Christ.* i. 205, ed. 3) *versus* Tillemont. 'As Dean Milman says, "The bishop of Constantinople was already a condemned heretic."' But in this quotation the words 'to them' (Cyril and Celestine) are omitted, so that the impression is given that the Church at large, and all the bishops when they came to Ephesus, took the view thus summarized. We are here concerned only with what related to the papal question; but we may say that Dr. Rivington's resentment at any censure of Cyril's conduct in regard to the opening of the Council before John's arrival, or to kindred points, exhibits a partisanship too thoroughgoing to be compatible with historical judgment. To hold that Cyril, in the heat of his zeal for orthodoxy, did anything wrong, is apparently to follow his 'enemies' (p. 7, cp. p. 59). This respect of persons seems to us demoralizing. Cp. *Church Quarterly Review*, xv. 268.

hausted when Cyril's letter was delivered to Nestorius on December 7. For it has respect simply to that proceeding; as Bossuet says, Celestine had then 'no thought' of a General Council; and the notion that a commission to do a certain thing can be held to be in force after the thing is done, with a view to another thing which the giver and receiver had not then contemplated, would seem absurd to any modern man of business. But had Celestine given Cyril any *new* commission? Dr. Rivington says that his letter of May 7 to Cyril shows that he 'considered Cyril to be already in charge of the whole matter, which would now be concluded in conjunction with the Council' (p. 37).¹ Supposing this letter to have reached Cyril in time, it still contains no express delegation; but it assumes that Cyril will carry the matter through, and treats the 'preceding decision' as still valid if Nestorius cannot be won back. It looks as if he was forgetting what the summoning of a General Council had involved, and trying to regard himself and Cyril as having extended the terms allowed to Nestorius. This, however, was against the reason of the case; he could not 'have it both ways.' But the more stress is laid on Celestine's letter, the more do the proceedings in the first session conflict with it. For in that session, after Nestorius had set at nought three citations, he was still spoken of, not only by bishop after bishop, but by Cyril himself,² and while his own letter to Cyril was being denounced, in the ordinary episcopal style as 'the most religious bishop'; so that the 'preceding decision' which, on Celestine's showing, should have taken effect on the previous December 17, was not held operative on the morning of June 22, while the Synod went through all the forms of a trial before pronouncing its own sentence. A Council that held it operative would not, and ought not, to have spent a long summer day over these forms.³ It

¹ In p. 61 we are roundly informed that 'Cyril acted as legate of Celestine.' The Acts say that he held the place of the absent Celestine, but confine the term 'legate' to the Roman envoys.

² 'This holy and great synod has heard what I wrote to the most pious Nestorius in defence of the right faith' (Mansi, iv. 1137). Observe that whereas this 'second letter to Nestorius' was among the documents sent by Cyril to Celestine in July 430, and thereupon approved by Celestine, Cyril asks the Council, after hearing it read, to 'say whether he had written rightly and unexceptionably . . . or not' (*ib.* 1140). Bossuet naturally lays stress on this.

³ Dr. Rivington, wishing to minimize the investigation, calls it 'very summary.' This is hardly respectful either to the Synod or to Cyril. Anyhow, it was professedly a serious business. But it is explained that they were not 'embarking on a theological investigation of the doctrine.'

would have simply inquired whether Nestorius had retracted, and on finding that he had not, would forthwith have recorded its assent to the Roman 'decision.' But now let us look at Dr. Rivington's interpretation of their sentence. A General Council, he holds, is under a 'moral necessity' of accepting a previous papal judgment, as already, 'of itself,' infallible *because* papal. But in doing so, he insists, its members are not mere instruments for registering the papal decision; they are, in a real sense, 'judges.' In what sense? In that of ascertaining and 'unfolding' the grounds on which it is based, and the 'motives' by which the Pope was probably 'guided,' and of making its promulgation the more 'striking' (p. 42). A singular mode of acting as 'judges'! And imagine an emperor commanding the bishops to undertake long and toilsome journeys merely to produce a dramatic impression! One would expect that some expression or indication of this conception of conciliar duty would be found in the minutes—say, in the several pronouncements against Nestorius's letter; but in the case before us there is none. Nor can it escape observation that this Vaticanist gloss has a significant bearing on the case of the First Œcumenical Council. Under what unfavourable conditions did that august assembly take up its task! How grievous the disadvantage of having before it no papal judgment on the tremendous Arian question, and being obliged to feel its own way without the light of an *ex cathedra* pronouncement by Pope Sylvester! But to return; the sentence was pronounced at the close of the proceedings; and in it the bishops say that as Nestorius had disregarded their citations, they had been 'under the necessity of proceeding to an examination of his impious language: and we, having on the ground of his letters, writings, and words recently spoken in this very metropolis, convicted him of holding and propounding what is impious—having been (and as) placed under urgent necessity¹ both by the canons, and on the

Certainly not as if the question were properly a new one. Taking the Creed as a standard, they used certain documents by way of illustration: among these Celestine's letter to Nestorius is read between Cyril's second and third, and patristic extracts follow. Observe, too, that Cyril's third letter, sent in pursuance of Celestine's instructions, is not said in the Acts to have been expressly approved by the Council. The appended Anathematisms, no doubt, presented a difficulty; we know that they needed repeated 'explanations.'

¹ The adverb *ἀναγκαιώς* is used both here and in the former sentence, to express the idea of unavoidableness. The Council's words in the third citation, 'If you do not appear, the Synod *ἀνάγκην ἔχει* to decide in your case in accordance with the canons of the fathers,' do not refer

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ground of the letter of our most holy father¹ and fellow-minister, Celestine, bishop of the Church of the Romans, with frequent tears proceed to this dismal sentence: Our Lord Jesus Christ, therefore, whom he has blasphemed, decides through this most holy Synod that the said Nestorius is alien from the episcopal dignity, and from every priestly [*i.e.* episcopal] assembly.'

Dr. Rivington insists on the pointed reference to Celestine's letter, and argues that a mention of the canons could only refer to Nestorius's contumacy, and that, therefore, the letter was *the* ground on which they treated him as heretical. Had it been so, the previously mentioned examination need not have been held, and would not have been emphasized.² And to say that 'no canon had dealt with his dogmatic error' is to miss the point. There were rules enough and precedents enough for condemning a persistent assertion of gross heresy. But why, it will be asked, should they thus lay stress on a letter not addressed to them, and which they had not, in fact, obeyed?³ Let it be remembered that they did regard the See

simply to the Roman-Alexandrian 'estimate' of Nestorius's language, as Dr. Rivington seems to mean in p. 44, but to the general imputation of heresy as well; see the opening speech of the Alexandrian secretary, Peter, in Mansi, iv. 1128.

¹ This title Dr. Rivington exhibits with initial capitals (so, too, in p. 368), and assumes it to refer to Celestine as Pope in the present sense of the term, or spiritual sovereign of all bishops. But in the speeches of bishops Cyril is called 'our most holy' or 'most pious father' more than fifty times. Mansi, iv. 1140 *sqq.*

² The preposition relating to the canons is, as Dr. Rivington says, *ἀπό*, while *ἐκ* is used in reference to Nestorius's language and to Celestine's letter. Dr. Rivington says, 'No one places the papal letter here *above* the canons; it remains, then, that they are co-ordinated' (p. 58). If we are to argue from prepositions, their identity in the case just mentioned 'co-ordinates' the synodical examination with the letter. *Κατασκευαίς*, which our author calls a participle containing the idea of 'tremendous force,' is applied, he admits, both to the canons and to the letter. Observe that in the notice of the deposition sent to Nestorius, and the similar notice sent to his clergy, the act is ascribed simply to the 'Synod,' and, in another sent to the clergy and laity of Constantinople, to 'the divinely inspired judgment of the holy fathers and bishops.' Imagine an Ultramontane 'Council' speaking thus!

³ Bossuet, as quoted by Dr. Rivington, undoubtedly ascribes to the letter a 'judiciary force,' so that 'the Council' could not but confirm it because it was 'fundamentally just, and valable dans sa forme comme étant émanée d'une puissance légitime,' *Œuvres*, xxx. 528. But, as his biographer says, 'he was at the same period of his life engaged on the *Defensio Cleri Gallicani*' (*Hist. de Bossuet*, iii. 252), and there he affirms that Celestine's letter to Cyril was *not* 'ultimum atque irreformabile iudicium'; it was 'suspended by the assembling of a General Council, examined, and confirmed, 'novo et irretractabili iudicio'; and while acknowledging 'sedis apostolicæ legitimam potestatem et primum,'

of Rome as ranking first in the Episcopate,¹ did ascribe to it not only a peculiar dignity, but also a proportionate interest in the maintenance of the faith and of Church order. What was the precise scope of its legitimate action and influence—how far might it go, what directions it might give, what degree of deference was due to it—these were questions which the bishops had not thought out, and which were naturally postponed to the exigences of an immediate crisis. They wanted all the support that Rome could give in the impending contest with their Emperor and his own Archbishop, as well as with a number of Easterns opposed to the Alexandrian type of theology, and jealous of Alexandrian self-assertion. It was well said long ago,² 'When a great system works in harmony, are confidence and words of honour so strange towards those who, in whatever sense, with greater power or with less, stand at its head?' But does such confidence, do such words of honour, 'prove that the power so trusted and honoured is supposed incapable of failure, or of usurpation'?

We come to the session in which the Roman legates were present.³ They brought a letter from Celestine to the Council, which fully and eloquently recognized that all bishops, himself included, had a common interest in the Apostolic commission, and in the duties which it involved in regard to the faith,⁴ and spoke of the Council as an Apostolic assembly,

the Synod 'illius judicium non probat, nisi per legitimam cognitionem et iteratum examen' (Lib. vi. c. 11). We are not much impressed by the Ultramontane Mansi's contention as adduced by our author (p. 88).

¹ The unhistoric notion that St. Peter had been actually the first bishop of Rome, which was clearly unknown to Irenæus (for he begins the episcopal series there with Linus), had before this time established itself, very much through the influence of Jerome. It is curious to see how modern Roman writers explain it away while trying to retain the advantage of it. No doubt the connexion of both Peter and Paul with the Roman Church did much to build up her 'primacy of honour and influence'; but its original basis was the grandeur of the 'Urbs' itself, as the centre of the Roman world.

² *Christian Remembrancer*, January 1851, p. 78.

³ Even after they had arrived, Cyril claimed to represent Celestine (Mansi, iv. 1305). At Chalcedon a bishop said that Cyril was the 'head' of the Ephesian Synod (Mansi, vii. 20).

⁴ 'Hæc ad omnes in commune Domini sacerdotes' (i.e. bishops) 'prædicationis cura pervenit. Advertere debet vestra fraternitas . . . quia accepimus generale mandatum. . . Agendum est igitur labore communi, ut . . . per apostolicam successionem hucusque detenta servemus. . . Lugeat hoc' (the new heresy) 'nobiscum in commune omne collegium.' Dr. Rivington does not repeat the extraordinary gloss which in *The Primitive Church*, &c., p. 339, made Celestine imply that he was to the bishops what St. Paul was to Timothy! He now gives the sense

assured as such of a Divine presence 'in the midst' of it. It is at the close of the letter that Celestine briefly refers to what he has previously 'ordained,' and 'doubts not that the Council will assent to it, since what is being done seems, (or 'whatever you may decide on would seem') 'to be decreed for the safety of the Church universal.' A leading prelate, Firmus, the Primate of Pontus, declared that Celestine had already given a sentence (or judicial opinion) and a formal regulation, which 'the Council had put into execution by drawing up a canonical and Apostolical judgment.' In the latter adjective he is clearly echoing the language of Celestine, just read, about the Apostolic office of all bishops;¹ by the former he could not mean a judgment which fulfilled the condition of conforming to that of Rome, for no such condition was imposed by any canon that has come down to us, and Rome would not have allowed such a canon to perish.² His words about 'putting into execution' what Celestine had formulated, could not imply that the Council's only duty had been to give an intelligent assent (not being free to withhold assent) to the Pope's sovereign decree; for, as Hefele fairly, save that he insists that 'in commune' does not mean 'equally' (p. 73). Surely the *onus* is on him to show that it does not. It certainly seems to have this sense in several passages in the Acts of the Fifth General Council (Mansi, ix. 197, 347, 369). And was Celestine to 'mourn' more than the rest? And what of 'common land,' or of 'community of goods'? As for 'common prayer,' the different positions of the 'clergyman' and the congregation, to which he refers, do not affect their equality of interest in the prayers thus offered; the officiant's function is not vicarious, but (in a true sense) representative. And so far as Apostolic 'solicitude' is concerned, Celestine here recognizes no difference whatever between himself and other bishops; whereas, according to our author, Celestine, in his action of the year preceding, was 'exercising his apostolate over the whole Church' (p. 17). With Celestine's language compare St. Augustine's to Boniface I., *C. duas Epp. Pelag.* i. 2.

¹ The Roman Catholic *Weekly Register* for May 13, 1899, says that the condemnation was called apostolical, 'not (pace Dr. Rivington) as being that of the Pope, but as that of the Council.' Repeatedly does our author treat Firmus as the mouthpiece of the Synod (pp. 70, 78), and so makes the Synod 'distinctly and emphatically claim to have executed the sentence of Pope Celestine,' whereas Firmus was only a leading member. As a sample of minute carping, we may observe that Dr. Bright is blamed for omitting, in a brief reference to the speech of Theodotus, the presence of the legates, and making him say that Celestine's letter showed his zeal, whereas Theodotus says, '*you* showed.' Dr. Bright was condensing, not translating; and the legates were present as bearers of the letter.

² Socrates's assertion (quoted in p. 86) seems to grow out of his misconstruction of Julius I.'s words in Athan. *Apol. c. Arian.* 35; cf. Soc. ii. 8, 17. By the way, Dr. Rivington says, 'The Greek historian *had* said that it was not lawful to make canons . . . contrary to the judgment of the bishop of Rome.' But Socrates's History was not published until at least eight years after the Council.

remarks, the Council in its first session had 'practically taken a different view, and introduced a fresh examination in order to prove Nestorius to be heretical.' True, Hefele adds that the Council now, 'partly by silence, partly expressly,' gave their adhesion to what he calls 'the papal view'; although Celestine's own words, already quoted, point in a different direction. But first, it is impossible to suppose that the bishops were implicitly owning that the 'fresh examination' of the case had been irrelevant, and in fact *ultra vires*; next, they had already told Theodosius that they had been 'under the necessity of discussing the subject of the faith';¹ thirdly, when in the same letter they 'commend' Celestine as having 'anticipated' them in giving sentence against Nestorius, they clearly do not, as our author thinks, 'date' the condemnation from that event, for they say just before, 'therefore *we* performed a canonical deposition of him'; fourthly, in writing to Celestine, they refer indeed to his having 'justly condemned' Nestorius, but they lay chief stress on their own proceeding, their citations, and their examination of Cyril's and of Nestorius's language, as leading up to the 'just sentence of deposition' which *they* had pronounced, with the effect of 'overthrowing an impious heresy.'² But what of the language held by the legate Philip, in speeches to the Synod, on the dignity of Rome? Obviously a legate would think himself bound to magnify his master's position, and cannot, any more than his master, be considered an independent witness.³ But then Dr. Rivington sings *Io Triumphe* at what he considers the endorsement of that language by the Synod as a body. Now what does Philip say? First, he says that they 'know that Peter is the head of the whole faith, or even of the Apostles'; and in the subsequent session, that 'everybody in all ages has known that Peter, being *princeps* and head of the Apostles, and pillar of the faith, and foundation of the Catholic Church,'⁴ received from

¹ Mansi, iv. 1237 (ἀναγκαίως). Dr. Rivington (p. 88) refers to Mansi as quoting the remark of Baluze that 'if Baronius had seen Celestine's *communitorium* to the legates' (see it in Mansi, iv. 556), 'he would have been able to say still more confidently that the legates were sent, *not* that the case of Nestorius should be subjected to a fresh examination, but to see that the sentence already passed was executed.' On this showing, then, the Council did that very thing which Celestine had wished to prevent.

² Mansi, iv. 1332. They address 'Celestine, bishop.'

³ 'We can but smile when Romish divines, who have undertaken to adduce evidence in proof of the papal claims, tender to us the assertions of Popes, or of papal legates, or of Roman presbyters' (Salmon, *Infallibility of the Church*, p. 404).

⁴ We need not say that here Philip (doubtless knowing no better)

Christ the keys of the kingdom, with power to loose and bind sins, and that up to this time and always he lives and exercises judgment in his successors,' including Celestine as now 'holding his place.' Here then, we are told, is 'plain teaching concerning Papal Supremacy,' not stated '*as an obiter dictum*, but made the pivot upon which the whole action of the legates hinged.' So we have now got beyond 'primacy'; but is this 'teaching' the whole Roman doctrine? It says nothing, for instance, on the crucial point, whether spiritual jurisdiction is derived to all bishops from the See of Peter alone. Dr. Rivington, we presume, holds that Peter alone *possessed* the keys, and that the other Apostles had to go to him for the use of them when they required it—and he certainly holds that the like relation obtains between the Pope and all the bishops who are bishops 'by the grace' of his See. If Philip meant to impress this view on his hearers, why did he not express it? The Eastern Church, we know, has never accepted it;¹ and now as to the attitude of the Council in regard to Philip's words. No protest was made, says Dr. Rivington; and he infers that 'silence gave consent.' This is a precarious form of the argument *ex silentio*. To assume that public men in that age mentally committed themselves to every assertion made by persons of dignity whose support was valuable for their object, and whose words they heard without reclamation, is to apply a strict modern standard of honour and candour to social conditions which made diplomatic reserve a part of that 'economy' which was a standing resource in Greek life. But Dr. Rivington urges that Philip's language was explicitly approved by the Council. Let us see. The main part of his speech is laudatory of the action of the Council in citing Nestorius, and of its sentence as regular, and as representing a virtually œcumenical resolution: 'therefore let Nestorius know that he is alien from the communion of the priesthood of the Catholic Church,' as if he was not properly alien from it before. The other legates made shorter speeches, professing to be sent as Celestine's 'agents' and to follow his regulations, but referring also to the synodical procedure. Then Cyril says that the legates who 'repre-

assumes an interpretation of Matt. xvi. 18 for which no *consensus patrum* could be adduced. Dr. Rivington repeatedly (pp. 141, 169, 319) quotes these words in such a way as to suggest that they were adopted by the Council: 'At the Council of Ephesus East and West had agreed in the position that,' &c. 'The East to a man believed that,' &c.

¹ It is just in Dr. Rivington's manner to say, 'As regards universal jurisdiction, *we have seen* that the Ephesine fathers admitted this in the Apostolic See' (p. 112).

sent the Apostolical See *and the whole synod of the West*,¹ have carried out what Celestine had already prescribed, and have assented to the decision of the Synod against Nestorius; let them therefore sign the minutes, in token of canonical agreement with us all.² One of the legates replies, that 'in accordance with the synodical acts, they cannot but do so.' And then the Council says, 'Since the legates have spoken *ἀκολούθως*,³ let them make good their own promise by signing': which they do, one of them professing to 'assent on all points to the just judgment of this holy and *Œcumenical Synod*.'

In regard to the condemnation of John of Antioch, Dr. Rivington holds that it was the legates' presence which made it regular for the Council, had it so pleased, to depose John. Yet he adds that 'they would have had that right, if assembled for the purpose of dealing with it [? him], without the legates,' *i.e.* as members apart from their head (p. 102). We must observe that in the Council's letter to Celestine the reference to the legates as 'sitting with us' is simply brought in to enhance the audacity of John in excommunicating occupants of 'the greater Sees,' which must include Ephesus, because John's synod directed its sentence against Cyril and Memnon.

Next, as to the prohibition of any other Creed than the Nicene, in connexion with an utterance from Rome. We agree with Dr. Rivington on the verbal purport of that prohibition; we believe that 'any other' (*ἑτέραν*) must be taken literally; but we must observe that the Creed in question was the original Nicene, not (as our author says by a strange oversight) the (so-called) 'Constantinopolitan recension.'⁴

¹ Philip had noticed this point, but Cyril lays stress on it.

² 'The legates *require* that the report of the Acts should be submitted to their inspection' (Rivington, p. 78). Turn to the original: 'We ask that you will cause us to be informed as to what has been formally ruled (*τετύπωται*) by your blessedness' (the Council). Or: 'Although it may be superfluous, we ask that the minutes which have been read in your synod may be again read to us.' The bishop of Ephesus then says, 'Nothing hinders compliance with the request of,' &c.

³ This adverb, as before in the session, means 'suitably,' and here refers to the acceptance of the synod's judgment, which was what the synod expected. Dr. Rivington tries to bring in a reference to the 'Petrine' opening of Philip's speech by italicising Cyril's and the Council's references to Philip (pp. 83, 85). But clearly they mention Philip after his colleagues as a presbyter, who yet has his place with them; so in the letter to Celestine, 'Arcadius, and Projectus, and with them the most pious presbyter Philip' (Mansi, iv. 1336).

⁴ Dr. Rivington says (p. 106) that in the sixth session 'the Creed in its Constantinopolitan form' was 'made the only Creed for use in the reconciliation of heretics.' We are amazed at this statement. It would

But Dr. Rivington tries hard to find a dogmatic 'decree' of Celestine himself as included in that 'right definition of the faith' (p. 107) which Cyril and Memnon say that the Council was assembled to 'confirm by a common decision.'¹ Where is there such a decree? Neither in Celestine's letter to Nestorius, nor in his letter to the Church of Constantinople, do we find more of doctrinal statement than the mention of 'Christ our God,' or of His 'virginal birth' and 'His Godhead.' There is at the end of the latter a warning addressed to Nestorius, entitled in the Acts 'definition,' but a 'definition' in the sense of a prescribed condition: 'unless you do so and so, you will incur such and such penalties.' As to the few quotations made by Celestine in his own synod, they were not presented as a test to Nestorius, nor brought before the Council at Ephesus. In short, the 'establishment of the right definition of the faith' consisted in the 'comparison' of Cyril's teaching with the Creed as a standard,² which took place quite early in the first session, and some time before the reading of Celestine's letter to Nestorius.

Before leaving this Council, we may notice the singularly close parallelism between some of its language in the decree in the case of Cyprus *v.* Antioch, and certain words in a letter of the African bishops written to Celestine seven years before, at the end of the case of Apiarius:

Africa.

'Lest we should seem to be introducing into the Church of Christ... *fumosum typhum sæculi*.'

Ephesus.

'Lest under the guise of priestly (= episcopal) action there should creep in the vanity (*τὶφος*) of secular authority.'

The Africans in their remonstrance were alluding to a recent apprehension that clerical agents sent to enforce a papal order might procure the support of the civil and military have been strange if the Council had then departed from Cyril's line by recognizing that 'form' of its Creed (see Cyril, *Ep.* 3 to Nestorius, 3; *Adv. Nest.* i. 8), or, indeed, from their own (see the references in the first session to the Creed of 'the 318'); but, in fact, it was the *original* Nicene Creed which, at the opening of this session, was read, and declared to be 'sufficient' (Mansi, iv. 344). It was the Fourth Council which placed the 'Constantinopolitan' form beside the Nicene (Mansi, vii. 112).

¹ Mansi, iv. 1308.

² *Ibid.* iv. 1237 (the first letter of the Council to Theodosius). Dr. Rivington appeals to Photius and Eulogius for the statement that the phrases 'Theotocos' and 'Hypostatic Union' were dogmatically sanctioned at Ephesus. These writers mean that the acceptance of Cyril's teaching involved this sanction. The second phrase does not occur in Celestine's words, although its idea does. Had this speech been a 'decree' for the whole Church, would it not have been preserved entire?

tary powers. The Council is thinking of the possible intrusion of some bishops into territories not originally belonging to their Sees. No doubt the immediate occasion was the claim made by the See of Antioch over the Church of Cyprus; but Dr. Rivington is equally certain that the passage alludes to Juvenal's 'attempt in this very Council to encroach on the province of Antioch.'¹ He descants in an edifying manner on the 'lust of power, and attempts to extend their jurisdiction, on the part of the more important Sees in the East.' Certainly 'the danger of worldly pride in ambitious projects,' wherever present, would suggest protests and safeguards. Of course it was wholly absent from the powerful See of Rome; 'successors of' the Fisherman would not yield to such a mundane temptation; there can be no significance in the secular grandeur which, as surrounding Damasus, provoked grave criticism on the part of a pagan historian,² and sarcasms on the part not only of the pagan Prætextatus, but even of the great St. Basil;³ and Socrates had no warrant for saying, in reference to Celestine himself, that 'the Roman See, like the Alexandrian, had begun to transgress the limits of episcopal action, and advance' to what he brands as *δυναστεία*!⁴ The coincidence between the two passages, however it may be explained, is at least remarkable; and for us its interest lies in the fact that the Third Council was led to insert in its records what would stand in after-times as a witness against the spirit of Papal domination. Only fourteen years elapsed before it received a signal illustration in that edict which Leo the Great, unhappily for his true fame, procured from the young Valentinian III. (in fact, from his regent-mother) for the subjection of the Gallic Church to the Roman See, *à propos* of the case of Hilary of Arles.⁵

¹ Yet a bishop of *Jerusalem*, aiming at what Leo calls the 'principatus' or primacy of Palestine, could make out a specially fair case. By 'province,' of course, Dr. Rivington means patriarchate, which is rather a different matter.

² Ammianus, xxvii. 3. 14.

³ A few years after Basil had pictured Damasus as 'sitting aloft with his head in the air, and thinking that arrogance was dignity,' and had complained of 'the Western superciliousness' (*Epp.* 215, 239), a Council of Milan gravely and gently disclaimed the 'ambition' and high-handedness attributed by Easterns to Westerns (St. Ambrose, *Epp.* 13, 14). But Damasus had a much better side, of which Basil knew nothing. See his inscriptions, and Jerome, *Ep.* 35.

⁴ Soc. vii. 11. 'In dominationem,' Valesius. Socrates is referring to Celestine's oppression of the Novatians in Rome itself.

⁵ The 'Constitutio Valentiniani,' reckoned as Leon. *Ep.* 11, July 8, 445. Leo wished, as we shall see, to dominate the East by means of a General Council in Italy.

Dr. Rivington makes capital out of two letters written by Celestine in the March of 432. In one he tells the bishops who had sat in the late Council that St. Peter's solicitude is universal, and says that the Apostolic See has always looked into many [subordinate] points of similar cases; in the other, he tells the clergy and people of Constantinople that while Nestorius was misleading his flock Peter had come to their aid: quite in the papal *modus loquendi*. But when our author asserts that in the second letter Celestine 'treats his own sentence and its execution by the Council as one' (p. 117), we must answer that this is just what he does *not* do. He describes, somewhat rhetorically, his action in the August of 430, takes credit for not having acted precipitately, and then proceeds, in effect, thus: Afterwards, Nestorius 'challenged an inquiry by bishops'—became 'petitor synodi'; but when the synod met he dared not face it, and thus, 'tandem in sacerdotibus suis Sanctus, sicut semper, Spiritus vivens, unus *in omnibus*, statuit quod omnibus subveniret.'¹ No words could more distinctly ascribe the final settlement to the General Council; and Dr. Rivington overlooks them.

We must now say something about the 'Latrocinium' chapter in this story. At the very close of Flavian's local synod Eutyches muttered an appeal to 'the synods of Rome, Egypt, and Jerusalem.' Why, on papal principles, did he not openly, and before the proceedings were ended, appeal to Leo as 'monarch' of the Church? A papalist who is satisfied with Flavian's second letter to Leo, as sufficiently dutiful to the 'monarch,' would seem to be thankful for rather small mercies. No doubt Flavian writes deferentially, as to the 'first' bishop in Christendom, highest in rank and influence; but he assumes that his synod's decision was all right, was 'canonical,' and requests Leo to 'decide with' it accordingly.² If, after the outrages at the Latrocinium, Flavian, in a recently discovered letter to Leo (on which Dr. Rivington lays stress), emphasized Leo's dignity as successor or the 'princeps' of the Apostles,³ we cannot wonder that, in his extreme need of

¹ Mansi, v. 276.

² Συμφηφισασθαι (*suffragari* in the Latin version) does not suggest the idea of a supreme judge validating the sentence of an inferior; nor can that sense be here imposed on it by the fact that in another context the verb is used of 'Almighty God' (p. 138)!

³ Doubtless the term 'princeps,' in the imperial times, was used for the Emperor; but this sense stands fifth in the series of senses of the word in Lewis and Short's *Latin Dictionary*. When it is utilised by Romanists, it commits them to the theory that St. Peter was the sovereign of St. Paul or St. John. Elsewhere the 'principatus in episcopatu divinae fidei,' ascribed to Leo by Marcian (*Ep.* 73) is glossed as 'sove-

help, he should do all he could to obtain it from the chief Patriarch in the hierarchy, whose seat he, like all others in his time, believed to have been actually occupied by St. Peter; and he took care to associate with Leo, in this appeal, 'the universal synod that was under him,' *i.e.* a synod that could really represent the West.¹ Leo had already, in a letter to the Council which had been imperially summoned to meet at Ephesus—a step which, he wrote to Flavian, was 'manifestly unnecessary,' but to which he had to accommodate himself—assumed that the Emperor's motive had been to obtain an interpretation of St. Peter's confession through St. Peter's own See, *i.e.* from Leo himself; and even Dr. Rivington, with all his enthusiasm for 'the lion,' seems troubled with a surmise that this was, perhaps, a little too strong.² But it must be plainly said that Leo, with all his excellence as theologian and Christian preacher, was so far from being 'the most accurate of men' on all subjects, that he seems to have known no scruple where the claims of his own See were even indirectly concerned.³ He brings them in at every turn, and harps on them with a sort of feverish insistence. He prompted Valentinian's unverifiable assertion that a 'sacred synod,' in addition to 'St. Peter's merit' and 'the dignity of the Roman City,' had established the primacy of his see,⁴ in order that '—or 'with the result that'—'no one should presumptuously attempt anything *illicitum præter auctoritatem sedis istius*,' implying that such attempt would be of itself 'unlawful'; which, if the

reignty over others in regard to the faith' (p. 200). It simply means that Leo, as holding the see which ranked first, had a corresponding pre-eminence of interest in the guardianship of the faith, and a right to be first addressed (as the next clause has it) when that faith was concerned.

¹ Dr. Rivington contracts the synod referred to into a mere 'cabinet council' of the 'ecclesiastical monarch' (as throughout he regards the Pope), by which the West could therefore be bound (p. 172). This notion does not appear either in Cyril's words already referred to, or in Flavian's appeal. And see St. Ambrose (*Ep.* 13. 4, 7) on the rights of 'Westerns' in general.

² In p. 140 he thinks Leo must have had some 'foundation for the statement'; on p. 168 he says it was 'an *interpretatio benigna* of the Emperor's desire for a Council' (!)

³ Thus he ventures to tell not only Anatolius (*Ep.* 106) but Pulcheria (*Ep.* 105) that the canon of Constantinople had for many years been ineffective; on which Tillemont remarks, 'He could have known but little of what took place in the East' (xv. 701). But when he meant 'It ought to have been ineffective,' he took the liberty of saying that it *was* so—on the chance of not being contradicted; in which case the assertion might be 'not ineffective' for the future.

⁴ Pope Gelasius (*Ep. to Anastasius*) refers to a 'series of canons of the Fathers' as 'establishing the authority of the Apostolic See.' It was convenient thus to deal in generalities.

allusion is to an incorrect Latin version of the sixth Nicene canon, or even to three Sardican canons, is a gloss which goes 'far and away' beyond the original. But on the Sardican canons we must say a word or two. Rome, in a dispute with the African Church, had claimed an appellate jurisdiction in the case of priests, as sanctioned by Nicæa; the African bishops had ascertained by inquiry in the East that the claim was unsupported by the genuine Nicene canons, and proof of this had been sent to Rome in 419. Yet, thirty years later, Leo told Theodosius that the Nicene canons implied this jurisdiction!¹ A man who could thus deal with facts and evidence could hardly be a safe witness in his own cause. To say that in his Petrine-Papal view he did *not* substantially go beyond the general tone of patristic teaching is to maintain what any *catena* on that subject would confute;² and to

¹ *Epp.* 43. 3; 44. 3. Dr. Rivington says that this (p. 185) 'may point to matters on which the *Nicene fathers agreed*, but which were not embodied in definite canons until the Council of Sardica met and the necessity for such promulgation of *Nicene principles* had been shown by the Athanasian conflicts.' This is a typical sample of the 'assert and assume' method. Is there the slightest warrant, in the Nicene documents or in the history of the Nicene Council, for suggesting that its members 'agreed upon,' or that its 'principles' involved, a system of appeal to Rome? Absolutely none; all that we know excludes such a notion. Our author cannot build so much as this even on the unsafe ground of the Roman reading of one Nicene canon—as to which more presently. But he goes further, and remarks that Leo's 'emphatic assertion that "the decisions of the canons at Nicæa," of which the canons of Sardica to which he referred formed part, had been "established throughout the world," shows that the African troubles about these Sardican canons had ended well, and the Church had set her seal on the term 'Nicene' being applied to those canons.' So, if Leo makes an assertion, it is 'the Church' that speaks through him! And what will our author's Roman Catholic readers, including, as the preface says, some who are not scholars, understand by 'the African troubles'? Later on Dr. Rivington speaks with a bold simplicity of 'the Constantinopolitan development of the original Nicene Creed, which we now call the Nicene Creed simply, just as the Sardian [*qu. Sardican*] canons were *always* called Nicene' (p. 287)!

² Dr. Rivington refers to two former Popes, saying that Leo 'in the whole conduct of the Eutychian controversy did not go one whit beyond St. Julius,' who 'claimed,' on the ground of 'a Petrine tradition, that a bishop of Alexandria must be judged from Rome'; and that Innocent had said as much as Leo without being thought by St. Augustine to innovate (p. 190). Now, first, we want other than papal testimony for papal claims. Next, the synodical letter of Julius, to which, as contained in Athanasius's great *Apology*, our author refers us, shows that he expressly distinguished the special case of an Alexandrian bishop from that of bishops in general, saying in regard to the latter, 'Word should have been written to us all, that so a just decision might come *from all*.' And Innocent I. (in the received Roman fashion) had strained the African expressions about the *auctoritas* of his see to mean more than they implied, as if they recognized in him a final authority. St. Augustine

plead that a man so good in many respects could not be ambitious from an official standpoint, could not be infected by the love of power for power's sake, is to contradict a whole array of too significant experiences, and to ignore the complexity of human motive-forces, and the peculiar intensity of passion when 'obliged to act under a religious disguise.'¹ The truth is that the spirit of old Rome—the instinct *regere imperio populos*—had entered, as it were, into Leo's blood. Some other great ecclesiastics have been by nature 'rulers of men'; but in them the imperious tendency has been met and restrained by a large measure of qualities which, to say the least, are not conspicuous in Leo's public conduct—by considerate equity, 'gentleness, sympathy, and experience of suffering'—the qualities which shine out in St. Athanasius.²

Dr. Rivington holds that Leo's successes in the Eutychian struggle could not have been achieved by a Bishop of Rome who was less than a Supreme Pontiff or ecclesiastical sovereign. We, on the contrary, hold that if such had been his acknowledged position, he would have escaped the checks which in fact he met with. On the Vatican hypothesis, he was known throughout East and West as the final authority in teaching and governing both bishops, clergy, and laity: for instance, he had, as supreme ordinary, a plenary jurisdiction in Egypt, which could override at his mere will the ordinary jurisdiction of the Alexandrian 'Pope.' If so—and if, as our author confidently infers from the uncontradicted words of a legate,³ 'the East to a man believed' that Leo's exercise of jurisdiction was that of St. Peter himself (p. 169, cp. p. 141)—how could an Eastern Council of some 130 bishops allow Dioscorus to oust Leo's legates from the presidency, and simply to suppress his letter addressed to itself⁴—and this

and his colleagues were not called upon to notice this 'adroit' inference, when the matter in hand was to secure Rome's support of the doctrine of grace as against Pelagianism. They had already pointed out to Innocent what he ought to do—*i.e.* to 'anathematize the error.'

¹ Mozley, *Univ. Sermons*, p. 93. Cf. Liddon, *Univ. Sermons*, ii. 201. On p. 327 Dr. Rivington refers to 'human nature' in the bishops of Constantinople. Did it not exist also in the bishops of Rome?

² See Newman, *Historical Sketches*, iii. 339. Leo actually said that the execution of Priscillian had been of 'good service' to the Church (*Ep.* 15). Contrast him here with St. Martin.

³ In p. 385, professing to show what 'the fathers' at Chalcedon did, he begins by quoting two legates.

⁴ In p. 182 Dr. Rivington makes Leo say that if his letter had been read at Ephesus, 'the tumult would have been quieted by the manifestation which, inspired divinely (*divinitus inspiratam*), we have received,' &c. Surely some words have here dropped out; Leo wrote, 'manifestatione purissimæ fidei quam, divinitus,' &c. (*Ep.* 44. 1).

too before the scenes of terrorism had begun? Would an 'ecclesiastical monarch,' backed up by a Western emperor and his regent mother, have failed so completely with a pious Eastern emperor as Leo failed with Theodosius, when he entreated, after the Latrocinium, that a new Council might be held in Italy, so that, as Valentinian is made to say, Leo himself might be 'in a good position for judging about the faith and the bishops'?¹ A pretty broad hint, given through an imperial medium. We are told (p. 196) that in Theodosius's reply to Valentinian, 'the jurisdiction of the See of Peter is in no way denied,' though 'its exercise is in this instance eluded.' But there is not a word which acknowledges it as extending over the East; Leo is simply referred to as 'the most reverend patriarch' whose 'petition' to Valentinian was grounded on misinformation, and might be set aside as such. Of course it was the imperial writer who was here misinformed.

As Gibbon says, the stumbling of Theodosius's horse, in July 450, at once changed the whole situation. His sister Pulcheria, already Augusta, who was orthodox on the Eutychian question, became sole sovereign of the East, but, by espousing Marcian, gave her realm an Emperor. The new sovereigns took for granted that Leo still, as in their predecessor's reign, wished for a new Council. But Leo had grown cool on the subject. He learned that Marcian meant

¹ Leon. *Ep.* 55. Valentinian was still, as Gibbon says, in 'supine lethargy' under his mother's tutelage. In the latter part of 449 Leo had written in a 'suppliant' tone to Theodosius (*Ep.* 44, 54), and to Pulcheria (*Ep.* 45), and early in 450 had petitioned Valentinian, his wife, and his mother, to use their influence with Theodosius. Galla Placidia says that he could hardly speak for tears; whereupon Dr. Rivington reminds us of 'the tears of St. Paul' (p. 183). Imagine a comparison between Leo's temperament and that of the Apostle of supernatural sympathy! Dr. Rivington adopts the Ballerini's view that the Latin form of the Western imperial letters is an incorrect version from the Greek. This helps him to make Valentinian say that antiquity yielded to the Roman bishop 'the episcopal rule over all,' as the Greek has it, τὴν ἐπισκοπὴν, the Latin being 'principatum sacerdotii' (p. 192). But further, Dr. Rivington tries to make Theodosius a party to Valentinian's 'constitution' about papal authority. He assumes that the two Emperors would, 'as a matter of course,' be agreed in what ran in their joint names (p. 205). By no means, when Valentinian was legislating for the West, and addressing Aetius, his own Master of the Soldiery, on the affairs of the Church in Gaul. So Marcian's letters to Leo before and after the Council of Chalcedon, though dated at Constantinople, ran in Valentinian's name as well as his own. So Symmachus, as prefect of Rome, had addressed his 'report' to Theodosius I. and Arcadius *pro forma*, as well as to Valentinian II. in fact. Nor did Theodosius II. in 449-50 act as if he believed Leo to be what Valentinian's rescript had called him, 'the ruler of the *universitas*' of Christians.

to choose the place of the Council,¹ whereas he himself, as Marcian must have known through Pulcheria, had urged that it should be held in Italy. He took advantage of the fact that the West was now being disturbed by barbaric inroads to deprecate the holding of any Council;² but Marcian had made up his mind that a Council there should be, and not in Italy but in the East; and Leo, as in the summer of 449, made the best of an unwelcome situation.³ Here, then, on our author's showing, we have the 'ecclesiastical monarch' entreating that his subjects may not be ordered by the temporal monarch to meet for despatch of ecclesiastical business at a given time; the temporal monarch holds to his purpose, and the ecclesiastical monarch, with unconcealed annoyance, has to give way. To be sure, he had compensations. Marcian and Pulcheria most naturally assumed that his influence would be prominent in a Council intended to vindicate that truth of which he himself, by his 'Tome' to Flavian, had been the great champion, and that the bishops, when assembled, would keep to the doctrinal lines which he had traced.⁴ And as the antecedents of Anatolius, the new Bishop of Constantinople, had been not a little suspicious, and Leo's countenance was for him peculiarly important, it was all the easier for Leo to take a somewhat authoritative tone towards him, and to associate him with his own envoys for the arrangement of terms on which bishops who in the Latrocinium had yielded to Dioscorus might be admitted to Catholic communion.⁵ Of the reception of his 'Tome' we will speak further on. When the Council met at Chalcedon,

¹ So Marcian wrote to him, *Ep.* 76, November 22, 450. Leo's next letter (April 13, 451) is extremely brief (*Ep.* 78), and not until June 9 does he state his objection to an immediate Council, and that with some positiveness (*Ep.* 83). He did not then know that Marcian had already summoned the bishops (May 17).

² *Ep.* 83. As Dr. Rivington says, 'Attila was on the war-path.' See Hodgkin, *Italy and her Invaders*, ii. 118. Still, if 'the West was always sufficiently represented at a Council by the papal legates' (Rivington, p. 202: on what ground is this asserted?), that difficulty could have been easily got over. Leo, indeed, does not make this claim for his legates; he implies that such a Council ought to include '*plurimi episcopi* even from distant provinces' (*Ep.* 94, and cp. *Ep.* 89).

³ *Ep.* 89, 90, 91, 94 (June and July). Fifty years later, Pope Gelasius had the audacity to write, '*Sedes apostolica . . . ut synodus Chalcedonensis fieret, sola decrevit*' (Mansi, viii. 55).

⁴ 'Te auctore,' *Ep.* 73; so in *Ep.* 76 he hopes that the bishops will, '*sua dispositione*,' set forth what may profit Christianity, as Leo, in accordance with ecclesiastical rules, '*definivit*.' If it were worth while, one might observe that '*dispositio*' is used in imperial determinations, (*Ep.* 33. 1; 90. 1).

⁵ Anatolius was to act with Leo's legates in this affair (*Ep.* 80. 2).

a question arose as to the position of Dioscorus. The Roman legates, to whom the first place among the bishops was conceded,¹ had been instructed to insist that he should not sit as a member of the Council; and they went so far as to demand that he should not even remain in the church; 'they would go out unless he was sent out.'² They had to give up this point, but the commissioners ruled that Dioscorus should sit in the middle, as being accused—which was in accordance with an intelligible principle, for the Council was, by hypothesis, a body of judges.³

Presently came a scene with Theodoret. We must look back nearly two years; he had appealed to Leo—as two other letters of his show, to Leo as presiding in a synod of Western bishops—against the sentence passed upon him at the Latrocinium. We gladly recognize Dr. Rivington's 'free' admission that as 'he was in distress, and disposed to lean on any arm that was likely to support him, this may be thought to discount somewhat his expressions of loyalty to Rome.'⁴ But 'loyalty' is too strong a word. He ascribes

¹ Leo had said that it was 'befitting' that Paschasinus, bishop of Lilybæum, should 'preside over the synod in his stead,' *Ep.* 89.

² The Roman recklessness of assertion was here exhibited by one of the legates, who said that Dioscorus had dared to hold a synod without the sanction of the Apostolic see, '*which had never been done*, nor was it lawful to be done.' Evidently the legate had never heard of St. Cyprian's synods, nor of the Alexandrian of 362. And he forgot that Leo had not only sent the Tome to be read at that synod, but had actually addressed *Ep.* 33 'sanctæ synodo quæ apud Ephesum convenit.'

³ It is a pure assumption that the commissioners were here simply bowing to a papal order, or, as it is not very gracefully worded further on, that Dioscorus was 'put in the dock by the order of the Bishop of Rome' (p. 256). As for the legate's talk about Rome being 'the head of all Churches,' the phrase is too vague to have any argumentative value. Dr. Rivington (p. 254), understands the fourth of certain brief speeches by the imperial commissioners in Mansi vi. 581 to be addressed, not to the legate Lucentius, as Hefele unhesitatingly takes it, but to Dioscorus, so that it would mean, 'If you come here in the character of a judge, you cannot, of course, plead as one on trial; but you *have* so to plead: *ergo* you must not sit as a judge.' *Q.E.D.* All this in a single sentence of two brief clauses! Now the preceding speeches had been addressed to legates; would the commissioners abruptly address Dioscorus, who had not yet said a word? The legates were insisting upon a decision of Leo's *re* Dioscorus; they were, thus far, claiming to judge him, and yet pleading like counsel against him. Clearly *δικαζόμενος* might apply to a pleader for the prosecution as well as for the defence. (Again we observe that Dr. Rivington mistakes Dr. Bright's summary for a translation.) In fact 'the most reverend bishop Dioscorus' appears in column after column as criticizing, bringing out points, and, as Dr. Rivington puts it, 'throwing the blame on others,' as well as defending himself.

⁴ He begins by saying that 'Paul went to the great Peter' to consult him as to the question raised at Antioch. When commenting on

to Leo a 'primacy'¹ founded on the civil greatness of Rome, the faith which 'specially adorned' its Church, and the martyrdoms of Peter and Paul. Why did he take *this* as 'the apex of your advantages,' instead of what the Papalist argument requires—Rome's privilege as the seat of an ecclesiastical monarchy? He does not say that its See is infallible, but offers to abide by its decision, intimating at the same time that if it went against him, he should 'await the just judgment of God our Saviour.' Leo's reply is unfortunately lost; but it is clear that on reading the papers forwarded by Theodoret, he pronounced that in this, as in other cases, the Latrocinium sentence was unjust, and that, therefore, Theodoret ought to be reinstated in his See.² Accordingly Theodoret was introduced, on the double ground of Leo's decision and of a special imperial order. Instantly a minority of the bishops—Egyptian, Palestinian, Illyrian—shouted fiercely against Theodoret: the majority, as we should say, cheered him; but the commissioners, true to their judicial instincts, ruled that he, too, should sit 'in the middle,' without prejudice to any right on his part to urge points against others, or on theirs to attack him;³ and this especially since

Gal. ii. 2, he is truer to the facts, and says that Paul and Barnabas went up to see 'the great Apostles.'

¹ In a companion letter he says (*Ep.* 116) that the Roman see has a *ἡγεμονία* over the Churches throughout the world. Dr. Rivington contends that *ἡγεμονία* may well be = *ἀρχή*. The sense must be settled by the context. In *Ep.* 113 Theodoret speaks of the city of Rome as having *νῦν κρατοῦσαν ἡγεμονίαν*, and giving *τοῖς ἀρχομένοις* a share in her title. Here, no doubt, the word does mean sovereignty; but when Theodoret says that the chief of many proofs of the Roman see's *ἡγεμονία* is its historical freedom from heretical taint, this would clearly be no proof at all of its 'sovereignty,' as Dr. Rivington translates the word, nor would it imply the infallibility of each of its occupants. Theodoret uses *ἡγεμονία* for the (Eastern) empire (*H.E.* v. 6), and for a province (*ibid.* v. 28); but he ascribes to a 'comes privatarum rerum' the *ἡγεμονία* over the Emperor's personal property (*ibid.* iii. 8); on 2 Tim. ii. 22, he hopes to be hereafter, in heaven, under the *ἡγεμονία* of Paul and Timothy; in *Orat. 7 de Provid.* he refers to bishops as having *ἡγεμονία* over the priests, and here, of course, 'to those who believe in episcopacy' (see p. 369) the word has the sense of 'rule.' But what kind of 'rule'? We know from Isidore of Pelusium (*Lib.* iii. *Ep.* 216) that the episcopate was not then regarded as an *ἀρχή ἀνεξέταστος* (which is precisely the present Roman theory of the papacy).

² This is the sense of 'Leo restored to him the episcopate,' Mansi, vi. 589; cp. *ib.* vii. 189.

³ In Mansi, vi. 592, the first part of this sentence is clearer in the Latin than in the Greek; the last words, in both, point to any discussion that might hereafter be started on either side, for or against Theodoret. Dr. Rivington sets aside the received Latin where it speaks of 'accusations'; but the whole drift of the passage means that at the proper time

the Bishop of Antioch appeared to testify to his orthodoxy; so that Leo's decision was not deemed conclusive. To say, then, that Theodore 'took his seat in the Council' as a member, but in the middle as being an accuser (p. 226), is by the hypothesis self-contradictory.¹

While the proceedings against Dioscorus were going on, the memorials were read as coming from certain Alexandrians—three clerics and a layman—against him. They were addressed to Leo and the Council—Leo being styled 'œcumenical archbishop' or 'œcumenical patriarch.' It is this which Gregory the Great mistook for an offering, on the Council's part, of the title 'universal bishop' to Leo. Of course it is quite unreasonable to make the Council responsible for such a mode of address to its virtual president. Dr. Rivington pleads that the petitioners 'in the same breath' called the Council œcumenical. Certainly they did; it was the established phrase. Dr. Rivington says, 'To call Leo

Theodoret should not only have full right to accuse his opponents, but should be open to be accused in turn (as our author himself puts it, 'in promising the Egyptians that they should be allowed to have their say with Theodoret afterwards,' p. 227); so Hefele, that neither he nor his opponents should have 'the right of speech and reply till later.' The Latin is plainer: Theodoret is free to accuse, and open to being accused. Theodoret indeed appears in the Acts of the second session as bishop of Cyrrhos, and as such accepts the Tome in the fourth, though this was strictly irregular, for he was not as yet synodically approved, nor as yet properly a member of the synod. Dr. Rivington says that his presence was objected to only by a 'tiny knot of sympathizers with Dioscorus.' Anyhow, the objectors got their way; for, as the Fifth General Council repeatedly insists (Mansi, ix. 76, 297), the synod did not properly recognize Theodoret until he had anathematized Nestorius. Great weight was given to Leo's decision in his favour, but it was not treated as *per se* conclusive. The legates no more gave the Council's judgment in his case than in that of Dioscorus; for after them the bishops present gave their own, and the commissioners referred to 'the judgment of the holy Council' (Mansi, vii. 192). Observe that after the legates, Anatolius, and Maximus, have spoken, Juvenal assents to the sentence given by Anatolius, and two other bishops of great sees to what has been 'settled by the fathers who have spoken their minds.'

¹ Dr. Rivington argues that to admit him as a competent accuser was to acknowledge his orthodoxy, according to what is called the sixth canon of Constantinople (*i.e.* of the adjourned Council in 382; p. 227). It was, indeed, to acknowledge it provisionally, and the special circumstances might make this the right course. But still this did not carry with it a final determination in his favour. And on Dr. Rivington's own showing, a canon of Constantinople ought to have had no weight; not being confirmed by the 'Holy See,' it was simply invalid. And yet the legates had approved of Anatolius's holding the second place next to themselves, whereupon the bishop of Cyzicus remarked, 'Because you know the canons,' *i.e.* those of 381 (Mansi, vi. 608). Did the legates' 'silence' at this point 'commit' them to a recognition of the Council of Constantinople?

"œcumenical patriarch" involved a doctrine.' What doctrine? Apparently that of the Vatican Council already described, a doctrine which goes far beyond the claims made by Gregory, who not only denounced the adoption of the title by John of Constantinople, but refused it, in any form, for himself.¹ As for those poor Alexandrians, it is absurd to credit them with a serious 'doctrinal' intention. They wanted to gain Leo's favour, and it cost them nothing to lay a 'magnific title' at the feet of his representatives.

But as to the close of the case of Dioscorus. After he had finally refused, in the third session, to appear and meet the charges against him, Paschasinus, as presiding legate, repeatedly asked the Council to express its mind: 'Do you command us to pronounce sentence?' and repeatedly came the answer, 'We agree; carry out the rules' against contumacy. One bishop then observed, that as Dioscorus had abused his presidential power at Ephesus, the legates should now use theirs,² as being assured that the Council would vote (or decide) with them. Then after Paschasinus had again asked, 'What is your pleasure?' and Maximus of Antioch had said, 'We will vote according to your mind,' the legates pronounced,³ in Leo's name as acting 'through them and the

¹ Cp. Greg. *Epp.* v. 18, 20, 43, viii. 30. Dr. Rivington claims Cyril as having called Celestine 'archbishop of the whole world,' but the 'homily' in which this occurs (Cyril, *Opp.* v. par. 2, p. 384) is on internal grounds highly suspicious. Cyril's usual phrase is 'bishop of the Roman Church'; in one passage (Mansi, iv. 1281) he echoes the legate's phrase, 'bishop of the Apostolic see,' but adds 'τῆς Ῥωμαίων.' Paschasinus, no doubt, spoke of Leo as 'archbishop of all the Churches,' or, as the Latin has it, 'Pope of the universal Church' (Mansi, vii. 9); but what then? Later, he even called Leo 'the bishop of the whole Church!' (*ibid.* vii. 189). Dr. Rivington returns to this point in p. 320, and suggests that John meant by his use of the term that all other bishops were but his legates, and that Gregory protested because he had 'detected' this meaning. John was not so foolish as thus to insult his Eastern colleagues; and, after all, he was only using a title which Justinian had assigned to his predecessors. The forger who deceived Thomas Aquinas professed to 'read in (the Acts of) the Council of Chalcedon quod *tota synodus clamavit Leoni papæ, "Leo . . . icumenaycos, id est universalis, patriarcha . . . vivat."*'

² The *κύριος* which Dioscorus is here said to have had belonged to him as president of the Latrocinium Council.

³ Compare the pronouncement as given in the Acts with that which follows Leo's *Ep.* 103. The latter accentuates the dignity of Leo as 'caput universalis ecclesiæ,' and of St. Peter as 'cælestis regni janitor'; but it also emphasizes the function of the synod as now called upon to pass against Dioscorus 'canonicam justitia suadente sententiam.' Neither version makes Dioscorus's excommunication of Leo the climax of his offences; both mention after it his disregard of citations and his communicating with persons lawfully deposed. The notices sent to him and to his clergy lay chief stress on the former of these two points.

Council,' and 'with' the authority of St. Peter, that Dioscorus was deposed: 'therefore let the synod vote on his case in accordance with the canons.'¹ Now comes the question: When Paschasius ceased to speak, was Dioscorus *ipso facto* and once for all deposed? So Dr. Rivington contends; he says that the Council had 'promised to accept the legates' sentence,' and the legates had assumed that 'as a matter of course' they would do so, and simply 'proclaim their adhesion' to it. But what the Council had said was, that they were of one mind with the legates, and would vote, or decide, *with* them.² So they speak, bishop after bishop: many taking care to join Anatolius's name with Leo's; others attributing the sentence, which they severally make their own, to the 'fathers' or chief prelates; many repeatedly describing their own action as that of 'judging' or 'giving sentence,' terms on which, as thus used, our author has to force a non-natural sense in order to bring them into line with the theory of an 'uncontrolled' papal monarchy. According to him, the action of the bishops differed in kind from that of the legates: the legates alone, properly speaking, judged; the bishops 'judged' only in the sense of giving an intelligent 'adhesion' to their judgment;³ they were not, in fact, morally free to do otherwise. A candid Roman reviewer of Dr. Rivington observes that 'the bishops at Ephesus or Chalcedon would not themselves have formulated in their age such a description of a Council.'⁴

And now as to the Tome, the world-famous '28th Letter' of Leo, sent to Flavian for use at the Council which became the Latrocinium, and there suppressed, or withheld, by Dios-

¹ 'Decernat'; the Greek has *ψηφίσεται*. Maximus's phrase was, 'We become *σύμψηφοι* with you.'

² In the subsequent 'signatures' two legates say that they 'define' (*ὁρίσασθαι*) 'together *with* the Council.' Evagrius, after giving the legates' sentence, goes on, 'which being confirmed (*κυρωθέντων*) by Anatolius, and the rest of the bishops' (ii. 18).

³ It is added that the bishops only 'say exactly what would be expected in accordance with the doctrine of papal infallibility' (p. 247). Does that doctrine take judicial acts into its scope? Not as formulated in 1870; although Dr. Pusey quotes the papal encyclical of 1864 as insisting on obedience, on pain of mortal sin, to *all* the Pope's judgments (*Eirenicon*, i. 304), which seems to imply their infallibility.

⁴ *Weekly Register*, l.c. The astounding parallel in *The Primitive Church*, &c. (p. 377), between a Council's relation to a Pope, as 'swelling out his sentence by proclaiming' it, and the relations of Christians to Christ according to Col. i. 24 is repeated in *The Roman Primacy* (p. 148). It reminds one too much of the idolatrous extravagances relating to Pius IX., which Mr. Wilfrid Ward quotes in his volume on *W. G. Ward and the Catholic Revival* (p. 246).

corus. Its date is June 13, 449. It is, we believe, regarded by Ultramontanes as a typical instance of an *ex cathedra* pronouncement or doctrine, although it nowhere professes to be addressed to the whole Church,¹ or obligatory *ab initio* and *proprio vigore* on all Christians. Dr. Rivington's eagerness in claiming for it this character leads him somewhat to under-estimate its intrinsic excellence as a balanced statement of truth. Its theological merits, together with the *prestige* of its author's character and dignity, fully account for the 'acceptance' which it received. To infer from this acceptance that it was believed to be infallible '*qua* Leo's' involves a most glaring *non sequitur*. We want proof of the existence of such a belief; and the iteration of mere assertions or assumptions has argumentatively the value of a cipher, or rather it tells distinctly against the cause with which it is associated. Take Leo's last letter to Theodosius:² he urges that Anatolius should consider what the 'Fathers' have uniformly taught as to the Incarnation, should 'observe the agreement of Cyril's letter with the mind of those earlier teachers, and also should go through the Acts of the Council of Ephesus: and let him *not disdain also* to turn over my letter, which he will find to be in all points accordant with the pious belief of the Fathers.' Is this the language of a Supreme Teacher of all Christians, imposing a work of his own as 'an infallible test of orthodoxy'?³ Or what is more natural, in the circumstances, than that Flavian's own Church of Constantinople, and 'very many bishops' in connexion with it, and that Antiochene

¹ See Dr. Ward, quoted in Dr. MacColl's *Reformation Settlement*, p. 506.

² *Ep.* 69. Compare *Ep.* 120, written as late as June 453: 'What the Lord had formerly defined by our instrumentality He confirmed "universæ fraternitatis irretractabili assensu," &c., and "apostolicæ sedis epistola universalis sanctæ synodi assensu firmata."' Here the final authorization is distinctly attributed to the Episcopate in general. What 'cannot be reviewed' is the act of 'the whole episcopal brotherhood.' Yet Dr. Rivington goes on (p. 389) to speak of 'the definition by the See of Peter, which was of God . . . and was therefore *irreformable*,' in order to bring the words into line with the Vatican decree. That definition (in the Tome) was said to be from 'the Lord,' because it was true to New Testament doctrine, which is the Lord's. So in the same letter, c. 4, that in the Tome 'tanta divinæ auctoritatis testimonia noverimus esse congesta,' &c.

³ Dr. Rivington infers (p. 206) that it had been 'already used as an infallible test of orthodoxy.' He sticks in this word 'infallible' at any point he chooses: the assumption costs him no difficulty. Again he says that Leo placed the Tome 'side by side' with other standards of faith. So far as Leo's context goes, he places it a little lower than the teaching of the 'Fathers,' which are not supposed to form an infallible standard.

patriarchate¹ which was likely, on the whole, to be specially antagonistic to Monophysitism, should welcome the Tome as a godsend, and applaud Leo as the man who had loyally used his great opportunities by saying the right word in a crisis perilous to the faith? So, when at Chalcedon the Commissioners proposed that the Council should frame an 'exposition'² of the faith, while many bishops (evidently fearing that some advantage might be given to Nestorianisers) protested against what they erroneously imagined to be a proposal to alter the Creed, others said that they had adopted the formulary put forth by Leo, *i.e.* the Tome. The Nicene Creed was then read, and Leo's name was joined with Cyril's as having taught in accordance with it: the 'Constantinopolitan' recension of the Creed was next recited, and followed by Cyril's second letter to Nestorius and his letter to John of Antioch. After these the Tome itself was read, and similarly greeted with acclamations, among which are the words, 'Peter uttered this through Leo': that is, Leo has truly interpreted St. Peter's confession. A few difficulties being raised by certain prelates as to passages in the Tome which they thought to savour of Nestorianism, some language of Cyril's was cited in explanation, but time was allowed for further inquiry. In the fourth session the commissioners refer to Leo's letter, and ask whether the Council

¹ *Ep.* 88. 3, dated 24 June 451.

² Dr. Rivington has three pages (pp. 261-263) and a long note (p. 292) on 'the word *exposition*,' the drift of which is to elevate Leo's Tome, as such and from the first, to a rank with the Creed. The reference to 'expositions' (Mansi, vi. 953) he considers to include the Tome. No doubt *ecthesis* is applicable to formularies which are not Creeds. But although the objection urged against a new definition, 'on the ground of the Ephesine rule' (against any 'other' Creed), comes after 'the earlier exclamations,' it is precisely what explains them. For that rule excluded no new exposition *not* professing to be a Creed. The first outcry, 'We will not, we dare not, make a new exposition,' must be read with the second, 'It is not permissible to make another.' Dr. Rivington assumes this last phrase to mean, 'We have no right to do so, being already committed to 'the authoritative decision of Leo.' But *οὐκ ἐξόν* is a plain verbal reference to the prohibitory rule of Ephesus, *ἐρέραν πῶτον μηδὲν ἐξέιναι προσφέρειν* (Mansi, iv. 1361). So far, then, as this objection goes, 'exposition' could only mean a Creed. Therefore it could not include the Tome. Dr. Rivington argues that if, as they profess to believe, the Tome truly interpreted the Creed, 'it is obvious that they could not add to it.' Is it so 'obvious' that a sound comment on a text is incapable of expansion? Dr. Rivington having misunderstood the purport of the exclamation coming after Cecropius's first speech, fails to see what is significant in the second, although he quotes it fairly (p. 265). Cecropius ranks Leo with six 'Fathers' who had 'confirmed' (*i.e.* illustrated and enforced) the faith of Nicæa. Among these Celestine of Rome comes between Cyril and Hilary.

considers the Creed in both forms to agree with it—a phrase which here, as the context shows, must needs mean, whether it is thought to agree with the Creed;¹ and then the legates speak. What an opportunity for proclaiming before that august assemblage that, apart from all comparison with pre-existing standards, a dogmatic letter emanating from the See of St. Peter was, as such, an infallible pronouncement, which could gain no authority from ‘the consent of the Church’!² Alas! the legates miss the occasion: they are content to say that the letter is one in faith with the teaching of Nicæa, Constantinople, and Ephesus.³ And the bishops, one after another, affirm this identity. Repeatedly do they ground their acceptance (whether given previously or at the Council) of the Tome on personal examination in the light of preceding authorities.⁴ But this will be best brought out by

¹ Mansi, vii. 9.

² It is known that the words ‘non autem ex consensu ecclesiæ’ were inserted in the Vatican decree, two days before it was passed, for the more complete discomfiture of the minority. Dr. Rivington seems to go rather ‘near the edge’ when (in p. 380) he says that the Tome was ‘irreformable,’ on the sole ground of its ‘œcumenical acceptance’ by ‘the Church diffused, before the Council met,’ ‘were there no other reason.’

³ In the text of p. 276 Dr. Rivington says that ‘Paschasinus’ here ‘asserted, in the language of the time, the infallibility of the Holy See.’ In a footnote he somewhat ‘climbs down.’ Paschasinus’s words ‘do seem’ to involve a belief in that infallibility. If so, it is closely ‘wrapt up.’ What the legates say is: ‘It is clear, and none can doubt’—what? That the letter is infallible? No, but that Leo’s belief agrees with that of the three Councils: *therefore* his letter stating his belief represents those Councils’ belief, and no other. The premise is not, ‘Leo cannot err,’ but, ‘You all know Leo to be orthodox.’ There is a slight change of construction in regard to the Ephesian ‘definition,’ but it does not affect the sense.

⁴ ‘Not one bishop rests it upon the simple authority of the See of Rome’ (*Chr. Remembr.* April 1855, p. 438). In his *Waymarks in Church History* (p. 229) Dr. Bright had quoted the words of Pope Vigilius to the effect that the fathers at Chalcedon grounded their assent to the Tome on its agreement with the teaching of Nicæa, Constantinople, and ‘beati Cyrilli’ at Ephesus. No, says our author: Vigilius was referring merely ‘to the comparison made in the house of Anatolius,’ for the sake of removing difficulties felt by a ‘few bishops,’ and to the declarations in the fourth session that all the bishops in their perusal of ‘the Tome’ ‘had certified its conformity with the doctrines of the previous councils’ (p. 390). Vigilius’s words will not bear this gloss; see them in Mansi, ix. 473. He does not mention the private explanations given; and he does say that our fathers ‘in Chalcedonensi synodo residentes’ spoke ‘de confirmatione Leonis epistolæ,’ which they ‘believed ought to be received *ita si eam assererent convenire*,’ on condition that—on the understanding that—they could maintain it to agree, &c. Of course the bishops did more than ‘certify,’ &c. They said that *having ascertained* its agreement they accepted it, *i.e.* accepted it *because* of what they had ‘ascertained.’ Dr. Rivington vainly tries to ignore the *causal* import of this ascertainment, as professedly the ground of acceptance.

comparing their language (in only a very few instances, for brevity's sake) with the language of the bishops at the Ephesian Council, which elevated Cyril's letter to the rank of a Catholic standard. Thus—

On Cyril's letter, as agreeing with the Creed—(Mansi, iv. 1140 sqq.)¹

'Since I see [repeatedly] . . .
I find, or have found [repeatedly] . . .
It has been made clear . . .
I perceive . . .
I have ascertained . . .
Having understood . . .'

On Leo's letter, as agreeing with the Creed and with the decisions of Ephesus—(Mansi, vii. 12 sqq.)

'I see [repeatedly] . . .
I have found [repeatedly] . . .
Leo is shown . . .
As far as I can perceive . . .
We have proved [*i.e.* by testing] . . .
I am fully persuaded [repeatedly] . . .'²

The language of conviction, formed on inquiry, as being the basis of adhesion, is as strong in the latter case as in the former. It looks as if the Chalcedonian expressions were actually suggested by the Ephesian. That bishops, not being Eutychians, should accept so valuable an anti-Eutychian formula as the Tome, was assuredly no wonder: the question of real interest is—Did they, or did they not, accept it on papalist grounds? Their own words, taken naturally as they stand, leave no doubt about the answer: and our author himself, in the course of an elaborate note on the Tome, seems to find the 'bed' too narrow for the 'stretching':

'The question of Papal infallibility was not before the bishops *Whether any positive evidence results from all this or not in favour of Papal infallibility*' [here the italics are ours], 'one thing is certain, viz. that there is nothing in the acceptance of the Tome by the bishops which *conflicts with*' [here the italics are his] 'a conviction that the See of Peter was the divinely constituted interpreter of the faith of Peter' (pp. 387, 393).³

¹ The idea of agreement is variously expressed in both cases: *e.g.* 'it agrees, or harmonizes—it is in no way discordant with—it differs in words only—it contains the same faith under different terms (*Eph.*); it agrees in sense—it makes for the same point—it says what is in harmony with—it differs not in meaning' (*Chalc.*).

² It is rather *too* bold to say that 'it was of the last importance to send some of these bishops forth not merely to say, "The Tome *must* be right because it emanated from the Holy See," but, "We can prove it to be right" &c. (p. 277). 'Not merely!' They never say so at all. To represent Anglicans as supposing the bishops to mean, 'We have found to our surprise,' is very poor work. The deputies of an absent bishop testify that he read the Tome, found it to agree, &c., and signed it (Mansi, vii. 23).

³ We need not dwell on the persistent and ultimately successful

On these last words we will say a word or two presently ; but does not the sentence land our author's argument in a bathos ?

At last we come to the twenty-eighth canon.¹ Dr. Rivington leads up to it by a fair account of the 'gradual' but 'natural advance' of the See of the Eastern capital to a position of quasi-patriarchal authority, not granted to it by the canon which in 381 assigned it precedence next after the See of 'Old Rome.' He suggests that at the end of October Constantinople had some advantage in the absence of the prelates of certain important Sees. However, it is undisputed that Aetius, archdeacon of Constantinople, requested the Roman legates to take part in a discussion (which the commissioners had provided for beforehand) on matters affecting his own Church ; and that they, having had this fair warning, declined on the ground that they had no instructions from Leo to that effect, and thereupon quitted the assembly. The commissioners also withdrew, after directing the Council to take up the subject. The canon was then read and passed : its effect was to erect Constantinople into a patriarchal see.²

pressure put by the legates on the great body of bishops to adopt in the 'Definition' formulary the distinct phrase '*in* two natures' instead of the indistinct phrase '*of* two natures.' The legates did well, and (as our author says) 'saved the situation.' But two things are observable : first, the 'State' had to be brought in, and even an imperial order was not sufficient to silence objectors ; and next, the question, 'Will you follow Leo or Dioscorus ?' referred to the previous acceptance of Leo's Tome, which carried with it the substitution of '*in*' for '*of*' (Leo, *Ep.* 28. 3) ; so that the appeal to consistency was irresistible.

¹ The point at issue in regard to the compact between Maximus of Antioch and Juvenal of Jerusalem is whether the salvo, 'if Leo should approve,' is genuine. It is not in the Greek Acts, but the Ballerini contend that a Latin MS. which contains it is '*melioris et accuratioris originis*' than the Latin version which omits it. To us it seems suspicious ; and one would think that if the legates knew of it, they must have quoted it in the Council, instead of urging merely the 'advantageousness of peace.' If it is genuine, the consent of 'St. Peter's Roman see' might have been thought specially important in a matter affecting his 'Antiochene.'

² It recited the third canon of Constantinople as having 'assigned to the see of New Rome privileges equal to those which the fathers had rendered,' or 'awarded, to that of Old Rome ;' it explained this by saying that as the *city* of New Rome had the same privileges with that of Old Rome, it was but right that the *sees* of those cities should be in a similar relation, and 'that the see of New Rome should be magnified in Church matters like that of Old Rome, and rank as second after it.' (Cp. Anatolius in Leon. *Ep.* 101. 4.) Then came the provision that the bishop of Constantinople should ordain (consecrate) the metropolitans (not the suffragans) in the dioceses (aggregates of provinces) of 'Pontus, Asia, and Thrace,' and in districts outside the empire.

Next day the legates reappeared, and protested against what had been done in their absence; and then it appeared that they *had* received instructions from Leo not to allow the (Nicene) rule as to the position of the chief Sees to be impaired by any 'precipitate line of action';¹ so that, having been ordered to prevent, as far as they could, a certain thing from being done, their mode of obeying was to stay away when they knew it was about to be done, and then come back and complain of those who had done it! A shabbier device is not easily conceivable. However, the commissioners direct the legates and the Constantinopolitan clergy to produce the canons on which they respectively rely. Paschasinus then reads a Latin version of the sixth Nicene canon, which, in its first part, contrasts as follows with the received Greek:

Greek.

'Let the ancient customs prevail—those in Egypt and Libya and Pentapolis, so that the bishop of Alexandria may have authority over all, since this [*i.e.* the like] is usual also for the bishop who is at Rome. And similarly both at Antioch, and in the other provinces, let the privileges be preserved to the Churches.'

Latin.

'That the Roman Church has always held the primacy [in Greek rendering, *τὰ πρωτεία*]. Let Egypt also hold [it], so that the bishop of Alexandria may have power [Greek, *ἐξουσίαν*] over all, since this is the custom also for the Roman bishop; and similarly also he who is constituted [bishop] at Antioch; and in the other provinces, let the Churches of greater cities have primacies' [the Greek rendering here agrees with the received text].

According to the Acts, Aetius produced the same canon in Greek, and with it an account of the legislation of the

¹ Dr. Rivington charges Dr. Bright (p. 349) with 'falsely accusing' the legates by describing their excuse as a 'falsehood': his ground is, that whereas Dr. Bright had made them say that they had no instructions about such a matter, their actual words are, that they had 'received no such orders.' Take it so, and what follows? If, when the excuse was given, Aetius could have produced to their faces what one of them read next day as the actual order, would they not have been convicted of such quibbling as amounted to a falsehood of specially mean type? They were ordered to oppose a certain proceeding. How could they oppose it, except by being present when it was about to be mooted? On this command they are then silent, in order to give a colour to their deliberate self-absenting; and then, when they return, they remark with an air of innocence, 'It is said that yesterday after your Excellencies (the commissioners) had gone out, and our Humility had followed, some things were put on the minutes which we think (or, affirm) to be contrary to the canons,' &c.

Constantinopolitan synod of 381.¹ Romanists contend that the reading of the Nicene canon in Greek has probably come into the text by error, because that canon would by no means encourage the aggrandisement of Constantinople; but, granting that the Constantinopolitans would not have volunteered to bring it forward, they might be moved to quote it when a version had just been read which had a very different exordium. Nor would it be deemed necessary to 'clamour' against the discrepancy this exhibited, when there was other work more immediately in hand. Dr. Rivington's attempt to claim Paschasinus's version as representing the original text will probably be thought too venturesome by more cautious advocates of Papalism.² The characteristic assertion of the legates that adhesions which had been given to the new canon in their absence were the result of coercion was denied by prelates one after another; and ultimately the commissioners ruled that 'the primacy (or first place) and the pre-

¹ In what he then read, 'Asia, Pontus, and Thrace are' *not* 'placed under the jurisdiction of the imperial city' (p. 342). They are mentioned simply in the terms of the second canon of Constantinople. Dr. Rivington has confused this with the new Chalcedonian canon, which does, not very ingenuously, represent the jurisdiction now conferred on Constantinople over those districts as logically involved in the earlier grant of simple precedence.

² To non-Roman readers it will seem paradoxical. The first words, 'Quod ecclesia Romana semper habuit primatum,' read like an insertion by some one who did not observe that the primary object of the canon-framers was to secure the authority of the Alexandrian see, and that the Roman was only referred to in the way of illustration as exercising a similar authority over some undefined districts; so that his exordium disturbs the drift of the sentence, and renders the third clause unnecessary. The 'primatus' of which the Latin exordium speaks undoubtedly involves a jurisdiction, but ought, according to construction, to be, not, as Dr. Rivington assumes, 'general,' but parallel to that which should continue to be held by Alexandria, as is indicated in the 'conflate' Prisca version. The suggestion that the present Greek represents an Arian mutilation implies that Arians thus engaged would have left the provision in favour of the see of Alexandria where they found it, whereas their enmity against Athanasius would have made this impossible. But in truth the version now identified by the researches of Mr. C. H. Turner with that brought home by Cæcilian of Carthage from the Nicene Council is decisive against the Paschasinian 'exordium.' It begins, 'Antiqua per Egyptum atque Pentapolim consuetudo servetur' &c. Its heading is, 'De primatibus qui ad quasdam pertinent civitates.' It explains the reference to 'the bishop of the city of Rome' by adding, 'ut in suburbicaria loca sollicitudinem gerat.' It is curious that Paschasinus's Latin implicitly favoured the very principle which he was concerned to oppose; for it read, 'in cæteris provinciis primatus habeant ecclesie civitatum ampliorum,' which would just suit the Church of the Eastern capital. The Greek form of his version agrees here with the received Greek.

eminent honour should be preserved, according to the canons,¹ for the archbishop of Old Rome, but that the archbishop of New Rome ought to enjoy *the same* privileges of honour"; the reason given in the new canon for such privileges—the imperial dignity of the two cities—being rather implied than expressed, and the substance of the canon, with some modifications, being added. The Council by acclamation accepted this 'just decree.' The legates entered a protest, but the commissioners adhered to their decision as 'approved by the whole Synod.'

But our Roman advocate insists on the Synod's letter to Leo. He has no respect for this 'knot of bishops' (among whom is Theodoret) when they pass the obnoxious canon; he even calls them 'adventurers'; but their letter lifts them, in his eyes, into some importance. He strains to the utmost such expressions as 'a beginner of blessings,' 'presiding over the Synod as a head over members,' 'entrusted by the Saviour with the guardianship of the Vine.' He grants that they use diplomatic 'ingenuity'; and to us it seems quite unreasonable to claim literal force for the sonorous phrases of Greek ecclesiastics, who had a point to gain from the presidency of the Synod, himself the bishop of Rome.² Anatolius

¹ If they were here referring to Paschasius's version, they overlooked the point which its context makes clear, that 'primatus' is there used, not for precedency on the one hand, nor (*pace* Dr. Rivington) for a papal 'primacy' of universal 'jurisdiction' on the other, but for such jurisdiction as the chief sees had in their respective districts. The context of the commissioners' speech shows that *they* used *πρωτεία* in its primary and natural sense, for 'precedency,' as explained by the next words, *καὶ τὴν ἐξαίρετον τιμὴν*, a phrase equivalent to *τὰ πρεσβεία τῆς τιμῆς* in the third canon of Constantinople, which Dr. Rivington translates 'honorary precedence' or 'primacy of honour' (p. 321); see the Latin rendering of the speech, 'primatum . . . *cisdem* primatibus honoris,' and Zonaras on that canon, *τὰ πρεσβεία τῆς τιμῆς, ἡτοι τὰ πρωτεία*. So in the Chalcedonian canon under consideration: 'the fathers ἀποδεδόκασιν to the see of Old Rome *τὰ πρεσβεία*, because that city was imperial' (Mansi, vii. 428).

² With the clause about 'the Vine' compare the language of the Fifth General Council, speaking distinctly *apart from the Pope*: 'We who have been entrusted with the duty *ποιμαίνειν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν τοῦ Κυρίου*' (Mansi, ix. 368: a quotation of Acts xx. 28 in one reading). One passage, on which Dr. Rivington much insists, he has misconstrued. He makes the bishops say that Leo was constituted 'interpreter of St. Peter's words' (*i.e.* of his confession of belief, Matt. xvi. 16) by our Lord's 'appointment,' by 'the precept of Him who gave the order to go and teach all nations' &c., Matt. xxviii. 19. But that 'precept' was addressed to *all* the Apostles; and in the Council's letter it is grammatically connected, *not* with Leo's position as 'interpreter,' but with 'the bringing down,' or transmission, of 'the faith' (as thus to be taught) 'even to our time'; which faith Leo has 'preserved, being,' or 'standing forth as, an

was probably the writer of the letter; and when we read in it that the resistance of the legates to the new canon was 'assuredly due to their wish that this advantage also [for Constantinople] should proceed from your forethought,' we may estimate the sincerity of such words by the downright language of Anatolius writing in his own person to Leo six weeks afterwards; 'your legates,' he says, 'not knowing what was your real intention, disturbed the Synod, and grossly insulted myself and the Church of Constantinople';¹ as Marcian puts it, they 'vehemently tried to prevent the enactment in the Synod of anything concerning that Church.'² Finally, the synodal letter requests Leo to 'honour their decision by his own vote' or 'sentence,' claims a 'divine approval' for what has been done,³ and sends it to him for 'his assent and confirmation.'

No doubt Leo's persistent refusal to give what was thus asked for was ere long successful with the authorities of Constantinople.⁴ But let us observe the line which he took. The last words of a legate at Chalcedon had intimated that 'the Pope of the universal Church might give his judgment either as to the injury done to his own see, or as to the subversion of the canons.' Leo, with a statesmanlike cleverness, chose the latter alternative. In several letters (which take a large licence of assertion and imputation⁵), he grounds his objection on the violation of 'Nicene canons' (meaning the sixth, as his legates had read it), and on the wrong done to the dignity of Alexandria and Antioch by the precedence claimed for Constantinople, and also to the rights of 'provincial primacies' and 'metropolitans'⁶ by the juris-

interpreter of Peter's words for all: whence we too, employing you (Leo) as an originator of what was good, . . . displayed the inheritance of the truth to the Church's children.' Verbose enough, certainly; but in few words it means that Leo was raised up to inaugurate, by his Tome, the setting-forth of the right faith against Eutychianism; which, if we date the controversy from Flavian's Council, is true.

¹ *Epp.* 101. 5.

² *Epp.* 100. 3.

³ Dr. Rivington takes this to mean that they felt they could claim divine approval *because* they were dutifully asking for Leo's ratification (p. 372). But what they say is, 'In order that you may know that we have done nothing by way of favour or of animosity, but as guided by a divine approval, we signify to you,' &c.; as if to say, 'Our consciences are clear as to our motives. We can well afford to place our acts fully before you.'

⁴ *Epp.* 115 (March 453) and 135 (May 454).

⁵ *I.e.* as to 'ambition,' 'vanity,' and 'extortion of assents,' &c.

⁶ *Epp.* 106. 2, 5; 129. 3. He uses 'primatus' so as to include metropolitan jurisdictions. It is true that he mentions the supposed Petrine relations of the sees of Alexandria and Antioch, *Epp.* 106. 5.

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diction newly assigned to her. It would require not a little of *sancta simplicitas* to believe that this was Leo's impelling motive; he was manifestly fighting behind this convenient shield against the increasing aggrandisement of Constantinople, and its probable effect on 'the See of St. Peter.'¹ He was obliged to assume, for the purpose of his contention, that all the rulings of Nicæa were 'sacrosanct' and 'inviolable,' as being actually 'ordained by the Holy Spirit':² although he ought to have known that this was virtually to disparage the great doctrinal work of the Council, and that, as a matter of principle, the hierarchical arrangements of one General Council might, under altered circumstances, be legitimately altered by another.³ The argument, however, fell in with the traditional reverence of Easterns for 'the 318,' and induced Marcian first, and then, through him, Anatolius, to give up insisting on the new canon.⁴ Yet Leo's success was, as Hefele admits, rather formal than real: the Greeks might 'even omit the canon from their collection,' but Constantinople did in fact retain the secondary precedence assigned to her in 381, and the patriarchal jurisdiction created for her in 451; and both the canons in question were reaffirmed two hundred and forty years later by the 'Trullan' Council.⁵

In this survey of Dr. Rivington's book many minor points have been necessarily omitted. On the controversial methods employed we make no further comment, except that in all of them one seems to read, 'The Pope has said it, *ergo* history must be found to attest it;' so that the author's whole view of events is coloured by a single preassumption. But one thing must be said by way of summary. He was concerned to show that in the years 430-451, the whole of Christendom knew itself to be subject to an 'ecclesiastical monarch' reigning by Divine right, having direct and plenary jurisdiction over all Churches, exempt from all control save that of his own conscience, and also endowed with a gift of official infallibility, which was wholly independent of any assent on the part of the Catholic body; in other words,

¹ So Gelasius, in Mansi, viii. 18, 53, 58, exhibits a natural and sensitive jealousy of Constantinople. See Salmon, *Infallibility of the Church*, p. 371.

² Cf. *Epp.* 104. 2, 3; 105. 3; 106. 2; 114. 2.

³ Hefele says: 'According to Catholic' [*i.e.* Roman] 'doctrine,' infallibility can be claimed only for the decisions of (Ecumenical Councils *in rebus fidei et morum*, not for purely disciplinary decrees' (Councils, i. 52, E.T.).

⁴ *Epp.* 115. 1 (March 453), and 135. 1, 3 (May 454).

⁵ Conc. Quinisext. c. 36. Rome did not indeed approve any Trullan canons that 'seemed opposed to decrees of Pontiffs' (see Hefele).

that the twofold doctrine of the Papacy, as defined by Pius IX. in the Vatican Council, was *substantially* held by all orthodox Christians, and acted on by the Third and Fourth Œcumenical Synods.¹ This, we say, was the thesis to which the author had committed himself, and which he undertook to establish by the evidence of history, with regard to a period fertile in documents. We leave our readers to answer this question : Has he succeeded—or has he failed ?

ART. II.—THE PHILOSOPHER AS PATRIOT.

The Philosophical Theory of the State. By BERNARD BOSANQUET. (London, 1899.)

MR. BOSANQUET disclaims, in his preface, any originality, does but interpret for a new generation an old and a great tradition. The Greeks discovered it. It sprang full-grown from the brains of Plato and Aristotle. The one clothed it with poetry, the other embodied it in pithy and concise maxims. With them through the ages of despotism or other-worldliness it lay smothered in the dust of libraries, or went abroad only disguised in the garments of Religion. As the heavy hand of the Church was lifted from the life of peoples, as the new-born nations of Europe began to feel their growing vitality, to stir uneasily in their swaddling-clothes, Philosophy, too, recovered her freedom, and opened her wondering eyes on the new world that was forming, scarcely yet conscious of itself.

But Philosophy saw but dimly, feeling her way through perplexed labyrinthine mazes, till she sought at the feet of the old masters teaching and inspiration. Rousseau caught the first glimpse of the light ; Hegel followed the light to its source, carried it forth in his hand, and 'set it on a candle-stick' for the illumination of Prussia and the world. Green carried it to Oxford, the first of a line of British torch-bearers and prophets of whom Mr. Bosanquet is the last and not the least worthy.

The Philosophy is also in its way a Gospel, a Religion. Its students are disciples, its lecturers Evangelists. Justified by faith in the State, men are sanctified in parochial activities

¹ That, the Vatican decrees exclude the idea of positive growth in this doctrine, see Bright, *Lessons from the Lives of Three Great Fathers*, p. xxiii.

and made perfect in civic devotion. The philosopher becomes an alderman, a councillor, a mayor; he founds and blesses institutions; he organizes charity, establishes missions, and preaches the Theory to the poor. The Theory, though rich in mystery for the wise, is, in truth, nothing if not a theory of life—practical, energetic, conceived, born, nursed, it may be, in the study, but formed by Nature to live out of doors.

It is this practical character that alone explains the passionate fervour of love and hate that blazed, and still traditionally blazes, round the persons of the Theory's first modern prophets. It is impossible even now to treat Rousseau with the cool, candid impartiality which is the fashionable instrument for emptying truth of all content, and exhibiting it as a lie. Still anger and fear rail at him, or a loving reverence, such as our author's, waits on his footsteps, and extracts the light of wisdom from the darkest of his utterances. Hegel, to us, is the name of a philosopher notorious for obscurity; naturally, therefore, a source and centre of those interminable wrangles which are to the layman Philosophy's only *raison d'être*, as they are her far-away, inexplicable Olympian delight.

But Hegel in his own generation was a name to conjure with or to curse; and, strangely enough, they that loved Rousseau hated Hegel, for the same Theory that in the one man's mouth made or justified the Revolution, in the other's put Revolution down, and was a crutch for the tottering tyranny of kings. In those days of disintegration the idea and the act, the thought and the deed, lay close to one another; there was no intricate, complex order of organization, through which the idea must slowly filtrate; the feet did not walk in it long after the brain had forgotten it; what the thought conceived at midnight was manifest before dawn in the guillotine or the gaol.

The peculiar hatred felt for Hegel by the Liberals of his time is worthy of our attention. It was the hatred felt by men for renegades and apostates. Philosophy—their sworn friend, 'their sister and brother and mother'—was in the enemy's camp. But it was more. Hegel was Ahitophel; but on the treachery of Ahitophel he grafted the methods of Tartuffe. He built despotism on the principles of Liberty. His premises were Hampden's, his conclusions Strafford's; blessing Freedom, he consoled and exasperated the prisoner and the captive in assuring them that prisons were Freedom's breath and gaols her open air.

Hegel was misunderstood. We may grant it. But the

causes of misunderstanding lay deep. Nearly all men misunderstood him—Liberals and Kings, Christians and Infidels. As many sects fought under his banner as there are parties in a French Chamber—Hegelians of the Right, Hegelians of the Centre, Hegelians of the Left. Political sects, too, they were, and religious, for an apparent or real identity of principle or interest made the cleavage of Religion almost coincident with the cleavage of politics. There must have been something very remarkable in the Philosophy or the Man for elements so contradictory, so antagonistic to unite in claiming it and him for their own. In Religion, for example, he talked like Athanasius; he endorsed the metaphysics of orthodoxy; 'the Son was of one substance with the Father;' 'Arianism was a crude solecism.' The Right had found their champion. The Left were in despair till they perceived that, though the Son were of one substance with the Father, the Father Himself was a Philosophical Abstraction, without parts or passions indeed, but without personality or orthodox substance.

So, again, the Theory of the State follows the lines of the Theory or Ideal of the Church; one by one the definitions and ideas of the Church are adopted, carried out, justified against the conceptions of heresy and Liberalism; it seemed as though the spirit of Hildebrand had possessed the soul of the professor to confound out of Philosophy's own mouth Philosophy's denials. But here, too, it soon became apparent that the orthodoxy was superficial; that the 'fair soul and fair body' of the Church was for Hegel a soul and a body that the Church had stolen, mutilated, disfigured—a soul and a body that he had come to claim for its right owner, to rid of Hebraic garments, to rid even of its supernatural and superfluous Head.

Hegel, therefore, if he was misunderstood, does not appear to have been misunderstood without cause. The minds of men do not run easily to a unity of contradictions. In their plain way they like the same word to stand always for the same notion; they are confused by a mind that is also not mind, by a liberty that is manifest in slavery. And, indeed, they will with difficulty believe that human thought, working on such conditions, with ever so clear an illumination of Philosophy, can really understand itself, will always suspect that to confuse others so persistently can only spring from being one's self confused.

No such storm as raged round Hegel rages in these latter days round Hegel's school of prophets. The Theory would

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be practical if it could ; but practical enthusiasm is running on other lines, and gives it little ear. Its influence is dynamic, silent ; and for that reason 'may have a future.' There are forces that make for its adoption. The decay of religious faith and the need of a substitute for religion open the way for the deification of country and the glorification of patriotism. We may yet once more burn incense to Cæsar. To this Mr. Bosanquet summons us. 'True Patriotism is the everyday habit of looking on the commonwealth as our substantive purpose and the foundation of our lives' (p. 282).

In Mr. Bosanquet's book the reader will find many things that instruct, many things that delight, many things that he is sure, whoever he is, to endorse—acute criticisms, subtleties of interpretation, ethical passion. Indispensable, too, we should say, for the student—so clear, concise, and cut dry for the note-book or the examination—are the determinations. But there are also, as is proper in a prophet of Hegel, many things that are obscure, and many things that when plucked from obscurity will probably repel.

We doubt often, in reading, whether Mr. Bosanquet has in view an ideal or an actual State. He is precise enough. 'To depict what most people call an Ideal State is no more the object of political philosophy than it is the object, say, of Carpenter's Human Physiology to depict an "ideal" man or an angel' (p. 250) ; and 'The ugliest human being—a criminal, a sick man, or a cripple—is, all the same, a human being ; the affirmative, his life, persists, in spite of the defect, and this affirmative is what we are concerned with here' (quoted from Hegel, p. 251).

But precision of statement does not always imply precision of treatment. An Ideal State is, of course, an ambiguity. It may be an Ideal for Ideal men, or the Best possible Polity for actual men, and an Ideal treatment may be repudiated when the latter alone is in view. If from a multitude of States one select two specimens as alone worthy of philosophical curiosity, that may not be an ideal treatment, but it is so near akin to it that the consequences are much the same. For if, *e.g.*, 'the very instrument of all political action is the simple device by which an orderly vote is taken, and the minority acquiesce in the will of the majority as though it were their own' (pp. 4-5), then in Russia, which is a State, there is no political action ; it is not what it ought to be, and Athens or the United States is the ideal. If, too, a State is by Nature, it has a perfect Life, and what else is that but an Ideal ? Or if the very root of all Political obligation

is that 'the Individual will his own nature as a rational being,' and the State is the embodiment and expression of that Real Will, is not that a condition *sine qua non* of the Being of a State? Or if the 'natural' limits of State action are discussed, and certain interferences justified, and others condemned on a theory of the Nature of the State, do we not travel into the region of what ought to be, and leave the region of what is?

Is not the very problem of political philosophy (p. 89) 'to find a form of association . . . by which each uniting himself to all may nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before'—in other words, does it not start from an ideal? Aristotle was a political philosopher and made a collection of polities, distinguishing good from bad, and excluding some States as subversive of polities, not polities at all. Plato was a political philosopher, and so far from finding the essential moments of a State in actual States, specifically constructed an Ideal because in actuality they were not realized.

To 'philosophy' the actual and the ideal may be one. The thing that is by Nature is to its prophetic eye the thing that it is coming to be. But he that knows not the ways of philosophy stumbles when the unrealized is described as realized, when the Ideal and the Actual are brought to unity by methods that appear to him mockery of Fact. This, as we shall see, is no unnatural result of the Hegelian treatment.

But it is not so much from even the confusion of the Ideal with the Actual that the plain man suffers as from the confusion of two Ideals, which seem to him different, but which to the teacher appear identical, interchangeable. As often as the mind assents to the one the other is substituted, nor can he even enter into that pure atmosphere in which the sense of their difference is lost in the perception of their unity.

Here the two confusions melt into one; for it matters not whether man is born to be free and the freedom is realized, though he know it not, though only the philosopher know it, in chains; or whether he is born both to be free and not to be free, and the two are the same.

These difficulties arose for us in the very first pages of this volume, and troubled us there so long that we feared for the end of our journey: on p. 6 it is written:

'The fundamental idea of Greek political philosophy as we find it in Plato and Aristotle is that the human mind can only attain its full and proper life in a community of minds, or more strictly in a

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community pervaded by a single mind uttering itself consistently though differently in the life and action of every member of the community.'

And there seemed to us to be here not one definition but two ; for while the one set of words called up before us the image of political freedom, of taking counsel together, of debate, the orderly vote, the decision, of each mind willing its own will, the other set of words implies of necessity no such vision. It recalls Paraguay, the Caste kingdom, the hard Hildebrandine mediævalism. One can conceive that 'single mind' resident in the Czar, or in the complex organization, the laws, the institutions, the traditions of the State. One can conceive the 'pervaded' citizens reduced to organic unity, functioning each in their several place, plastic, submissive, with nothing left even of consciousness but a 'feel.'

And so again on p. 6 : 'The whole is summed up in the famous expression of Aristotle, "Man is a creature formed for the life of the City State."'

We a little deprecate Mr. Bosanquet's rendering. The limitation of area, the limitation to the city is there, and it has significance. But its main significance is in the political liberty. That had in the Greek experience never been realized outside the city. The city was the scene in which personality was displayed, found the field of its activities, the satisfaction of its energies, came truly and at last to the possession of itself. Man was formed for the life of a citizen in the City State, was a political animal, was never truly himself but in a polity in which he bore a part, and whether he were Metic, mere sojourner for profit, or subject, or actual slave, not being of the polity, knew not and had not freedom.

The slave may be formed for the life of the City State in quite another sense ; formed to hew its wood and draw its water. The City State is a distinct individuality, itself a living person, for whose life the life of a slave is food, fuel, tools ; and what it is to the slave, it may become to the 'freeman,' if the freeman surrender to it, or be deprived of, his share in its personality ; if it do not continue to be a life that he makes, as truly as a life that he lives by.

On the other hand, on p. 7 :

'There is no sound political philosophy which is not an embodiment of Plato's conception. The central idea is this : that every class of persons in the community—the statesman, the soldier, the workman—has a certain distinctive type of mind which fits its members for their functions, and that the community essentially consists in the working of these types of mind in their connection

one with another, which connection constitutes their subordination to the common good.'

Here the idea of 'political liberty' is entirely absent. The personality of the State is in the foreground, the fair soul in the fair body. It is the Ideal of the Christian Organism, but without the Christian accuracy of reservation. Of that organism the mind is the mind of Christ; and the mind of Christ not merely pervades the body, but is in each of its members. Differentiation is not by distinctive types of mind, so that the soul is their sum or their relation, but by extension of the whole mind in certain directions. They rest upon an inherent whole nature which with its inherent 'rights' is inalienable. The ideal working of their organism is attained not by the natural organic methods of reducing cells to a unity, but by the ideal political graces, love, humility, together-mindedness, 'submitting themselves one to another.'

In the actual Christian Church there have been oscillations. Mediævalism was Platonic. Sacerdotalism, as, *e.g.*, Comte viewed it, has all the specific marks of Platonism, even to those 'bizarre accidents,' the cutting across and destroying, so far as might be, any other authorities or group bases than its own; the State, the family, the individual, each suffering alike. Emancipation swung the pendulum to individual liberty. Even in organization the idea of the cell aggregate became dominant. 'The demagogic sect' live by the cell aggregate, and if either Church or State be to it an organism, it is an organism of low type, in which the functions of the ruler are minimized and the individual left as much as possible to himself.

The same issues are raised by the question of End and Means. Does the State exist for the individual, or the individual for the State? Mr. Bosanquet will not away with this distinction.

'The conceptions of Society and the Individual are correlative conceptions throughout; at whatever level therefore we take the one, we are bound to construe the other as at the same level; so that to distinguish the one element from the other as superior from inferior, or as means to end, becomes a contradiction in terms' (p. 180).

Society is, however, an ambiguous term. If we take the less ambiguous term 'the State,' it is not clear that the conceptions are correlative; the relations to the State do not necessarily exhaust the relations of the Individual; moreover the State is made an end, the Individual a means to it, if for its well-being he must strip himself of his nature. That may

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not be possible ideally, if the State by hypothesis is the satisfaction of man's nature. But the ideal does not appear to us actual. We set aside for the moment that which cannot be set aside—our relation to God, our conversation in heaven. But has the Frenchman never been sacrificed to La France? The obligation to die for one's country may entail no loss of nature, but what about the obligation to live for it? the obligation to serve it, obey it, stand by it, suffer for it or from it, fight for it *per fas et nefas*? Mr. Bosanquet contemplates the possibility of a revolution; yet it is difficult to find any lever for it 'if the advancements of the universal and its differences vary together, and are indeed one and the same thing? (p. 181.) If the Nation State be but an ethical idea, a faith, a purpose, a mission, a thing realizable but not realized, all these difficulties vanish; but if not, the individual will still question the actual: how am I provided for? Where in you are my liberties, my rights, my nature satisfied? Do I exist for you as a fact, and you for me by a quibble? Nor will he trust his well-being to the law of simultaneous progress, or fear to confront the identity in differences with a contradiction in terms.

If one cast a glance over the actual world there rise to view a great company of States. To determine the essential moments of a State on such a survey, to gather the one from the many, may be both a difficult and an illegitimate process. The definition varies with the standpoint. To international law Turkey and Switzerland, China and Holland, Russia and France are States; they are all equal, each as much a State as the other; their internal relations are indifferent; all that International Law requires is that there should be a permanent Government of some or any sort responsible for its subjects to other Governments. In this view Kentucky is not a State, nor Canada, nor Baroda, nor Saxony, nor the Transvaal. But if, on the other hand, we consider internal relations, we find sovereignty divisible and divided in innumerable degrees. There are partial and local autonomies that come under no rule. In China, *e.g.*, religion is a department of State; in India the State steadily ignores it. The exemptions from control are not derived from wisdom or policy or indifference, always revocable by the Supreme Power; they rest as often as not on the determined assertion or the recognition of natural rights; they rest also on traditional or hereditary or theoretical ideas of the functions of Government, which are, *e.g.*, one to the Rajput, and something quite other to the Finn or the Russian or the Swede.

The classification of all these varieties tends to the grouping of them in two principal divisions. There is a group which has for its watchwords Individual Liberty, Self-Government, Freedom, and starts philosophically from the nature of man; starts from the nature, too, of many social systems other than the State, that the State, a system of systems, must take in whole, to modify or destroy. There is a group again in which all these ideas fall into the background; the State is a unity completely organic; the rulers rule and rule absolutely; the subjects mind their several businesses; they have no voice and do not dream of having a voice in the government; there is no freedom, no sphere which the ruler leaves untouched, uncontrolled. In such a State there are, strictly speaking, no citizens; in content, acquiescence, and, when things are at their best, cordial assent to the wisdom of the rulers as wise, the subjects attain the nature not of man, but of the kind of man they are. Arrived at that nature, they may be said 'to unite in willing a certain type of life as a common good in which they find their own' (p. 285).

But across these two groups there cuts another division of 'good' and 'bad.' In the free States freedom may be a burlesque; under the paternal Government the subjects may be dumb beasts of burden working for its splendour, whose wills, if they stir at all, stir in wondering impotent rebellion.

The philosophical theory of the State may be said roughly to take the moments of the first group, freedom, the nature of man, as essential. Since the essential can never be absent, it must prove that these are present in the second group; and since, again, the theory is a theory of the actual, it must prove also that they exist in its corruption, so that the political prisoner journeying to Siberia may not only have an insight and feeling that it is good for him to go there, but may arrive at the supreme consolation that he did in fact virtually sentence himself, and rivet his own chains.

The philosophy does of necessity start with an ideal. 'Nature,' as the perfection and full growth of a thing, is itself an ideal, whether it be the nature of man, or the nature of the State; and the two natures imply two ideals even though they correspond, for the perfect harmony of a State life, a fair soul in a fair body, stands out as a more glorious, a more perfect thing than the perfect harmony of an individual life, even as the life of the human soul transcends in value the life of any of the systems of which it is a system, and is something more than their sum, a new thing in fact. But this

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more glorious ideal seems unattainable, out of reach ; for the nature of man, in any state of growth that we can prophesy as reachable, will not be reduced to harmony whole, will always make 'two states in one' by the imperfections of its will and the defects of its wisdom. Shall we abandon, then, our ideal city and make a city still ideal out of the harmony of less whole human natures, 'distinctive types that have learned temperance even though they have no wisdom, and are brave, with no will of their own, to obey a ruler's will ; and shall we then, returning on our steps, prove the ideals still unaltered, still the same, since in truth that always is that ought to be, and the actual has always in it the essential moments of the perfect.

It is with this problem that our author continually strives. He presents us with, in fact, a series of essays on the Identity of Contradictories, of Mind and Not Mind, of Freedom and Slavery, of Self-Government and Despotism, of Free Will and No Will. Essays we called them. Ingenious and subtle running constructive criticisms rather they are, conversations, symposia, with friend and foe, with Hobbes and Bentham, with Mill, Spencer, Locke, Rousseau, with the great and little Germans, in which pearls are strewed everywhere by the wayside, and in which the journey's goal seems to have little or no relevance to the philosophy or the ideals, of which the sum, if one strip it of non-essentials, seems to be that it is good to be an Englishman, that England is worthy of our service, and that we would be better, happier, more ourselves, if we corresponded more fully to her claims.

However it is only in the light of his philosophy that Mr. Bosanquet arrives at this terminus ; it would be disrespectful to him if we treated the philosophy as irrelevant ; we must discuss it as well as we can who are not versed in the Hegelian logic.

Liberty to the old school, as it is to the evolutionists of to-day, was freedom from restraint. Its essence was self-assertion. Every interference with liberty was evil. Restraint was, as Bentham put it, pain ; all law is restraint, as restraint pain, and as pain *per se* evil. This leads to curious consequences. For instance, to most of these thinkers morality is restraint pure and simple. It is the inhibition of individualistic impulses by social ones. It matters not, indeed, whether the restraining power be instinct, tradition, custom, or law, nor for what motive or in what way society exercises restraint. The significant fact is that in some way or other the individual comes to restrain himself, the external power

being at last only referred to in conscience as an objective law of right and wrong. Over a large field of the moral life we are conscious of this self-restraint ; it still is needful ; but the need of restraint fades away in another large field ; the actions and feelings become as it were mechanical ; they are not mechanical, because the will goes with them, only there is no longer any struggle. When we turn round on this process to survey it, the restraint of an outward law is no longer, if it ever were, regarded as moral. Morality begins when we control ourselves by the law of conscience ; it is made perfect when the need of control has passed away. Freedom, liberty begins with the absence of external restraint ; it is realized in the disappearance of restraint by the complete harmony of the will with the law. Freedom in its fullest sense is thus the result of a long course of pressure. *We are free because we have been forced to be free.* Nevertheless at a certain stage in our development any external pressure seems immoral, to be a violation of our nature ; we must, if we are free, at least have consented to it ourselves on general considerations of advantage or disadvantage, of right or wrong. Even in individualists their liberty has a positive content. It is the assertion of a *status quo*, of a certain measure of fulness, and it is also a rejection not merely of any diminution of that fulness by process of law, but of any increase of it on the old lines. The old method was a method only now applicable to children, imbeciles, degenerates, backward races, no longer applicable to men as men. There is something that a man is or has now that he will not give up, that he will jealously guard, a freedom of regulating his own life, of managing his own concerns, of adjusting his own social relations. Simultaneously, coincidently with this sense of freedom arises an independent attitude toward all authorities ; he no longer sees any rational basis in them unless he himself not only limit them, but give them some warrant of attorney ; and though they may have grown by nature as he has, their nature at any rate must correspond to his. He will not submit to be pruned by force, even though the pruning tend to fruit-bearing, and though in bearing fruit he would find himself at last freer than before.

The same thoughts arise on the comparison of natural with civil liberty ; the former is regarded often as a state of unrestraint, and the latter one which gives less liberty in extent, but more liberty in content ; covering less space, but having more value. Natural liberty may, however, be the liberty of the savage, or the liberty of a golden age ; or the

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liberty of an age of innocence. The two last may differ as the perfection of a child from the perfection of manhood, and the liberty of the one grow into the liberty of the other unrestrained. Civil liberty would so know nothing of restraint through all its course, but be from first to last a harmony unconscious of itself. The natural liberty of the savage on the other hand is itself a bondage, and the bondage can only be broken by a bondage. We must serve sin or righteousness, God or the Devil. Liberty comes to be measured either as pure subjective feeling (the world is all restraint, and liberty dwells only where by habit, adaptation of nature to nature, we move within the limits set, not trying to upset them), or comes into consciousness only as restraint removed, desires no longer impeded. Or its measure is one of substantial values. How is life most hindered, by brigands, forests, mountains, bridgeless rivers, impassable bogs? or by police and the cost of police, roads and the cost of roads, knowledge and the pain of knowledge? On the comparison the sense of something lost by civilization as well as gained is common; 'the broad, free life of the spreading veldt.' True liberty then will be in the satisfaction of all natural desires of the perfect nature. Because God knows what this will be, the restraints of God are bearable; willingly we yield ourselves as slaves to righteousness, because the fruit we know is holiness and the end eternal life.

But we have no mind to let the State determine our true nature and its wants; we do not trust her wisdom. A principle of religion is no principle of politics. That freedom comes through forcible restraint, and that freedom is the fulness of a living energy, the satisfaction of a nature, that freedom is obedience to a law; are maxims all of them that Christians know, and maxims all of them that stolen from their proper sphere are tyrants' weapons. Man to be free on the earth must will his own will, govern himself, judge his own nature and his nature's needs, maxims in turn which the philosophy continually admits, continually even applies in-consequently in detail, and continually explains away, when these essential moments of a State are visibly lacking.

The paradox of political self-government may be stated as a theorem. Given to prove that a man governs himself when (a) he has a vote but is outvoted by a permanent hostile majority, (b) when he has no vote, no influence, and no infinitesimal means of influencing any public decision.

Of course there are many subsidiary cases, as, *e.g.*, was Aristotle right, was Cato right, was Rousseau right in identi-

fying self-government with the political liberty of active personalities continually busy in managing public affairs ; or, in other words, is not self-government a mockery for the bulk of the citizens of a modern constitutional State? We quote from the *Daily Mail*, July 25, on this point :

'No : law is not for the like of you and me. They say we make the law, but that is sheer nonsense. The law is something apart and supernatural. We do not understand it, and it does not understand us. We respect it and fear it most consumingly. Out in Fleet Street the omnibuses and the eating-houses, and the people are all the raw material of the law if they only had the misery to know it. You buy a halfpenny newspaper for the cricket scores, and go out a walk with your intended bride ; the law is controlling you all the time. Deviate a hair's breadth and they will have you—those heart-quaking beings with the strange language and no backs to their heads.'

And in fact we cannot see that Mr. Bosanquet himself requires much more.

'The English labourer . . . to begin with is a law-abiding citizen. He keeps his hands off others and their belongings by the same rule by which he expects others to keep their hands off him and his belongings. He recognizes fairness of bargaining, and is prepared to treat others fairly, as he expects them to treat him. He is aware of his claims, that is to say, as depending on something in common between himself and others : and if he does not practically admit any such community "he is one of 'the dangerous classes' virtually outlawed by himself." "So far he is a loyal subject only"' (p. 293.)

Nor need he be anything more, though Mr. Bosanquet sketches an optional career as a member of a trades union, with 'that feeling for his State which is connected with the idea of home and fatherland' (p. 293). So he will have a 'fuller sense of a social good.' But the point at which we stand is whether he governs himself, can be said to make the law, whether he does so in fact or 'virtually,' *i.e.* in fiction ; for we will call it fiction that a man in the dock, being sentenced to three months' hard labour, is in his true self the man on the bench who is sentencing him.

Yes, it is the two selves, Jekyll and Hyde, that the philosophy conjures with. We will not say the hostile majority in your true self. That smacks of collectivism, and collectivism, if unanimous, can only give the will of all, which is the sum of bad bribed particulars, not the general will, which is always good, sincere, and holy, and, like the Queen, can do no wrong. Where this general will definitely resides is not

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so certain. It is found, however roughly, in the complex organization, the law built up through ages, the selected capacity, the institutions of the State. Somewhere in these the true self dwells. How it got there is another matter. There is a faint suspicion of its being after all a demagogic growth, grown up through ages of demagogic voting, yet each vote carrying with it the overruling of the spirit, and registering 'self at its best.' But this suspicion fades away. The self was in the growing law when ruling rulers made it ; in king, and barons, in the old aristocracy, and the new, and the very squire was Hodge's self when Hodge was voteless. A great conception borrowed from the Church and parodied in borrowing, as parody they must who transfer from one sphere wholesale to another, and mingle things alien in the transfer. Obedience to the Church as to a person who cannot err, who is guided through the ages to all truth, whose laws and institutions embody her mind, whose dogmas are irrevocable, is in itself and in its own sphere a dogma definitely guarded, and, without the definitions, full of pitfalls. We cannot easily and indefinitely apply it to the State ; and as a matter of fact we know that the mind of States so gathered is but a mixed affair. The law's an ass was Bumble's verdict, and as often as not the law's a devil ; States reflect all sides of human nature. Nor, again, has the distinction of the two selves ever been dragged into the claim of the Church to obedience ; her dogmas have had validity not as 'self-made' laws, but as laws of God : the 'two selves' belong to the psychology of repentance, of the struggle with sin—they appear both of them in the individual consciousness. The idea of the real self lying, as it were, wholly in the field of inattention ; that field of inattention being a deep sea, up from which self floats into rulers, laws, philosophers, and institutions, but never into the actual man himself, or if ever into him, into him through them—such an idea, if it be made the foundation of a political philosophy, must carry with it the corollary that the false self may swim through the same waters, and that the True gazing out from the man's own eyes may recognize his own old foe sitting on Cæsar's throne.

That one should call one's self self-governed, because the government is wiser, better, than one's self is, does not what one's actual self would do if ruler, but what one's better self would do, seems at first sight a harmless mysticism, yet when it is just self-government that is the principle at stake, when self-government is the confessed basis of any real

State, an essential moment of the State as such, such mysticism is sophistry; and when the government is actually bad such mysticism is galling mockery; to suffer from King Bomba is enough, without having Bomba for one's self.

Self-governed is taken by the plain man for just its worth; he means by it his share and nothing more, and, limited though that share may be in the best of human conditions, the having of it is a different thing from the not having of it, and it is a mischievous philosophy that dreams away the difference with any logic.

'Sovereignty therefore resides in no one element. It is essentially the relation in which each factor of the constitution stands to the whole. That is to say, it resides only in the organized whole acting *quâ* organized whole. If, for example, we speak of the Sovereignty of the People in a sense opposed to the Sovereignty of the State, as if there were such a thing as the "people" over and above the organized means of expressing and adjusting the will of the community, we are saying what is, strictly speaking, meaningless' (p. 282).

A great truth. Yet if the organized whole be so organized that the rulers rule and the people 'stick to their last' cultivating temperance, to talk of the sovereignty of the people is meaningless, and worse than meaningless, for the organized whole being the Populus, the Czar, for example, is the Populus, and every *status quo* of tyranny is consecrated by a phrase. Tyranny may be well enough; tyranny in the clothes of Gracchus is unbearable.

The same monotonous circle is trodden over 'the Real Will.' 'The real or rational will is embodied in objects which have power to make a life worth living for the self that wills them' (p. 149). 'In the family at its best the will has an object which is real and stable, and which corresponds to a great part of its own possibilities and capacities. In willing this object it is, relatively speaking, willing itself' (p. 149). And so the Will that wills itself in the fullest sense is the Will that wills the State, for the State *is* 'by nature,' and is *ex hypothesi* the satisfaction of all our wants. 'Our nature as rational beings implies the imperative claim on us of a will which is thus real and thus rational. This is the ultimate root of all political obligation' (p. 149).

The tendency of such philosophy is to call any other will than the real will an impulse or a desire, so that a bad will becomes impossible; there is no such thing. 'We saw even in Mill how extreme cases bring out the necessity for assuming a real will at variance with the individual's desire' (p. 96).

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Forcing a man off an untrustworthy bridge, keeping back the crowd to the boats with a revolver, are thus justified. The 'real will' of the crowd is realized, or what it is fair to presume their real will would be. The case reminds us of the old explanation of the child's answer in Baptism. His 'I will' is what his real will would be if he had one. There, again, the Church keeps clear of the possibility of mistake; the child *ex hypothesi* has no will, or no will grown to an energy of acting as will. But the treatment of adults as infantile or imbecile, or as having no will of their own, is a dangerous matter. The law draws a very clear distinction between sane and insane: for political philosophy to abolish the distinction, and to make exceptional cases the rule would be found in the long run impossible. Mr. Bosanquet reasons continually on the assumption that the unreal will, although it does not will the best, is still a will and therefore real. For example, the use of Force by the State, although inevitable and always the State's crowning prerogative, is alien and hateful to her. She is a moral Person, and Force is not *ἡ αἰτία*, is not her true nature; but to use force on physical things is not alien to her; only to use force on moral beings is alien; but it is the very essence of a moral being to have a will of its own, and, since compulsion is necessary to it, it is *ex hypothesi* not a will that wills its own true good.

The same result appears in his criticism of the 'Reformatory theory' of punishment; it is a theory, he says, that at bottom ignores the offender's personality, treats him as a being without a will.

But when we come to the theory of the State itself, with its to us imaginary paradoxes, it is just in the natural sense of a will willing itself that the co-operation of a man's own will is held essential ordinarily to political freedom. Cleon did not will his own or Athens's good, but what he willed he willed. This is one of the *momenta* of the State, considered as a polity, and if the free citizen wills only when he wills what is good, he may be deprived at any moment of his liberty by a man 'with a pistol,' willing for him his real will and leaving him freer than he was before.

We should not ourselves ever have adopted 'the consent of the will' as the root of political obligation, nor even any recognition by ourselves that Cæsar, though of human making, is a 'minister unto us for good.' Political obligation seems to us to rest partly on '*Spartam nactus es*,' but over and above that—nay, and in that—upon the Divine Authority. If the Divine Authority be repudiated we be-

lieve that no rational or philosophic ground for political obligation can be found at all. But if the principle of the 'demagogic sect'—viz. the consent of the individual will to the Law, and the co-operation of the individual will in all law-making—lie at the very foundation of political freedom, and if without political freedom there is no political obligation, then, it appears to us again mere sophistry to pretend to satisfy the principle by altering its terms.

Practically if we follow the consequences self-government disappears, for, on the theory, the Real Will swam away long ago with the True Self, and is where the True Self is. It took on there a new name, and is the General Will, an energy of the common mind, of the one fair large soul, which is always good and always tends by its own innermost nature to the best. So we come to Reformations by the General Will, though peoples in particular fought against them, expiring 'violently self-slain' in Pilgrimages of Grace, to the General Will now manifest in Henry VIII. destroying constitutions, and now in some Napoleon making fresh ones, or driving on through *coups d'état* to piece together, not without sharp amputation, poor Italy's *dissecta membra*, to give again poor Italy's fair soul a tenement and instrument.

Thus the common mind, the Nominalist's abstract term, spurning abstract life, and born as real, was resident at first in each, then sought or made a common brain for habitation, yet travelled up and down the neural system, transforming and possessing every nerve, till every nerve pulsed wisdom, storing up great oil-stores also in such fields of inattention as Encyclopædia Britannica, Record Offices, Law Libraries, and Hansards; but when the body, by some unkind fate or energies of wills not real, or alien impact, is threatened with paralysis, decay, or mutiny, she is not tied to brain or member, but, gathering up her forces wheresoever she pleases, speaks and acts in king, usurper, parliament, or mob, as suits her; nay, when the wreckage comes, if come it must, can wear again another body. Thus our own real will, though somewhere in the body politic while the body politic lasts, is somewhat difficult to corner and interrogate; yet she is always busy for our good; in loyalty to our country, whatever its constitution, we are safe; while she lasts she is the embodiment of all our needs, nor does it matter very much to us in what part of the body she for the moment is, so long as she is there. She, always wise, always good, goes on to her perfect destiny. But which City of God it is that Hegel found his dream in who shall say? The Church or Dea Roma, one of them, in-

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spired him; will it fit the British Empire as edited for elementary schools, with portraits of Lord Rosebery?

Each fresh attempt to explain away political liberty, granting it as an *a priori* postulate, and retracting it by subtleties of logic, leads one, perhaps, to wonder why the theory ever hampered itself with the postulate at all. But, in fact, the force of the recurrent mysticisms is felt, as a religion is seen growing up in the very recurrence itself. Not political liberty itself belongs to the essence, but the ideal of political liberty; for without it the mysticisms have no basis, and without them the idea of a person, who is at once the incarnation of the general law and the expression of one's own true being, could never be developed with fulness and content enough for reverence and worship. That which is aimed at is an attitude of the citizen towards the State, such as is indicated by the thought of 'a life hid with Christ in God.' Conversely, the logical destruction of political liberty does not lead to its practical destruction. For as each new definition of the true freedom, the true self, the true will, emerges from the Theory, it emerges as a challenge to the individual to seek them, to realize them, to correspond, and it emerges with all the more force that the distinctions lie in the field of spiritual mystery, and are bathed, therefore, in the waters of religion.

Their whole tendency might be to intensify the sense of public duty; where political liberty existed to make the use of it more real, more conscientious, more effectively an energy of science; where political liberty did not exist its trend might still be to diffuse the temper out of which political liberty could grow, provided only there were men with ears to hear and understand. Otherwise it is a doctrine of pure fatalism, of political subservience. It is full of crannies, holes in the rock, for all kinds of hide-bound conservatisms to shelter in, and we doubt whether, for the bulk of men, it could ever be made available at all. Mr. Bosanquet and the late J. H. Green seem to us to be altogether off the mark in treating this unavailability as a question of poor or rich, educated or uneducated, virtuous or vicious; but minds capable of mysticism at all are not common. They occur in every class, and occur rarely in any class, and when they do occur weave their dreams round adequate concrete things and personalities. Yet the 'Widow of Windsor,' or Nelson, or the Flag might serve with all their stories at their back; the 'White Man's Burden' is a trumpet call; and the Theory possibly has the making of a Shorter

Catechism in it, round which the legends and the myths might gather, itself the unintelligible nucleus and explanation of all their visible glory.

The State comes on the scene 'by Nature' as a fact. We have doubted, in reading, whether 'by Nature' it may not also leave the stage, being a time growth with no eternity in it. The nearest approach to an intelligible definition of the State we find on p. 184 :

We have hitherto spoken of the State and Society as almost convertible terms. And in fact it is part of our argument that the influences of Society differ only in degree from the powers of the State, and that the explanation of both is ultimately the same. But it is also part of our argument that the State as such is a necessary factor in civilized life ; and that no true ideal lies in the direction of minimizing its individuality or restricting its absolute power. *By the State, then, we mean Society as a unit, recognized as rightly exercising control over its members by absolute physical power.*

We pass over any other thoughts arising out of this passage to point out that in the definition 'limits of locality' have no place. Society might be oecumenical, the State a world-embracing one. The reasons why it cannot be so we find on pp. 183-4. The gist of them is that man is not everywhere man. The old distinction of Greek and barbarian, the difficulty that hampered the little republics of New England, in which to give the Indian a vote as a Christian and to leave him heathen were the two impossible alternatives ; the difficulty felt by the United States of to-day, internally with her negroes, externally in grafting Imperialism on the constitution, stands in the way. In the phraseology of the theory 'no such identical experience can be presupposed in all mankind as is necessary to effective membership of a common society and exercise of a general will' (p. 329).

So England and India cannot constitute one effective self-governed community (p. 330). Here the theory talks like the plain man ; but if the British Raj is India's true self, the expression of her real will, and gives her liberty by forcing her to be free, the objection breaks down. The British Raj, on the one hand, may treat the Indian as man by nature, with the citizenship before him as an attainable goal, and the Indian learn in finding his real self in the British Raj to become his real self himself. Mr. Bosanquet appears, however, to consider that the distinctive types of humanity are so essentially distinct that the distinction must be permanent ; 'to every people its own life has seemed the crown of things, and the remainder only the remainder.' Differences may not

then mean defects, deformities, or even immaturities. He includes among these differences differences not only of white, black, and yellow, but of religion, 'Mussulman and infidel, Christian and heathen, Jew and Gentile.' *Actual States, however, include all these differences.* China holds together in one political experience multitudinous religions and races. In the United States the problem is acute; at any rate it has been dealt with in the bold confidence that the Union could assimilate all sorts and conditions of men. The distinctive types of Celt and Saxon, to say nothing of others, are a trouble to ourselves. Johannesburg and Pretoria will not fuse, where the incompatibility is the incompatibility of two civilizations.

If we turn our eyes back to Hellas, the city States were each 'two States in one.' The solid fact in Greek history is that the tie between oligarch and oligarch, democrat and democrat, was stronger than the tie between citizen and citizen. The difference was one of class, and class interests cut across city interests, constituted leagues, alliances, federations, overcoming even the distinction between Greek and barbarian. In our own time the same forces are at work. We have Semitism, and with Semitism, besides much else, the significant development of economic cosmopolitanism, with its leagues of capital with capital, of labour with labour. Socialism and Anarchism join hands with one another, and with every Fenianism or Nihilism that sees in society as a whole, or in any State section of it, no pure general will but a devil incarnate.

Religion, the Christian religion, has never been anything else but cosmopolitan. It has been said, with some shadow of truth, that the Nation State has risen on its decay. The struggle to turn it into 'the King's Religion' has been long and hard; but the King's religion whose toast is King and Church, not Church and King, is but a sterile hybrid.

Finally there is race. 'Where is the German Fatherland?' Race cleaves States in half, drives wedges into other States, settles in discrete clusters under any flag, serves the flag, perhaps, with gratitude and friendship, but finds itself 'at home.'

A division by mere locality can never be fundamental in determining the regulative and controlling power of all these interests that cut across locality. Locality goes for much, but it has been the coincidence of locality with the more lasting and deeper distinctions that has given the State its personality, and the personality, if need be, will follow them,

not it. The limits of State action are often considered as turning on the relation of society to the individual—in fact, they turn on the relation of the regulative and controlling power in any locality to many systems which are not merely systems within itself, but systems only an arc of whose circumference is within itself, and which have an independent life of their own which the State may let or hinder as well as help.

The State, in other words, is not a natural whole, except by the coincidence of Nature. If the principle of locality is kept when the coincidence no longer exists, regulation must tend to a minimum or choke the natural life. What the trader, Jew, German, Briton, or Indian, Outlander in general, wants in any locality is law and order on a reasonable basis, and otherwise 'his liberties.' It is nothing to him who supplies it; his allegiance is elsewhere. If the only effective way of getting law and order is to become a citizen where he is settled, he will become a citizen, but his real allegiance is unchanged.

The local principle often works most disastrously. In things economic, *e.g.*, interest and locality often run together; as often, or more often, they do not. The modern nation States are all protectionists to establish a forced coincidence. They build dams to turn the water of profit to their own locality, not even to their own people or race. Their flag, where it flies, proclaims the existence of a dam. Every State on this principle fights to hoist its own flag, and a free, world-circling stream is choked up to fill the local tanks.

Local varieties of religion are reasonable. Even religion need not wear a great coat in the tropics; but a variety of clothes is one thing, and for the State to lay hold of one's soul, and force it with loppings innumerable into its own, is another. Whatever the Church may be, it is not an 'adjustable system inside a system of systems whose whole is the State.'

The adjustment of the systems one with another by mutual give and take is an adjustment ultimately proper to wisdom and their nature, and the desire for a final arbitrator, a final court of appeal, a final forcible sword-bearer, is but one with the human desire for unity and the search for a soul above and beyond one's soul. The finality of the State is never final. The State with its sword is a makeshift, a very necessary makeshift too, and in a spoilt, makeshift world has a place 'by nature' to punish the evil-doer, who is also here by nature. But we would keep it in its

place, and wear, we too, our own swords, which, in a make-shift world, our nature forges for our use, and arms us with.

Is the principle of locality essential to the theory? Aristotle had it explicitly, 'formed for life in the city State,' but the limit, as we thought, was due in him to an experience and an Ideal of Liberty; the extension to the Nation State preserves in a way the limit with the same experience and Ideal. But locality does not count for so much in the Nation State, although, as a matter of fact, love for country lives for most men in the memories and associations of a District or neighbourhood, and is being lost for most men in the Indifference of great cities: Mr. Bosanquet sees that locality even works against the theory. 'The State and its ideal purposes are not clearly set above flesh and blood; a great legal system is not created; it is not conceived that man as man 'belongs neither to this place nor to Jerusalem' (may migrate, in fact, from S.W. to S.E. and still remain an Englishman). 'With the ideal unity of a modern nation such conceptions harmonize much more readily, and the neighbourhood can lend them flesh and blood without hiding them' (p. 310).

Plato has, perhaps, the principle of locality implicitly, for soldiers imply a state of war: but his theory is not local; his Republic is an organization of classes; its only limit of size is that it should not be too great for unity. An organism is too great for unity if the volume outruns its surface, if its parts are not accurately co-ordinated, sufficiently differentiated, if its integration is incomplete. There is no practical objection to extending Plato's State or any State to any world size if the organization can keep pace with the growth, which will depend, again, on the workable characters of the distinctive types.

In Hegel the State Proper is built on the Family and its extensions, the Bourgeois State and its extensions; neither of these is essentially local, and in the last fifty years even the sentiment of locality has disappeared from them for a great part of Christendom.

We notice how small a part is played by what we call local autonomies in the theory. The family, the class, the trades-union, take their place. On any theory of the State as a high organism this must be so. A local autonomy is in the very thought of it a disintegration of the State, a partition of its Soul. The United States is a collection of mutilated Souls, or the shadow of a single soul. Family life in

it varies from State to State, as, *e.g.*, in the Divorce or Marriage Laws.

So it is not merely India that makes it difficult to bring the British Empire under the theory. There are Canada, Australia, the Cape, each in their own way local unities; not constituting one economic unity, with us or one another; dealing differently each by itself with divorce and marriage; while at the Cape we have tentative formings of an Africander soul, and many distinctive types of no common experience; Zulus, Basutos, Indians, all seeking to be assimilated in one soul with Dutch and English, before that soul can find any true assimilation with ours.

The theory, in a word, with its simplicity, its rejection of so many types of humanity, its one Soul adjusting, regulating all life, hindering all hindrances, the sum of all hopes, the arbiter of all faiths, the decider of all interests, does not fit the great complex actuality. It is a theory for a Nation complete in itself, isolated in a corner of the world, born of one family, trained in one religion, whose citizens touch at no point the great world-sweeping currents, which even the breath of Heaven may not enter, till it have passed through the National Charcoal Filter; or it is a Theory for a World State, that has reduced all distinctive types to a unity, finding for them distinctive work in her service, but depriving them of their own life, which seemed to them the 'crown of things.'

If limits of locality are of her essence to begin with, limits of locality will be of that essence to the close. The absolute supremacy of the State within any local area must mean the overriding, the distortion, and finally the destruction of all non-local elements. Every manifestation of life is viewed as a State interest, and is manipulated for an adjustment to an end which is not its own. Constantine lays hold of Christ and turns him into a State functionary, and in turning Him into a State functionary empties Him of Himself. 'A universal language as a substitute for national languages would mean a dead level of intelligence unsuited to every actual national mind, the destruction of literature and poetry' (p. 330). So Mr. Bosanquet describes the effect of a World empire. What is it but the continuation of a process that the Nation State has already carried far, levelling all dialects? The soul of the Nation State is a hungry entity. It grows fat by swallowing other souls. Six great ones still hungry at the last remain, a number of little ones surviving through their jealousies or fears. One day the black snake will have the rattlesnake by the throat, never to let go till one of the

two is dead, and the survivor will smooth the fallen carefully out, tenderly smear him with the saliva of organization, lie down in front of him, and with gulp, gulp, gulp, bolting him whole, crawl away to digest him in peace, getting ready a new appetite for a new meal.

If the State be a whole adjusting all relations, so long as the relations can be rung round with a fence and circumscribed by an area, they may be manipulated as systems within a system, with a local habitat. But if the relations drive out beyond the fence, and the State is still to adjust them, she must drive out beyond the fence also. The whole world is her ultimate area. The whole world will be organised on the family basis. There will be ruling and subject races; Ham to serve, Japhet to organize, and Shem—well, Shem to become a philosopher. Economic Interests, the Bourgeois State, must, however independent, be reduced in the main to follow the family lines; it is really inconvenient that persons of no family should be millionaires. Let us come, perhaps, to a compromise: the wealth and the power and the wisdom for the white races, and the work for the black, and the brown, and the yellow. The Inferior white races may be foremen and overseers, and generally non-commissioned officers. Religion shall be the 'feeling' coincident with the whole, distinctive in each caste, but in each caste burning incense to Cæsar. Art will work to embody the soul for the concrete imagination; roughly, *i.e.*, to paint and to act, sing Empire songs, and furbish out great Jubilee shows. Philosophy will bind the scheme of things as they are with the scheme of things as they ought to be.

We are, perhaps, at first surprised at the theory repudiating this programme. The fact is that the theory has not the strength of its convictions. It is hampered throughout by the condition of providing for political liberty. Political Liberty, although sufficiently emptied of content by the philosophical definitions, still sits on its dreaming breast as a nightmare. For example (p. 330), it is still supposed that a world or State can only be formed by some such process as 'Englishmen attempting to make one effective self-governed community with the Indian population,' whereas, if the State is the embodiment of one's true self, the Raj, whatever it may be, is the true self of the Indian populations, and the great Queen, we should have thought, would have stood for such true self well enough. In India, moreover, strangely enough, the mass of the population have already been reduced by a Platonic system of sound political philosophy to a silent and

complete acquiescence in the self-government of the theoretical type. Raj may come and Raj may go, and the business of the Raj is to be the Raj, theirs to till, sow, reap, and on occasion starve.

Again, although Man to the Greek was a political animal, and political implied in that context actually and not philosophically self-governing, the Greek did not mean by Man all kinds of men, or even all kinds of Greek. There were lower Greeks even, that were fitted by nature in philosophy's eyes to be mechanics, farmers, and soldiers of the lower sort. And the Greek did not even dream that barbarians and slaves and sojourners not of the State family should have political liberty, and yet did not dream of a Polity without a slave substratum to hew its wood and draw its water. Whether the lower Greeks should be politically free, self-governing, was fought out in Greece with bitter passion. Contempt and hatred never in the world story blazed with more furious and more destructive fires than in the strife between Greek oligarch and democrat, and the Philosophers were not democrats. Thus, so far as the theory goes, a world Empire might be a self-governing Polity, even in the actual sense, so long as the ruling families were free.

We marvel, then, at first look that the theory does not go the length of its logic. The truth seems to be that the local State soul precisely by localizing humanity unfits it to cross the boundaries except as a conqueror and destroyer. It reduces its distinctive types to unity too soon; then, colliding with another set of distinctive types, its instinct is to extirpate, turning the world into a monstrous Dorsetshire, and when it cannot extirpate, it retires into its shell or 'treks' beyond the 'vaal.' Nor ought we to fail to notice how 'the distinctive type' theory generates, even within the borders, a kind of loathing and disgust for one another between the castes, as though mutilated humanity would at all costs avenge itself.

The theory of the Christian religion rests all its differentiation on the 'maximization' of the common humanity as its fundamental basis. The work of the Holy Spirit in specialization is built upon the work of the same Spirit in transforming the whole nature, and recognizes no distinctive 'crowns of life' that are not woven with the flowers of a common grace, manifold in its expression, but one in its being as it is one in its source. The Hegelian theory of Identity in Difference stereotypes too much for it the existing differences as final and exhaustive. In co-operative structure,

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we are told, the screw and the nut into which it fastens are identical, each the expression of the one mind. That may be so. The ruler and the ruled, the owner and the slave, the employer and the hand, the upper classes and the substratum, and even the residuum, may take it for their fate, their joy, their despair; and the philosopher contemplating it may even get some touch of humility, compassion, and kindliness in considering his own identity with the unlettered boor.

But it is not hard to see the practical issue. Even Christianity with all her corrective principles has not escaped the taint of a State gospel preaching content to the poor, blessing the *status quo* of society, satisfying hunger and thirst with a phrase. It is not strange that the Liberalism that ostracized Christ should refuse to take Hegel to its bosom.

In the very interesting chapter in which Mr. Bosanquet treats of the relation of the Philosophy of Society to the sciences he tells us that each science represents a facet or point of view from which Society as a whole may be regarded. It has not escaped us that the whole theory as it is here presented may wear a different aspect to eyes that look through other spectacles than ours. It is a theory adjustable to the Christianity from which, indeed, it appears to us to have borrowed so largely. If it mean, for example, that a man just where he is set, in the condition of life to which God has called him, peer or peasant, squire, farmer, or labourer, philosopher or tradesman, has a career to live which at its best may call out all his manhood, and calling it out will realize for him his nature; if it mean that the family and the trade, the village, the township, the county, are but many opportunities set near him of saving himself in losing himself; if it mean that country also is a vocation, and that a man's country is his to preserve and serve, to love and ennoble; if it mean that he may do so and be all this just in his own place, not thrusting himself into another's; that the true value giving distinction is not in what condition or rank a man serve, but in the whether or how or in what mind he serve—all this we learned and were taught long ago, and in the faith of it have died beside all waters. The theory, then, is a theory of the actual, and the philosophy tells what is and has been.

But when we so learned it we learned it not so that any of these should be 'our substantive purpose and the foundation of our lives'; they were but activities and ends, in a temporal world, of lives that were themselves eternal, and

whose conversation was in heaven. So we brought always to things as they are a faith in what things ought to be; and were able to serve the Actual the better that we did not set her on the Eternal's throne, but feared God in honouring the king. Every Christian State derives its authority by explicit avowal from God and is subject to the Divine Law, which gives to Christian Patriotism its limits and its full content. It is not Liberty only that is enlarged by being made smaller. But the content of Christian Patriotism may survive for a time after it has been severed from its source. Ideals are carried on, ethical passions still throb with a reflex activity, though cut off from the brain, and the Theory, talking like a Christian, evidently feels like a Christian in many ways, and is Christian in the energies of its disciples. Thus in this volume, so rich in intellectual treasures, so warm with prophetic fervour, one understands that another, perhaps, may feel its essence and work in them, when we see only a great Idol through the mist. And as a matter of fact we are at one with the writer over a great part of the field he traverses. He is the exponent—as we believe he would admit—of views and principles that are the heritage of Christendom. He is the opponent and destructive critic of much anti-Christian philosophy. When, for example, he dwells upon Law as something more than a command with penalties, as being the expression of a wisdom, a will, a personality, or when he insists upon the essentially social nature of man, or when he tears to pieces the idea of Liberty as mere absence of restraint, or when he estimates the true value of economic conditions, displaying in their nakedness the fallacies of Buckle, he is speaking to a brief that Christian theology might have drawn.

Nay, in all those theories of the State being the True Self, the Real Will, of the 'being forced to be free,' he is but expressing a temper which, with certain conditions, Christendom instils and common sense endorses. There are moments, occasions, in which such theories are actual, in which they are realized in conscience, to whatever vile purposes they may be prostituted, or however unfit they may be for cornerstones of the building.

It is more pleasing, again, to hear men spoken of persistently as minds, even though it involve some pedantry, than to hear them persistently treated of as mere objects in Nature, neural systems, mechanisms, automatisms; more akin to Christian language, which calls a man a soul; and through all the sphere of human life it is good to be reminded that

human souls or minds give to all concrete things that men create and use their innermost reality.

But among all the many things that please us, which it were too long to enumerate, the one thing pleases us not. The State looms too large. We like not even that the 'State is by Nature.' We like rather that the State is of God, for then she has her limits; we know 'whose authority she hath'; we neither want to make her nor pretend to make her, and think we shall serve her none the worse for knowing that on occasion, God forbidding, we would serve her not.

ART. III.—DR. BRIGGS'S INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF HOLY SCRIPTURE.

General Introduction to the Study of Holy Scripture, the Principles, Methods, History and Results of its several Departments, and of the Whole. By CHARLES AUGUSTUS BRIGGS, D.D., Edward Robinson Professor of Biblical Theology in Union Theological Seminary, New York City. (Edinburgh, 1899.)

THE full title of this book affords, of itself, sufficient indication of the vast field which it professes to cover in its endeavour to provide an 'Introduction' of more than 700 pages to the study of Scripture. Much of the labour demanded by this book would be more profitably bestowed upon conscientious study of the Scriptures themselves than in dilating upon a mass of preliminary matter which does not advance the real knowledge of the Scriptures, whether Greek or Hebrew. The writer in his Preface affirms that the Bible is to him Holy Scripture, but he leaves us undecided as to what he regards as the extent or limits of the word 'Holy.' And, indeed, it is the nature and meaning of this epithet as to which the perusal of this book, learned and useful in many respects as it really is, leaves us after all in doubt. It is a general laudation of the Higher Criticism in the abstract that it presents, with many startling examples of the application thereof in certain cases alike in the Old and New Testaments rather than a demonstration of the wisdom and justice of the professed results. And, indeed, this is the method commonly followed by this school of writers. They start from certain premises, in many respects hypothetical and imaginary, and deduce from them certain conclusions more or less in accord

therewith, but which certainly do not follow from the premises assumed even if true, and which are worth nothing if those premises are false. It becomes wearisome after a time to find one man after another playing the game of 'follow my leader,' and repeating assertions which they all find it convenient to forget have never been, and cannot be, verified.

For instance, assuming that the book found by Hilkiah in the temple was Deuteronomy—an assumption in itself which is hard to reconcile with the statements of the record on which we depend for the knowledge of its discovery—it by no means follows that the reformation of Josiah was due to this discovery, inasmuch as it was begun several years before, and yet the correspondence of this reformation with the prescriptions of Deuteronomy is always advanced as one of the main proofs that the book so discovered was Deuteronomy. Assumption in proof of hypothesis and hypothesis as the basis of assumption is the character of much that passes under the *imposing* and majestic name of Higher Criticism. Though the refutation of such criticism in detail is comparatively easy, what we really want—which, however, is not so easy to find or formulate—is something which shall serve as a solvent for the principles adopted. It is notoriously more easy to reason correctly from false premises—though we must allow that in this case the conclusions are illegitimately inferred from the premises—than it is to detect an error latent in the premises. Dr. Briggs, however, has the courage of his convictions both as to premises and conclusions, for he is persuaded that the Higher Criticism has attained the character which warrants it to rank as a science, if indeed it is not the highest of sciences, *e.g.*:

'The Higher Criticism has vindicated its rights in the field of Biblical study as well as in all other kinds of literature. It matters little who may oppose its course, what combinations may be made against it, it will advance steadily and irresistibly to its results; it will flow on over every obstacle like a mighty river, and bury every obstruction beneath its waves. In time it will give a final decision to all the literary problems of Holy Scripture. No other voice can decide them. Men for a time may refuse to listen to its voice; they may try to deaden it by a chorus of outcries and shoutings of opposition. But Higher Criticism is in no haste, she can wait. She does not seek the favour of ecclesiastics or the applause of the populace. She seeks the truth, and having won the truth she is sure of the everlasting future' (p. 108).

These are bold words, but we do not on that ground object to them. The writer, however, seems to be oblivious of one

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thing, and that is the latent *petitio principii* there is in them. The point to be proved and not assumed is the truth of the professed results. What is the original basis of them, conjecture or fact? If conjecture, is it consistent with the necessary conditions of time, place and circumstance? Is it alone consistent with them? For when there is so much room for conjecture we must accept that which is the most probable under all the circumstances. Supposing the hypothesis adopted the most probable, are the inferences drawn from it legitimate? Is there no circularity of reasoning in the process of obtaining them? If the result is legitimately obtained, are there any other facts or circumstances which are inconsistent with and therefore tend to invalidate them? All this is requisite to be borne in mind by him who 'seeks the truth' before he can be sure that he has 'won' it, and therefore can be 'sure of the everlasting future.' It is precisely for this reason that, notwithstanding the confidence of Dr. Briggs and his school, we are not prepared to accept many of his premises and still fewer of his conclusions. Let us take one or two specimens, for we have not space for more:

'The formation of the Canon began with the promulgation of the Ten Words as the fundamental Divine Law to Man. These Ten Words were given in their original form as brief, terse words or sentences. The specifications and reasons were added in the several different documents of the Hexateuch, and these were eventually compacted together in the two versions Ex. xx. and Deut. v. These Ten Words were given by the theophanic voice of God to Israel at Mount Horeb. They were taken up into all the original documents of the Hexateuch. They lie at the basis of the entire legislation. They have the authority of God and public recognition and adoption. They were kept on the two tables of stone, in the holy ark in the most Holy Place of the tabernacle and the temple. If any document fulfils all the tests of canonicity, the Tables of the Law certainly do' (p. 118).

There are sundry questions here we should like to ask. First of all, is not the Hexateuch itself an assumption and a premise? There is positively not one atom of evidence external to the theory which has created it. Dr. Briggs himself speaks of the four parts of the Law. It would seem, therefore, that there never was a Pentateuch, and if not a Pentateuch certainly not a Hexateuch. And yet this Hexateuch is continually being brought before us as if its existence were as well assured from all time as that of the Old Testament itself, whereas till some fifty years ago it was never heard of. Dr. Briggs, however, is not only certain of its existence, but

also of all its original documents, which, however, seem only to have been two, containing Ex. xx. and Deut. v. respectively. But now we are confronted with far more serious questions. We are told that the Ten Words were given by 'the theophanic voice of God' (whatever that may be); that they have the 'authority of God,' and were kept on 'the two tables of stone' in the Tabernacle. Now, we want to know, does Dr. Briggs really believe that these Ten Words were spoken by God at Horeb? Does he believe that there was a 'theophanic voice?' If so, what was the nature of it? and was it God's voice, and how does he know that it was God's voice? How does he know that these Ten Words have the authority of God? Does he believe that God wrote them on the tables of stone, and that these tables were kept in the Tabernacle? If so, why does he believe it, and on what authority? Simply on the authority of documents which he considers himself at liberty to dismember and mutilate till all that is left are the 'Ten Words' for which there is no other known authority than that which has thus been dismembered and destroyed beyond all recognition. Thus logically it would seem that the only authority for the 'Ten Words' is that of Dr. Briggs himself. If this is false reasoning, it certainly is no more illegitimate from the premises than that of Dr. Briggs.

There is that about this so-called Higher Criticism which compels us to ask, What is the ultimate result to which it leads us?

'There can be little doubt,' says Dr. Briggs, 'that the original Book of the Covenant contained only the brief, terse words; and that the other types of Hebrew Law, such as statutes, judgments, and commands, contained in the Greater Book of the Covenant and in the Deuteronomic Code, are later additions from varied sources, in the development of Hebrew Law in the northern and southern kingdoms' (p. 119).

This, we presume, is one of the certain results of criticism, and yet it is introduced with 'there can be little doubt'—the amount of which obviously depends upon the capacity of the individual for swallowing the hypothetical premises and digesting the unwarranted conclusions. Surely the more natural and obvious course would be to reject the whole theory, Ten Words, Documents, Hexateuch, and all, if there is no more evidence for the writing of the Ten Words on the tables of stone by the finger of God, or even for the authority of God, than a narrative which has to be thus mutilated and dismembered before it can be received.

Dr. Briggs makes his appeal to reason, and would have us

exercise our critical reason. We gladly do so, but against Dr. Briggs himself. 'Hast thou appealed unto Cæsar? To Cæsar shalt thou go.' There is a great deal of discussion of the history and origin of the Canon, with a vast amount of learning and not a little conjecture, but it seems to us to fall short of the mark. If the canonical authority of Deuteronomy, for example, is that given to it by Hilkiah, the high priest, and nothing more, then we do not hesitate to say that such authority is not enough for us; nor do we believe that it would have been for the high priest and for Josiah; but unquestionably if Deuteronomy was invented as well as discovered in the reign of Josiah and edited, or what not, from unknown and unauthorized sources, it can have no more authority than the unknown sources from which it was so derived, which on the supposition is confessedly *nil*.

It does not seem to be understood that the authority of any document is not that which it derives merely from external sources, but that which it has of itself and is testified to with sufficient weight of fact or inference. In this way there would seem to be no better means of discriminating than that of authenticity and genuineness—understanding by authenticity trustworthiness as to matters of fact, and by genuineness rightness of ascription as to authorship. For instance, we believe St. John's Gospel to be both genuine and authentic; and if it is genuine we may well accept it as authentic, and if it is authentic it certainly is genuine, because it obviously professes to be written by St. John. On the other hand, St. Mark's Gospel nowhere professes to be written by him: it is merely a matter of traditional evidence that it is so, but its accuracy as to matters of fact does not depend upon its being written by St. Mark but upon the acceptance it commonly met with, which was no doubt a measure of its intrinsic merit, but in no sense the cause of it. The acceptance it met with is thus the testimony to its merit, which would be equally great even though St. Mark had not written it. But if the genuineness of St. John's Gospel is disproved its witness as to matters of fact is entirely destroyed, for it comes to us as the professed record of an eye-witness, who can be no other than St. John, and if it is not St. John its testimony is utterly discredited, for it is a fiction professing to be truth.

And so in other cases where genuineness and authenticity are mutually dependent. A book may be accurate and *bona fide* if its authorship is kept back or unknown, but if it is stated to be by a given author whose identity is essential

to its accuracy, and it proves to be by an independent person whose testimony is of no value, then the disproof of its genuineness is fatal to its authenticity. Now this is applicable to Deuteronomy. The writer everywhere professes to have been an eye-witness of what he records, and he also appeals to the testimony of those whom he is addressing for the accuracy and reality of what he relates (v. 5, &c.). No unbiassed reader who is not interested in maintaining the contrary can possibly question this. Therefore if, instead of being the narrative of an eye-witness, it was written by some unknown priest six or seven hundred years after Moses, it is at once discredited as a worthless narrative of the events it professes to record, and we are bound to dismiss its testimony as of no value, and the only value it can still retain is that of a well-meaning and graphic romance, written for the purpose of inculcating certain precepts, which, however, for the most part have long become obsolete. Now if the origin of Deuteronomy was what is suggested, it is impossible that the recognition of Hilkiah and Josiah could give it the authority it did not possess; for their recognition was only the measure of their own deception, and was the recognition and endorsement of a fictitious and unauthorized document. It had no authority to start with; it could acquire none by their acceptance of it. Its promulgation was the genesis of a falsehood, which they were the means of authenticating and promulgating.

It is, however, under the circumstances impossible for us to be deceived by or to be participators in their fraud. All sorts of flimsy and euphemistic language may be used to account for and to condone their action, but all in vain; for truth is truth to the end, and we know that no lie is of the truth. Whatever Deuteronomy may have been to Josiah and the rest, it cannot ever be that to us. Even supposing that they were so uncritical and indifferent to the truth as to be deceived in accepting it as the word of God, it is impossible for us to do so. If we have nothing else more worthy of the name, then we must go without the thing; for this most assuredly can show no claim to it. Now the assumption that underlies the theory of Drs. Briggs, Driver, Ryle, and others, is that the authority of any book in the Canon is derived casually from the fact of certain persons at the time of its production having attributed thereto certain characteristics of authorship, credibility, and the like; that this was a mere accident, and was based on nothing more certain or satisfactory than their belief itself. For instance, Hilkiah, Josiah, Huldah, and the

rest, heard of a book found in the Temple written professedly by Moses, and purporting to contain God's own words to him and by him. They at once accepted this book, not only as a genuine production of Moses, but also as, for that reason and no other, having the authority of God. For if it was not by Moses it clearly could not have the authority of God. It is not likely or possible that if they had any knowledge or suspicion that the book was a modern one, and had come into existence in the last fifty years—which, had it been the case, would certainly have been known—they could have accepted it as Divine under these circumstances, and merely because it professed to be what they knew it was not; and most certainly the fact of their doing so could not and would not have given it that authority. The supposition is that as the book pretended to be written under certain circumstances, which undeniably would have given it the highest possible authority, therefore it had that authority, whether or not it was so written; whereas we at all events can see that if it was so written it would have had no authority at all. Nor can we with justice ascribe any such authority to it now. Nor does the fact of its having received the recognition of Josiah and the others invest it with any such authority as we are bound to recognize; on the contrary, we should be bound to reject it if there were sufficient reason for believing such to have been its real origin. Indeed, this theory disregards and ignores the difference between things genuine and spurious. If it matters not whether a document is genuine or not, then it matters not what was the origin of Deuteronomy or who wrote it; then it matters not whether St. John's Gospel first saw the light in the second century or not; whether Virgil wrote the *Aeneid* or Horace the *Odes*, and the like: though in these latter cases it is merely a literary prejudice to which violence is done, but in the other cases the question is whether or not the claim of Divine authority is destroyed, as under the assumed condition it manifestly would be.

Another assumption of this school of writers is that that only is to be considered as the word of God which can establish its claim to the individual conscience. As Kuenen says, 'Every word which finds an echo in your heart and in your conscience is to you a word of God.' This at once limits the area of revelation to those who receive it. Revelation is a purely subjective matter. It exists where it is supposed to exist, and nowhere else. Hilkiah and Josiah supposed it to exist in the 'pseudepigraphic' Deuteronomy, to use Dr. Briggs's chosen phrase, and so it existed there to them. But we are

wise enough not to be imposed upon. There was no other revelation there than they believed, and therefore there is none to us, because we do not believe there is. Neither is there any revelation in St. John's Gospel, except to those who find the echo of it in their own hearts, which is indeed most true. But we want to know whether the revelation which they find exists only because they find it, or whether there is an objective and real revelation there, whether they find it or not; for this is most certainly the case if that Gospel is what we most certainly believe it to be; whereas on the other supposition the revelation is not where it is not found to be, and in any case is only there to those who find it. Now we are willing to maintain that if St. John's Gospel, for example, is genuine and authentic, then it undoubtedly has all the credentials of a revelation, whether they are acknowledged or not, though manifestly the acknowledgment of them makes all the difference between light and darkness. The sun nevertheless is shining, albeit the blind cannot see the light. 'These things are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye might have life through His name': the life can only come after the belief; nevertheless Jesus has shown Himself to be the Son of God, whether ye believe it or not. We take the Gospel of St. John as an illustration because most persons will have the more diffidence in rejecting that, though we are sorry to find that Dr. Briggs sees even in that the indications of alterations of an earlier Gospel on which our existing Gospel is based. It is surely obvious that it must make all the difference whether the Gospel of St. John is genuine or spurious. If it is the work of St. John from first to last it must be inestimably precious; if it is the work of some one else, writing in his name, it is comparatively worthless, and certainly not authentic. But this is a matter of evidence. Under favouring auspices the Higher Criticism will doubtless have something hereafter to say to the disadvantage of St. John's Gospel; for in these last days there is no such thing as finality. It has to be borne in mind that many of these questions are beyond the solution of any criticism, however high. It will always be possible to suggest a doubt. There will always be a point that we cannot reach, and that is demonstration. Higher Criticism, though rejoicing in the 'probable,' the 'most likely,' 'there can be little doubt,' and the like, seems always to forget that this is a long way short of demonstration, and unworthy of the name of science; whereas the highest effort of the judicial mind is the comparison of

probabilities, and probability, as we are told, is the very guide of life. It is wiser, then, to help us to strike the balance of probabilities than to expatiate on the joy of rendering everything uncertain. It is therefore wiser to help us to determine whether it is more probable that St. John wrote his Gospel than to sharpen our critical acumen in discovering the precise dimensions of the original Gospel which our present St. John has superseded. It is hardly to be supposed that the authority we ascribe to St. John's Gospel is derived from those who accepted it as his. The fact that they accepted it as his is due rather to the evidence there then was in its favour, which evidence, therefore, their acceptance reflects, than it is the cause of its authority. That authority to us, at all events, is based on the fact that it is his, which fact is the result of the strong balance of probability in its favour.

Now the same considerations, *mutatis mutandis*, are applicable to Deuteronomy. The internal assumption of authorship is at least as strong as in St. John's Gospel. The first historical evidence of the recognition of the book is more definite and certain than it is with St. John's Gospel. This can only be set aside by the assumption that the first acceptance of the book was a mistake on the part of prophetess, priest, and king, involving at all events 'pseudepigraphy,' where everything points in the other direction. For it is a pure assumption that 'pseudepigraphy' would have produced the results that were produced; and it is a pure assumption that in the fifty years before Josiah's reign anyone was flourishing in Israel who could have written the existing Deuteronomy. And these are conditions which must be satisfactorily met in order that the professed theory of its origin can stand. Before dwelling upon the alleged discrepancies and contradictions of Deuteronomy, exaggerated if not strained by our ignorance of circumstances indispensable to the understanding of them, it would be well to look these facts full in the face and decide whether they can be reconciled with the opposite theory, or whether they are not inherently fatal to it. The Higher Critics arrogate to themselves the exclusive possession of scholarship, and talk loudly about 'the best scholarship,' 'the great majority of modern scholars,' and the like, as though there were nothing to be said on the other side, and as if nothing had been said on a matter by no means one of pure scholarship by Robertson, A. Blomfield, Baxter, Kennedy, Cave, Spencer, Stanley Leathes, Lias, and others, much of which, we are bold to say, not only has not been answered, but which never can be answered.

Dr. Driver himself is no match for a man like Professor Robertson of Glasgow, who is possessed of a telling and lively style, together with a genuine sense of humour, in both of which the former is conspicuously deficient. And though in the case of one like Dr. Briggs, who has shown himself a master of liberal learning, it may seem invidious to single out what is probably an error of the press, yet it is as well to say that it is hard to understand how such an error could escape the grammatical criticism of so 'high' a critic as we find on p. 371, 'élé for 'el, under the circumstances an absolutely impossible form. Scholarship, when it is advanced as the main ground of criticism, which is confessedly not dependent upon it, may become a two-edged weapon and be found dangerous to those who boast the use of it.

The question which the Higher Critics seem to evade rather than try to answer is, What is the objective authority of Scripture? If, as is alleged in the case of the Old Testament, it is in the highest degree uncertain and dependent only upon a very vague and ineffectual witness which is largely accidental and entirely unauthenticated, it seems to come to nothing and fade into an authority derived merely from the persons giving it. If, *e.g.*, the Psalter is only of the second century, according to the wild and extravagant theory of Professor Cheyne, it seems to fail altogether of any authority which it can derive either from its unknown authors or from those who cherished and preserved their writings. The 110th Psalm, *e.g.*, can in no sense be Divine or fit to bear the use made of it in the New Testament. Indeed, on this principle, the Hebrew Psalter would seem to have no more claim to be regarded as divine or called the Word of God, as Christ calls it, than *The Ring and the Book*. It is as though the assumption were first made that there was something to be called the Word of God, though why so called it is hard to say, and then the effort was to be made to destroy the right and title of that which is so called to the name given it. In fact, we only call it the Word of God because from time immemorial it has been so called, and whether or not, with Professor Driver, we add to this name the phrase, 'mediated by a human agency,' we must at all events be careful to show that it has no other right to this name than the prescription of use. The intrinsic claim is gone: in fact, it never had any, although we must do Professor Briggs the justice to allow that he is a strenuous advocate for the intrinsic and spiritual authority and essence of the Divine word, even if, as it too often seems, this is to be determined ultimately by his

own individual opinion subject to the final results, if there ever are such, of the Highest Criticism. The question, therefore, resolves itself into this: Can the Scriptures make good their claim to have come with the actual authority of God? We do not speak of inspiration, because that involves so much that has to be proved and not assumed; but have they historically any credentials peculiar to themselves which other books have not and cannot have, and if so, what were those credentials? On the Driver and Ryle theory this is a question hard to answer, and we doubt if they would be careful to answer it. They would prefer leaving it to the great king to answer for himself, whoever he may be.

Now, it must be premised that a scientific answer cannot be given to this question. The Higher Criticism endeavours to give a scientific answer, but it can give none, and seems to forget that none can be given. We cannot scientifically prove that St. John or St. Mark wrote the Gospels respectively ascribed to them, still less can we prove scientifically that Moses wrote Deuteronomy; but we can prove with overwhelming probability in either case, that St. John wrote his Gospel and that Moses wrote Deuteronomy. But if we are to wait to believe in the Old Testament till we can scientifically prove that Moses wrote Deuteronomy, or that David wrote one of the Psalms, or that Isaiah wrote any one of the chapters ascribed to him, we shall never believe in it, for the thing is *per se* impossible, just as it is scientifically impossible to prove the contrary. There is so much jugglery in this matter. Dr. Briggs is very careful to lay it down as one of the many laws of thought governing alike Higher Criticism and other things, that 'Everything is either A or not A; everything is either a given thing or something which is not a given thing; there is no mean between two contradictory propositions' (p. 82). Then if this is so, that which we have is a revelation or it is not a revelation; if it is not a revelation, then away with it! no expulsion of the unclean thing can be too violent; but if we have a revelation, then by all the laws of reason and science it must fulfil certain conditions, it must present certain credentials—if, that is, we are to judge of it. Now, the boast of the Higher Critics is, that such and such books fail utterly in the presentation of such and such indispensable credentials: *ergo* that which professes to be the word of God is not the word of God; that which professes to come as a revelation from God does not at all come from Him—at all events, it is 'mediated by a human agency'; and when we examine it there is

nothing, as Dr. Briggs would say, 'back' of the human agency, it is human from first to last—and Professor Ryle would *back* him. For clearly if A is bold enough to say, 'After all, I feel there is something behind this profession of a revelation,' B will reply, 'I do not care: I do not feel that there is, and therefore there is not. Everything must be or not be; if it is it is, and if it is not it is not.' That is the Higher Criticism all over. It is the law of the *ipse dixit*, the *sic cogitavit*. When it is confessedly impossible to have Demonstration, then we must content ourselves with Probability, and when these Briggs and Ryle theories of the origin of the Divine word land us in uncertainties which are absolutely fatal to its ultra-human authority, then we must fall back upon probability, and we venture to think that for calm and unimpassioned *believers* the probabilities in favour will sufficiently outweigh those which are advanced against the authority of Scripture and the supposed origin of its most important books. As we have said before, Dr. Briggs professes at the outset that to him Scripture is *Holy* Scripture. But after wading through his very learned, and in many respects very valuable, 700 pages, we are still somewhat perplexed by his application of the epithet 'Holy.' We are constrained to ask why Holy? And the answer is, Because Dr. Briggs thinks it so, because it satisfies his preconceived conditions of Holiness. But suppose it does, what then? The question is, Does it satisfy ours? And if it satisfies his, Why does it satisfy ours? for we have the same right to be satisfied that he has.

We cannot but think that after this wave of destructive criticism has passed over us (for the Higher Criticism is essentially destructive) we shall again feel the need of something that is constructive. We shall cast about amid the ruins of the old for something wherewith to reconstruct the new, and then it may be that we shall be astonished to find in how many cases the stone which the former builders in their excess of zeal rejected may again become the head of the corner. After men have discovered that in many cases they have mistaken the footprints of their fellow-creatures for the footprints of their God, they will begin to ask whether there are not still marks in Scripture deeper and more unmistakeable that it is impossible to ascribe to man, and that if this is so, they still speak for themselves in witness of that which man cannot have done, and that while man was doubting, debating, disbelieving and disobeying, the Lord God had after all been walking about in the garden in the cool of the evening, and

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saying unto man 'Where art thou?' The footprints were there, but they were unseen and unrecognised till he heard the voice and quailed before it and was fain to hide his nakedness as best he might. In short, the central question, after all, is this, 'Is the Word of God the creation of the Church, or is the Church itself created by the Word of God.' Now the historic teaching on this matter from first to last is that the Church is the creation of the Word of God. Abraham was called by God; the Spirit of the Lord came upon David; the believers to whom Peter wrote were born again, not of corruptible seed but of incorruptible, by the Word of God; and the like. If this Word was in the imagination of those called and nowhere else, then there is an end to all revelation, inspiration, and what not. But if the Word of God is a living and objective essence, then it is itself a creative energy, and that which it creates is the Church. The Church does not create its creator; the Creator makes Himself known to the Church, and the history of this manifestation is recorded in the Scriptures in Genesis, Deuteronomy, St. John's Gospel, and the like. If the history is not sufficiently authenticated, then the manifestation is a lie, the creation of those who were deceived into believing it to be the truth, and in that case the supposed Word of God is the creation of the Church.

And it is the thinly disguised purpose, or at least effect, of the Higher Criticism more and more to approximate to this position. Dr. Briggs and Professor Ryle make the Canon nothing more than the creation of the Church, and what the Church has made, it can, of course unmake. Hence the unsatisfactoriness of its methods and results. According to the sixth Article of the Church of England, the Church is 'the witness and keeper of Holy Writ,' and this defines exactly her relation to Scripture: it is the evidence of testimony to certain documents. It stands to reason that this evidence must vary in various cases. It is very strong in the New Testament; it is far less so in the Old. It does not profess to be scientific or demonstrative in either case—it is impossible to foreclose every avenue to doubt—but in either case there is not really any rebutting evidence. The books of the New Testament have stood the test of time; it is impossible that they should undergo material alteration. With the books of the Old Testament, their evidence is also one of testimony: testimony to a large extent confirmed by the accepted testimony of the New. In their case, however, it must also be borne in mind that there is actually no rebutting evidence. The evidence, such as it is, is deduced from themselves. The Higher Criticism bases

all its case upon the internal evidence of the books, which, it boasts, is conspicuously against their traditional value.

Now it is this internal evidence which is, to a large extent, dependent upon the individual, and must necessarily be so. But it must also be remembered that there is a large body of internal evidence distinctly in favour of the books as we have them. And this internal evidence is a positive element which has to be dealt with no less than the other. And this internal evidence has to be accounted for ; because, if it is to give way to the other, then we must presuppose a long and elaborate system of intentional manipulation with the preconceived object of perverting the features that we perceive. Not only must the names of Moses, David, Isaiah, and the like, have been substituted for others, but they must have been gratuitously affixed with a definite object. Because though it is true that we know absolutely nothing of the early history of these books, yet we do know that the ordinary conditions of human life and action must have operated here as elsewhere. Now this presupposes a very deep-laid scheme of intentional manipulation, inasmuch as the system of cross-reference between the several books can only be explained on the hypothesis that it was designedly followed without any very obvious or discernible motive, unless the motive was to give the reader the idea that the entire literature from beginning to end was of this closely connected and interdependent character. There is no need for instances to be given, because the thing is patent. But let anyone look at Bissell's coloured Genesis, and say if the result as there presented can be otherwise accounted for than as for the express purpose of the theory of the critic who will have it so ; and can any man in his senses believe that it gives any intelligible explanation of the historic origin of Genesis. Consequently, the adoption of this theory, for which all the Higher Critics make themselves more or less responsible, lands us in far greater difficulties than those from which we endeavour to escape. It is indeed hard to believe that Moses or anyone else ever heard the 'theophanic voice of God.' But supposing he did, as Dr. Briggs does suppose, there is nothing improbable in an authentic narrative of it having been recorded and preserved. The narrative we have professes to be such. We do not solve the initial difficulty by depreciating and discrediting the narrative as we have it, and safeguarding our belief by taking refuge in some vague and imaginary 'theophanic voice of God,' which is destined to prove far less endurable or credible than the narrative itself.

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Let the general principles of the Higher Critics as laid down by Dr. Briggs and others be to a large extent conceded, two points have to be borne in mind: Are there to be no limits, but subjective ones, to the application of these principles? Are we conceivably to be obliged to regard St. John's Gospel as a document of the second century, and therefore neither genuine nor authentic? Are we finally to recognise nothing more than a few dubious and uncertain *logia* as the bare residuum of the Synoptic Gospels, and are we to consider this result as condoned and compensated for by allowing the Parable of the Prodigal Son to be the consummate flower of all human compositions, and by expending effusive and misplaced epithets on the moral character of Christ? Are we finally to accept the position that Abraham and Moses are unhistoric characters; that Samuel's history is more or less disfigured with mythical additions; that David was not the spiritual man he has always been supposed to be; that the real history of Elijah and Elisha is irrecoverable, and the like? In short, where are we to stop? Who shall set bounds to the flight of this Higher Criticism, and where shall we be when it has passed beyond all bounds? We are justified in asking this question because there is another point that has to be kept in view, which is this. It is impossible to disguise the fact that if the broad and general veracity of the Old Testament is overthrown, as Driver and Cheyne have overthrown it, and as Dr. Briggs in numerous instances has done, it is simply hopeless for Christianity as a Divine revelation to survive the overthrow. It is not the authorship of the books of Moses that is at stake, but the historic reality and worth of these books which the New Testament has so largely endorsed. It is not the integrity of Isaiah, or the historic value of Jeremiah that is at stake, but the validity of the authority to which they laid claim, or which has been ascribed to them, because if this rests on a merely human basis which in the case of Isaiah is asserted to be entirely false, then the place assumed for and assigned to them in the New Testament, is altogether wrong. For with the credit claimed for them by the New Testament writers goes also their own credit as guides for us. They reverently bowed to authority which we cannot accept. They regarded their language as we have learnt not to regard it. And what is to be the end? The mission of Christ is largely coloured by the mistakes and misrepresentations of His disciples. We occupy a vantage ground which was denied to them. We understand Isaiah better than Paul or John did, and though we do not know who

wrote words ascribed to him by Paul and Christ, we know at least that he did not. And great indeed is the gain! for the Bible becomes less and less the word of God, and more and more the word of man—indeed, it is impossible to distinguish the one from the other. And with the non-human and extra-human origin and authority of the Scriptures of the Old Testament and the New—for the New perishes if the Old is destroyed—goes also the edifice of non-natural and superhuman fact to which both alike bear witness. The ethical basis of the Gospel is closely connected with its framework of supernatural fact. The two cannot be separated. Our Lord laid down His life in attestation of His claim to be the Christ. After His resurrection He claimed that the things written concerning Him in the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms, must needs have been fulfilled. If such things were written, they were not written by men who spake casually, but as they were borne along by the Holy Ghost. There is no advantage, therefore, in minimizing the effect of this operation. We do not get nearer to its original source by groping about the indications of human authorship. The spirit that spake by the Prophets and Apostles is different in degree if not in kind from that which has spoken before or after Christ. The Christian Church can show nothing to compete with it at least in authority. Why is this? Because an agency manifested itself which it is not the province of science to define, however eagerly it may aspire to do so. Consequently, in order to estimate this agency aright and to come under the influence of it, we must divest ourselves of the human and the earthly, as in every approach to God that which is our own must be abandoned. There are many remarks in the last pages of Dr. Briggs which we would gladly adopt, especially as when he finely says that 'the student of Scripture should be bathed in prayer' (p. 662).

It may be hoped that such 'hallowing of criticism,' if honestly and earnestly exercised, may have a moderating and corrective influence on the recklessness and confidence with which many of the advocates of the Higher Criticism pursue their inquiries, for not otherwise, with all due allowance for the zeal and learning of Dr. Briggs, do we understand how the Sacred Scriptures can rightly be regarded as the Word of God, or that, without withdrawing what we have already professed to believe, to him or anyone else the Bible can continue to be the Holy Scripture.

The difficulty which confronts the reviewer in dealing with this book is the extent of the ground that it covers.

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Beginning with the advantages of the study of Holy Scripture, it deals especially with the literature and languages of the Bible, with the criticism and Canon, the history and criticism of the Canon, the history of the text, the translations of the Bible, the criticism of the text, the structure of the prose and poetry, ending with the credibility and truthfulness of Scripture and the use of it as a means of grace. It were hard, indeed, if in the treatment of all this range of subjects there were not much that is of real and permanent value, and much that will fulfil the endeavour of the writer to meet the want of the student. We have marked passage after passage for reference and quotation, but to deal adequately with all these would demand a volume rather than a review.

'Exegesis,' says the writer, 'does not start from the unity to investigate the variety, but from the variety to find the unity. It does not seek the author's view of the divine doctrine through an analysis of the writing, the chapter, the verse, down to the word; but, inversely, it starts with the word and the clause, pursuing its way through the verse, paragraph, section, chapter, writing, collection of writings, the entire "Bible," until the whole word of God is displayed before the mind from the summit that has been attained after a long and arduous climbing. Thus the study of Holy Scripture is altogether scientific; its premises and materials are no less clear and tangible than those with which any other science has to do, and its results are vastly more important than those of all other sciences combined, for they concern our salvation and everlasting welfare' (pp. 16, 17).

This is all very well, but everything depends upon the conception and the meaning of science. It is clearly not mathematical science; and then, if science is based on the induction of facts, two things are indispensable: one is that the facts should be thoroughly well ascertained, and the other is that they should be sufficiently broad to bear the induction. Now we must hesitate to place certain hypotheses, *e.g.* about Micah, Isaiah and the rest, in the category of ascertained facts, and therefore rightly decline to accept the induction built upon them. One needs only to compare the first and latest lucubrations of Mr. Cheyne, for instance, on Isaiah, to be fully justified in refusing to accept his results. Stated generally, there is, perhaps, little objection to be taken to these remarks of Dr. Briggs, but the difficulty arises in the application of the principles as stated. We absolutely deny the general claim of the Higher Criticism to rank as a science in the sense assumed. And when one knows the uncertainty that must always attach to the poems of Homer and to the authorship

of sundry plays of Shakespeare, it is vain to boast in the confident and certain way that Dr. Briggs and his fellows are wont to do. No one desires to forbid them the right to speculate as widely as they like, but the right to demur to their so-called results must be allowed also to those who would criticize them. Moreover, it must always be borne in mind that there is a certain weight of traditional and external testimony which ranks in the category of positive evidence which must be fairly dealt with and not merely brushed aside in favour of that which is merely hypothetical and purely subjective. Dr. Briggs is a great analyst. He divides Biblical exegesis, itself belonging to 'the Introductory department of *Biblical Hermeneutics*,' into Grammatical Exegesis, Logical and Rhetorical Exegesis, Historical Exegesis, comparative Exegesis; Literary Exegesis, Doctrinal and Practical Exegesis, and having gone so far in his analysis one is surprised that he is content to go no further.

'A scientific Biblical study,' thus conducted, he says, 'under the guidance of the Holy Spirit will ere long remove the clouds of prejudice and bigotry which envelop the battle of the sects and enable all men to see the Truth, the entire Truth of God, in all its wondrous simplicity, beauty, grandeur and glory. Biblical science in its warfare with error and bigotry uses smokeless powder, and all its aims and their results are in the clear light of heaven and open to the vision of the entire world' (p. 41).

If all history is to be dealt with according to the requirements of subjective analysis there is an end to the credibility of every record that was ever made, whether that of Joseph, the Exodus, or, as Whately shows, of the career of Napoleon.

'It is distressing,' says Dr. Briggs, 'to part with the sweet stories which have been told us in our early life, and which have been handed down by the romancers from the childhood and youth of our race. We may still use them as stories, as products of the imagination, but we dare not build on them as historic verities. As men we must know the truth. We cannot afford to deceive ourselves or others. Many of these legends and traditions have strongly entrenched themselves and lie like solid rocks in the path of historic investigation. They must be exploded to get at the truth; and this cannot be done without noise and confusion and outcries of alarm from the weak and timid, and those who are interested in the maintenance of error and court popularity by an appeal to prejudices' (p. 85).

It seems difficult to say what narrative is safe that is approached in this spirit. Whether that of the Gospels or the Acts, there is ample material for criticism in either, and

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if that only is to be accepted which is absolutely secure from such treatment, our repertory will be small indeed. Dr. Briggs mentions four canons by which the Higher Criticism determines the credibility of writings. These are :

1. The writing must be in accordance with its supposed historic position as to time and place and circumstances.

2. Differences of style imply differences of experience and age of the same author ; or when sufficiently great, differences of author and of period of composition.

3. Differences of opinion and conception imply differences of author when these are sufficiently great, and also differences of period of composition.

4. Citations show the dependence of the author upon the author or authors cited, when these are definite and the identity of the author cited can be clearly established.

It is at once evident that these canons are in themselves unexceptionable, but much depends upon the way in which they are applied and upon the judgment with which inferences are drawn from them. It is also to be borne in mind that in many cases they are inapplicable to several of the Scripture documents in consequence of our entire ignorance of the conditions required and involved before they can be applied. What, for example, do we know about Joel or Josiah apart from the premises with which we start ? And those in the case of Joel, at least, have led critics to diametrically opposite conclusions. Surely Dr. Briggs is over sanguine when he anticipates unanimity as the final outcome of *his* application of the Higher Criticism. Nor is it easy to see what his theory of the Canon is. He appeals to the statement of the Westminster Confession : ' The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, dependeth not upon the teaching of any man or Church, but wholly upon God (who is truth itself) the author thereof ; and therefore it is to be received because it is the word of God.'

' This principle,' says Dr. Briggs, ' of establishing the Canon lifts it above mere ecclesiastical authority, far above the speculations of dogmaticians and fluctuating traditions, and builds it on the rock summit of the authority of God Himself. It was ever the internal divine evidence and the holy character of Holy Scriptures that persuaded the ancients of their canonicity, and these evidences have persuaded devout souls in all times. But some say : " You are giving every man the right to make his own Bible." Not so ; criticism takes from every denomination of Christians, and from tradition and from the theologians their spurious claims to determine the Canon of Holy Scripture for all men ; but it does not give that authority to any individual man. It puts the authority to determine His Holy Word

in God Himself. It teaches us to look for the divine evidence in the Holy Scriptures themselves,' &c. (p. 161).

One does not see what is to prevent Dr. Briggs and the critics being included in this enumeration, but if so the assertion falls to the ground and leaves us where we were. What about such books as Daniel and Jonah? The critics reject them, but there are not a few, scholars and others, to whom these books speak, not only with the very voice of God Himself, but also with certain cogent reasonings of another kind which carry conviction to those who are content with a balance of probability, and prefer that to a conclusion which rests entirely on hypothesis. To us it seems that the criteria of Dr. Briggs are worth nothing, because they appeal only to the subjective judgment of the individual, which will vary in every individual case. To one the Bible itself and every part of it will be the Word of God; to another it will be only a mass of puerile conceits and myths and fictions. The test is an absolutely subjective one, which appeals only to the subject, and despairs of making good its claim to any but those who swallow the premises and accept the conclusions drawn from them. Surely those who are prepared to accept the divine authority of Holy Scripture must demur to much that Dr. Briggs tells us of the Scriptures which he calls Holy, or else the word is altogether a misnomer. 'If men are not won by the holy character of the biblical books, it must be because for some reason their eyes have been withheld from seeing it.' Precisely so. But what if much of what boasts itself as Higher Criticism is exactly that which is absolutely fatal to their seeing it? The brief which he holds for the Higher Criticism is self-contradictory or fatal to the authority of Scripture. In fact, much of the argument of Dr. Briggs proceeds on the assumption that there is no halting-place between a blind and indiscriminating Bibliolatry and the unconditional acceptance of any assertions, however vague or extreme, which shelter themselves behind the name of Higher Criticism.

No one desires to take exception to many of the general principles enunciated by Dr. Briggs; the only question is the method of their application and the conclusions they are advanced to support. For example, he is at great pains to observe that what he calls the inspiration of a book does not depend upon the truth with which it is ascribed to a particular author. And consequently if every one of the Gospels was by an unknown author, or, by parity of reasoning, any of St. Paul's Epistles were not by him, the

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authority in every case would be the same, because they would all speak for themselves as divine documents. This seems to be a legitimate statement of his position. Its defectiveness, however, is apparent in this. An Epistle of St. Paul *not* by him would not have the authority of St. Paul ; it would be of the less value because it had not ; it might conceivably inculcate something of which St. Paul would have disapproved ; it cannot be therefore an immaterial point whether or not it is St. Paul's, and if not being St. Paul's, it bears his name, that would be absolutely fatal to any authority it might claim as being his. In like manner with regard to the Synoptic Gospels everything depends, not indeed upon the correctness with which they have been ascribed to their several writers, but upon the credit they possess as being the work of competent and trustworthy witnesses. But if St. John's Gospel, which claims to be by him, is not his (and Dr. Briggs speaks, p. 269, of *the editor of the original John*, which goes a long way towards negating his authority), then there is an end to all its authority as being the testimony of an eye-witness except so much as we please arbitrarily still to assign to him, which may be anything or nothing. It cannot, therefore, be a matter of indifference whether or not he wrote the Gospel as we have it. This is not a question of inspiration, but of the genuineness of a certain work which must inevitably involve the question of its authority and general trustworthiness.

In like manner with regard to the prophecies assigned to Isaiah : supposing them to be genuine *as they profess to be*, they manifestly have the authority which the sixth chapter leads us to ascribe to them ; but if they have been so carelessly edited as the critics assume, or so ignorantly put together that documents separated by centuries have all been tacked on to a bare nucleus of Isaiah's writings, and the thirteenth chapter especially, wrongly, not to say fraudulently, inscribed with his name—for it is hard to see how this can otherwise be accounted for—then it is clear that the spurious chapters are not only deprived of his authority, but whatever authority they may have of themselves is depreciated by their mistaken assignment to him ; and inasmuch as nothing is known of their writer, they come before us as indifferent writings of no more authority than they incidentally derive from the fact that some unknown person or persons ascribed them by design or mistake to a person whose authority is unquestioned. It is therefore perfectly absurd to say that it matters not whether such or such a book was or was not written by its alleged author, because this must depend upon the amount of

authority due to that author and the correctness or incorrectness with which it is ascribed to him. It is a matter of merely literary interest who wrote the letters of Junius, because nobody ever knew by whom they were written, and Junius is only another name for the letters themselves, which have nothing but their own authority and not the authority of Junius. But if anyone were to publish letters now purporting to be by the same author as those of Junius, all the authority or interest they could have would depend solely upon the success with which they could or could not make good their claim to be written by the same author as the letters of Junius, even if it still remained unknown who Junius was. And it is not very different with the writings ascribed to Isaiah which it is asserted do not belong to him ; for being confessedly by an unknown writer, the only authority they have is that which whether by accident or design they derive from being associated with him.

Now, on the supposition that they are predictive prophecies, it is certain that they could not have become so associated, whether by accident or design, except in the belief that it was the function of the prophet to utter such predictions. But, it is just this function which is by the critics denied to prophecy. If, on the other hand, these so-called spurious writings of Isaiah were attributed to him because they were ignorantly supposed to be his, then the authority they possess is that only of the persons who so attributed them *plus* the authority of their unknown author or authors, which may or may not be *nil*. At all events, all their *authority* is derived from the fact of their being gathered together—how, we know not—into the collection of Isaiah's writings. Their authority, therefore, as regards its origin, is purely human, and involves an error of ignorance, carelessness, or judgment. Clearly, therefore, the authority of a book is not independent of the name of the person to whom it is ascribed—that is to say, it is not a matter of no importance whether a book is genuine or spurious. What is the value of any one of the plays of Shakespeare when it is shown to a reasonable degree of certainty that it is not by him ? But in the case of Scriptures, which are comparatively worthless if they do not contain a divine revelation, all their claim to such a revelation vanishes when it is found that their credentials fail, as is obviously the case with the writings of Isaiah which are not his. For they come to us with the credit of his name and can show no other except that which is fraudulent or mistaken. Now, the theory of Dr. Briggs,

Professor Ryle and others appears to be that the only authority of the Old Testament Scriptures is the consensus of the Jewish Church in addition to any intrinsic value they may have of a moral or spiritual kind. But this consensus of the Jewish Church is, on their own showing, greatly at fault; in fact, in many respects their own opinion is directly counter to it. There remains, therefore, nothing but such moral and spiritual value as they may think fit to assign to the Old Testament Scriptures, which, as Dr. Briggs allows, can only reach those whom it reaches. Now, the question is whether this is or is not the *ultima ratio* of Scriptures which manifestly profess to record circumstances which they interpret as significant of a special Divine message. Because if their message is Divine and they are charged with it, that is a fact altogether independent of their inherent moral or spiritual value, and likewise of any consensus of human opinion about it. For instance, what about the authority of the Book of Genesis as to the origin of the Hebrew Church? Is it veracious or mythical? Is it historically trustworthy or not? If it is, then there must be sufficient evidence to warrant our accepting it as such. But what is this evidence? The consensus of the Jewish Church. Doubtless; but that consensus carries with it the Mosaic authorship which the critics reject. Consequently that alone can be worth little. But there is something besides the consensus of the Jewish Church, and that is the witness of the Jewish literature from beginning to end. Take away, for instance, the substantive truth of the history of the Patriarchs and the whole of that literature is left without any foundation to rest upon. In fact, it would be as if the Christian literature were left without the foundation of the Gospel history. And in such a case it would be idle to talk of revelation or inspiration or anything of the kind, for it would be a question of truth or falsehood, history or myth, and of nothing else.

Now, with regard to Genesis, it is true that we do not know who wrote it; nor is this of vital consequence, inasmuch as the book is absolutely silent as to its own authorship, or at all events its own author. Here, therefore, arises the crucial question of authority. On whose authority do we accept Genesis? Clearly on that of the Jewish Church, but likewise on the uniform testimony of all the literature, which is something vastly more than the consensus of the Jewish Church, which the critics regard as worthless, so far as the Pentateuch is concerned. We might therefore challenge Dr. Briggs to say how he knows Genesis to be

true, and if not true what is its value. Now the traditional position is that Moses must have been ultimately responsible for Genesis. Whatever documents or records he may have had access to, his whole work, so far as we historically know it, cannot be explained or accounted for except on the supposition that both he and his people were as well acquainted with the narrative of Genesis as we are. This can be proved to demonstration unless the historic value of the narrative of the Exodus is ruthlessly denied, for the whole subsequent history can only be explained on the supposition that the Genesis narrative is true. But if this narrative is *true*, and only true, then God spake with and gave promises to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob; and if this was so, the record of these communications becomes invaluable. There is no need to talk of their being inspired. The question of questions is, Are they sufficiently true for us to trust them? because, if so, they must in a certain sense and to a certain degree be inspired. In what sense and to what degree it matters not: they do contain a veritable communication from God, and this, not because the Jewish Church said they did, nor because Moses wrote them—which he may or may not have done—but simply because the whole course of circumstances, the nature of the history, and the witness of the literature, shut us up to no other possible conclusion. Thus the Church, whether Jewish or Christian, is a witness and keeper of Holy Writ. She does not create the Scriptures, but they are the record of her own origin and creation. God spake to Abraham, and the voice of God called Abraham out of Chaldæa. He did not imagine that Divine voice, nor create his creator, but he obeyed the voice with the consequence and result that is recorded. The only question is, Is the record true? The critics do not help us to decide that, except in the negative, nor tell us on what principles it is to be decided otherwise, unless on those of simple faith; nor does Dr. Briggs tell us how else we are to know it to be the word of God. There can be no question, however, that if it is not true, and if it has no other authority than that of an unknown and unauthorized writer, it has no valid claim to be the Word of God.

Dr. Briggs is very careful to distinguish between the adoption of a false name and forgery. 'Why should the pseudonym be banished from the Bible?' he asks (p. 324); but adds on the next page:

'All would admit that no forger or forgery could be inspired. But that everyone who writes a pseudonym is a deceiver or forger is

absurd. The usage of literature, ancient and modern, has established its propriety. If it claims to be by a particular author, and is said by a critic to be a pseudonyme, then its credibility is attacked and the question of its inspiration is raised. In the New Testament the Gospel of St. John was thought by some to be a pseudonyme of the second Christian century, but this has been entirely disproved.'

Now, here there is a confusion between the practice of pseudonymous writing and forgery. The two things are distinct. The *Waverley* novels were not falsely named as being by the author of *Waverley*. But a book that is falsely named and claims to be by one who did not write it is *ipso facto* a forgery, as the *Epistles of Phalaris*; and a book that has internal marks of being by a certain writer which are apparent indications of its being that writer, and are intended to suggest that it is by no one else, courts public attention under false colours, and may or may not be called a *forgery* according to the importance of the issues depending upon it. For instance, nothing depends upon the so-called 'Wisdom of Solomon' being by him, inasmuch as it does not even mention his name or claim to be written by him, and it owes its claim, such as it is, simply to those, whoever they were, that called it the 'Wisdom of Solomon'; but the Gospel of St. John distinctly claims to be written by him, as does the Book of Deuteronomy by Moses: and very important issues depend upon the correctness, with or without which they make this claim or appear to make it, and consequently though some would call the 'Wisdom of Solomon' a forgery, under the circumstances it would be impossible to call Deuteronomy or St. John anything else. Nor is it possible that in either case the claim to have been written by Moses or St. John could have been advanced for any other purpose than to gain that recognition to which they were not entitled, and which otherwise they would not have gained. This is the difference between a pseudonym and a forgery, and Dr. Briggs is in error in endeavouring to apologize for the one by suggesting that it may be covered by the other. To show how completely this is the case, 'It is now conceded by scholars that Ecclesiastes is such a pseudonyme, using Solomon's name,' says Dr. Briggs (p. 324), forgetting altogether that the writer nowhere uses it.

As a specimen of the random conjectures which this strenuous advocate of the Critics is willing to adopt, even in regard to the New Testament, we may take the following:

'The Book of Acts is a compilation, using a Hebraic narrative of the early Jerusalem Church, and the "We" narrative of a co-

traveller with Paul and probably other sources. The Gospel of John is also partly a compilation, using an earlier Gospel of John in the Hebrew language, and the Hymn to the Logos in the Prologue. The Apocalypse is a compilation of a number of apocalypses of different dates. The Book of Daniel is a compilation in two parts—the one giving stories relating to Daniel, the other visions and dreams of Daniel. It is written in two different languages—the Hebrew and the Aramaic' (p. 327).

This is, indeed, a rough and ready way of settling such questions. The only consolation is that the very extravagance of the method adopted is the best guarantee that the *settlement* will not be permanent. It seems to us that Dr. Briggs greatly strains and overstates his case when he puts it as he does :

'If we regard the last chapter of Romans as not in the original autograph of the Epistle to the Romans, does this remove it from the Canon of inerrant, inspired Scripture? And what shall we say of the difference between the Hebrew and Greek Bibles? If we compare the Greek version with the Hebrew text of the writings, it is evident that editors and scribes have been at work subsequent to the time when the translations were made of the texts upon which the one or the other of these original authorities rely. The additions to Daniel, Esther, and Ezra in the Greek version show the work of editors and scribes upon these books. There are also serious differences in Jeremiah, the Psalter and the Book of Proverbs. Even in the Pentateuch the arrangement of the material is different. If we maintain that in all cases the Hebrew text should be followed, and the work of the scribes upon the Hebrew manuscripts which underlie the Greek text should be rejected, we are met with the use of the Greek text by the Apostles in the New Testament and by the Christian Fathers in the sub-apostolic age. But what shall we say of the editors and scribes who have made the editorial changes which may be traced in the Hebrew text itself? Can we fix a time when the Divine Spirit ceased to guide the sacred scribes who edited and re-edited, arranged and rearranged the writings of the Old Testament? Will it be necessary to eliminate all the editorial additions and glosses, readjust all the transpositions, correct all the mistakes, and return the text to the exact original before we get at the original inerrant Scripture? When anyone gives his serious attention to the practical work of criticism, as it has been described in the pages of this book, he will see in what an untenable position he involves himself by recognizing errors in all documents accessible to us, and by insisting solely and alone upon the inerrancy of the original autographs. In point of fact, as regards the greater part of the writings of Holy Scripture, it may be said that the original autographs, as they "came from them to whom and through whom God originally communicated his revelation," were not the ones which were recognized by the Church as inspired and canonical; but the Jews and

the Christians alike recognized rather the documents as they came from the hands of later editors at many stages of removal from the original autographs' (p. 619).

Now there runs through this paragraph the assumption that the opponents of the extreme critical position and the so-called results of extreme criticism are pledged to maintain the absolute inerrancy of some particular form of Scripture, and that the discovery of this particular inerrant form is incumbent upon them in order to establish the validity of their position. But in neither particular is this the case. We do not believe that God has so linked His revelation to the words of any book as that the reality of it must stand or fall with the preservation of that book from all the accidents of transcription and from every occurrence of minute error. God's revelation has been given in fact and history. The contention with those who call themselves Higher Critics lies rather in this, that they have thrown so much doubt on the historic credibility and the facts of Scripture as to make uncertain and insecure the witness of Scripture to the very facts and framework of revelation. That this is the case is manifest and notorious, and we join issue with them just here and say : If your results are such as you allege them to be, then they are fatal not only to the inerrancy of Scripture, which we are by no means careful to maintain, but also to the certainty of the revelation itself, whether that depends upon the Divine authority of the Mosaic Law or upon the resurrection of Jesus Christ ; and, therefore, inasmuch as we utterly refuse to accept these results, we not unnaturally call in question the principles which have led to them ; and when we come to investigate and examine them *critically* we find that they rest so largely upon hypothesis and conjecture as to be destitute of valid ground for accepting them. As this is a matter of detail, it can only be dealt with in detail to be made apparent, and that would require the argument to be extended over the whole of Scripture : but enough possibly has been said to indicate the nature of the contention, and the decision of the question depends so much upon *a priori* considerations as to the true character of revelation and as to the relation of the Holy Scripture to it that we may leave the detailed discussion of it with the less anxiety and concern, as not really essential to the more important question which has first to be determined, and that is whether or not God has spoken to man, and if so where is the record of His communication to be found, and is it in itself sufficiently certain and substantial for us to trust in it.

As an instance of the method referred to we also take this: Pseudonymous literature was common among the ancients, is common among ourselves; *therefore* we may assume that it was not unknown to the Hebrews; *therefore* we may take Ecclesiastes as an undoubted instance, and may not hesitate to affirm the same for Deuteronomy, Daniel, certain of the prophets, and even the Gospel of St. John itself. But it is patent to everyone that the assumption here is hypothetical, and that even if it is allowed, the several *therefores* do not necessarily follow, but must each be examined on its own merits and determined accordingly. Besides, it is a very far cry from the assumption of anonymous literature to the assertion that the narrative in 2 Kings xxii. proves that Deuteronomy was a 'literary fiction' of the time of Manasseh and Josiah. In all their statements, and in the attitude of the Higher Critics generally, there is nothing more conspicuous than their sublime unconsciousness of a *non sequitur*. Most truly it may be said of them that they do not understand the meaning of the word *therefore*, and Dr. Briggs is no exception, but in him the unconsciousness of the necessary connexion between premises and conclusions is coupled with a corresponding inability to see that his own conclusion is inconsistent with if not absolutely fatal to the principles which he advocates. For he professes his acceptance of Scripture as something Holy, and therefore we may suppose *sui generis*, and yet he deals with it in such a way as effectually to destroy its authority, except where he is willing to admit it. How he proposes to bring home that authority to those who are equally prepared to question it, he does not condescend to tell us. We may presume that neither Daniel nor Deuteronomy comes with this authority to him, though our Lord was content to rest on the latter as the written word of God in his conflict with his adversary. It were amusing if it were not painful to read his remarks on a cognate matter:

'A careful study of all the ethical passages of the Old Testament convinces me that there is an entire absence of censure of the sin of falsehood until after the exile. [Observe here the unsustained assumption of the late date of certain parts of Scripture.] The sin of falsewitnessing is condemned in the Tables; and also the sin of falsehood, so far as it is connected with robbery and murder, is frequently and severely scourged in the prophets. But they seem to know nothing of the sin of speaking lies as such. What is the evidence from their silence? They were altogether unconscious of its sinfulness. The ruling men did not hesitate to lie whenever they had a good object in view, and they showed no consciousness of sin in it;

and the writers who tell of their lies are as innocent as they. The evidence from this silence is that the Hebrews did not in their ethical development reach the understanding of the sin of lying until after the return from exile, and then largely under the influence of Persian ethics, which from the earliest times made truth-speaking essential to good morals. These are examples of the method by which the evidences of the Higher Criticism may be applied to Holy Scripture' (p. 308).

In view of the disintegrating process which is so recklessly applied to the literature of the Bible, it is as well to bear in mind that it is still possible to approach the study of it on other principles, and with very substantial and satisfactory results. This is not the place to enter into these, but there is a certain witness of history to Scripture which even the Higher Criticism cannot touch, and there is a certain witness of Scripture to itself, and of one part of Scripture to another, which is also proof against criticism until the witness of Scripture is found to be false witness; and the result of this constructive process on the unbiassed mind is to establish on a sufficiently sound basis the position that we have a written record of a message from God which is sufficiently clear and definite, notwithstanding all the accidents of translation, transcription, and the like, to commend itself to the believing mind of the child of God as the voice of his Father in Heaven. We are quite willing to allow criticism to go on its own way untrammelled and unhindered, and we are by no means disposed to grudge it its well-ascertained results; but we have a right to demand that they shall rest upon something more certain than the mere *ipse dixit* of a self-satisfied and over-confident person who calls himself a Higher Critic, and we will reserve to ourselves the right to determine whether given conclusions do follow necessarily from assumed or even allowed premises; whether every alleged *therefore* does follow from the *because* asserted; and whether, after all said and written and supposed to be proved, it is not Q. E. F. that has to be subscribed rather than Q. E. D. at the end of the process.

The Word of God is, after all, quick and powerful, and, being sharper than any two-edged sword, it may wound and wound fatally those who wield it unskilfully and use it for an illegitimate purpose. In groping about the roots of the Tree of Life with the intent of discovering its origin and laying bare the secret of its growth, we may do that which will injure ourselves, and spend our labour for that which does not profit, inasmuch as it is the leaves of the tree which are for the

healing of the nations, and its fruit that can alone sustain us. To know that God is true, and that His Word endureth for ever, is something more than to know what was the actual origin of Genesis, which is no less impossible than needless, and which in any case is not to be confounded with the belief, however confident, that we have discovered it.

ART. IV.—WEST AFRICAN PROBLEMS.

West African Studies. By MARY H. KINGSLEY, author of *Travels in West Africa*. With Illustrations and Maps. (London, 1899.)

IT is not a little refreshing to meet with a writer at once so well equipped and so original as Miss Mary H. Kingsley shows herself in her *West African Studies*. The subject to which she has devoted so much and such well directed pains, despite its inherent importance, is not one that would be expected to present any special attractiveness to a female traveller; but Mrs. Bishop has taught us that the energy and courage of women are not one whit inferior to those of men in the exploration of difficult and uncivilised regions, and Miss Kingsley's scientific ardour has carried her successfully through all impediments. We who live at home at ease can only read with profound gratitude and with unfeigned admiration the record of adventures in that deadly climate calmly faced by one who describes herself 'as ever the prey of frights, worries, and alarms,' who with unaffected modesty arrogates the place of one 'of the brickmakers of science,' and who bewails her inability to show us anything clearly and neatly, owing to her bad manner of expression.

On this last point we may assure Miss Kingsley that she need have no misgiving. Whatever difficulty she may experience in putting her thoughts into words, it is well to remember that so-called easy writing often makes very hard reading. We have too frequently to mark the lack of force, the shallowness of thought, the partial knowledge with which books of travel are written, not to welcome cordially a work that teems with thought and displays on every page a mastery of its subject. Under such conditions we are supremely indifferent to occasional ruggedness, relieved as it is constantly in these *West African Studies* by a humour which is somewhat exuberant. Miss Kingsley, like other

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writers, has the defects of her qualities, and in her efforts to reproduce life on the West Coast she at times allows her pen to indulge in unnecessary repetition of such coarseness of language as is a real blemish in her sparkling and most interesting volume.

To our thinking it needs a soul cast in a heroic mould to face the daily horrors of sojourn on the West African coast. The first and a highly effective deterrent is presented by the bare thought of a voyage to that fever-stricken region in a trading steamer, crammed with cargo, its saloon shared with West African merchants, who are eloquent on the dangers which the inexperienced visitor will shortly be called to incur, and whose talk varies from perils on land to those to be encountered amongst the breakers that fringe the coast. 'Do you get anything else but fever?' asks a new-comer nervously. 'Hav'n't time, as a rule, but I have known some fellows get kraw-kraw.' 'And the Portuguese itch, abscesses, ulcers, the Guinea worm, and the small-pox,' chimes in a chorus of voices. To the inexperienced what a spectre of horrors is suggested by congratulation on the possession of a dress suit of clothes as being constantly in requisition for funerals, followed by cheering reminiscences of first one comrade and then another who had been 'pegged out' and buried. Then come the delights of insect pests—clouds of mosquitoes, black beetles so tall that they can stand on their hind legs and drink out of a quart pot, scorpions and centipedes of exceptional malignity, huge dragon-flies that swish you in the face as you sit at dinner, and minute sandy-coloured ants that come in swarms and bite and burrow into your flesh and leave their offspring in the wound to keep up the conflict, culminating in the Driver ant, whose invasion is terrible enough to empty an African village, and on whose entrance into a hut the inmates fly, leaving all that is most precious behind them. To such perils by land the coaster adds the discomforts experienced on board during the rainy season with the occasional interlude of a tornado, and even then the picture is far from complete. How some vegetable life contrives to survive in the struggle for existence thus inaugurated is described by Miss Kingsley in a very interesting page:

'It is a very fascinating thing,' she writes, 'to see the strange devices employed by many kinds of young seedlings and saplings to keep off these evidently unpopular tenants. They chiefly consist in having a sheath of exceedingly slippery surface round the lower part of the stem, which the ants slide off when they attempt to climb. I

used to spend hours watching these affairs. You would see an ant dash for one of these protected stems as if he were a City man and his morning train on the point of starting from the top of the plant's stem. He would get up half an inch or so because of the dust round the bottom helping him a bit, then, getting no holding-ground, off he would slip and, falling on his back, desperately kick himself right side up, and go at it again as if he had heard the bell go, only to meet with a similar rebuff. . . . Some plants don't mind ants knocking about among the grown-up leaves, but will not have them with the infants, and so cover their young stuff with a fur or down, wherewith the ant can do nothing. Others, again, keep him and feed him with sweetstuff, so that he should keep off other enemies from its fruit, &c. But I have not space to sing in full the high intelligence of West African vegetation, and I am no botanist; yet one cannot avoid being struck by it, it is so manifold and masterly' (pp. 32, 33).

The reader will not fail to notice here as elsewhere the attribution of design and purpose to the vegetable creation and the studied abstinence of all reference to that Higher Power which is before all things, and through Whom all things consist.

The first four chapters of Miss Kingsley's *Studies* are descriptive of the country and of the manners and customs of its inhabitants, and her genius displays itself in the living interest with which she invests each of the many and varied topics she handles. The secret of her success as a writer lies in her whole-hearted devotion to her subject, which concentrates her entire attention upon each particular as it comes under review. Never was there a better illustration of the familiar maxim 'Si vis me flere, &c.' Whether Miss Kingsley is treating of the natural products of the country, or the different tribes upon the West African coast, or the strange fishes and the native fashions of catching them, or the dangers of sunken reefs on which so many ships have foundered, or even so commonplace a topic as the loading huge logs of teak, she carries her readers with her by the sheer force of her own sense of the importance of the matter in hand, and her consequent carefulness and accuracy of observation; and to this is added no ordinary power of humour and description. Miss Kingsley is, moreover, a true scientist, and is not afraid in the fulness of her knowledge to confess her ignorance where she has not collected sufficient data on which to base a decision. Her transparent honesty of mind commands our confidence even when we cannot unreservedly accept her conclusions.

How seriously the inevitable discomforts attendant upon

a voyage along the West African coast are aggravated when the traveller is overtaken by the wet season is vividly portrayed in the following paragraph, which we quote as an admirable example of descriptive power :

' After we passed Cape Verde we ran into the West African wet season rain sheet. There ought to be some other word than rain for that sort of thing. We have to stiffen this poor substantive up with adjectives, even for use with our own thunderstorms, and as is the morning dew to our heaviest thunder "torrential downpour of rain," so is that to the rain of the wet season in West Africa. For weeks it came down on us that voyage in one swishing, rushing cataract of water. The interspaces between the pipes of water—for it did not go into details with drops—were filled with grey mist, and as this rain struck the sea it kicked up such a water dust that you saw not the surface of the sea round you, but only a mist sea gliding by. It seemed as though we had left the clear cut world and entered into a mist universe. Sky, air, and sea were all the same, as our vessel swept on in one plane, just because she capriciously preferred it. Many days we could not see twenty yards from the ship. Once or twice another vessel would come out of the mist ahead, slogging past us into the mist behind, visible in our little water world for a few minutes only as a misty thing, and then we leisurely tramped on alone "o'er the viewless, hueless deep," with our horizon alongside. If you cleared your mind of all prejudice the thing was really not uncomfortable, and it seemed restful to the mind ' (pp. 24, 25).

We are compelled to resist the temptation to indulge in further quotation from Miss Kingsley's chapters on Sierra Leone and its surroundings and on African characteristics. We have vivid glimpses of the rough life spent by buccaneers on the coast a century and a-half ago, as well as of contemporary manners and customs at the capital city of Freetown, where, on market days, 'there is more noise to the square inch than in most things,' which grows to an entire compound yell on the visit of a swarm of locusts. We have experience of perils incurred amongst the shoals of St. Ann (a danger anticipated by the authoress, whose scientific training had taught her to associate red velvet slippers worn by the chief officers with exceptional terrors), and of the cheerful assurances of the older traders that they were all as good as lost. As yet no trustworthy chart can indicate the position of every sunken rock and pinnacle, and perhaps none ever will, on a coast whose river mouths are barred by shifting sands and where the reefs beneath the surface rise and fall at the impulse of subaqueous volcanoes. The politics and the mistakes of Liberia, and the comparative excellencies of the African tribes, the noises of West Africa, animal and instrumental,

and the specific odours of that torrid zone, its joys and sorrows, and the more marked features of British commerce on the Gold Coast, all present occasions for lingering, which we must hurry past to glance at the chapter on fishing where Miss Kingsley is quite in her favourite element.

Let no ardent devotee of 'the gentle craft,' however, imagine that he will find in Miss Kingsley's volume a fitting supplement to that placid prose pastoral *The Complete Angler*. It would be impossible to picture a stronger contrast than that presented by the calm contemplatist who had the happiness to live in days when men had time to think, and the furious and fighting sport of our enthusiastic fisherwoman. We wonder what is the secret of the idiosyncrasy; is it transmitted by hereditary tendency or is it an as yet unaccountable variety, which, for some persons, invests with a fascination which will stand any climate or discomfort a form of occupation which presents no charm to others. To many of us nearly all the details of West African fishing would be irredeemably repellent—the risky canoes, the African fellow-voyagers, the dangerous sea-monsters, the stinking bait, and more than all the terrific stench of the sea-board mud, steaming with the odours of a tropical vegetation rotting in the glare of a tropical sun. None of these things deter the born sportsman, male or female, and under the conditions just described, 'with the surrounding atmosphere 45 per cent. mosquito,' we are told 'if you are fishing you will enjoy yourself.' Well, the standard of enjoyment is variable.

A special voyage to the Island of Corisco, to share in the annual fishing of its freshwater lakes by representative ladies from its several villages, brought with it imminent peril of being burned to death through the carelessness of a native in 'making a farm.' Some of the 'ladies' were severely scorched and used the most energetic language concerning that fool man and his female relations. The Corisco fishing was delayed until appropriate baskets had been manufactured, and was then carried out by driving the fish into them. From twelve to fifteen baskets is the average take, which, after division amongst the representative ladies, is followed 'the same evening' by a tremendous fish supper, and the fish left over are smoked and carefully kept as a delicacy, to make sauce with &c., until the next year's fishing day comes round. Occasionally the sport becomes highly exciting, as when a cat-fish with terrible spiny tail and fins is inadvertently landed into the canoe. Miss Kingsley's characteristic account of one such adventure is admirably vivid, but it is

too long for quotation *in extenso*, and would be spoiled by abbreviation.

Weird and queer are the methods employed for catching West African fishes, adapted as they are to the exceptional conditions of a coast amongst whose peculiarities are floating islands adorned with trees at the mouth of their vast rivers, which are utilized to supply tremendous catches. Weird and queer too are the fishes that haunt these tropical waters. Anywhere else one would dismiss as fabulous the story of a monster 'as big as a man, only thicker, which walks about on its fins in the forest at night'—a frequent subject of native conversation—but examples hardly less strange abound. There is the electrical fish, which sometimes kills a duck with its shock, and diminutive warrior fishes who will attack your hand when down in the water, and finding no fight in it, will take any food from it and swagger away with an air of conquest; and even singing fishes who upset all one's previous conceptions of ichthyology, and deprive the epithet of muteness of its classic suitability for the finny tribe. We can sympathize with the irritation caused by the Ning Ning, which comes beside the canoe at night just as you are falling asleep and rouses you with its idiotic and monotonous strumming, a creature gifted with powers of ventriloquism and pertinacity in equal proportions, which will neither be silenced nor driven away. This fresh water species is matched by the salt water drum-fish, with its 'bum-bum' note. The occupation of fisherman is held in low esteem, for in plain terms the African is a born thief, and employment carried on at night affords opportunity for stealing the missionary's ducks, or the merchant's goods, or the neighbour's plantains.

From fishes to fetish is not a very abrupt transition, as all living creatures and most dead objects besides afford occasion for Fetish, by which term Miss Kingsley means the religion of the natives of the Western Coast of Africa, and not the 'worship of a material object'—the accepted sense in which the word is used by comparative ethnologists. The whole subject of Fetish is difficult and complex, and with its allied topics of African medicine and witchery fills a most important section of Miss Kingsley's studies. It may seem presumptuous to attempt a definition of Fetish when so high an authority as the authoress admits 'it is far easier to state what Fetish is not, than to state what it is,' but from the very interesting details which she supplies we should venture to define it as a modified form of Pantheism in which the place

of the one God, whom Spinoza identified with the hard and unchangeable order of nature, is filled by a multitude of spirits and demons which pervade all the animate and inanimate world. But to the mind of the West African these spirits are very different, in their perpetual and practical power over the destiny of man, from those inflexible rules which, in Spinoza's system, are only another name for the eternal decrees of God. Innumerable and malignant as these spirits are they are yet to be successfully combated, needing for their effectual defeat a proportionate exercise of antagonistic influence, so that the demon who would not yield to the opposition of a private person may be conquered by the higher charms of a chieftain or a great witch doctor. The whole life of the West African is coloured by unceasing apprehension of these members of the spirit world who do not require of necessity a material object in which to manifest themselves. After nightfall, especially, those journeying on a forest path are the prey of alarming apparitions, calling for the most careful investigation to determine the exact nature of the visitant. Woe to the travellers who cannot discover any white ash left behind in the ghostly track! 'Unless the Fetish authorities in town chose to explain that it was merely a demand for so much calico, or a goat, &c., someone of the party will certainly get ill' (p. 117). How widely distributed this demonic force is held to be may be gathered from Miss Kingsley's quotation of the following lines, which she affirms to be magnificent Fetish :

'God of the granite and the rose,
Soul of the lily and the bee,
The mighty tide of being flows
Through countless channels, Lord, from Thee.
It springs to life in grass and flowers,
Through every range of Being runs,
And from Creation's mighty towers
Its glory flames in stars and suns.'

It is only natural that with such a make of mind every form of disease should be attributed to supernatural malignity, and that the successful employment of European medicines should be promoted by a liberal infusion of Fetish ; and we can only lament that Miss Kingsley does not give us in full, with her own indication of the analogy between the ideas of Goethe and the native philosophers, the conversation of the witch doctor, the gist of which she declares was Goethe's *Promethèus*. The African's sense of man's inferiority as compared with the Semitic conception of his place in Crea-

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tion, and of the unwearied antagonism of the spirit world, may be largely due to the terrific natural phenomena by which he has been surrounded and the ease with which his wants are supplied; but how the bent of mind which his external conditions have helped to engender affects the African's view of Christianity is a subject of the deepest moment, on which all interested in missions will be anxious to hear Miss Kingsley's testimony.

'The more you know,' she writes, 'the African, the more you study his laws and institutions, the more you must recognize that the main characteristic of his intellect is logical, and you see how in all things he uses this absolutely sound but narrow thought-form. He is not a dreamer nor a doubter; everything is real, very real, horribly real to him. It is impossible for me to describe it clearly, but the quality of the African mind is strangely uniform. This may seem strange to those who read accounts of wild and awful ceremonies, or of the African's terror at white man's things; but I believe you will find all people experienced in dealing with uncultured Africans will tell you that this alarm and brief wave of curiosity is merely external, for the African knows, the moment he has time to think it over, what that white man's thing really is, namely, either a white man's Juju or a devil. It is this power of being able logically to account for everything that is, I believe, at the back of the tremendous permanency of Fetish in Africa, and the cause of many of the relapses into it by Africans converted to other religions: it is also the explanation of the fact that white men who live in districts where death and danger are everyday affairs, under a grim pall of boredom, are liable to believe in Fetish, though ashamed of so doing. For the African, whose mind has been soaked in Fetish during his early and most impressionable years, the voice of Fetish is almost irresistible when affliction comes on him. Sudden dangers or terror he can face with his new religion, because he is not quick at thinking. But give him time to think when under the hand of adversity, and the old explanation that answered it all comes back. I know no more distressing thing than to see an African convert brought face to face with that awful thing we are used to, the problem of an omnipotent God and a suffering world. This does not worry the African convert until it hits him personally in grief and misery. When it does, and he turns and calls upon the God he has been taught will listen, pity and answer, his use of what the scoffers at the converted African call "catch phrases" is horribly heartrending to me, for I know how real, terribly real, the whole thing is to him, and I therefore see the temptation to return to those old gods—gods from whom he never expected pity, presided over by a god that does not care. All that he had to do with them was not to irritate them, to propitiate them, to buy their services when wanted, and, above all, to dodge and avoid them, while he fought it out and managed devils at large. Risky work, but a man is as good as a devil any day if he only takes proper care; and even if any devil should take him unaware—kill him bodily—he

has the satisfaction of knowing that he will have the power of making it warm for that devil when they meet on the other side. There is something alluring in this, I think, to any make of human mind, but particularly so to the logical, intensely human one possessed by the West African. Therefore, when wearied and worn out by confronting things which he cannot reconcile, and disappointed by unanswered prayers, he turns back to his old belief entirely, or modifies the religion he has been taught until it fits in with Fetish, and is gradually absorbed by it' (pp. 124-6).

It is noteworthy that in the classification of spirits it is the lower orders only which require some material objects for their manifestation, and that the higher they rise in the scale the more absolutely are they independent of matter as the medium of their working; that the dreaded being, when incarnate, is conceived of as so putrefying on one side that the slightest contact with it may cause fatal disease; and that over all the hellish host there is one superior over-lord, who in epicurean fashion is benevolent and careless of mankind. These ideas suggest a resemblance to important elements of Christian teaching which the skilful missionary will not disregard. Are they not more than the pale shadow of the lofty truth that God is a spirit, who dwelleth not in temples made with hands, as though He needed anything; that our adversary the Devil as a roaring lion walketh about seeking whom he may devour; and that we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against spiritual wickedness in high places? Hardly less astounding as an anticipation of advanced scientific conviction is the lack of gaps to the African between the conception of spirit and matter: 'it is all an affair of grade—not of essential difference in essence.' And when we add to all this the testimony of the writer that the African—to use one of her own striking expressions (p. 128)—is not 'gaseous-minded all round,' and feels the prick of conscience even when he disobeys it, we cannot help feeling persuaded that it is no idle optimism to believe that the same Gospel which has 'apprehended' the negro in other districts will eventually gain the west coast of the Dark Continent for Christ.

The four several schools of Fetish which Miss Kingsley recognises among the West African negroes, with their different ideals of the chief good to be secured for man; the discussion of Fetish views of the state and condition of the human soul after death, which has caused the non-deification of ancestors, to the intense mortification, it would seem, of evolutionists who had proclaimed that animism is a necessary

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link in the chain of human development ; the belief in re-incarnation, in the hovering of the spirits of the departed about their old homes, in the help afforded by 'the well-disposed ones,' in the advantage to the dead of suitable burial, so that neglect of it is the most withering of reproaches ; the importance to the dead of going to the under-world with all the pomp they had enjoyed here—a conviction which accounts for the horrible custom of human sacrifices at funerals, and in some degree qualifies their enormity ; the singular superstitions about twins and infants born with ready-cut teeth ; and more than all, the connection of Fetish and witchcraft—all these are attractive topics, to which we call the reader's attention as we pass from the consideration of Fetish with one more quotation in which Miss Kingsley gives her verdict on its character and working.

'I have dealt here with Fetish as far as the human being is concerned, because this phase may make it more comprehensible to my fellow white men who regard the human being as the main thing in the created universe ; but I must beg you to remember that this idea of the importance of the human race is not held by the African. The individual is supremely important to himself, and he values his friends and relations, and so on, but abstract affection for humanity at large, or belief in the sanctity of the lives of people with whom he is unrelated and unacquainted, the African barely possesses. He is only capable of feeling this abstract affection when under the influence of one of the great revealed religions which place the human being higher in the scale of Creation. This comes from no cruelty of mind *per se*, but is the result of the hardness of the fight he has to fight against the world ; and, possessing this view of the equal, if not greater, importance of many of the things he sees round him, the African conceives these things also have their fetish—a fetish on the same ground idea, but varying from human fetish. The politics of Mungo mah Lobeh, the mountain, with the rest of nature, he believes to exist. The Alemba rapid has its affairs clearly, but the private matters of these very great people are things the human being had better keep out of ; and it is advisable for him to turn his attention to making terms with them, and go into their presence with his petition when their own affairs are prosperous, when their tempers are not, as it were, up over some private ultra-human affair of their own. I well remember the opinions expressed by my companions regarding the folly—mine, of course—of obtruding ourselves on Mungo, when that noble mountain was vexed too much, and the opinion expressed by an Efik friend in a tornado which came down upon us. Well, there you have this difference. I instinctively say "us." She did not think we were objects of interest to the tornado or the forest it was scourging. She took it they had a sort of family row on, and we might get hit with the bits, therefore it was highly unfortunate that we were present at the meeting. Again, it is the

same with the surf. The boat-boys see it's in a nasty temper, they keep out of it; it may be better to-morrow, then it will tolerate them, for it has no real palaver with them individually. Of course you can go and upset the temper of big nature spirits; but when you are not there, they have their own affairs. Hence it comes that we have in Fetish a religion in which its believers do not hold that devotion to religion constitutes Virtue. The ordinary citizen is held to be most virtuous who is least mixed up in religious affairs. He can attain Virtue, the love and honour of his fellow-men, by being a good husband and father, an honest man in trade, a just man in the palaver house, and he must, for the protection of his interests—that is to say, not only his individual well-being, but the well-being of those dependent on him—go in to a certain extent for religious practices. He must associate with spirits, because spirits are in all things and everywhere and over everything; and the good citizen deals with the other spirits as he deals with that class of spirits we call human beings; he does not cheat the big ones of their dues; he spills a portion of his rum to them; he gives them their white calicoes; he treats his slave spirits honourably, and he uses his slave spirits for no bad purpose; and if any great grief falls on him, he calls on the great over-lord of gods, mentioning these things. But men are not all private citizens: there are men whose destiny puts them in high places—men who are not only house-fathers, but who are tribe-fathers. They, to protect and further the interests of those under them, must venture greatly and further, and deal with more powerful spirits, as it were, their social equals in spiritdom. These good chiefs in their higher grade dealings preserve the same clean-handed conduct. And besides these, there are those men, the Fetish men, who devote their lives to combating evil actions through witches, and miscellaneous spirits who prey upon mankind. These men have to make themselves important to important spirits. It is risky work for them, for spirits are a risky set to deal with' (pp. 176-9).

The theory and practice of African medicine, which, as in more civilized regions, is under the twofold charge of the general practitioners and the consulting physician or witch doctor, supplies material for two of Miss Kingsley's liveliest chapters. A real 'clash of cultures' not infrequently arises from the intermixture of European with native pharmacy, as when a patient swallows a hot poultice whole, or the isolation of contagious disorders is carried to the extent of driving out the sick to perish unattended. The continent of Africa, proverbially famed for its production of novelties, introduces us to diseases unheard of elsewhere—the yaws, the malignant melancholy, and the sleeping sickness, the two latter of which have their head centre in the Lower Congo. Terrible is the havoc wrought among the natives by smallpox, pneumonia, heart disease, and tetanus, this last being the scourge of

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African childhood. The method of the village apothecary is generally to resort either to herbal preparations, with which he has no despicable acquaintance, or to baths and massage in various forms. The witch doctor or consulting physician, whose aid is only invoked when the general practitioner has failed to work a cure, naturally takes a more serious view of the position, and forthwith sets to work with all the appliances of Fetish and witchcraft to master the spirits who are the cause of all the mischief. It requires the most skilful diagnosis to discover which of the four souls—(1) the soul that survives, (2) the soul that lives in an animal away wild in the bush, (3) the shadow cast by the body, and (4) the soul that acts in dreams—is the true seat of the disease, and all the art and craft of the witch doctor to bring the rebellious soul to order; and the relation of his ideas and methods of treatment is too long to be even sketched in outline. Incredible in its intermixture of absurdity and imposture as is the witch doctor's procedure, Miss Kingsley affirms that he is not, with all his incantations, invariably a conscious humbug. She remarks that no town has more than one witch doctor, with possibly an assistant, and notes significantly that nothing would induce an African doctor *to dine* with a brother member of his profession.

A highly characteristic division of Miss Kingsley's *Studies* is concerned with English methods of dealing with our tropical possessions, and all the vials of her wrath are poured out in unmeasured volume upon the futility and failure of our Crown Colony system. Seriously speaking, her indictment is a formidable one, and should command the close attention of those to whom the charge of these vast outlying regions of the Empire is committed. Some of the blots on which she fastens are sufficiently obvious: the lack of continuity through party exigencies in our colonial policy; the brief tenure and inadequate pay of the higher grade of colonial officials; the neglect of advice from the trading community, whose fortunes are bound up with the prosperity of the colony, and whose experience would be in many instances invaluable when legislation is under discussion, or the law is being with difficulty administered; and the folly of attempting to govern an alien race according to the preconceived notions of the bureau in Downing Street. Yet the blame cannot, in Miss Kingsley's judgment, be assigned to any one class for blunders which have lost us in the past a large slice of the best feeding-ground the world can offer for England's manufacturing millions, and which threaten, unless they be

remedied, to deprive us in the near future of priceless markets, or to leave the colony which is the door to them a bankrupt estate on our hands. Yet Miss Kingsley possesses the courage of her opinions, and she has boldly sketched out a system which she thinks would be practicable and, while securing the co-operation of healthy commerce and healthy law, would command the loyal adhesion of the natives. We can only commend her plans to those whose task it is to help in forming or guiding public opinion of the value of our West African possessions, of which she speaks in terms of great but rational enthusiasm.

These regions are of vast natural wealth in rubber, oil, timber, ivory, and minerals from gold to coal.

'They are in most places densely populated with customers for England's manufactured goods,' and 'we really want the humid tropic zone more than other nations do; a climate that eats up steel and hardware as a rabbit eats lettuce is an excellent customer to a hardware manufacturing town. A region densely populated by native populations willing to give raw trade stuffs in exchange for cotton goods, which they bury or bang out on stones in the course of washing or otherwise help their local climate to consume, is invaluable to a textile manufacturing town' (pp. 298, 299).

Yet all these advantages, conquered for us by the energy and enterprise of our countrymen, are in danger of being lost to us under the keen competition of rival nations and the dearth of statesmanship at home. How satisfactory a result can be obtained under a wiser system is explained in a telling page, which relates the success of the Royal Niger Company and which strikes a true chord of patriotic pride.

'The Company,' Miss Kingsley writes, 'has in a few years, and during the period of the hottest French enterprise, acquired a territory immensely greater than the territory acquired during centuries under the Crown Colony system; it has also fought its necessary wars with energy and despatch, and no call upon Imperial resources; it has not only paid its way, but paid its shareholders their 6 per cent., and its bitterest enemies say darkly, far more. I know from my knowledge of West Africa that this can only have been effected by its wise native policy. I know that this policy owes its wisdom and its success to one man, Sir George Taubman Goldie, a man who, had he been under the Crown Colony system, could have done no more than other men have done who have been Governors under it; but, not being under it, the territories he won for England have not been subject to the jerky amateur policy of those who are under the Crown Colony system. For nearly twenty years the natives under the Royal Niger Company have had the firm, wise, sympathetic friendship of a great Englishman, who understood them

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and knew them personally. It is the continuous influence of one great Englishman unhampered by non-expert control, that has caused England's extremely strange success in the Niger; coupled with the identity of trade and governmental interest, and the encouragement of religion given by the constitution and administration of the Niger Company. . . . This association of trade and government is, to my mind, an *absolutely necessary restraint* on the Charter Company form of government; but there is another element you must have to justify Charters, and that is that they are in the hands of an Englishman of the old type' (pp. 360, 361).

How far all Miss Kingsley's animadversions on the Crown Colony system can be substantiated we are unable to determine. Recent information indicates that she has been mistaken in her unqualified condemnation of the hut tax, which, as the latest returns show, is being collected without resistance and in increasing amount. As we write, moreover, the governing powers of the Niger Company are passing into the hands of the Colonial Secretary, and a new order of things is being inaugurated. But that Englishmen will be more on the alert to the worth of their tropical estates and that they will watch their progress with awakened vigilance will, we predict, be one result, and that not the least meritorious, of Miss Kingsley's labours. What she specially insists on is the adoption of a plan whereby every white trader can work on every legitimate line absolutely free from governmental hindrance, and under which every black man can clearly understand that, while his prejudices are respected as far as is consistent with regard for morality and justice, he is under a régime which will insist on the performance of treaty obligations, and will not weakly tolerate ill-doing.

'The great difficulty,' she urges, 'in arranging any system of government of West Africa lies not in the true difficulties this region presents, but in the fictitious difficulties that are the growth of years of mutual misunderstanding and misrepresentation—the (consequent) distrust is the mere product of folly and ignorance, and is therefore removable' (p. 416).

The task should not be too hard for the race which has won and rules India and Egypt.

An exposition of the divers kinds of property which exist among the true Negroes—the special people with whom the laws which regulate West African property have reached their highest development—brings Miss Kingsley's *Studies* to an interesting conclusion. Those who are only familiar with European conceptions of property law will find some startling variation from our legal practice. The true negro is

only to be met with in unadulterated purity in the line of coast which stretches from the Gambia to the Cameroon—elsewhere he has been modified by Berber or Bantu intermixture—and we have the tests afforded us by which their influence may be traced. True Negro culture is discernible to the sense of smell: his strong odour being gained 'by leaving the sanitary matters of villages and towns in the hands of Providence.' The Bantu culture looks after the cleaning and tidying of the village streets to a remarkable degree, though by no means clean in the houses.' The true Negro's great gods are male; with the Bantu the supreme deity is female. Moreover, the latter keep their slaves in separate villages, while the former permit them to share their houses. The State-form is the wreckage from the destruction of the old empire of Melli, (which fell in the sixteenth century; and is remarkable for the degree in which it is controlled by secret societies. 'It is identical in essence with the House system,' which Miss Kingsley describes as follows:

'The House is a collection of individuals, I should hesitate to call it a developed family. I cannot say it is a collection of human beings, because the very dogs and canoes and so on that belong to it are part of it in the eye of the law, and capable therefore alike of embroiling it and advancing its interests. These Houses are bound together into groups by the Long ju-ju proper to the so-called secret society, common to the groups of houses. The House itself is presided over by what is called, in white parlance, a king, and beneath him there are four classes of human beings in regular rank, that is to say, influence in council: firstly, the free relations of the king, if he be a free man himself, which is frequently not the case; if he be a slave, the free people of the family he is trustee for; secondly, the free small people who have placed themselves under the protection of the House, rendering it in return for the assistance and protection it affords them service on demand; the third and fourth classes are true slave classes, the higher one in rank being that called the Winnaboes or Trade boys, the lower the pull-away boys and the plantation hands. The best point in it, as a system, is that it gives to the poorest boy who paddles an oil canoe a chance of becoming a king. Property itself in West Africa, and as I have reason to believe from reports in other parts of tropical Africa that I am acquainted with, is firmly governed and is divisible into three kinds. Firstly, ancestral property connected with the office of headmanship, the Stool, as this office is called in the true negro state; secondly, family property, in which every member of the family has a certain share, and on which he, she, or it has a claim; thirdly, private property, that which is acquired or made by a man or woman by their personal exertions over and above that which earned by them in co-

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operation with other members of their family which becomes family property, and that which is gained by gifts or made in trade by the exercise of a superior trading ability. Every one of these forms of property is equally sacred in the eye of the African law' (pp. 427, 428).

The system thus described presents many notable features. Under it the head of the Stool or of the family is simply a trustee, who must work the property not for his own personal enrichment, but for that of the Stool or the family, and is liable to be removed if he is extravagant or unfortunate. If it is open to abuse through the rapacity of the family elders who would carry off an undue proportion of the wages earned by a man conjointly with other members of the family, it leaves him in such secure possession of what he has made separately or with the assistance of his free wives, that no king, priest, or other man would openly dare interfere with the private property of the lowest slave, which can only be confiscated for bankruptcy or crime. It brings into prominence and enforces in practice the great principle that privilege exists not for mere private advantage, but for the welfare of the community. It secures at least some of the benefits claimed for co-operative action, and, as has been already noticed, it opens the way from the lowest rank to the highest position.

The three main sources of danger to a man's estate in West Africa are debt and charges of witchcraft or adultery. Under the last of these names is comprised almost every form of supposed injury to a woman, even brushing against her in a crowded market or on a bush path. The severity of the law renders the accusation one of danger to respectable men, and frivolous charges are the source of much extortion and injustice. In the case of a debtor being seized by his creditor, the latter is responsible for all his captive's debts if he dies while in his custody. Of all imputations that of witchcraft is the most terrible. Short shrift and lynch law is the ordinary fate of the wretched creature held guilty of being a witch, and after his violent death no decent family will own him or give him burial; for this latter act of charity may involve very serious consequences. To take charge of and inter a corpse makes a man executor to the estate of the deceased, and several relatives will come hurrying with coffins for the purpose and will quarrel fiercely over the dead body; but to the charge of the dead man's property is united a legal liability to discharge his debts.

Hence it comes that a Negro merchant on a trading tour away

from his home, overtaken by death in a town where he is not known, is not buried, but dried and carefully put outside the town, or on the road to the market, the road he came by, so that any one of his friends or relations who may perchance come some time that way can recognize the remains' (p. 434).

It has been our difficulty in dealing with Miss Kingsley's *Studies* that each of the subjects she discusses would require and is worthy of a separate article for its adequate treatment; so that we have only been able to indicate, and that very imperfectly, the deeply interesting problems with which she deals. Whatever our opinions on the political and religious, the social and commercial, aspects of West Africa, there can be no question that they are destined to loom large in the near future as an element of high national importance, and we are greatly indebted to the gifted authoress for her courage and devotion in investigation, and for the candour with which she states the conclusions she has formed. Nor is our debt to her lessened by the fact that she frankly owns the limitations of her aims, and that she stops short in her discussions of much that most deeply interests ourselves. Upon the sarcasms which she flings about so wildly at times on subjects sacred as well as profane we will only express our regret, and would rather remember the occasional words of unfeigned respect in which she glances rapidly in passing at missionary effort. But we must utter our emphatic protest against her assertion, in the chapter on the Clash of Cultures, that the one thing needful for West Africa is *to try Science*, and the quiet assumption on the next page that the grand Scriptural assertion that God has made of one blood all nations that dwell on the face of the earth is a mistake, and the origin of the whole human race from a single pair a misleading delusion. Nor can we admit the conclusion to be as inevitable as she asserts it to be, that under the present way of contemplating different races, the European cannot help regarding races of different and inferior culture to his own as more deeply steeped in sin. In Christian teaching, sin is proportionate to opportunity, and Chorazin and Bethsaida are held more criminal than Sodom and Gomorrah.

It is Miss Kingsley's crowning merit that she has striven to master the knowledge of the nature of West Africa and the West African—his native laws, religion, institutions, and state-form—so as to understand his mind and to see things from the native point of view. She has been led by this study to the conviction that the African is of steadier build

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than the Asiatic; more trustworthy and tractable; likely eventually to prove a more potent force in the world. Such a race, brought, as we are persuaded, in the fulfilment of God's predetermined purpose under our influence, it is worth much fully to understand, and here is its portrait drawn by Miss Kingsley's master-hand:

'Careful scientific study has enforced on me, as it has on other students, the recognition that the African mind naturally approaches all things from a spiritual point of view. Low down in culture or high up, his mind works along the line that things happen because of the action of spirit upon spirit; it is an effort for him to think in terms of matter. We think along the line that things happen from the action of matter upon matter. If it were not for the Asiatic religion we have accepted, it is, I think, doubtful whether we should not be far more materialistic in thought-form than we are. This steady sticking to the material side of things, I think, has given our race its dominion over matter; the want of it has caused the African to be notably behind us in this, and far behind those Asiatic races who regard matter and spirit as separate in essence, a thing that is not in the mind either of the Englishman or the African. The Englishman is constrained by circumstances to perceive the existence of an extra material world. The African regards spirit and matter as undivided in kind, matter being only the extreme low form of spirit. There must be in the facts of the case behind things, something to account for the high perception of justice you will find in the African, combined with an inability to think out a pulley or a lever except under white tuition. Similarly taking the true Negro States, which are in its equivalent to our Thirteenth century, it accounts for the higher level of morals in them than you would find in our Thirteenth century; and I fancy this want of interest and inferiority in materialism in the true Negro constitutes a reason why they will not come into our Nineteenth century, but under proper guidance could attain to a Nineteenth-century state of their own, which would show a proportionate advance' (pp. 386, 387).

We are prepared fully to accept alike the portrait and the plea. We want no slavish reproduction of English nineteenth-century culture upon African shores. We want the West African to enjoy the only true satisfaction for his intensely spiritual nature which God has in His abounding love and wisdom provided for all men. We want to see on the West African coast another branch of the Catholic Church which is already growing so rapidly in the central and southern regions of that mighty continent.

ART. V.—THE DEAN OF CHRIST CHURCH ON
HOOKER AND THE PURITANS.

An Introduction to the Fifth Book of Hooker's Treatise on the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. By the Very Rev. FRANCIS PAGET, D.D., Dean of Christ Church. (Oxford, 1899.)

THE Dean of Christ Church says in his preface 'I send out this volume' 'with uneasiness and a sense of manifold failure' (p. x). We, on the other hand, have read it with gratitude and recognition of the writer's success. It has been his aim

'to help the reader to approach Hooker's Fifth Book with such knowledge of its conditions, its preliminaries, its aims as may contribute to the understanding and appreciation of its contents:—to place the reader—if the phrase be not presumptuous—in the likeliest attitude of mind for entrance into the Book' (p. 125).

To accomplish this aim—which may appear to be of the simplest possible character to those who have little knowledge of Hooker's work or the complexities of the circumstances with which he had to deal—it has been necessary for the Dean to deal very fully with some aspects of the history of the latter part of the sixteenth century. The first chapter, entitled 'The Character of Hooker's Writings and Work,' is valuable chiefly as showing, in a short and clear form, reasons which may well call for the most careful study of the *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*. That he may rightly be described as 'holding a conspicuous place in the history of English literature' (p. 1); as a profound theologian with 'distinctive notes' (p. 3), which include the retention of the 'glow and life of truth' (p. 4), the recognition of both the beauty and the strength of the doctrines which he has to defend, and an abiding freshness and relevance; and as a man of great diligence and unworldliness, is sufficient to show that the work on which he spent the most careful pains is at least worthy of serious attention. 'It is rare,' writes the Dean,

'to see a man still young (for Hooker was but thirty-eight when he resigned the Mastership) turning away from a sphere where he has borne a brilliant part, and betaking himself into comparative seclusion, with the simple and unselfish desire only to do before he dies as much as he can of that which he believes to be his proper task. But it is perhaps even more rare for the heat of controversy to kindle in a man the desire not to talk but to think. And in both

ways the example of Hooker's life may claim as much attention as the strength of his theology and the grandeur of his style' (p. 7).

The second chapter is of high excellence. The Dean has restrained himself from attempting the fascinating, if difficult, task of describing at any length the Elizabethan age with its 'richness and energy and enterprize,' that wonderful 'time of great men, great perils, and great beginnings,' 'of strange confusion and inconsistent hopes,' compared by some 'for the splendour of the work that was done in it' 'with the age of Pericles at Athens' (p. 8). The few sentences which he has written suggest that a fuller treatment of the subject from his pen would have been of interest and value; but he has probably been well advised in restricting himself within the limits which he thus describes:

'All . . . that will be attempted here will be to delineate the position which stood over against Hooker's in the chief religious controversy of his day: the position which was before his gaze as he conceived and wrote his treatise *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*. The position was that of the Puritans, and it will be here presented, so far as is possible, in the language of their own most important and deliberate utterances. In altercation men often do themselves as much injustice as they do others, and the Puritans of Hooker's time may be unfairly dealt with if they are judged by the controversial language either of their opponents or of the less sober among themselves. But it may be hoped that there will be less danger of unfairness if the statement of their opinions and demands is based upon documents which were put forward or generally recognized as the corporate expression of their position—their *platform*, in the classical sense of the word—documents which proceeded from, or were openly accepted by, men who would have been ranked among their leaders in that period' (p. 9).

This quotation shows the spirit with which the Dean has carried out the work of describing 'the Puritan position' as well as the historical limits within which he has kept. In some passages, perhaps, there may be signs of difficulty in appreciating the standpoint of the Puritans, yet he is everywhere scrupulously fair, and the clear and accurate statements of the account which is at once readable and compressed are based upon the most careful study of original authorities. This chapter may be strongly commended to students both of Hooker specially and of the general history of the period.

The third chapter is on the life of Hooker. It will not take the place of Walton's *Life*, and the Dean evidently does not intend that it should do so. It will be interesting and useful to those who are already acquainted with Walton;

and it will supply students of the Fifth Book who might otherwise read little about Hooker's life with a clear idea of the most important events in it. It contains a sympathetic and powerful description of the conception of the *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*.

'He was not, and probably he knew that he was not, effective as a preacher. But he had the knowledge and the power of work and the subtlety and penetration and patience of thought which should avail to make a strong case clear to able men; he had a deep enthusiasm for the Church's cause; he had that amplitude of view which braces men for intellectual enterprise on a large scale, and stirs them to a natural eloquence, almost as great scenery or great events excite the faculty of poets; and whether he was aware or unaware of his singular gifts, their presence told on his conception of the work he had to do. And so, as he toiled on, painstaking, unremitting, resolute—labouring, in his own phrase, even to anatomize every particle of that body which he was to uphold sound—he formed his brave design: to display the universal field of law; to show how by the will and providence of God the whole world and all the ways of men are included in that system, vast and manifold, whereby through diverse channels the authority and beneficence of law travels to the diverse fields of human life; and then to claim for the legislative action of the Church its rightful place and its divine sanction within that sacred system which reaches from the throne of the Most High to the least of the creatures He has made' (pp. 87-8).

The fourth and fifth chapters supply a full account, with explanations and some criticisms, of the contents of the preface, the first four books, and the Fifth Book, of the *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*. The sixth chapter, under the title 'The Sequel of the Fifth Book,' deals briefly with the *Christian Letter* published in 1599 in reply to Hooker, the marginal notes made by Hooker on his copy of the *Christian Letter* now preserved in the Library of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, the three fragments by Hooker attached as Appendix I. to Book V. in Mr. Keble's edition, and the letter written to Hooker by George Cranmer, which forms Appendix II. to Book V. in the same edition. The short but valuable seventh chapter, entitled 'The Outcome of Hooker's Work,' is on 'the service which Hooker rendered to England and to the English Church' (p. 222).

There are seven appendices. The first gives some useful extracts from 'certain books' on the Puritan side 'which appeared and attracted much notice towards the close of Mary's reign' (p. 231), which are 'cited' 'not as representative of the opinions of any considerable section of the Puritans, but as pointing to an element in the struggle which could

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not fail to tell on the policy of any Government that had to bear part in it' (p. 235). The second appendix is on the proceedings in Parliament in 1566 and 1571. The third appendix consists of a reprint of the MS. in Lambeth Palace Library¹ of the work *Disciplina Ecclesiae sacra Dei verbo descripta*. There is some description of this document in the third chapter of the Dean's book; but he has certainly acted wisely in printing it at length in the appendix. It was the Latin original, which learned writers on Puritanism have supposed to have altogether disappeared, of the *Directory of Church-Government*; and the importance of the work may be seen from the statement of the Dean:

'This document is the Confession of Faith which was signed by the Puritans in their private assemblies; and it deserves careful consideration. In regard to the frequency of references to it, the influence it exercised, and the history through which it passed, it is worthy to rank with the Admonitions and the Explicatio; it has even been called "the Palladium of English Presbyterianism;" and it will fairly complete the presentation of the Puritan platform' (p. 68).

The fourth appendix is on the *Booke of the Forme of Common Prayers, administration of the Sacraments, &c.*, presented to Parliament in 1584, which the Dean distinguishes from the *Book of Discipline* and identifies with the book 'printed at London by Richard Waldegrave and reprinted in Hall's *Fragmenta Liturgica*, vol. i. pp. 1-81' (p. 253). The fifth appendix is an enumeration of the principal editions of the *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*; the sixth is a short note on 'Hacket's conspiracy' of 1591, of any direct or indirect responsibility for which the Dean acquits Cartwright, though he thinks it possible some of the Puritan ministers might have done more than was done to check Coppinger and his associates; the seventh is entitled 'The Last Three Books of the treatise, and the Opuscula.' The Dean is of opinion that the last Three Books, 'as they are now extant, may be taken as representing the best that could be made of rough, unfinished and incomplete papers' of which 'there seems no doubt that' they 'represent' Hooker's 'work,' 'though it is in a form in which he would never have let it come abroad' (pp. 263-4). Of the Opuscula the Dean's judgment is as follows:

¹ There is another MS. of the work in the British Museum, which the Dean describes as 'substantially identical' with the Lambeth MS. He says that the latter 'seems to have been the more carefully written of the two, and it is in a far earlier handwriting' (p. 69).

'It can hardly be doubted that the Answer to Travers, together with Travers' Supplication to the Council, is genuine. The two were printed in 1612; they are well accredited, and bear ample tokens of authenticity. They carry with them into the list of genuine works Sermon I (On the Certainty and Perpetuity of Faith in the Elect), and Sermon II (the Learned Discourse of Justification), both printed in 1612: for these contain passages complained of in Travers' Supplication and defended in Hooker's Answer: they are knit into the history of the controversy at the Temple: and the former of the two is well worthy of Hooker. Part of what is entitled Sermon III (Of the Nature of Pride) was printed in 1612, the rest was first published by Mr. Keble in 1836, from a MS. in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin. The work seems to the present writer to be below Hooker's level, lacking somewhat of his power, brilliancy, tenacity of theme, and sense of order: but it is clearly marked by some of his characteristic thoughts, and it is hardly to be severed from Sermons I and II, with which it apparently formed a part of a long course of Sermons on the prophecy of Habakkuk, and it is moreover accredited by the testimony of Archbishop Ussher. The Funeral Sermon (Sermon IV) was printed in 1612, and has in it points of close affinity with Hooker's mind: Sermon VII (on St. Matthew vii. 7, 8), published by Walton as Hooker's in 1678, and described as "found in the study of the late learned Bishop Andrewes," seems to show, save at the beginning, but little of the distinction of Hooker's work. Weakest of all in internal evidence are the two Sermons upon part of St. Jude's Epistle (Sermons V and VI). Mr. Keble sums up, in §27 of his Preface, their intrinsic tokens of unlikeness to Hooker's work. An expression in Sermon V. §15 seems to fix the date of that sermon either in 1582 or in 1594: the earlier of these dates,—at which Hooker was under thirty, and may perhaps have been writing as he never could have written in his maturity,—seems barred by a reference in the same section to a book published in 1583. But if it follows that the Sermon was written in 1594, it may fairly be said further to follow that some one else than Hooker wrote it' (pp. 264-5).

In all this work the Dean of Christ Church has joined to extensive and accurate knowledge great powers of compression and clear statement, while his evident enthusiasm for his subject has given to his learned book a charm which might otherwise have been lacking. We hope it may lead not only to better understanding of the Fifth Book, but also to more general study and appreciation of the first Four Books, and in particular to a wider recognition of the greatness and permanent value of the First Book.

The carrying out of the aim which the Dean has set before him involves some discussion of Hooker's general theological position and of the line taken by him in particular matters. He has rarely anything to express but approval and admira-

tion. He emphasizes from time to time Hooker's wide knowledge, sound judgment, and conscientious spirit. Hooker's 'treatise alone,' he writes, out of 'all that was written in the voluminous debate,' 'most' of which 'survives only among the curiosities of controversy, or the materials for historical research,'

'has stood the trial of time and taken rank with the abiding works of learning and reflection. There may be much in the mixed record of the English Reformation which those who are jealous for the Church's honour find it humiliating to recall—much about which men may wonder that it was over-ruled for good. But in the field of argument during the Elizabethan period the Church of England need not fear a comparison between the work of its great champion and that of his antagonists' (p. 224).

This general approval and admiration of Hooker's work is not indiscriminating. The Dean points out that 'Hooker does not appear at his best in dealing with' the Puritan complaint of the neglect of preaching in the Church (p. 137). That complaint, says the Dean, was 'real and serious';

'for the space of a whole generation the destitution had gone on: men had passed from youth beyond middle age and seen the Church neglecting in thousands of parishes one great part of the divine commission: seen moreover the Prophesyings, which might have done something to mend matters, suppressed rigorously, in spite of the Archbishop's protest: and seen also some of those who were eager and seemed able to do the neglected work refused the liberty to do it, or, as Travers was, inhibited in the course of it. It was natural that men should speak strongly as they saw the multitudes left almost untaught: it was not strange if in speaking strongly they said some things that were rash and indefensible' (pp. 135-6).

Thus, though the Puritan case on this point was 'overstated,' it had 'rightful strength'; and it is admitted by the Dean that Hooker 'did less than justice to' it, and 'weakens his position by making no adequate confession of the gravity of the long neglect of preaching' (p. 137).

Exception, again, is taken to some parts of Hooker's reply to the Puritan attack on the reception of Communion in the Church of England by those who were or had been members of the Church of Rome. It was contended by the Puritans that these ought not to be admitted to Communion in the Church of England without some distinct purging of themselves from the 'suspicion of popery.' As the Dean clearly points out,

'there were really two distinct questions involved in the Puritan argument. One was the rightfulness of admitting to Communion

without special examination, recantation of error, or probation, those who had lived as members of the Church of Rome. The other was the rightfulness of compelling such persons to receive the Communion in the Church of England : since in admitting them to Communion freely and without question the Church of England could hardly be clear of some concurrence in the compulsion put upon them' (p. 183).

While the Dean holds that on the former of these two questions Hooker's reply is 'strong and just,' since 'those who have lived in the Roman Communion are members of Christ's Church : and the Church of England must recognise and deal with them as such' (pp. 183-5), he describes his language 'with regard to the responsibility for defending the Holy Communion from sacrilegious use by those Romanists who, under pressure of the Acts of Uniformity, sought it simply to escape the penalties of the law' as being such as 'may be thought open, at some points, to adverse criticism' (p. 185), and adds that

'Hooker seems to show . . . some lack of sensitiveness to what really was amiss : and it might be hard to defend him against the charge which many good men have had to bear : the charge of having faltered somewhat from that fineness and justice of discernment which very few can keep with perfect integrity in times of trouble and conflict and confusion' (p. 186).

On a third point the Dean criticizes with greater severity. In the last chapter of the Fifth Book Hooker

'treats of the compromises or concessions or dispensations by which the prevalent difficulties of the day or the demands of special cases were wont to be met ; the ordination of incompetent men, the sanction given to non-residence, and the accumulation of benefices, being especially brought under consideration' (p. 202).

In Hooker's treatment of these questions there are passages on which the Dean, after quoting them, thus comments :—

'It is impossible to refrain from wishing that Hooker had not written those passages : and it seems right to quote them here because stress has been laid in this Introduction upon the words and acts in which he appears at his best, and does justice to what he really was. If in such words as have just been cited he seems to lapse from the true standpoint for a faithful and unworldly and spiritually-minded man, if here and there he says what is poor and what may be easily represented as cynical or cringing, the lapse may not be ignored. Such excessive deference in the things of the Church to the distinctions of the world has often given just and deep offence, in many generations since Hooker's : it would be hard to

measure how far it has obscured the spiritual reality of the Church, and alienated those for whom the Church's eager and disinterested care should have been, as in Christ's day, high among the tokens of His truth : it has lodged in many hearts, both of rich and poor, false, perplexing thoughts which years of faithful toil and teaching cannot eradicate : it has stayed the presence of Christ, the realization of the supernatural, from overwhelming, as with a sweeping tide of unearthly light, the cramping barriers that rank or money has set up. It is a serious indictment against Hooker that he faltered here, and that his great authority could be pleaded in defence of things that no one now would try to defend' (pp. 203-4).

The candour with which the Dean thus admits, in more than one instance, that parts of Hooker's work may rightly be criticized, increases our regret that on the subject of Hooker's Eucharistic teaching he has done little more than bring out clearly the real attitude taken up in the Fifth Book and quote a useful selection of statements by Calvin. It is certainly a very valuable piece of work that he should have shown, against much prevalent misconception, what was the line of thought on the subject of the Eucharist which Hooker was at pains to affirm ; and this work is done with the sensitive care which is a characteristic mark of the Dean's writings :

'Sure of God's care for the Church, reverent towards human reason, watchful for the teaching of events, he saw the one theme of faith and meditation and thanksgiving—the consummation of the Holy Communion by the entrance of Christ Himself into the soul of man—drawing towards itself men's minds and hearts with an increasing unanimity of belief in the high and awful truth, commanding the devotion and uplifting the thoughts and lives of men of all schools : while on the other hand he saw the wasteful, bitter, barren controversy about the earlier stage in the Eucharistic mystery dragging on from age to age and dividing those whom Christ had bidden live in unity. And so he makes his great appeal that men should concentrate their thoughts on that Real Presence of Christ which by means of the Eucharist they do in truth receive : that they should steadily make that the primary and central and dominant point on which to fix their gaze as they tried to move forward in apprehension of the Eucharistic mystery : that they should refrain and check back their minds from returning to scrutinize that stage in it which was beset with unprogressive controversy : that they should seek the fulfilment of Christ's words where beyond debate or doubt it was to be found, in all reality or perfection, in the glorious coming of the Incarnate Son of God, through the Sacrament of His Body and Blood, to dwell within the soul of man. . . . This then is Hooker's deliberate, clear, distinctive line of teaching with regard to the Eucharist. It is a line which had much specially to recommend it in the circumstances of his day, a day of tumult and transition, when

quiet and balanced presentation of the truths that were being dragged this way and that in hot contention had little chance of being understood: it is a line which would keep a man's mind in the way to welcome further light, if further light should come. And it is also a line which at all times is tenable, intelligible, hopeful. All are not likely to think it adequate: whether it is so or not, this is not the place to consider: but before it is censured it should be thoroughly understood and well tried, and that, as nearly as may be, at the height on which Hooker followed it. And at all events he should have the credit of having really meant what he said. On the ground of some passages in his argument he is claimed as supporting one side in the very controversy from which he urged men to refrain. Against these it would be possible to set other passages which have a different look. But to dwell on such passages one way or the other is not treating Hooker as he deserves to be treated. If he had felt able or thought it right to argue either against or for belief in the external Presence of Christ's Body and Blood in the Eucharistic Elements, he would have done so in the manner and on the scale he uses when he deals with other great questions, fully, frankly, laboriously, systematically: he would not earnestly and elaborately have called men away from the controversy, and then himself have crept back into it' (pp. 175-6).

We repeat that it is a very valuable piece of work to have made clear, with the skill which the Dean has shown, Hooker's position that attention ought to be concentrated on the agreement that communicants receive the Body and Blood of Christ, and diverted from the disagreement whether the Body and Blood of Christ are, by virtue of the act of consecration, present in the elements before Communion. But we regret, for many reasons, the limitations which he has thought to be imposed upon himself by the character of his book, and have led him to say 'this is not the place to consider' whether Hooker's 'line' is 'adequate.' We should have liked to have seen a statement, written with the caution and accuracy and delicacy of which the Dean is a master, of some of the differences which necessarily result from the affirmation and the denial that the Body and Blood of Christ are present in the consecrated elements on the altar before Communion. No doubt, many statements on this subject may easily be found. For the most part, they are expressed with harshness and crudity which deprive them of much of their value, and certainly would not be found in anything written by the Dean.

Underneath the almost innumerable details, which are a weariness to the student of the controversies of the reign of Elizabeth, lay the crucial differences between the Puritan

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position and that of which Hooker was the representative. The Puritan attack was in reality an onslaught on the whole system of historical Christianity. For the errors and the bitterness of those who took part in the attack many allowances have to be made. There was the necessary reaction from much distorted and exaggerated teaching in the later Middle Ages. Joined with this were the effects of the cruelties and tyranny of the reign of Mary. There was the general impression made by the utter incapacity to meet the needs of the times which the Papacy had shown, and the untenable character of the Papal claims—an impression which, in those days as well as later, tended to discredit everything which bore, or was supposed to bear, any resemblance to the teaching and practice of the Church of Rome. There were the ignorance and the neglect of many of the clergy and the abuses in the Church. When all these allowances are made, it remains clear that there were fundamental faults in Puritanism, which justify the antagonism to it which Hooker showed, and the rejection of it by the Church of England. It was derogatory to, instead of protective of, the authority of Holy Scripture by assigning to Scripture an office which it was not designed to perform. It was in conflict with the real teaching of Holy Scripture on the subject of the Church. It was destructive of any true view of human nature by its insistence on ignoring the proper office and right use of reason. Any acceptance of it necessarily involved departure from the historical conception of the Christian religion. That the Puritans themselves were well alive to the greatness of the issues at stake may be seen in many passages in the book before us. That both parties were right in believing the controversy to be of crucial importance may be illustrated from the 'four points' of the 'fully developed Puritan position' to which the Dean refers as of 'eminent significance':

'1. The first is the demand for equality of ministers. The title or office of a Bishop may be retained, but only as synonymous with that of Pastor or Teacher. The order of Bishops is held to be contrary to the Scriptures; the act of Ordination is to be the act of the Ministers and Elders; and no minister is to use or challenge any authority outside his own charge, save through the action of the synod of which he may be a member. There are to be only two sorts of ministers, namely Pastors and Teachers, equal in dignity, differing only in work.

'2. Secondly, all members of the Church are to be subject to the discipline of the Consistory. . . .

'3. Thirdly, the breach with the past is to be complete. The

English Church as it is to be detested with a perfect hatred ; those who were priests under Henry VIII. and Mary ought to be utterly removed ; the prescript order of service taken out of the Mass Book ought to go, with all that recalled the worship of the unreformed Church.

'4. Fourthly, no ordinance can stand in the Church unless it is expressly appointed in Scripture. Nothing must be done but that for which the express warrant of God's Word can be adduced' (pp. 52-3).

In repudiating the Puritan position the Church of England remained true to the historical Church of Christ. It would be well for those who fret over what seem to them imperfections in the system and methods of the Church of England, to consider how great was the danger that she would yield to the temptation to compromise some matter which was essential to her position as a true part of the Church. It is by observing what the English Church was urged to do by formidable controversialists and the resolution with which she refused to accept their position that the real significance of her assertions of doctrine and her practical system can be known. It is the greatness of Hooker that he played a valuable part in that attitude of the English Church which involved in his time her historic continuity with the Universal Church, and made possible her great work in the future.

'On such an issue,' says the Dean of Christ Church, 'as that which had to be decided between the historic system of the Church and the Puritan policy many forces tell—the deeper tides of national character, the foresight and patience of statesmanship, the testing and rectifying action of time, the will of those who wield power, the mistakes and exaggerations of assailants, and argument. It was with the last of these forces that Hooker served the English Church (pp. 223-4).

'Hooker's appeal in things spiritual is to a threefold fount of guidance and authority—to reason, Scripture, and tradition—all alike of God, alike emanating from Him, the one original Source of all light and power—each in certain matters bearing a special and prerogative sanction from Him, all in certain matters blending and co-operating. And in maintaining the rightfulness and the duty of thus appealing, Hooker rendered his highest service and did his most abiding work. For on equal loyalty to the unconflicting rights of reason, of Scripture, and of tradition, rest the distinctive strength and hope of the English Church. It has left much undone which it ought to have done : it has much to do to "perfect that which is lacking" : but it has not set up any barrier that stays it from a sincere, unflinching reference of its case to that threefold authority. And so it may hope to commend itself to the conscience of reasonable and religious men, and to hold its continuous course ; strengthened,

not imperilled by the progress of human life and thought, by the increase of learning, by the gain of frankness in enquiry; blending the wisdom and strength of a great past with the recognition of what is greatest in the present; ancient, and not antiquated. So also it may hope to go on proving itself able and worthy to be the Church of a great and free nation . . . fit to express and represent the religious life of the English people. And so, lastly, it may cherish a yet higher hope. It would be presumptuous to say either that the fulfilment of "the Divine purpose of visible unity amongst Christian" is near at hand, or that it is far off. . . . The hope of being allowed, through faith and toil and patience, to bear a special part in forwarding, when and as God wills, His purpose of unity, is a serious and chastening hope to entertain: but it cannot be declined when the call to entertain comes to the Church of England from a sober study of its own history, and heritage, and conditions. And in all that has led men to think that the Church of England may be found to have a special power to attract and draw towards union the sundered communities of Christendom, nothing can be reckoned higher than its unreserved appeal to reason, to Scripture, and to tradition. The maintenance of that appeal secures the only ground of common principles on which a general and real agreement is likely to be attained: while the Church that maintains it has the best hope of advance in the character and temper which may make for reconciliation' (pp. 226-7).

It is impossible that there should be any intelligent study of the controversy with the Puritans in the reign of Elizabeth without eliciting much which has a more or less intimate bearing on some of the controversies of the present time in the Church of England. Indeed, some parts of what the Dean of Christ Church has written in the present volume are so applicable to these controversies that he has thought it necessary to explain in the preface that no reference to them was intended by him.

'I have been revising the proofs through days of hot debate and much anxiety in the Church of England: and here and there passages in the book have seemed to me to bear somewhat plainly on the present troubles. And so it may not be impertinent to say that I am not conscious of having written a single sentence with any such reference in my mind. Whatever lessons or warnings the words convey rise simply, I hope, out of the past, where any one, I think, may find them' (p. x).

We have not yet emerged from the conflict which has been caused by the attempt to overthrow the great work in the Church of England in the present century, which has been due to the Tractarian Movement. The Tractarian Movement, in its essential features, brought back much which

was involved in the rejection of the Puritan position and had become obscured in intervening times. The agitation for the overthrow of the work which the Tractarians began has as its central principle the same abhorrence of the historical system and methods of the Church of Christ as was a distinctive feature of the Puritans. It can hardly be denied that some allowances ought to be made for those who are concerned in this agitation. There is much by which they are necessarily stung; there are many things which not unnaturally have been offensive to them. It cannot be expected that the successors of the Puritans should be unmoved by the knowledge of the steady growth of the principles and practices to which they are strongly opposed, and the fact that their position is all the time becoming more untenable in the Church of England. They have been aggravated in many places by crude and reckless teaching, sometimes, while substantially true, so unbalanced in its expression as almost to lose its truth, sometimes in its substance altogether indefensible; and by ritual and services, sometimes right and lawful but hurriedly introduced and unduly emphasised, sometimes both unlawful in the Church of England and difficult to defend anywhere. They have been encouraged by the knowledge that the brawling of Mr. Kensit and the gibes of Sir William Harcourt have led some, at least, of the bishops to endeavour to suppress what for many years they have steadily let alone; and the mischievous sense that they can frighten those who ought to be the rulers of the Church into action which argument would never gain. In their case, as in the case of the Puritans, when these allowances are made, it may still be seen that their aim is that breach with the historical conception and methods of the Church which the Church of England has definitely refused to make; and that, as such, it needs to be resisted now as strenuously as the aim of the Puritans in the reign of Elizabeth. It is a result of their narrow outlook, their perversion of Holy Scripture, and their rejection of Catholic tradition that their victory would mean the loss of that which Hooker did much to secure and the destruction of that 'threefold hope of the English Church' to which the Dean of Christ Church has emphatically referred,—

'its hope of abiding unshaken and enriched by the progress of the world; its hope of rising towards the fulfilment of its work for England; its hope of guarding for Christendom through the time of its severance the ground on which at last its reunion may rest' (p. 228).

The Dean of Christ Church has given many proofs that

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he is one whom the 'sober, peaceable, and truly conscientious sons of the Church of England' may well trust. If his book does something to impress on the minds of English Church people lessons which are much needed in our present dangers, there will be added to its historical worth a practical utility which its author will hardly value less.¹

ART. VI.—PROFESSOR EARLE ON DANTE'S EARTHLY PARADISE.

The Purgatory of Dante Alighieri. Part II. The Earthly Paradise (Cantos xxviii.—xxxiii.). Translated by CHARLES LANCELOT SHADWELL, D.C.L., of Oriel College, Oxford. With an Introduction by JOHN EARLE, M.A., LL.D., Prebendary of Wells, Professor of Anglo-Saxon in the University of Oxford. (London and New York, 1899.)

WE do not propose to comment upon Dr. Shadwell's share in this book. He acknowledges that he went too far when in his earlier volume he closed his translation of the *Purgatorio* at the end of Canto xxvii., omitting the further six which describe Dante's experience in the Earthly Paradise; and he admits that these last cannot be omitted without loss to the whole structure. He now, therefore, supplements his translation by another, of the final six cantos. Of this performance, which is carried out in the same Marvellian stanza adopted in the first translation, we have nothing further to say than that we find no reason in it to alter or in any way modify the opinion expressed in the number of this *Review* for April 1893, to the effect that the metre is wholly unfitted for the reproduction of Dante's tercets, and that the inevitable result of its use is failure.

The work is, however, preceded by a so-called Introduction by Professor Earle, which should rather have been styled an 'Essay on the Mystic Significance of the Earthly Paradise,' and in which are put forward views so novel and so startling that they call for the serious attention of all Dantofili, and challenge discussion by those who, like ourselves, are unable to accept them.

In limine, we must express our dissent from the Professor's

¹ We hope that in the second edition an index and a few words on pages 212 and 218, to mention that the appendices referred are those in Mr. Keble's edition of Hooker, may be added.

view that this part of the *Divina Commedia*—though in so far as the scheme of the poem is tripartite it may be regarded as a subordinate section of one of the three members, viz. Inferno, Purgatorio, Paradiso—constitutes one entire member of the four of the quadripartite scheme, viz. Hell, Purgatory, Earthly Paradise, Heavenly Paradise. We do not recognize as legitimate any severance of the Earthly Paradise from the Purgatorio. In *Purg.* i. 4–6 Dante tells us that he is 'about to sing of that second realm in which the human soul is purified, *and* becomes worthy for ascent to heaven.' Both of these effects upon the soul are produced, therefore, in this 'second realm,' *i.e.* in Purgatory. The purification is spread over Cantos i.–xxvii.; the discipline that fits for heaven is undergone in Cantos xxviii.–xxxiii. And the Earthly Paradise is the summit of the Mount of Purgatory.

Professor Earle lays great stress on the completeness of the change from toil, anxiety, and pain, to ease and enjoyment, which takes place at the opening of Canto xxviii.; but this is merely the logical result of the purgation which has been accomplished in the soul, then admitted to the final part of its probation. The Earthly Paradise is but a stage in the journey towards the Heavenly; according to Dante, it figures the blessedness of the present life, which consists in the practice of its proper virtue; whereas the blessedness of eternal life consists in the fruition of the Divine aspect, to which such virtue cannot ascend without the aid of Divine illumination. This blessedness is to be sought in the Heavenly Paradise.¹ When, therefore, Professor Earle maintains that for Dante the six cantos relating to the Earthly Paradise 'were the "hub" of his great poem,' and that 'Hither converge all the leading and pervading ideas, as the spokes of a wheel converge about the axle tree. In these Cantos, more than anywhere else, is the chief motive of the poet to be sought' (p. xiv), we cannot but think that by assigning a quite undue prominence to the subject of his essay, he is led into the error of practically making Dante the hero of the whole poem; which, if so, should have concluded with what we shall find Professor Earle regarding as his spiritual marriage to Beatrice.

The Professor's opinion that 'with the twenty-eighth Canto, which is the first of the Earthly Paradise, we pass into a new atmosphere, out of the historical into that which is avowedly allegorical and symbolical' (p. xxxix), makes him regard both the things and the persons treated of, in a

¹ *De Mon.* iii. c. 16, ll. 45–52.

'sembianza non sua.' Thus, Matilda, the fair lady whom Dante encounters in the 'divine forest' of this canto, is neither the Countess Matilda nor any other of the persons with whom different commentators have identified her. She 'is not any particular person at all; not a woman, but Woman.' And besides being Woman, she is also Wisdom, and 'she knows the secrets of Creation' (p. xxvi). In passing, we may remark that, if so, she is the equal of 'Philosophy' or 'Wisdom' as described in the *Convito* (iii. c. 15, ll. 8-11), where Dante says that 'things appear in her aspect which display the pleasures of Paradise'—i.e. the Heavenly Paradise—together with much more about the wonders of her eyes and smile: all which praises may with reason be considered as referable also to the glorified Beatrice, but in no way to her precursor Matilda.¹ Next, with regard to Beatrice herself, because Dante in the *Vita Nuova* evades all direct assertion of her death, although the Professor admits that he refers to it 'both beforehand in the way of presentiment, and afterwards in the way of allusion' (p. lxxvii) we are told to infer that her death never happened. We suppose that Professor Earle is one of those who regard her as not a real but an allegorical personage; for he proceeds to say that in the Earthly Paradise Dante can choose among the incidents of her mortality such as naturally bear an allegorical meaning. When therefore she speaks in Canto xxxi. of her death, her members disintegrated in the earth, her change from body to spirit, all this is to be understood only of the shedding of those *πρωτὰ στοιχεῖα* which have supplied the framework of juvenile theology (p. lxxix). And as there is a danger that when childish theology is left behind, all theology may be dropped with it, the reproaches of Beatrice to Dante for his conduct after her death relate to his letting religion slip and closing with philosophy instead. This last conclusion is the same as that arrived at by Scartazzini, and the only one in which we can agree with the Professor. (We assume, of course, that he does not mean by 'Philosophy' the *Divine* Philosophy which he identifies with Beatrice.) We come now to the most extraordinary of all the theories propounded by our author. In the midst of the mystical procession of the personified books of the Old and New Testaments described in Canto xxix., a two-wheeled triumphal car figures, drawn by a Gryphon—a fabulous animal described by the ancients as

¹ Professor Earle himself says (p. lxxxviii) that Beatrice in the *Commedia* 'is not frankly (*ἀπλῶς*) the Church, but Heavenly Wisdom, Divine Philosophy, which is the same as Theologia.'

half eagle and half lion. Accordingly Dante says of this Gryphon (ll. 113, 114) that 'he had gold members, as far as he was bird, and the rest white, mixed with vermilion.' And, as the Professor admits, the opinion of the commentators, that he represents Christ, is in possession of the field. He, however, entirely dissents from it.

'How,' he says, 'does it agree with the colours of white and red in the description? The main colour is white, that is to say the foundation of the Gryphon's character is Faith. Is it possible that the poet (who was a theologian) could have meant to apply this characteristic to Christ? When was Faith ever attributed to Him? Of His people it is the most universal and comprehensive attribute; they are Believers, "Fideles," the Faithful: such is their commonest designation. But for Christ Himself, He awakens faith in others; He is the object, not the subject, of faith. The text itself furnishes us with abundant evidence of the poet's meaning, which is very far indeed from that which the commentators have imposed upon him. The Gryphon symbolizes the general body of the Faithful, the bulk of the Christian congregation, the simple folk, the unlettered laity, and his rigid figure is the complement to the graceful beauty of Beatrice, who represents the *élite*, the dignity, authority, wisdom, and government of the Christian Church' (p. li).

Let us closely examine these assertions. The commentators are agreed in explaining that the gold part of the Gryphon refers to the divine nature of Christ, and the 'white mixed with vermilion' part to His human flesh and blood. Professor Earle is not warranted in saying that white is the main colour. Dante lays no more stress upon it than upon the red. Assuming, however, that white *is* the main colour, it is a far cry from that to the conclusion that it has here any reference to Faith. Compare with the description of the Gryphon that of the Angels in the Empyrean.¹ 'They all had faces of living flame; the wings of gold; and the rest of such whiteness as no snow can arrive at.' Here we have, in addition to gold, red and white colours not mixed, as in the Gryphon, but in separate parts of the figure; and an instance in which the main colour *is*, undoubtedly, the white. Does it on that account import that the Angels have faith? When was faith ever attributed to them? Faith is the evidence of things not seen; but they have the full fruition of the sight of God, from whose face they have never turned their sight.² The fact is that Professor Earle cannot refrain from assigning an allegorical meaning to every colour which Dante mentions, and, as we shall

¹ *Par.* xxxi. 13-15.

² *Par.* xxix. 76-8.

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see hereafter, does not restrict himself to colours which occur in the Earthly Paradise. This propensity so biases his judgment that it leads him constantly to wrong conclusions.

We now pass on to consider his astounding proposition that the Gryphon symbolizes the simple, unlettered and untutored Christian laity. He supports it by the further passages in which the Gryphon and his actions are referred to. These are *Purg.* xxxi. 80, 81, 121-6; xxxii. 25-7, 43-51, and 85-90. We will take them in their order. We notice, as regards the first (*Purg.* xxxi. 80, 81), that he does not cite line 80, but line 81 only. We must rectify this omission. The two lines are as follows:

'Vider Beatrice volta in sulla fiera,
Ch'è sola una persona in due nature.'

The Professor renders the second of these lines by 'Who is one sole person in two natures.' But 'sola' agrees not with 'persona,' but with 'fiera' in line 80, and the true rendering of the passage is, 'They saw Beatrice turned towards the animal which, alone, is one person in two natures.' The correct interpretation demolishes at a stroke the whole argument which the Professor founds upon the wide application of the term 'one sole person in two natures.' It at once puts an end to Didron's theory that the Gryphon signifies the Pope—eagle so far as he is priest, and lion so far as he is king—and Professor Earle's, that he represents man in his double nature, half earthly and half spiritual. Of whom, save of Christ, can it be truly said that He, *alone*, is one person in two natures, the divine and the human? Compare *Par.* xiii. 25-7:

'Lì si cantò non Bacco, non Peana,
Ma tre Persone in divina natura
Ed in una persona essa e l'umana.'

He, *alone*, even of the three Persons of the Holy Trinity, has both the natures. 'Sola' is the emphatic word in the lines we have been considering.

We now turn to *Purg.* xxxi. 121-6. Space forbids us to cite the whole of these lines, but the material ones are 122, 123:

'La doppia fiera dentro vi raggiava
Or con uni or con altri reggimenti.'

Anglicè, 'The double animal was flashing within them,¹ now with one and now with other "reggimenti." The Professor

¹ 'them,' i.e. the eyes of Beatrice, in which the Gryphon was reflected.

wrongly translates this word 'reggimenti' by 'Governments.' It occurs in but one other passage in the *Divina Commedia*, viz. *Purg.* xvi. 128, where it is undoubtedly used for the two governments, of priest and of king. He says that the word has the same meaning in both passages; but he goes completely astray, as the Church of Rome is in the first passage said to have done, 'per confondere in sè due reggimenti.' Nothing can be more obvious than that here there is no question of 'governments,' but that 'reggimenti' has the same sense as in the *Convito* (iii. c. 7, ll. 95-113), where Dante says that the operations proper to the rational soul, in which the *divine* light most keenly *shines* ('raggia,' the same word, be it observed, here used for the Gryphon's action), consist in speech and actions, which are usually called 'reggimenti e portamenti.' And in Book iv. c. 25, ll. 13-15, he says that gentle 'reggimenti' consist in sweet and courteous speech, sweet and courteous service and action. Beyond doubt these are the 'reggimenti' which Dante speaks of in the lines before us. And although they are not elsewhere referred to, under that designation, in the *Divina Commedia*, they are implied in a passage in the *Paradiso* (xviii. 52-4), where he says that he turned himself to see his duty marked out for him in Beatrice 'either by speech or by action;' that is to say, he looked to see what 'reggimenti' she was displaying.¹ Professor Earle, citing Longfellow's mistaken translation of the word as 'natures,' goes off at a tangent to object that the assumption that the Gryphon was reflected in the eyes of Beatrice, now in the divine and now in the human nature, raises the difficulty of understanding how the divine nature could be represented to the eye; and also amounts to a forestalling of the contemplation of the mystery of the Incarnation, which Dante reserves for the final canto of the poem. To this we answer that Beatrice here represents Theology, and that Theology contemplates Christ at one time under His human, at another under His divine *aspect*. This involves no necessity for considering the mystery of the Incarnation. The Incarnate Person, only, is the subject of it. *E.g.* the eye may picture, and the mind may dwell upon, at one time His 'reggimenti' at the marriage at Cana in Galilee, and at another His Transfiguration. The passage lends no support whatever to the Professor's surprising conclusion from it that

¹ Perhaps, if we are to employ a single word to render the meaning of 'reggimenti,' 'gestures' comes nearest to it.

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'The real subject of the meditation of Beatrice is the faithful laity, the plain untutored folk who accept the gospel from their teachers, and contribute little from their own minds beyond the instinctive recognition of spiritual truth. On these simple folk she is gazing with emerald eyes, that is to say with eyes of Hope, and she sees the lay people, not as they appear to the casual observer, but in all the fullness of their potential and ultimate development. The mass of day labourers and mechanic artisans are yet to be, what Dante himself has been dubbed by Virgil, kings and priests' (p. xci).

He also says that 'So wonderful was the transforming power of the emeralds, that they translated, not reflected, the Gryphon, displaying as his equivalent *in posse* august human figures, now of priest and now of king.' We have shown that the theory that priests and kings were reflected falls to the ground when the interpretation of 'reggimenti' by the author is shown to be erroneous. And as to the ascription to Beatrice's eyes of the power to translate, not reflect, the Gryphon, Dante expressly says, in lines 125, 126, that the transformation of his reflection was *his* act—and therefore not hers. As to the degradation of seeing in an animal which combines the eagle's and the lion's natures the symbol of a set of stupid day labourers and mechanics, we shall have to say a word or two before we conclude. And as to the supposition that Beatrice saw the reflection of the Gryphon not as it actually existed but prophetically as it might hereafter exist, it is so opposed to Dante's faithful adherence to the actual present condition of everything that he saw, that we shall not waste words in combating it.

The next passage is *Purg.* xxxii. 25-27. This is a mere allusion to the impassibility of the Gryphon, who, in drawing the car towards the tree of knowledge, did not stir a feather. In this the Professor discovers that 'the Gryphon has no sympathy with the new departure; he complies mechanically, but exhibits no emotion of interest in the movement;' or that, 'more generally,' the passage 'may be taken to indicate blank simplicity and passive obedience' (p. cii). We leave our readers to judge between this opinion, which again degrades the Gryphon into an animal in the lowest scale of creation, and the received one, viz. that Christ guides the Church without visible effort or show of external means.

Purg. xxxii. 43-51 next calls for our consideration. The first three lines contain the benediction of the Gryphon for refraining from stripping with his beak the tree of knowledge. Here again the Professor falls foul of those who suppose that this commendation is directed to Christ. To

us, on the other hand, He appears to be a most appropriate object for it. In line 37 'Adam' had been ejaculated by the saintly spirits accompanying Beatrice. They may be supposed to have then had in mind the sin of Adam in tasting the forbidden fruit of the tree. What more natural than that, when they find the Gryphon wholly abstaining from it, they should bless Him for His self-denial. To quote for once Dr. Shadwell's rendering :

'O Griphon, blest art thou, that ne'er
With beak that tempting tree wilt tear,
The taste whereof will make
The bowels sore to ache.'

The speakers' thoughts revert to the consequences of Adam's transgression :

'Il Padre, per lo cui ardito gusto
L'umana specie tanto amaro gusta.'

They reflect that, in the words of Cardinal Newman's well-known hymn :

'When all was sin and shame,
A second Adam to the fight
And to the rescue came.'

We have to choose between this view and the Professor's, which is that the blessing is bestowed upon the unlearned folk, signified according to him by the Gryphon, and that they are blest for not being captivated with a taste for knowledge of high things ; inasmuch as 'when people without competent education amass learning, they fail in the digestion of it, and drift into tortuous currents of thought, bringing confusion and pain' (p. cv). He also treats the reference to the Gryphon's beak as importing that, when the uneducated aspire to understand great matters and go about to collect knowledge, they generally gather only the results and tips of learning, well figured by the leaves and flowers which a bird's beak might snap off. Here again this commendation of purposed ignorance, and of abstention from the acquisition of knowledge, still further degrades the Gryphon, if he is regarded as the fitting object of it.

In lines 47, 48 the Gryphon, styled the 'binato' animal, utters his only speech, which is :

'Sì si conserva il seme d'ogni giusto.'

In this 'seed of all that is just' the Professor recognizes 'Faith' again, which, he says, is so described by the rhetorical

¹ *Par.* xxxii. 122, 123. ² No. 172 in *Hymns Ancient and Modern*.

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figure Antonomasia. Thus he makes the Gryphon say that, 'for simple folk who desire to hold fast their faith, it is better not to meddle with learned controversies; a favourite apothegm with untutored believers in every generation' (p. cviii).

Once more, therefore, he presents us with a Gryphon composed of an eagle with clipped wings and claws, and of a caged and tamed lion. What a contrast to that (also golden-winged) eagle which descended, 'terrible as lightning,' in Dante's dream, and snatched him up to the gate of Purgatory (Canto ix. 19-30); and to that lion which came against him in the dreadful wood, head erect, and ravenous with hunger, and of whom the very air seemed afraid!¹ We must not omit to notice that the Professor translates 'binato' by 'twice born.' He says, and truly, that this epithet is inapplicable to Christ; but, as we have seen before, he is beset by an inaccuracy in his translations of which this is another instance. The word does not mean 'twice born,' but 'two-natured.' It has the same sense as 'doppia' in line 122 of Canto xxxi.,² and as 'biforme' in line 96 of Canto xxxii. If so, there is an end of the fantastical explanation that we have in the word a reference to the evangelical doctrine of the new birth of the faithful. We therefore adhere to the commentators who see in line 48 a reference to Christ's saying, 'Thus it becometh us to fulfil all righteousness.'

In lines 49-51 we are told that the Gryphon dragged the car to the tree and left it bound thereto. Professor Earle discerns in this another proof that the Gryphon cannot be Christ, to whom Dante would never have assigned such a menial act. But what says Dante in *De Mon.* iii. c. 3, ll. 75-9? 'Ante quidem Ecclesiam sunt vetus et novum Testamentum, quod "in eternum mandatum est," ut ait Propheta; hoc enim est quod dicit Ecclesia, loquens ad Sponsum: "Trahe me post te."' So, in *Epist.* viii. par. 4, ll. 42-5, he upbraids the heads of the Church as 'per manifestam orbitam Crucifixi currum Sponsæ regere negligentes.'

Purg. xxxii. 85-90, the last passage concerning the Gryphon, relates his ascension, followed by the angels and glorified saints who had accompanied Beatrice. But, says the Professor, this ascent is not to be identified with the ascension of Christ, except in the sense of the collect which prays that as we believe Him 'to have ascended into the

¹ *Inf.* i. 46-8.

² So the Centaurs are spoken of in *Purg.* xxiv. 121-123 as having fought against Theseus 'coi doppi petti.'

heavens, so we may also in heart and mind thither ascend' (pp. cxii, cxiii). The meaning merely is that the elevating discipline of the ordinary Christian life, supported by the Scriptures, is a pilgrimage towards the upper regions. Or, if we choose, we may, he says, regard this ascension as a mere exit, a disappearance rather than a dismissal.

From first to last, in short, the Gryphon is, in the estimation of the Professor, a humble, ignorant retainer of the Church, dutifully contented with that ignorance. And this in spite of his golden wings, which soared upward beyond the range of sight;¹ in spite of his eagle nature, that of the bird whose flight is above all others;² which can even endure to face the sun;³ and is the symbol, in *Par.* xviii., not of unlettered laymen, but of the glorious company of sainted righteous rulers.

If the Professor is right, we can but express our amazement that it should have been reserved for him, more than six centuries after Dante's birth, to discover a truth hidden from the eyes of all the commentators, editors, and translators who have preceded him.

The subject of the Gryphon has required such attentive consideration that we must be brief in noticing the Professor's other strange discoveries. Foremost among these is the theory that the mystical procession of the personified Scriptures, in which, as we have seen, the Gryphon figures, is a bridal procession in honour of Beatrice the bride, and Dante the bridegroom, whose spiritual nuptials are celebrated by his approach to and gaze into her emerald eyes, under the guidance of the four cardinal and the three theological virtues, and by her unveiling her face to him, as described in *Purg.* xxxi. 130-145. Surely, however, this, as we have said, is to make the *Divina Commedia* nothing more than a love story of which Dante is the hero, 'the lover whom' Beatrice 'has chosen' (p. lxxx), and with whose marriage, although not such a one as to violate the *neque nubent* principle,⁴ the poem ought to terminate. But since, as before, this manifestation of herself, Dante continues to be no more than Beatrice's reverential pupil and follower. So far from in any way arrogating to himself the position of a husband, he describes himself in the next canto as wholly devoted to her commands, and he addresses her, in the Heaven of the Moon, as the object of the love of the primal Lover, *i.e.* God, and as herself a goddess;⁵ and his final address to her after she has left him,

¹ *Purg.* xxix. 112.

² *Inf.* iv. 96.

³ *Par.* xx. 31.

⁴ See *Purg.* xix. 136, 137.

⁵ *Purg.* xxxii. 106, 107; *Par.* iv. 118.

and he beholds her seated afar off in glory, is in fact, and indeed is called by him, a prayer.¹

The Professor, if we may say so, is too much under the influence of Bunyan, as also under the tendency to see constant symbolism in all colours, to be able to rid himself of the habit of contemplating Dante as a pilgrim pure and simple, and those with whom he meets as destined for bliss, or helpers to the bliss of others, if only they are associated with red, white, or green. Take for instance the stress which he lays upon the colours in which Beatrice is described as arrayed, in *Purg.* xxx. 31-3. In these we have those three colours in, respectively, her white veil, her green mantle, and her vesture of living flame; but Professor Earle must add to these the further green of her olive wreath, without which her possession of Faith, Hope and Charity is sufficiently indicated. Green, moreover, is the colour which more than any other warps his opinions. Thus, even in Hell, all those who in any way are said to be associated with that colour, have consequently, he maintains, a good hope of salvation. This is true of the virtuous heathen in Limbo, who are gathered together in a green meadow;² and even Brunetto Latini will be saved, because he, on parting from Dante, runs off at a pace so swift as to recall that of the winner in the race at Verona for a green mantle. The trifling obstacle to this theory, arising from the last line in the inscription on the gate of the Inferno, 'Abandon all hope, ye who enter,'³ is got rid of by the assumption that, as Hell says it, it is so far false that it is subject to exceptions. Yet poor Brunetto Latini tells Dante that should he halt to speak to him he must lie down for a hundred years without fanning from him the tormenting rain of fire; and speaks of himself as one of a troop under eternal damnation.⁴ And as to the inscription on the gate, it surely must be regarded as placed there not by demons but by the *alto Fattore*. In *Purg.* iii. 133-135, King Manfredi's Spirit tells Dante that excommunication does not exclude the subject of it from eternal love, so long as hope has aught of green; but this is a statement far short of the assertion that wherever there is green, there is hope. Virgil, apart though he is from connexion with this colour, is in the Professor's opinion sure of ultimate salvation, and therefore must be regarded as unduly despondent whenever he asserts the contrary, as in *Inf.* iv. 41-3; *Purg.* iii. 40-45, xxi. 16-18; and Statius is mistaken in telling him that though his writings

¹ *Par.* xxxi. 79-91.

² *Inf.* iv. 111-114.

³ *Inf.* iii. 9.

⁴ *Inf.* xv. 37-42.

had led him (Statius) to turn Christian, they had in nowise averted his own doom.¹

There are several ingenious suppositions by Professor Earle: e.g. that Dante never leaves only six instances of anything, but either before or after giving that number implies a seventh; with which we are pleased to have no fault to find. We may notice the following. In *Inf.* iv. Dante is received into fellowship with five chief poets, and makes the sixth. But Statius, though he does not appear till far on in Purgatory (*Purg.* xxi. 91), completes the number of seven. This adds one more to the plausible conjectures which have been made as accounting for the introduction of Statius at all into the poem.

We must now bring our criticisms to an end. Such is the captivating style and the alluring rhetoric of Professor Earle, that we cannot part from his essay without a feeling of some regret that it leaves us unconvinced.

ART. VII.—MRS. OLIPHANT'S LIFE AND LETTERS.

The Autobiography and Letters of Mrs. M. O. W. Oliphant.
Arranged and Edited by Mrs. HARRY COGHILL.
(Blackwoods, 1899.)

WHEN Mrs. Oliphant passed away amid the festivities of the Queen's second Jubilee, the average English reader could not but acknowledge that, as Tennyson in 1890 had expressed it, her 'prolific work had been amazing,' and would very likely add with him that 'she was nearly always worth reading.' If the question had then been put, in the words of the 'beloved second cousin' who has edited her *Autobiography and Letters*, 'Who has ever achieved the same variety of literary work with anything like the same level of excellence?' it might have received an affirmative reply. But no one outside the circle of private friendship would have supposed that hers was a specially interesting personality. The volume before us makes that fact abundantly clear. It contains a fragmentary autobiography, which the Editor in one passage calls a journal, and which was begun specially for her younger son, and written at long intervals between 'her early

¹ *Purg.* xxii. 64-72.

widowhood' in 1859 and the death of that son in 1894.¹ Mr. Leslie Stephen, in the *National Review*, has justly called it 'pathetic;' but the pathetic deepens into the tragic as the story advances to its close. It might be called a fresh comment on the old theme of 'The Vanity of Human Wishes;' but it is really a record of the slow, sure blighting of a mother's brilliant hopes, which for years had supplied the motive force for work at once 'enormous in volume' and 'multifarious in kind.' She survived the final blow, the death of 'her last, her dearest,' for the greater part of three years; 'I am forced to live,' she wrote, 'though everything in life is gone' (p. 407).

Margaret Oliphant Wilson—we presume that this was the full form of her name as unmarried—was born at a Lothian village called Wallyford, within sight of Arthur's Seat. The date of her birth is not given in the Autobiography, but in a letter of January 1884; it was April 4, 1828. We might wish that, while respecting her 'distinct injunction that no biography of her was to be written,' the Editor had felt free to illustrate the blanks in the personal narrative by a few footnotes, or to add somewhat to the disappointingly 'slight thread of story' by which her letters have been 'connected.' As it is, we must take what we have got, and have abundant reason to be thankful. Her earliest recollections were associated with Lasswade, a pretty little village about six miles from Edinburgh, where Scott had taken a cottage in the first year of his married life. Her father was a Scotchman of the lower middle class, and, we should imagine, inferior in practical ability to his compeers; morbidly shy and taciturn, incapable of exercising any influence in his own household—altogether a poor sort of creature. The mother, who set a high value on her descent from the ancient line of Oliphant, was a high-spirited, quick-tempered, warmly affectionate, intensely energetic woman, whom her daughter found it difficult to refer to any distinctive human type, and whose temperament prepared the future authoress to 'understand the Carlyles,' and thereby to win such a commendation as Carlyle gave her in a note to Tennyson.² It was a vehement, impulsive, and almost

¹ The Autobiography ends with: 'And now here I am all alone. I cannot write any more.'

² He introduces her as 'an old and esteemed friend, distinguished in literature (*Life of Edward Irving*, &c.), and, what is best of all, a highly amiable, rational, and worthy lady' (*Memoir of Alfred, Lord Tennyson*, p. 616). Of the *Life of Irving*, she says in a letter of 1862 that she will be 'disappointed if it does not make some commotion. There never was such a hero—such a princely, magnanimous, simple heart.'

turbulent nature, in which vast kindness and generosity were strangely combined with strong partisanship and a 'dangerous facility of sarcasm.' Ere long the family removed to Glasgow, and afterwards to Liverpool, where Mr. Wilson 'had an office in the Custom-house.' They retained their Free Church Presbyterianism and their militant radicalism; the dark corner of their life was the ever-recurring anxiety and ultimately the bitter shame produced by the moral breakdown of one of the sons, who, after falling more than once 'into his old vice and debt and misery,' was fondly supposed to have so far righted himself as to be qualified for the duties of an English Presbyterian minister near Berwick. Ere long another collapse put an end to all hopes; 'he never got out of the mire, nor was able to support himself again.' His utter want of self-controlling power had previously brought Margaret to London to 'take care of him' during a course of theological studies; and this led to an acquaintance with her cousin, Francis Oliphant, and thus to her marriage in the May (unlucky month!) of 1852, three years after her mother had 'laughed and cried with pride and happiness and amazement unbounded' over the publication of 'Maggie's story,' called *Passages in the Life of Mrs. Margaret Maitland*, a book which won cordial praise from so rigid a critic as Jeffrey,¹ and the first of a series which 'can hardly number less than a hundred.' Her husband was an artist, but by no means of the first order; her parents lived with the young couple in London, but she drops a hint of interior discomfort; 'my husband and my mother did not get on: my father sat passive, not perceiving much.' Her firstborn child was another Margaret; but she lost two infant children—a mournful foreshadowing of far more agonizing bereavements, although she confesses with a sort of shame that the death of 'her little Marjorie' in 1855 had given her a deeper pang than that which came, five months earlier, with the departure of the mother who 'had been everything to her all her life' (she had much more of life to go through under the saddest conditions), 'and to whom she was everything.' The birth, in November 1856, of her eldest son, Cyril, 'her

¹ See this letter (January 5, 1850), in p. 153. Mrs. Oliphant calls it 'full of the most delicate criticism and fatherly commendation' (*Lit. Hist. Engl.* ii. 67). The once formidable Aristarchus of the *Edinburgh*, who, as Lockhart says, was so 'unjust and petulant' as the reviewer of *Marmion*, had become *lenior et melior* as he approached his end. He discerned the feminine hand in *Margaret Maitland*, and said that he had been 'captivated' by the book before he received a copy from the unknown author.

beautiful, delightful child,' is recorded in the Autobiography with 'sudden tears' that prevent her from 'seeing the page;' for she is writing in January 1891, some three months after his death. Her life in London was pleasant enough; she 'wrote steadily, and got about 400*l.* for a novel. . . . I linger upon this brief, and, as it feels to me now, halcyon time' (p. 44).

In the summer of 1858 the cloud which was to darken all first showed itself; she was told that her husband had 'brought up a little blood. . . . He never was well after;' but the whole significance of the symptom was not made known to her, or perhaps she refused to take it in. They left England for Italy in January 1859, and suffered much on the journey, especially in the severe cold of Lyons; from thence, by Marseilles and Cannes and Genoa, they reached Florence, where 'Frank' became worse and worse, but her 'sanguine' nature prevented her from realizing the situation: 'he evidently foresaw the end, and 'set his heart on going to Rome,' perhaps, as she thinks, because he had a friend there who might be 'a help' to his wife in her approaching bereavement. In October a French doctor told Mrs. Oliphant *franchement* ('that word,' she adds, 'always even now gives me a thrill when I read it'), that there was 'no hope;' her husband bravely said, 'Well, if it so, that is no reason why we should be miserable.' He 'died quite conscious, kissing me when his lips were already cold,' and so left her 'with two helpless children and one unborn, and very little money, and no friends but the Macphersons,' a strange and somewhat 'Bohemian' couple, 'who were as good to me as brother and sister, but had no power to help me beyond that,' &c. Her relation with the great publishing house of Blackwood had become—as it always continued—a relation of helpful friendship; but her prospects were doubtful enough when she returned to England, and after a while to Scotland, being 'only thirty-one, and in full convalescence of sorrow.' Her second son was born after his father's death, and named after him, although from her habit (hardly a wise one) of keeping up baby-names for sons after they grew into manhood, not only is Cyril repeatedly mentioned as 'Tiddy' or 'Tids,' but even the Editor writes of his brother as 'Cecco,' the pet-form of 'Francesco.' We must pass rapidly over the first years of her widowed life. She drew more and more closely to the Blackwoods, and

¹ 'We have great hopes,' she wrote, 'from the doctor that he wants chiefly rest and change' (p. 166).

made acquaintance with Carlyle and his wife, for both of whom she conceived a fervent admiration, in which Mr. Blackwood could not share, and also with Principal and Mrs. Tulloch of St. Andrews, who became her warm friends, the latter being constantly spoken of by Mrs. Oliphant as the *padrona*. With them, and with her earlier friend, Mrs. Macpherson, she made a second journey to Rome—a journey which ended in the next great sorrow of her life, described in a record dated at Rome in 1864.

'Oh, this terrible, fatal, miserable Rome! I came here rich and happy, with my blooming daughter, my dear bright child . . . who was as sweet as a little mother to her brothers. There was not an omen of evil in any way. . . . My Maggie looked the healthiest and happiest of all the children, and ailed nothing, and feared nothing, nor I for her. Four short days made all the difference. . . . My dearest love never knew, nor imagined, that she was dying; no shadow of dread ever came upon her sweet spirit' (p. 92).

The next two pages might seem almost too sacred for publication. A few words—a few accents of the bitter cry of a mother's heart, may perhaps be quoted: 'I have nobody now; my friends are very sorry for me; but there is nobody in the world who has a right to share my grief, to whom my grief belongs, as it does to myself; and that is what one longs for. Sympathy is sweet, but sympathy is for lighter troubles.'

Twenty years later, she referred gratefully to an Italian Marchese as 'watching over her little sanctuary in the English cemetery with a delicate sympathy which that dear people has the secret of' (p. 316). The present writer, who had the honour of a slight personal acquaintance with Mrs. Oliphant, made a special visit to that gravestone at the summit of the cemetery-slope, which, she says in the dedication-page of her *Makers of Modern Rome*, covers the remains of 'those of mine who lie under the walls of . . . that sad city.' The inscription records the death of the little daughter, aged ten, 'on her mother's second visit to Rome: *God have pity on the living!*' Writing in 1894, when she had become childless, Mrs. Oliphant says:

'I laid her by her father, and it seemed to me that all light and hope were gone from me for ever. Up to five years ago,¹ I could not say her dear name without the old pang coming back; since then, when there came to be another to bury in my heart, my little girl seemed all at once to become a tranquil sweet recollection; and now that all are gone, she is but a dear shadow, far in the background, while my boys take up in death, as in life, the whole of the darkened scene' (p. 95).

¹ *Sic.* It was on November 9, 1890, that Cyril died.

Can any fictitious tale of sorrow match this for pathos?

We must again pass over a good deal that the Autobiography chronicles about Mrs. Oliphant's sojourn in Paris, her introduction to, and converse with, the celebrated Comte de Montalembert, and with other very different and indeed curious acquaintances, such as the 'unfrosted priest' 'Father Prout,' and a 'coarse, half-vulgar' and discredited 'Oxford man,' who tutorised her son Cyril—'not a bad man,' though 'perhaps a little vicious,' and 'certainly addicted to drink'—an estimate which reminds us 'a little' of Johnson's pronouncement on poor Sir John Hawkins. The English travellers, after leaving Paris, spent some time in Normandy and Brittany, and were of course 'delighted with Mont St. Michel;' from St. Malo, by way of avoiding a prolonged voyage, they drove along the coast to Boulogne, and after reaching England found a home—which became the home of many years—at Windsor in November of 1865.

It is in connexion with this period of her life that Mrs. Oliphant avows what perhaps should be regarded as a defect—her 'carelessness in pecuniary matters' (p. 106).

'I never had any expensive tastes, but loved the easy swing of life without taking much thought for the morrow. . . . I made enough to carry me on easily, almost luxuriously, but not enough to save. . . . I fear it was not in me to practise that honourable pinching and sparing by which some women do so much.'

So in an earlier passage (p. 64) she says that it was 'her way to travel expensively, though, Heaven knows, our position was poor enough' (cf. p. 91), and in a later (p. 126):

'Never knowing quite at the beginning of the year how the ends would come together at Christmas—always with troublesome debts and forestalling of money earned, so that I had generally eaten up the price of a book before it was printed—but always (thank God for it!) so far successfully that, though always owing somebody, I never owed anybody to any unreasonable amount, or for any unreasonable extent of time.'

This reminds one of what R. H. Hutton blames in Scott, 'the wild and dangerous practice' of raising money on the security of literary work not yet completed—of the 'forestalling his gains' and 'drawing bills on the future.'¹ Mrs. Oliphant further on (p. 129) admits with a certain severe candour that her 'rash' proceedings in this direction constituted

¹ *Sir Walter Scott* (series of *English Men of Letters*), p. 87.
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'at least an unmoral mode of life. . . . I should think any one who did so blamable now. . . . I might say now that another woman doing the same thing was tempting Providence. To tempt Providence, or to trust God—which was it? In my own case, naturally, I said the latter, and did not in the least deserve, in my temerity, to be led and constantly rescued, as I was.'

So in 1872 she tells Mr. Blackwood (p. 238) that she was ready, *if* 'the necessity absolutely arose,' to make the sacrifice of removing 'to some cheap village where she could live at less expense; but she would rather work to the utmost of her powers than withdraw from all that makes existence agreeable.'

There was one dominant motive for the expenditure into which she ran by sending her two sons, for instance, to Eton,¹ a school which her husband would doubtless have regarded as far beyond his own means and the natural prospects of his children. She was ambitious for the boys, each of whom had undoubted abilities, although the elder, Cyril, was the more brilliant. She decided to give them all possible advantages, to surround them with 'all that was happy and pleasant and of good report.' She knew that she had become a personage in one or two departments of literature—that she had achieved for herself a higher place than an artist's widow could as such have hoped to occupy. Life should be made sunny for them: doors should be opened, connexions formed, opportunities of distinction multiplied. Few will have the heart to blame her; and yet in one very affecting passage (p. 106) of an Autobiography which must needs open all hearts to its subject, she tells us (be it remembered that she intended its pages for publication) that she has been lately pondering over a mournful question. Had she not 'so accustomed' the boys

'to the easy going-on of all things, never letting them see my anxieties, or know that there was a difficulty about anything, that their minds were formed to that habit, that it took all thought of necessity out of my Cyril's mind. . . . It was a kind of forlorn pleasure to me, that they had never wanted anything; but this turns it into a remorse. Who can tell? God alone over all knows,' &c.

It was certainly a drawback and a loss to the two youths that the obligation of work was never adequately impressed upon their consciences. As a matter of fact, their path was somewhat too smooth, and they were thus tempted to avoid

¹ They used 'to read to her a verse or two out of her little well-worn Bible' before starting as day-boys for school.

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strenuous mental exertion, to rely on 'natural impulse and that kind of genius which is so often deceptive in youth.' Cyril, whom she once calls 'her careless boy,' 'missed somehow his footing—how can I tell how?' He 'never outgrew the perversity of youth;' and his mother's contempt for a priggish intellectualism 'gave him, perhaps, or helped him to form, a prejudice against the good and reading men' at Oxford, 'who have so many affectations, poor boys! and led him towards those, so often inferior . . . who had the naturalness, along with the folly, of youth . . . He went out of the world, leaving a love-song or two behind him," and a single 'little volume' on the French writer De Musset, of which 'much was so well done, and yet some so badly done, and nothing more to show for his life. And I to watch it all going on, day by day and year by year!'¹

'My Cecco,' she adds, 'took the first steps in the same way; but, thanks to God, righted himself and overcame, not in time enough to save his career at Oxford, but so as to be all that I had hoped . . . my dearest companion, consulting me about everything, desiring to have me with him . . . full of knowledge, full of humour, a most accomplished man, though to me always a boy . . . He did not make friends easily, and he had few: but those whom he had were very fond of him,' &c. (p. 148; cp. p. 411).

The mother was right. His was a reserved nature, but his affection for those whom he trusted was most faithful, generous, and touching, and was, we have reason to know, warmly returned. His mother, in a private letter not included in this collection, admits that at Oxford he had been 'careless and idle,'² but pleads that 'his health had also some share in his shortcomings.' That is true of both the brothers; they had not enough physical vitality for the strain of continuous work; they could not be judged by the standard applicable to youths of healthy constitution with the consciousness of strength laid up, humanly speaking, for many

¹ Mrs. Coghill says that 'Cyril went to town to work in the chambers of a barrister, and when he was at home his mother tried to keep him to his books, much as she had done when he was a very little boy, but with less success: still, she was happy in having him at home,' &c. (p. 285). This is a melancholy sentence. Further on she speaks of his 'falling away from that bright youth—broken health, broken hopes, a dismal resignation to inactivity' (p. 378). When he died, his mother wrote to Mrs. Coghill: 'God bless my boy! Life was hard upon him. . . . My heart is broken!'

² She did not much like what she saw (in 1879) of Oxford society, and 'could not understand why Oxford should have furnished so uncomfortable a period in his early career.' The academical stage of life is indeed full of incalculable influences on character.

years.¹ The letters of 'Cecco,' which appear in the concluding portion of this book, are charming specimens of his turn of mind, his moods of humour and seriousness, and give real promise of literary distinction—a promise, unhappily, not to be fulfilled. We might refer especially to a description of an earthquake near San Remo, and of the heroism of a priest who said to his affrighted people when a shock interrupted his mass, 'We must not cease worshipping God, but it is not necessary that you should stay within these walls: go and kneel outside, and I will go on with the mass here;' and then finished it 'with all due reverence, and not till then the second shock came.' Some very sad passages in the Letters represent the mother's alternations of hope and fear as the chest-disease appeared to vary in 'Cecco.'² All was over for him in this life on October 1, 1894. He had survived his brother four years. The elder was thirty-four, the younger nearly thirty-five, when death claimed them. On the 5th of that sad October she wrote: 'He is lying in his coffin in the room next to me; I have been trying to pray by the side of that last bed' (p. 64).

One of the sorest disappointments of Mrs. Oliphant's life was the early death of her nephew, Frank Wilson, who, since the ruin of his incapable father had thrown a second family on her hands,³ had been to her as a son, and to her own sons as a 'true brother.' She calls him 'her good Frank, her steady boy' (this perhaps with a sad side-reference to the weak side of Cyril's character) 'who had grown the most

¹ In the elder of them there was—perhaps from some warp in the blood—a certain 'facile lightmindedness' such as she ascribes, in her book on Venice, to poor young Jacopo Foscari, 'incapable of any serious conception of the meaning of life and its risks and responsibilities.' Her own nature was altogether of stronger stuff; it spoke out in a terse apophthegm about Burns, 'No one is led away whose will is against going' (*Lit. Hist. Engl.* i. 149).

² She was first warned of its presence in January 1887. 'My mind jumps at everything that is worst and most dreadful.' She goes with him to Pau, and there passes through 'tortures of anxiety;' in 1890, with both her sons to Jerusalem, and with the younger, after the elder's death, to Davos Platz, which to her was 'a vast (snowy) shroud with black trees.' 'All through he was getting weaker; and I knew it, and tried not to know' (p. 150; cp. p. 384).

³ Nothing is more characteristic of her brave and loyal nature than her unhesitating reception of her brother's four children into her family. 'I remember making a kind of pretence to myself that I had to think it over, to make a great decision. . . . I never did, nor could, of course, hesitate a moment as to what had to be done. It *had* to be done, and that was enough' (p. 125). So she associates her nephew with her sons: 'If I can rear *three* men who may be good for something in the world, I shall not have lived for nothing' (p. 238; written in 1872).

trustworthy and satisfactory boy in the world—robust and vigorous, nothing wrong about him either real or fanciful—such a one as is a stand-by and tower of strength in a family’—‘of all the family the one I had least anxiety for’ (pp. 139, 283). He passed ‘very well’ through the school at Cooper’s Hill, and went out to India in 1875; ‘he had always, says Mrs. Coghill, ‘been a most satisfactory and delightful young fellow, full of talent and energy, and succeeding in whatever he undertook’ (p. 285). ‘What a comfort,’ his motherly aunt wrote to him in 1877, ‘that you have found the career that suits you, and are doing well in it and liking it! Nothing gives me so much consolation’ (p. 271). But two years pass, and he is carried off by rapid Indian fever. ‘It is,’ she writes to a friend on Christmas Eve, ‘the most inscrutable blow’ (p. 283).

So it was with this gifted woman—blow after blow, loss after loss; ‘pain ever . . . this has been the *over-word* of my life’ (p. 92). ‘Ah me, alas! pain ever, for ever. God alone knows what was the anguish of these years’ (p. 146). One looks on well-nigh awestruck, as from a distance, at the picture of this exceptional and protracted trial. How did she bear it? how did it affect her character? In the answer to this lies, for Christians, the supreme interest of the book. At one time she was ‘groaning under the rod’ (p. 67), ‘always making appeal to Heaven and earth, consciously or unconsciously, saying often, I know, as I have no right to say, “Is this fair; is it right that I should be so bowed down to the earth and everything taken from me?”’ (p. 81). So, in reference to ‘Maggie’s’ death: ‘I shudder to see the light and the day returning. . . . All that I can do is to take desperate hold of this one certainty, that God cannot have done it without reason.’ Then a piteous entreaty: ‘Stand by the forlorn creature who fainteth under Thy hand, but whom Thou sufferest not to die’ (p. 93, compare p. 193, ‘the *impossible* life to which God has seen fit, He alone knows for what mysterious reason, to ordain me’). Again: ‘People are sometimes in discord with common life and the will of God, as well as with the more natural thoughts and feelings of their friends’ (p. 212). And yet she did not fall into sheer despair or habitual rebellion. ‘It must be that God knows best.’¹ Years later,

¹ So she makes a mother say in *A Beleaguered City*, p. 223: ‘It was all I was capable of, to trust my God and do what was set before me. God, He knows what we can do and what we cannot. I could not tell even to Him all the terror and the misery and the darkness that was in me, but I put my faith in Him. It was all of which I was capable.’

she could dwell (in a letter to A. K. H. Boyd) on 'the great, calm, all-sustaining sense of a Divine. Unseen, a silent companion, God walking in the cool of the garden' (p. 360), and could write to 'Cecco': 'What has been my consolation for a very long time is the conviction that God understands what we mean, or *what we want to mean*, so much better than any one mortal can do. I have the most perfect reliance upon His sympathy. . . . Have confidence in our Heavenly Father as, and far more than, you have confidence in me, for He will never misunderstand you' (p. 365). So to Mrs. Coghill: 'It is wonderful what control we have over our own thoughts when we exercise it steadily.' She had become, perhaps gradually, a Churchwoman, and found early Communion a comfort and a help; when her last child was taken from her, she did indeed say, 'It seems as if even God did not pity me,' but at once added, 'And yet no doubt He had a higher reason than pity for me' (p. 407). In the remaining three years of her life she found solace in the loving companionship of nieces who were as daughters, the younger children of her brother Frank; and to one of them she wrote in 1895, 'Our Lord, for our everlasting consolation, was a man.' The long troubled day had a tranquil golden sunset. 'She said she could not think of God as the Almighty God of all the world, but just as her Father, and that at this moment even the thought of her children seemed to cease in the thought of Him' (what a height had been gained when she, the stricken mother, could say this!). 'She thought the love of God' (meaning, of course, love for God) 'came by degrees, and was certain that the pity of God was boundless. She spoke of being always greatly helped by prayer and thought.'¹ . . . The names of her boys were on her lips almost at the last, though she had said repeatedly, "I seem to see nothing but God and our Lord." And so, at last, 'she softly passed away' on Friday, June 25, 1897. *Transivimus per ignem et aquam, et eduxisti nos in refrigerium*. Surely thus it was well—it was best.

Much might be said of scenes in her life, or of expressions of feeling and opinion, which belong to a lower level than those solemn serene heights, with their 'ampler ether and diviner air'; and perhaps some reference should be made to her natural outfit of disposition, and its combination of buoyant hopefulness, with a liability to recurrent 'ferocious anxieties' (pp. 183, 237, 252, 343), its indomitable resolu-

¹ Many years before, she had asked a Windsor friend to 'help her in praying for the great boon' which, in a time of special anxiety, she 'desired. . . . The change she desired came to pass' (p. 116; cp. p. 128).

tion, its wonderful capacity of work, as illustrated by the fact that only once in her life did she give her mind a week's holiday (p. 287). She did not think very highly of her own writings,¹ and took no pleasure in compliments about them, still more about her industry; the text about 'wood, hay, stubble,' was often in her mind; her 'first motive' in writing was simply that it came natural to her, though 'she could no more go solemnly into them, and tell why she had done this or that, than she could fly' (p. 5). At the same time she resented patronising approbation on the part of G. H. Lewes (p. 188), and could be disheartened when critics let her best efforts fall flat without a word (p. 219).² She had 'never worshipped Byron,' was amused with the magniloquence of Mr. Ruskin, laughed gently at Stanley as 'grappling all dissentients to his small bosom,' thought George Eliot somewhat ponderous, and characterised Macaulay as 'the historian of sophistication.' Of his memoir she says, 'How rich and how poor a life!' Dickens was no 'favourite of hers;' she 'did not like Disraeli's works;' Miss Martineau's reputation was 'puzzling;' J. S. Mill's 'notion of the franchise for women' was 'mad' in the opinion of this distinguished authoress. Her early Radicalism had long died out, and she denounced 'the vile fallacy that all help to working men has come from so-called Liberal hands.' She thought 'the Gladstone fever the strongest proof she had heard of the old slander that Scotland is without any sense of humour;' but Gladstone, on his part, acknowledged her book on Jerusalem by a reference to 'abundant recollections of knowledge and of pleasure derived from her on many previous literary occasions.' The Queen, in February 1886, received her with marked kindness,³ and, 'as a true Scotchwoman, ventured' to send her 'copies of the *Journal in the Highlands*,' and her return of thanks produced 'a most gracious autograph letter.' Yet she was not carried away by Scottish sentiment, either in favour of Knox, whom she calls 'a most intolerant bigot and as *dour* and obstinate as the nether millstone,' or on

¹ Of the weird and sternly suggestive story, *A Beleaguered City*, she says: 'It is a story that I like—a thing that does not always happen with my own productions' (p. 286); and she could be 'comically, not seriously, angry at a bit of a young person who complimented her on it' (p. 131). If she wrote too much and too fast for complete 'artistic' excellence, she did it deliberately, to earn enough for her 'boys' (p. 130).

² She was indignant at 'an insulting attack, not criticism at all, but a personal assault, in the *Saturday Review*' (p. 351).

³ 'She spoke to me a great deal about the Tullochs, and also about myself, and was very sweet and friendly, hoping to see more of me, and other amiabilities' (p. 333).

the tender question of Mary Stuart's guilt or innocence; to call 'that wonderful woman innocent' was, for Mrs. Oliphant, as absurd as to call her 'a fool'; and in regard to Charles Edward, one of the noblest, most moving, and most musical paragraphs in English prose is that in her *Historical Sketches*, which just indicates, with pitiful forbearance,¹ the degradation of his later life, the 'darkening and shipwreck and ruin of a gracious and princely soul.' Readers who would form an idea of Mrs. Oliphant's powers in other areas than that of fiction might well study the passages in that volume on such an 'unspiritual' century as the eighteenth—or, in the *Literary History of England*, the vindication of the Waverley novels from the charge of moral fruitlessness,² or the estimate of Byron and Shelley as two children of the French Revolution, Byron's being 'in every way the lower side of the great rebellion against discipline and order;' or, for absolute melody and descriptive splendour, the opening of *The Makers of Venice*,³ or, in the same book, the sympathetic sketch of the good patriarch Orso as vice-doge; or, in *The Makers of Modern Rome*, the picture of Jerome and his patrician female disciples on the Aventine, or the summary of those unique associations which, for English Christians, must ever cling to 'the time-worn steps' where Gregory the Great stood when he 'sent forth the mission to England with issues which he could never have divined. We all have a sacred right to come back here.'

This short list might be widely extended; but we must conclude with a sincere hope that Mrs. Coghill may have a speedy opportunity of making this fascinating book somewhat easier to 'turn,' and of supplying what it well deserves—a good index.

¹ 'Shipwrecked, weary of life, shamed by his knowledge of better things, consumed by vain longings for a real existence such as never could be his, the Chevalier sank as, God help us! so many sink into the awful abyss. To forget his misery, to deaden the smart of his ruin, what matters what he did?' &c. (*Hist. Sketches*, p. 247).

² Here she dwells on the great service done by Scott to the cause of truthfulness in his creation of Jeanie Deans—'not lovely,' outwardly commonplace, 'homely' as the farmstead on which she lived, but 'a creature of the most heroic type, full of a tenderness, forbearance, and long suffering beyond the power of man, willing rather to die than to lie, but resolute that the truth her nature has forced her to respect shall not be used for harm if her very life can prevent it,' &c. (*Lit. Hist. of England*, ii. 149).

³ Mr. Gladstone might well say that 'the book had quite given him the feeling of being in Venice' (p. 350).

ART. VIII.—THE LETTERS OF R. BROWNING
AND ELIZABETH BARRETT BARRETT.*The Letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett Barrett,*
1845–1846. Two Volumes. (London, 1899.)

THE letters of poets afford some of the most delightful specimens of English literature. The best of all letter-writers, in Robert Southey's opinion (and we agree with him), was the poet William Cowper. Southey's own letters are more interesting than his poetry; Lord Byron was an admirable letter-writer, though his letters, like his poetry, leave an unpleasant flavour in the mouth; the poet Gray's letters have been characterized, not undeservedly, by Mr. Leslie Stephen, a good judge, as 'all but the best in the best age of letter-writers';¹ the freshness and manliness of Sir Walter Scott's letters are worthy of the novelist, and more than worthy of the poet. We can hardly say the same of the letters of Matthew Arnold; but there is a sweet domesticity about them which makes them delightful reading, and the list of good poets who have also been good letter-writers might be almost indefinitely extended. But it may safely be said that none of their letters exactly correspond with the remarkable collection published in these two volumes. Here we have a true poet and a true poetess mutually attracted to each other, first, by their respective writings, then by a correspondence entered upon and carried through twenty-seven letters without either setting eyes upon the other, then by a weekly, then by a bi-weekly interview, the climax being a runaway match, which turned out to be the greatest possible blessing to both parties.

At the first blush of the thing one is naturally inclined to ask, 'Was it right to expose to the unhallowed gaze of the general public a correspondence which was apparently of the most private character, and which palpitates throughout with the deepest emotions of the two correspondents?' To this the editor, who may be regarded as the result of the letters, wisely takes care to give us a satisfactory reply at the outset. In his 'Note,' which most people would call 'Preface,' he tells us, 'My father destroyed all the rest of his correspondence, and not long before his death, he said, referring to these letters: "There they are, do with them as you please when I

¹ Article on 'Gray, Thomas,' in the *Dictionary of National Biography*.

am dead and gone." After this reassurance we need not be under the slightest scruple about treating them as public property; and they are the more valuable because the editor tells us in the same note that they 'are all that ever passed between my father and mother, for after their marriage they were never separated,' a fact which is itself significant of the happy subsequent relations between the two writers.

And, first, let it be said that these new letters fully bear out the high estimate which we have more than once taken in this *Review* of the character of one of the writers.¹ They do not, like the letters of some whom we could name, bring the hero down from his pedestal, and reduce him to the level of ordinary mortals; the letters signed 'R. B.' are worthy of Robert Browning, and those signed 'E. B. B.' are worthy of Elizabeth Barrett Barrett. In fact, they endear both of them all the more to us.

At the same time the reader must be warned that he is not to expect in these letters the graceful and finished compositions of Gray or Cowper. He will have to overcome a difficulty which the crabbed style—modelled, one might fancy, on that of Carlyle, of whom both writers were great admirers—creates before he can appreciate their merit. In fact it is, after all, the writers that give interest to the letters rather than the letters to the writers. If it were not Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett a reader might think twice before girding himself to the effort of wading through five hundred and seventy letters, filling eleven hundred and forty-six closely printed pages, all written from the same places (Wimpole Street and Hatcham), all dated between January 10, 1845, and September 18, 1846, and all dealing mainly with the writers' purely private concerns. But the game is well worth the candle, and the majority of readers will quite concur with the judgment of the editor (except in one important instance, to be noted presently), who 'thinks it well that the correspondence should be given in its entirety.' It may be, as he says, that 'a few of the letters are of little or no interest' in themselves; but even these acquire an adventurous interest when we remember who the writers were. Those who have read the *Letters of Elizabeth Barrett Browning*, which have been previously published, will readily believe it to be so in the case of one writer, and they may take our word for it that they will find it equally so in the case of the

¹ See *Church Quarterly Review* for October 1878, Art. III. 'Mr. Browning's Poems,' and for July 1890, Art. III. 'Robert Browning.'

other. Or rather they will, we hope, believe it to be so when they have read the remarks we now propose to make.

The medium through which this strangely dissimilar couple—dissimilar, that is, outwardly, for inwardly they were much alike—were brought together was Mr. John Kenyon, himself a man of some mark, a philanthropist, and a friend of most of the great literary men who adorned the early years of the nineteenth century.

'Always remember,' writes Browning to Miss Barrett in November 1845, 'I never wrote to you, all the years, on the strength of your poetry, though I constantly heard of you through Mr. K[enyon], and was near seeing you once, and might easily have availed myself of his intervention to commend any letter to your notice, so as to reach you out of the foolish crowd of rushers in upon genius—who come and eat their bread and cheese on the high altar, and talk of reverence without one of its surest instincts—never quiet until they cut their initials on the cheek of the Medicean Venus to prove they worship her. My admiration, as I said, went its natural way in silence—but when on my return to England, in December, Mr. K[enyon] sent those poems to my sister, and I read my name there—and when, a day or two after, I met him, and beginning to speak my mind on them, and getting on no better than I should now, said quite naturally—"if I were to write this, now?"—and he assured me with his perfect kindness you would be even "pleased" to hear from me under those circumstances—nay,—for I will tell you all, in this, in everything—when he wrote me a note soon after to reassure me on that point—*then I did write, on account of my purely personal obligation*, though of course taking that occasion to attend to the general and customary delight in your works,' &c. (i. 281).

After four months' correspondence Browning humbly and tentatively threw out a hint (May 13) that he should like to see Miss Barrett (i. 66), and she replied (May 16), 'If you care to come to see me you can come; and it is my gain (as I feel it to be) and not yours, whenever you do come' (i. 67). And so the intimacy began with an hour and a half's interview once a week, increased subsequently to a three-hours' interview twice a week, with innumerable letters in between. Robert Browning was at that time a young man of splendid physique, fond of society, and entering with zest into its various functions; Elizabeth Barrett was nearly four years his senior, fragile and delicate—indeed, to all appearance a confirmed invalid, shrinking from all society, as much from temperament as from ill-health. But the two were drawn together from the first; and their correspondence, beginning with compliments by each to the other's poetry, soon assumes a warmer complexion, till it breathes the language of the

most rapturous love. The expression of this love, like the Reports of a Society, we may 'take as read,' and pass on to other points which illustrate the characters of the writers and their contemporaries, and the times in which they write, on all of which topics the letters throw an interesting light.

The first thing that strikes us in the letters of both is their extreme practicalness and shrewdness, qualities one does not usually associate with the poetical temperament. These qualities are quite as conspicuous in the delicate recluse as in the robust man of the world; the reader is constantly coming upon little touches which show how shrewdly observant she was. As one instance out of hundreds take the following passage:

'It is amusing to me, quite amusing, to observe how people cannot conceive of *work* except under certain familiar forms. Men who dig in ditches have an idea that the man who leads the plough rather rests than works: and all men of out-door labour distrust the industry of the manufacturers in-doors—while both manufacturers and out-door labourers consider the holders of offices and clerkships as idle men—gentlemen at ease. Then between all these classes and the intellectual worker, the difference is wider, and the want of perception more complete. The work of creation nobody will admit—though everybody has by heart, without laying it to heart, that God rested on the seventh day. Looking up to the stars at nights that they might as well take all to be motionless—though if there were no motion there would be no morning—and they look for a morning after all. Why who could mind such obtuse stupidity?' (ii. 72).

It should be explained that Miss Procter seems to have insinuated that Robert Browning led an idle life because he only worked at his poetry, and the above remarks were sent to comfort him.

As to Robert Browning, his letters only confirm what all who knew him knew before, viz. that he was no vain dreamer, but the most rational, matter-of-fact, and, in his way, business-like man. Some people may find a difficulty in reading his poetry, but there is no difficulty in reading his character. He is a true 'vates,' but does not belong to the '*genus irritabile vatum*.' There is not the slightest trace in his letters of any petty jealousy of his brother writers; in fact, there is no littleness and no mystery about him; he is a fine, generous Englishman throughout.

Both writers have a wide range of knowledge, quoting quite naturally and appositely Greek, Latin, French, and above all Italian, as languages with which they are familiar as a matter of course, and making allusions which show that

they are well acquainted with the best literature of their mother-tongue, both ancient and modern. Both show a knowledge of and taste for the fine arts—music, painting, sculpture, as well as poetry. Above all, both take a high standard of morals and religion. We wish we could add that both took as their guide in morals and religion the English Church, which really would have been their natural home, if they had but known it. But, at any rate when they wrote these letters, they had, neither of them, had the Church's system at all fairly or adequately presented to them. Brought up in a dissenting circle (though not apparently a bigoted one), they were naturally prejudiced against the Church by their early training; and, so far as appears, there was absolutely no countervailing influence. Nor was it likely that there should be. They knew the Church of England as she was in the years preceding the Oxford Movement, and in the years when that movement was cruelly misrepresented and intensely unpopular. To earnest, poetical natures like theirs the Church of that period, even when its best side was presented, would not be attractive; and they only saw its worst side. And so Miss Barrett only hopes that they will not be married in a 'Puseyite' church, having evidently the vaguest notion of what a Puseyite was, for she calls Archdeacon Hale one; and Robert Browning was greatly shocked (as well he might be) by Count d'Orsay's standing godfather to one of Charles Dickens's children, 'the devil-father,' he writes with pardonable indignation, 'as I take the Count to be.' 'When,' he adds, 'you remember what the form of sponsorship is, to what it pledges you in the ritual of the Church of England—and *then* remember that Mr. Dickens is an enlightened Unitarian—you will get a curious notion of the man, I fancy' (i. 136).

Miss Barrett explains what her religious position is, and Robert Browning says 'ditto'; but the reader shall judge for himself whether either of them could have been really satisfied with it.

'I used,' writes Miss Barrett, August 2, 1845, 'to go with my father always, when I was able, to the nearest dissenting chapel of the Congregationalists—from liking the simplicity of that praying and speaking without books—and a little too from disliking the theory of State Churches. There is a narrowness among the Dissenters which is wonderful; an arid, grey Puritanism in the clefts of their souls: but it seems to me clear that they know what the "liberty of Christ" means, far better than those who call themselves "Churchmen"; and stand altogether, as a body, on higher ground' (i. 145-6).

To which Robert Browning replied the next day, 'My father and mother went this morning to the very Independent chapel where they took me, all those years back, to be baptized, and heard, this morning, a sermon preached by the very minister who officiated on that other occasion!' (i. 147). A year later Miss Barrett is in the same doubtful state, for she writes to Robert Browning on August 13, 1846:

'Dearest, when I told you yesterday, after speaking of the many coloured theologies of the house [*i.e.* her own family], that it was hard to answer for what *I* was—I meant that I felt unwilling, for my own part, to put on any of the liveries of the sects' (ii. 429).

And then she goes on to criticize Dissenters, Formulists (that is, apparently, Church people), and Unitarians, though, she says, she 'could pray anywhere and with all sorts of worshippers from the Sistine Chapel to Mr. Fox's, those kneeling and those standing' (*ib.*).

To which Robert Browning replies:

'Dearest, I know your very meaning, in what you said of religion, and responded to it with my whole soul—what you express now is for us both—those are my own feelings, my convictions beside—instinct confirmed by reason. Look at that injunction to "love God with all the heart and soul and strength"—and then imagine yourself bidding any faculty, that arises towards the love of Him, be still!' (ii. 436.)

But, in spite of this vagueness and eclecticism, the two were intensely earnest, as far as they went, and recoiled utterly from irreligion.

'Miss Bayley,' writes Miss Barrett, '. . . told me she was a materialist of the strictest order, and believed in no soul and no future state. In the face of those conclusions, she said, she was calm and resigned. It is more than *I* could be, as I confessed. My whole nature would cry aloud against that most pitiful result of the struggle here—a wrestling only for the dust, and not for the crown. . . . I thank God that I can look over the grave with you—*past* the grave—and hope to be worthier of you *there* at least' (ii. 137).

'And I, too,' replies Browning, 'look long over the grave, to follow you, my own heart's love' (ii. 139). Of such earnest souls may we not say, 'Cum tales sint utinam nostri essent'?

But the religious views of both writers were evidently very crude and unformed; and perhaps it would have been as well if the passages in which they are touched upon had been omitted. Some, however, may think that the omission of any reference to what is in itself the most important of all subjects, though the sentiments expressed about it are

vague and unsatisfactory, would have been a mistake; but there is another topic about the excision of which there surely cannot be two opinions. The letters give a most unfavourable impression of Miss Barrett's father; and the editor might have saved much soreness of feeling without in the least detracting from the value of the correspondence if he had used the editorial pruning-knife unsparingly in cutting out passages on this painful subject which, whether true or not, were calculated to give quite needless offence. We have heard, indeed, that there is another side to the question of the relationship between the lover and the lady's father; but this is a purely private matter, with which the general public has no concern, and into which it would be an impertinence to pry. It is a sad pity that these letters were not purged of any reference to it. From time immemorial mothers have wished to see their daughters married, while fathers have never been inclined to view with a favourable eye the men who come to rob them of their daughters. Miss Barrett had no mother living; and, to speak quite generally, we can well understand that any father might find it exasperating to have a young man hanging about his house, first for an hour and a half every week, and then for three hours twice a week. And though it may seem terribly prosaic to mention such a mundane matter in connexion with a poet and a poetess, it must not be quite forgotten that Miss Barrett had a little money and Mr. Browning had none.

But it is, after all, not in these domestic incidents, which might have happened to any one, that the main interest of the book lies, but in the curious relationship between a real poet and poetess; and as poetry was the first bond of this relationship, though it soon made way for a closer one, the first point of interest is their remarks on each other's writings. On Mr. Browning's part these are all of unqualified praise. The very first words of his first letter, 'I love your verses with all my heart, dear Miss Barrett,' are the key-note of all that follows. At a very early period of their correspondence he expresses the wish, 'I should like to write something in concert with you; how I would try!' (i. 59). But on Miss Barrett's part, mingled with enthusiastic admiration, we have criticism; of the gentlest, indeed, but still of the shrewdest and most helpful kind; and it is quite touching to observe how humbly the poet not only welcomes but courts her criticism. 'Do not you,' he writes, 'be tempted by that pleasure of pleasing which, I think, is your besetting sin—may it not be?—and so cut me off from the other pleasure of

being profited' (i. 127). 'Dear, dear Ba!¹ I cannot thank you, know not how to thank you, for the notes [on *Luria*]! I adopt every one, of course, not as Ba's notes, but as Miss Barrett's, not as Miss Barrett's, but as anybody's, everybody's—such incontestable improvements they suggest' (i. 570). It is fair to add that Miss Barrett fully recognizes in him her superior in poetry—she would not have been the sensible woman she was if she had not. 'To judge at all of a work of yours, *I must look up to it, and far up*, because whatever faculty *I* have is included in your faculty, and with a great rim all round it besides' (i. 129).

But still she tells him her mind; and, with a true woman's instinct, sees that the point which must especially be dwelt on is the obscurity of his poems. After all, obscurity is not a merit, but a defect—a very grave and fatal defect—in any writing which is intended to be generally read, and it is undeniable that minds of greater culture than that of 'Gilead P. Beck'—as, for instance, the creator (or rather creators) of that most amusing character²—have found Browning unintelligible. So to this she addresses herself:

'I have been thinking much of your "Sordello" . . . feeling that it might be thrown into the light by your hand, and greatly justify the additional effort. It is like a noble picture with its face to the wall just now—or at least, in the shadow. And so worthy as it is of you in all ways! individual all through: you have *made* even the darkness of it! And such a work as it might become if you chose—if you put your will to it! What I meant to say yesterday was not that it wanted more additional verses than the "ten per cent." you spoke of—though it does perhaps—so much as that (to my mind) it wants drawing together and fortifying in the connections and associations—which hang as loosely every here and there, as those in a dream, and confound the reader who persists in thinking himself awake' (i. 193-4). 'I do hold that nobody with an ordinary understanding has the slightest pretence for attaching a charge of obscurity to this new number,—[that is, the new number of *Bells and Pomegranates*, under which queer title Browning was now bringing out his poems in a cheap series]—there are lights enough for the critics to scan one another's dull blank visage by. One verse indeed in that expressive lyric of the "Lost Mistress" does still seem questionable to me, though you have changed a word since I saw it; and still I fancy that I rather leap at the meaning than reach it—but it is my own fault probably—I am not sure. With that one exception I *am quite* sure that people who shall complain of darkness are blind—I mean that the construction is clear and unembarr-

¹ 'Ba' was her pet name in her own family, and Browning adopts it. Most of his letters begin, 'Dearest Ba,' and *hers* end, 'Your own Ba.'

² See *The Golden Butterfly*, ch. xxiv., by Besant and Rice.

passed everywhere. Subtleties of thought which are not directly apprehensible by minds of a common range, are here as elsewhere in your writings—but if to utter things “hard to understand” from *that* cause be an offence, why we may begin with “our beloved brother Paul,” you know, and go down through all the geniuses of the world, and bid them put away their inspirations. You must descend to the level of critic A or B, that he may look into your face. Ah well! “Let them rave.” You will live when all *those* are under the willows’ (i. 269).

Still she would have him as intelligible as possible, and with great good sense she writes:

‘Do tell me what you mean precisely by your *Bells and Pomegranates* title. I have always understood it to refer to the Hebraic priestly garment—but Mr. Kenyon held against me the other day that your reference was different, though he had not the remotest idea how . . . Tell me too why you should not in the new number satisfy, by a note somewhere, the Davuses of the world, who are in the majority (“Davi sumus, non Œdipi”), with a solution of this one Sphinx riddle. Is there a reason against it?’ (i. 248).

The obedient lover replies that he will do as she suggests (he always does), and will make a note in a future number; and explains:

‘The Rabbis make Bells and Pomegranates symbolical of Pleasure and Profit, the gay and the grave, the Poetry and the Prose, Singing and Sermonizing—such a mixture of effects as in the original hour (that is quarter of an hour) of confidence and creation, I meant the whole should prove at last’ (i. 250).

But he does not appear to have fulfilled his promise quite as soon as she expected, for the persistent little lady returns to the charge five months later.

‘Dearest, I persist in thinking that you ought not to be too disdainful to explain your meaning in the *Pomegranates*. Surely you might say in a word or two that, your title having been doubted about (to your surprise, you *might* say!), you refer the doubters to the Jewish priest’s robe, and the Rabbinical gloss—for I suppose it is a gloss on the robe—do you not think so? Consider that Mr. Kenyon and I may fairly represent the average intelligence of your readers—and that *he* was altogether in the clouds as to your meaning—had not the most distant notion of it—while I, taking hold of the priest’s garment, missed the Rabbins and the distinctive significance, as completely as he did. Then for Vasari, it is not the handbook of the whole world, however it may be Mrs. Jansson’s. Now why should you be too proud to teach such persons as only desire to be taught? I persist—I shall tease you’ (i. 575).

But his mentor is also his staunch advocate.

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'I have no patience,' she writes, 'of what is said [in a review in the *Athenæum*] of "mist," because I who know when you are obscure and never think of denying it in some of your former works, do hold that this last number is as clear and self-sufficing to a common understanding, as far as the expression and medium goes, as any book in the world, and that Mr. Chorley [the *Athenæum* critic] was bound in verity to say so. If I except that one stanza, you know, it is to make the general observation stronger' (i. 416).

And, again, after telling him how Mr. Kenyon had praised his *Luria*, she adds, 'And when he tried to find out a few darkneses, I proved to him that they were clear noonday blazes instead, and that his eyes were just dazzled' (ii. 82). In the same spirit she takes up the cudgels for him against Miss Mitford: 'I was writing to Miss Mitford and of you—we differed about you often,—because she did not appreciate you properly, and was fond of dwelling on the "obscurity" when I talked of the light' (ii. 243). She could do this with a clear conscience, for she had previously informed him with great satisfaction, 'The fact is, that your obscurities—as far as they concern the *medium*—you have been throwing off gradually and surely this long while—you have a calmer mastery over imagery and language, and it was to be expected that you should' (ii. 92). And she will take no credit to herself for the improvement: 'Now do observe the *Soul's Tragedy*, which is as light as day, I never touched with my finger, except in one place, I think—to say—"Just here there is a little shade"'" (*ib.*).

But it is time to turn to another interesting feature of these letters: they give us a sketch of literary England, drawn by two highly competent persons who were in the thick of it, during a period which is too recent for history and too remote for contemporary recollection—except among the elders; and to these it will be most interesting of all, because it will remind them of matters of which they have probably only a dim remembrance, and which they were too young at the time to appreciate aright. It was the time when Carlyle was just reaching the zenith of his fame as the great prophet and teacher of the rising generation; when Dickens was delighting and amusing the nation with his earlier and better works; when Tennyson was beginning to be regarded by the more enlightened as *the* poet of the day, though still sneered at and abused by many; when Bulwer Lytton was generally regarded by the majority as the prince of novelists, and by not a few as a great poet and dramatist besides; when Miss Mitford had lately given her vivid pictures of village life, doing, as

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Mrs. Browning herself observed, in prose what Crabbe had previously done in verse; when Mrs. Jameson was beginning to instruct us in what we sorely needed instruction, sacred and legendary art; when Serjeant Talfourd had suddenly leapt into fame as a poet and dramatist by his *Ion*; when Henry Russell was taking the town by storm with his songs; when Walter Savage Landor was still a name to conjure with; when the old literary lions, such as Wordsworth and Rogers, were retiring into the shade, but were still among us; when R. H. Horne was famous as a writer on all sorts of subjects, notably as an epic poet—alas! who knows anything about *Orion, an Epic Poem in Ten Books* now?—when Chorley in the *Athenæum* and Forster in the *Examiner* were critics before whom budding authors trembled. These were all known, more or less, to Mr. Browning and Miss Barrett, and we have shrewd and discriminating, but never unkindly or malicious remarks about them in the letters. There is something singularly generous in the attitude of both the writers towards Tennyson; for they must have felt that there was a sort of competition between him and Browning, and that all the popularity, and indeed all the substantial rewards, were going to Tennyson. The 'grand passages in *Cenone* and *Arthur*,' and 'the mystery of music in Tennyson's versification,' are warmly recognized by Miss Barrett (i. 97); and there is not one word of soreness or unkindness in Browning's allusion to the pension which had been granted to Tennyson—so different from Bulwer Lytton's escapade about 'School-Miss Alfred' in his *New Timon*—or when Moxon tells Browning, and *he* tells Miss Barrett, how well Tennyson's poems sell. 'I am glad,' replies Miss Barrett, 'both for the public and Tennyson, that his poems sell so well—and presently you will do as well or better—and I, half as well perhaps' (ii. 339). Both do full justice to Walter Savage Landor, Miss Barrett placing him, not among ordinary critics, but among 'the gods' (ii. 77), and Mr. Browning accounting his praise as 'a gold vase from King Hiram' (i. 287); Carlyle is, of course, an oracle with them both, and Mr. Browning frequently (see i. 152 and *passim*), and always kindly, refers to his interviews with him, while Miss Barrett even defends 'his mannerism' (i. 450). It must not, however, be supposed that their criticism of their literary contemporaries is merely indiscriminate praise—it would be deprived of all value if it had been. Both agree in thinking Bulwer Lytton no poet and no dramatist, Mr. Browning hardly doing him justice in the latter capacity; but they do

not quite agree in their estimate of him as a novelist; Miss Barrett 'could not deny a certain proportion of genius to the author of *Ernest Maltravers* and *Alice*' (i. 261); to which Mr. Browning replies, 'I have read those novels—but I must keep that word of words, "genius," for something different—"talent" will do here surely' (i. 162), in which posterity will probably agree with Mr. Browning. Again, both agree about the merits of *Ion*, but they cannot accept Talfourd as a great writer generally. 'Surely,' writes Mr. Browning, '*Ion* is a *very*, very beautiful and noble conception, and finely executed,—a beautiful work—what has come after, has lowered it down by grade after grade—it don't stand apart on the hill, like a wonder, now it is *built up* to by other attempts' (i. 318); and Miss Barrett, still more outspokenly, 'Certainly it is a noble play—there is the moral sublime in it: but it is not the work of a poet:—and if he had never written another to show what was *not* in him, this might have been "predicated" of it as surely, I hold' (i. 321). It must have been rather galling to Browning to know that his 'own *Paracelsus*, printed a few months before, had been as dead a failure as *Ion* a brilliant success' (i. 323), but he does not complain.

This, however, leads us to another point. It is difficult for a reviewer to read these letters without an uncomfortable feeling that *he*, too, may be in danger of making the absurd mistakes which reviewers, as good, or perhaps better than himself, made fifty years ago. In gratefully acknowledging a notice of *Paracelsus* from Mr. Forster in the *Examiner*, Browning tells Miss Barrett that 'before that *every* journal that thought worth while to allude to the poem at all, treated it with entire contempt.' Mr. Moxon, the publisher, playing the part of 'the good-natured friend,' showed him 'his [Moxon's] book, in which he was used to paste extracts from newspapers and the like,' and 'out of a long string of notices, one vied with its predecessor in disgust at my "rubbish," as their word went' (i. 324). It is really a serious matter to stop the utterances of one of the immortals, as these reviewers, whoever they may have been, did their best to do. Fortunately Robert Browning, with all his modesty, had faith in himself, and would not be stopped; and he had one at hand, on whose slightest word he hung, who persisted in believing and in telling him that the public would do him justice some day. Otherwise a great genius might have been nipped in the bud by the mischievous pens of the reviewers.

However, we would fain hope that criticism is in a more wholesome condition now than it was in 1846; otherwise it

is in a parlous state. The same 'good-natured friend' who showed Browning the notices of his 'rubbish' gives him the following portentous information: 'Moxon,' he tells Miss Barrett, 'was speaking of critics, the badness of their pay . . . and of the inevitable effects on the performances of the poor fellows. "How should they be at the trouble of reading any *difficult* book so as to review it,—Landor, for instance?" and so on, *da capo*' (see ii. 343-4). Reviewers told the same tale as publishers. Mr. Chorley, of the *Athenæum*, told Browning distinctly 'times were never so bad as now—people come without a notion of offending a critic, and offer him money—"will you do this for so much—praise this or blame this?"' (ii. 412).

It must, however, in common fairness to the critics, be remembered that when these letters were written Robert Browning had not done his best work. It was a far cry in 1846 to *Fifine at the Fair* and *The Ring and the Book*, but *Paracelsus*, *Pippa Passes*, *Luria*, *The Soul's Tragedy*, &c., were already before the world; and if all these were 'rubbish,' what shall be said of nine-tenths of the literature which finds a market every year? True, this literature is intelligible, so far as there is anything in it to be understood; and it is idle to deny that it requires an effort of mind to grasp the meaning of Browning's earlier works. The question naturally arose, 'Was the game worth the candle?' and it was not quite so easy a question to answer then as now. His obscurity is all the more striking because it is in such marked contrast with his personal character. 'Mr. Kenyon,' he tells Miss Barrett, 'says my common sense strikes him, and its contrast with my muddy metaphysical poetry!' (i. 79). But Mr. Kenyon also credited him with higher qualities than common sense. Little knowing the relationship between them, he remarked to Miss Barrett, to her great delight, "How strikingly upright and loyal in all his ways and acts Mr. Browning is! how impeccable a gentleman, &c. &c.," and so on and on' (ii. 83); and on another occasion she tells him, 'Mr. Kenyon praised you as usual—for inexhaustible knowledge and general reasonableness, this time' (ii. 387). These qualities are strikingly illustrated in the letters before us. For instance, when poor Haydon, the disappointed painter, committed suicide, leaving his manuscripts to Miss Barrett, 'with a desire for her to arrange the terms of their publication with Longman' (ii. 304), with what fine indignation he dissuades her from the task!

'This disinspiring bequest of poor Haydon's journal—his "writings"—from which all the harm came, and, it should seem, is

still to come to himself and everybody beside—let us all forget what came of those descriptions and vindications and explanations interminable; but as for beginning another sorrowful issue of them—it is part and parcel of the insanity—and to lay the business of editing the “twenty-six” (I think) volumes, with the responsibility, on *you*—most insane! . . . And then how horrible are all those posthumous revelations,—these passions of the now passionless, errors of the at length better-instructed! All falls unfitly, ungraciously—the triumphs or the despondencies, the hopes or fears, of—whom? He is so far above it all now!’ (ii. 307–8).

How finely he brushes aside a piece of gossip about poor Haydon and Mrs. Norton! ‘For the bad story,—the telling *that*, if it were true, is nearly as bad as inventing it. That poor woman is the hack-block of a certain class of redoubtable braggarts—there are such stories by the *dozen* in circulation. All may have been misconception’ (ii. 313). Well would it have been if many others, who have been tempted to publish garbage, had had such an adviser at hand, and had listened to him! In the same spirit is his righteous indignation against the ‘interviewers’ (the *word* was not then known, but the *thing* was) of the aged poet-laureate, ‘to try and inveigle Wordsworth into doing what he would hate most—to his credit be it said—why it is abominable—abominable!’ (ii. 119).

The letters, of course, illustrate many a curious contrast between 1846 and 1899. Who, for instance, would recognize the present Finchley in this delightful sketch from E. B. B.?

‘To-day we drove out as far as Finchley. Do you know Finchley? It is pretty and rural; the ground rising and falling as if with the weight of verdure and dew! fields, and hedge-rows, and long slopes of grass thick and long enough, in its fresh greenness, quite to hide the nostrils of the grazing cows. The fields are little, too, as if the hedges wanted to get together. Then the village of Finchley straggles along the road with a line of cottages, or small houses, seeming to *play* at a village. No butchers, no bakers—only one shop in the place—but gardens and creepers round the windows. Such a way from London, it looked!’ (ii. 445).

And what an old world we seem to be living in when we read from the same pen:

‘Mr. Kenyon (dear Mr. Kenyon, in his exquisite kindness!) took me to see the strange new sight (to *me*!) of the Great Western—the train coming in: and we left the carriage and had chairs—and the rush of the people and the earth-thunder of the engine almost overcame me’ (ii. 234).

And then the difficulties about their proposed journey after

their marriage! How strange they seem now, when we can travel anywhere in rather less than no time! However, the difficulties were surmounted. The secret marriage, which took place 'in Marylebone Church,' September 11, 1846, is alluded to but not described, though eighteen letters are inserted which were written after the ceremony had taken place, but before the elopement—if elopement it can be called. The last words of the last letter are highly characteristic: 'Do you pray for me to-night, Robert? Pray for me, and love me, that I may have courage, feeling both.—Your own Ba.'

We may fitly conclude with two comments on the union from famous personages frequently mentioned in these letters. When Mrs. Jameson, the firm friend of both bride and bridegroom, heard of it she exclaimed, 'God help them, for I know not how two poet heads and poet hearts will get through this prosaic world!' We are sure the good lady would be delighted when she found they 'got through' better than she anticipated—in fact, extremely well. Wordsworth's remark was, 'So Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett have gone off together! Well, I hope they may understand each other—nobody else could!' a remark which we may put about on a level with Jeffrey's remark on *The Excursion*, 'This will never do.'

ART. IX.—'AUTHORITY AND ARCHÆOLOGY.'

Authority and Archæology Sacred and Profane. Essays on the Relation of Monuments to Biblical and Classical Literature. Edited by DAVID G. HOGARTH, Fellow of Magdalen College, Oxford, and Director of the British School at Athens. (London, 1899.)

WE welcome the appearance of this volume because, whatever reasons we may have for differing from some of its conclusions, it brings our knowledge of what has been done recently in the matter of excavation and other archæological discoveries up to date. It is a book of great importance, whether we look at the qualifications of the essayists, or the range of inquiry proposed, or the general results of the comparison made between monumental and literary evidence. Professor Driver, of Oxford, stands in the first rank of Hebrew scholars, and whatever he writes respecting the

Old Testament deserves attention, and he has made the archæological study of the Bible in a special way his own. Mr. Francis Ll. Griffith, Mr. D. G. Hogarth, Professor Ernest A. Gardner, and Mr. F. Haverfield are conspicuous in archæological researches, and Mr. A. C. Headlam is an authority upon all matters concerned with the beginnings of the Christian Church. Such a body of scholars must command respectful attention. And their information has been brought up to the present time, much of it being derived at first hand,¹ and the references show that the most recent literature has been consulted. The range of inquiry has been necessarily limited 'to the geographical area from which the culture of Christian Europe has directly sprung, namely, that debatable land of the Near East' (p. v); but it is sufficiently wide as it is, including Palestine, Egypt, Babylonia, Asia Minor, Greece, and Italy, besides other lesser fields of discovery. The writers act independently, the editor being responsible only for a prefatory chapter and his own essay; and this is in itself a gain, because here and there we are able to correct, or at least modify, a conclusion which has been drawn by one or other from his own sphere of investigation, without regard to a wider experience; and, on the whole, the attitude of the writers, though writing in the interests of archæology, is fair-minded towards what is called 'Authority.'

The importance of the book is enhanced by the absorbing interest of the contents. Nobody could say that the essays were dull, although they are crammed full of facts, and though many of the examples adduced have been already used by others. We do not mean that it is a book which the general reader would find altogether entertaining, for he would meet with many things which demanded some previous special knowledge in order to be appreciated; but we mean that the scholar, and specially the Biblical or classical student, would find the newest results of archæological research presented here in a most attractive way. What we say will apply to the whole volume, but more particularly to certain parts which we shall specify. In regard to the Hebrew literature, it may be that we have here comparatively little that is quite new, for the labours of Professors Schrader, Sayce, Hommel, and others have put us in possession of the inscriptions which throw light upon

¹ We notice a reference to the *Expository Times* of March 1899 (p. 44, note 2), and to 'the most recent excavation (March 1899)' in the editor's note on p. 184.

the Biblical history; but for the first time now in England we have the results of archæology presented in relation to the modern criticism of the books of the Old Testament, and that by one who is in the first rank as a Hebrew scholar, and who has taken a very definite attitude on the side of the so-called Higher Criticism. Professor Driver often appeals to those results which have been arrived at on 'independent' grounds, and he claims to show that archæology is on his side. In regard to the classical portion of the book, after Mr. Griffith's clear exposition of the Egyptian and Assyrian discoveries in their bearing upon Herodotus and other Greek writers, we have three delightful essays respecting Greece and Rome which would be sure to interest any person who had the ordinary knowledge of classical times to start with. Mr. Hogarth's argument may be a little complex, and Professor Gardner's may be somewhat technical, but Mr. Haverfield's reconstruction of the history of the Roman Empire is thoroughly clear and attractive. Indeed, Mr. Haverfield's essay (unless perhaps it be surpassed by Mr. Headlam's chapter upon the Catacombs) is the best of the whole series; but then Mr. Haverfield writes without the constraint, which the others for the most part have, of being obliged to compare archæological discovery with some particular literary evidence. He has no Herodotus or Homer to put to the test, and he dismisses Tacitus in one sentence (p. 299). Mr. Headlam in dealing with Christian literature has a less free hand; he is bound to vindicate his authorities. The accuracy of St. Luke, the credit of Eusebius, the tradition of early Church government, and the sacramental character of the first Christianity are all as so many standards by which he must test modern discovery, and he is able out of comparatively slight and unattractive material, such as Phrygian inscriptions, to rehabilitate the Church of the second century, and from the Catacombs he is able to make good the beliefs and practices of the earliest age, without being controversial. We trust that what we have written will send many students to the consideration of this volume; they will not lightly put it on one side.

The importance and interest of the book are further enhanced by the tone of the several writers. The tendency is upon the whole conservative, moderate, and to some extent constructive. It has encouraged us to look forward hopefully to the discoveries of the next twenty years. Archæology has been shown to be confirmatory of literary evidence; even in prehistoric times the results of excavation

and comparative archæology have not been as revolutionary as might have been expected, or as once was thought. Herodotus is found to be less contemptible than he was a little while since. Homer is found to contain the colouring proper to his age. Even 'legend' has an element of truth. The following extracts will, we believe, justify what has been said, viz. :

(1) 'The list of Manetho,' writes Mr. Griffith, 'contains sundry mistakes, and the names in it are often strangely deformed; yet on the whole it is confirmed by the monuments and by ancient lists drawn up in the time of the XIXth Dynasty. The kings, down to the conquest of Alexander, are arranged in thirty dynasties, the XXVIth Dynasty being headed by Psammetichus; and Egyptology has accepted his arrangement as a reasonable working basis' (p. 164; cp. also p. 169).

(2) 'The names and succession of the kings of the XXVIth Dynasty are accurately given by Herodotus, as well as those of the Persian invaders and rulers . . . who appear in one part or another of the nine books. Manetho's list confirms Herodotus' (p. 177).

(3) 'Greek legend,' writes Mr. Hogarth, 'which, as a living authority has declared, is not in the light of archæological discovery "lightly to be set aside," is strongly reminiscent of some great southward movement of men of the north not long before the opening of the Hellenic period' (pp. 242, 243). And again: 'To turn to archæological discovery—while that supports strongly the tradition that at the opening of the first millennial period B.C. some incursion of half-civilized but not wholly alien peoples eclipsed for a time a high precedent culture in the Peloponnesus' &c. (pp. 243-4).

(4) 'The revelation of the prehistoric age of Greece,' writes Professor Gardner, 'is perhaps the most remarkable of all the recent results of archæology; but the exact relation of the prehistoric to the historic, of Mycenæ to Corinth and Athens, offers a problem which still awaits its final solution. . . . The Homeric poems stand in the gap; it cannot be doubted that they preserve, on the one hand, many traditions of the glory of Mycenæ, nor that they shew, on the other hand, many indications of a new order of things. Chief among these is the prominence of the Phœnicians, both as makers of the finest works of decorative handicraft and as the chief traders and seafarers' (pp. 267-8).

(5) 'In these and other results,' writes Mr. Haverfield, 'which archæological research has gained in its inquiries into early Italy, one feature perhaps deserves notice. The results confirm strongly certain of the legends which the ancients themselves told about Italian origins, and in particular about the origins of peoples' (pp. 306-7). [The whole paragraph respecting the confirmation of 'legends,' by which are meant the traditions preserved in classical writers, is well worth considering.]

(6) 'Its tendency,' writes Mr. Headlam, in respect of the evidence of archæology, 'is constructive, and not destructive. It

supports, on the whole, the literary evidence' (p. 422). And elsewhere he writes: It 'certainly forbids us to adopt the attitude assumed by many critics that a statement in the New Testament must be wrong unless it can be proved to be right' (p. 360). [This refers to the corroboration of St. Luke's accuracy as a historian in the matter of 'the first enrolment' under Quirinius, but it is meant to bear a much wider application, and we think it to be equally true of a statement in the Old Testament.]

We have reserved judgment in respect of Dr. Driver's essay because we do not feel that his position is identical with that of the other writers. We think that his tone is less conciliatory and more controversial than theirs. He writes, as we believe, with a strong bias against the traditional view of the Old Testament, and he has done his case no good by it. A more calm and judicial tone would have been preferable, because what is really due to conviction and earnestness is likely to be taken for prejudice. The same kind of tone was apparent also in a former controversy with Professor Sayce,¹ and in a more recent controversy with Professor Margoliouth.² We regret this *animus* in such matters as the truth of the Old Testament, where calm and sober criticism has much more weight. We allude, of course, to the attitude of Professor Driver towards Professor Hommel and Professor Sayce (pp. 145, 146, 149, 150). No doubt Professor Driver had to put his case strongly—viz. that archæological discovery supports more than goes against the results of the so-called 'Higher Criticism'; but we think that much of what he has written is discounted by the principles laid down by his fellow-essayists, especially by Mr. Hogarth, Mr. Griffith, and Mr. Headlam. We feel that Dr. Driver is constantly running into that mistake against which Mr. Headlam has warned us—viz. 'that a statement . . . must be wrong unless it can be proved to be right' (p. 360)—and it is just here that we differ from those who press the argument from archæology as strongly as Dr. Driver does; we are content to regard our authorities as 'innocent' and trustworthy until they have been proved to be 'guilty' or false. Our English principle is preferable to that of other countries in all kinds of evidence equally with that of the law court. For estimating the tone of these essays one could not do better than, after reading Mr. Hogarth's preface, which is remarkably conservative, to go directly from Dr. Driver's three chapters to those of Mr. Headlam; and at once we feel ourselves to have passed from a storm-tossed sea into the

¹ *Guardian*, March, April, May 1896.

² *Ibid.* July 1899.

stillness of a harbour. The difference of subject may account for the change, but we should prefer a more judicial tone (which is generally characteristic of these essays) to the apparent *animus* of the Hebrew Professor.

Something may be said, too, of the method of this volume. It consists of three parts—Hebrew, Classical, and Christian. Such an arrangement has its advantages, no doubt, but it is not wholly unobjectionable from our point of view. Under it, however, we are able to bring Mr. Griffith's and Mr. Hogarth's conclusions respecting Egypt and Assyria and Prehistoric Greece to bear upon the criticism of the Hebrew literature, and we find in them a corrective, especially in regard to the *absolute* value of archæology; and, again, we are able to some extent to bring the results of a reconstructed history of Greece and Rome to bear upon the Christian world. Mr. Headlam feels this when he speaks of 'Latin and Greek inscriptions' forming a 'background to Christianity,' and of our fresh knowledge of 'Greek organization for religious purposes' as showing how 'Christianity would have been likely to spread' (p. 337). And then, again, we have gained by the collection of these essays in one volume, because each writer is independent, the editor being under no obligation to bring their conclusions into line. Indeed, so far as we have noticed, Mr. Hogarth has added only one note to the other essays, viz. on page 184. And, as we have seen, a comparison of the several essays has shown us that archæological discovery does not necessarily revolutionize tradition, but rather tends to be confirmatory of it, and is largely constructive. This is indeed an advantage; but at the same time one may feel that to have kept the investigations of the Old and New Testaments separate from the discussion of classical literature would have been more in accordance with English sentiment, not to say with reverence. The Hebrew Scriptures are not a mere literature, but an authority for Divine knowledge, and the New Testament is the same; whereas Homer and Hesiod have no sacred character, and Herodotus or Diodorus can hardly be ranked with the books of Kings or Chronicles or Acts. Comparative study, however, is the order of the day; nothing is sacred from it; and we must only be glad that both the Hebrew Scriptures and the Christian literature can stand the test of archæology equally with, if not even better than, the Greek and Roman historians. The comparison has in their case served only to emphasize the truth.

Before we proceed to consider the contents of the several

essays it may be useful if we say something about the two subjects which together form the title of this volume, viz. (I.) Authority and (II.) Archæology.

(I.) By 'Authority' it is intended to cover all the literary evidence which can be adduced for the illustration of the history of the several peoples, and with it must be classed a great deal which is called 'tradition' or 'legend,' because in some of these essays, *e.g.* those of Professor Gardner and Mr. Haverfield, no particular authors are subjected to the test of archæological evidence, but there is an appeal to the constant beliefs of the peoples which have been embodied in their literature. The term 'Authority' is therefore employed somewhat loosely, and, as we have already pointed out, it means to us something very different when applied to the Bible from what it connotes when applied to classical authors, traditions and legends. It might have been better if some such term as 'history,' or 'written documents,' had been used, for fear that the Pentateuch should be put on a level with 'Prehistoric Greece,' or the beginnings of Christianity treated like Italian 'legend.' We do not say that the essayists have so treated 'authority,' but the collocation of these subjects might easily lend itself to such a view in the minds of less conscientious scholars. Of course, 'authority' means very different things in the case of Hebrew, Classical, and Christian literature. In Hebrew it can mean only the writings of the Old Testament, and even here the question of 'authority' is considerably modified when the Biblical theory is made to give place to the hypotheses of the New Criticism. It makes all the difference to the credit and value of the Pentateuch whether it be regarded as written from contemporary knowledge or made up in later times out of documents, some earlier and some later. In the one case its authority is absolute; it is what it professes to be, and embodies the carefully preserved traditions of a great people which had from the first realized its theocratic position; in the other case its importance is only relative, being an attempt to make history in order to explain how the nation came to be what it is, and to account for certain existing habits and customs. To our mind the authority of the whole Hebrew Scriptures is seriously impaired if the results of modern criticism are accepted. For to take but one example, viz. in respect of the 'Priestly Code': 'We are required to believe that the spiritual teaching of the prophets preceded the ritual teaching of the law'; 'that prophet and psalmist come first, and the Levitical sacrifice afterwards'; 'we are asked also to believe that the Temple

preceded the Tabernacle.'¹ The very background of the prophetic teaching is taken from us, and instead of history we have 'myth.' Under such conditions it is scarcely worth while to test the Pentateuch by archæology: it would be better to put it aside altogether as unhistorical. It has always seemed strange to us that the modern critics, after treating the Pentateuch as they have, should employ it as 'authority' for the history of Israel; it seems to us like arguing in a circle, first to disparage its value, and then to make use of it. Our own position is that the Pentateuch, equally with the historical books and the prophetic writings, is historical—that is, based upon well-preserved traditions, written documents, and contemporary knowledge, and composed in the age to which it professes to belong. In that case it is a real background to Israel's history, and an authority beyond question, and we do not fear for it the test of archæological discovery. Classical authority has quite another position. We are dependent upon late Greek writers for our historical knowledge of ancient Egypt, Babylon, and Assyria; and Herodotus, who is our chief authority, has many shortcomings. We are told that he lacked the power of observation, was a retailer of gossip, knew nothing of Egypt above Memphis, never went south of the Faiyûm; but at the same time he was generally accurate on customs, though at fault concerning religion; and yet he serves as a guide to the investigator (pp. 186-94). Mr. Hogarth is more tender than Mr. Griffith with the credit of Herodotus:

'Depreciation is often in the mouth of the professed student of the Lesser Archæology. "An inch of potsherd is worth all Herodotus." Why should the professed archæologist compare these at all—he whose science deals with the potsherd, but not with Herodotus, except as illustrated by or illustrating potsherds? It is rather for him to compare to whose end the end of Archæology is always relative: Herodotus will have all due honour from the historian' (pp. viii, ix).

It is allowed also by Mr. Griffith that in the later history Herodotus is accurate (p. 178). It is unnecessary to consider the value of Diodorus and the later writers referred to in these essays, and the value of Manetho's lists has already been mentioned (cp. p. 164). Mr. Hogarth has much to say that is interesting in regard to the Homeric Epics; they are 'a memorial of the passing away of the greatness of Mycenæ'—'possibly an early product of the Ionian "after-glow,"' presenting 'a striking series of coincidences between the Homeric

¹ Dean Payne Smith's 'The Mosaic Authorship and Credibility of the Pentateuch,' *Present Day Tracts*, No. 15, pp. 59-61 (R.T.S., London).

and the late bronze-age civilization.' 'Homer sings of the beginning of the age of iron; but the word "bronze" is still in use' (pp. 245-6). There are, however, serious divergences between the Homeric Epics and the 'Mycenæan' age (pp. 247-50), and yet the conclusion arrived at is:

'So we find that there is no sudden and violent breach between Mycenæan and Homeric civilization, just as the later Hellenes felt there was no sudden and violent breach between the Homeric world and their own. The spade gives corroborative evidence' (p. 250).

The effect of this is to make the Homeric poems a real and trustworthy authority for the age to which they belong—that is, an age of transition from the 'Mycenæan' civilization to the later Hellenic culture. As we have said above, Professor Gardner and Mr. Haverfield do not deal with the credit or defects of any particular 'authority,' but they have dealt with Greece and Rome in their own way, and therefore we need not ask what 'authority' means to them. But with Christian times we come back to that kind of authority which we had for the Hebrew literature, viz. writings which profess to belong to the age of which they are the record, and after the Apostolic age those writings which recount the beginnings of the Christian Church. Mr. Headlam does not think it likely that we shall get 'any fresh information about our Lord's life and words,' but 'we may gain a large amount of material for reconstructing the history, the traditions and the knowledge of the second century' (p. 346). He reminds us, too, that 'Eusebius had no sources of information at all authentic concerning the first century which we do not possess, nor can we hope to find anything that he had not' (p. 347). His three chapters are taken up (1) with points by which the records of the New Testament can be tested, especially the accuracy of St. Luke both in the Gospel and the Acts; and (2) with establishing the credibility of the early Church writers in regard to ecclesiastical organization, doctrine and practice. The skilful use that he has made of Phrygian inscriptions for the illustration of the second century of the Christian Church, and of the Catacombs for the elucidation of the early history of the Roman Church, has convinced us that our accepted authorities for the first ages of the Gospel are not likely to suffer damage by any modern discoveries. In regard to Gospel times the tendency of archæology is 'constructive, and not destructive' (p. 422). We may trust our 'authority'; we may assume it to be right until proved to be faulty (p. 360).

(II.) We turn now to Archæology, and at once we welcome

Mr. Hogarth's prefatory essay as defining for us the limits of the study as it is dealt with in this volume. He says that 'nowadays' the term has 'three connotations'—viz. (1) 'the propædæutic training of the æsthetic faculty by the study of style in antique art,' but with that we are not concerned here; (2) 'the science of all the human past' (Sir Charles Newton), or 'the Greater Archæology'; and (3) 'the study of *material documents*'; '*the science of the treatment of the material remains of the human past*,' or 'the Lesser Archæology'; and it is of this third kind that we have to think in this volume. This 'Lesser Archæology,' he says, is 'a science of first-rate importance to the end of history' (pp. vi, vii, viii, ix). Mr. Hogarth has many warnings to offer in regard to this study, which may serve to modify those hasty conclusions which have been drawn from archæology to the disparagement of written documents. For example, he says:

'The material documents of antiquity are often coloured by a subjectivity that will mislead—those inscriptions of kings and cities that were expressly intended to deceive contemporaries and posterity; those even not so intended, which may as easily deceive us, not knowing from other evidence the circumstances of their erection' (p. ix). Again, 'It [Lesser Archæology] suffers from the impossibility of verifying many of its hypotheses, especially in dealing with periods before written history, which are at once its opportunity and its occasion of falling' (p. x).

We are reminded here of a warning about the danger of trusting 'Egyptian materials' too implicitly, given by Mr. Griffith (p. 176), and one about the 'speculative element' in archæology, given by Mr. Headlam (p. 392). And we cannot refrain from quoting what Mr. Hogarth says of the relation of this 'Lesser Archæology' to history; for it is admirable:

'But the continual reference to literary documents, which will be noted in the essays that follow, is designed to keep in view the great fact that Archæology, understood thus as the science of the treatment of the material documents of the human past, is concerned with only one, and (if comparison need be instituted) not the most important, class of documents from which the life of past society is to be reconstituted. If all the material documents of antiquity had vanished off the earth, we could still construct a living and just, though imperfect, picture of antiquity. But were it, on the other hand, literature that had perished utterly, while the material remains of all past civilizations survived everywhere in soils as fecund and as preservative as the sands of Egypt, nothing of that picture could be drawn beyond the most nebulous outline. As things stand at this day, material monuments take a place, important or unimportant, in the historian's construction of the past according as they can

be interpreted well or ill by comparison of the monuments of letters' (pp. xiii-xiv).

All the essayists are careful to do honour to those pioneers and founders by whose patience, energy, and heroic studies archæology has made such strides during the present century. It is a pleasure to read what they have written concerning Sir Henry Rawlinson, Dr. Schliemann, Theodor Mommsen, Layard, Grotefend, and others, and we welcome their full appreciation of Professors Sayce, Flinders Petrie, Ramsay, and Mr. A. Evans in our own day. Mr. Griffith (pp. 155-60), Mr. Hogarth (pp. 220-6), and Mr. Haverfield (pp. 309-13) may be cited as doing justice to those who have gone before; and the remarkable testimony, which comes out in these pages, to the forward position of English workers in all these fields of study is a cause for great happiness:

'British scholarship may well be proud of the part it has taken in the decipherment of cuneiform' (Mr. Griffith, pp. 159-60). 'We may congratulate ourselves that in this department at least [the recovery of lost works, such as Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*] the chief prizes have fallen to England; while in the application of the *data* acquired from inscriptions, from historical and topographical research, and from the many kindred studies that form the equipment of the geographical traveller, English scholars, from Leake to Ramsay, have held a foremost position' (Professor Gardner, p. 291).

We have already said something about the purpose of archæological study, but again referring to Mr. Hogarth (pp. vi-vii) we may learn that 'the seeking, examining, and ordering of all the documents of the human past' is the work proper to the archæologist, while it is the work of the historian to 'reconstitute the picture' of the past, and 'to apply the result to the life of man in the present and future.' Mr. Headlam also has some remarks upon the value of archæology which deserve attention:

'Archæology brings us new material: but it also helps in the development of a new method.' 'It teaches us to study the books of the New Testament and the writers of the early Church from the point of view of history.' 'A mind trained in an archæological method will be trained to interpret a book historically, and not to use it controversially without regard to the circumstances under which it was written or the meaning that the author intended to convey' (pp. 361-2).

Professor Driver, too, has shown the general result of archæology upon the history of Israel, viz.

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'to take the Hebrews out of the isolated position which, as a nation, they seemed previously to hold, and to demonstrate their affinities with, and often their dependence upon, the civilizations by which they were surrounded' (pp. 6, 7). 'There are many representations and statements in the Old Testament which only appear in their proper perspective when viewed in the light thrown upon them by archæology' (p. 8).

But we think that Mr. Haverfield has a much truer view of the functions of archæology than Professor Driver; for while the Professor throws contempt upon some attempts to rehabilitate the patriarchal age, such as have been made by Professor Sayce and Mr. Tomkins (p. 149), his fellow-essayist has shown that the value of archæology is 'educational, not historical.'

'The amphitheatres of Thysdrus or Pola are not more instructive to the historian than a dozen less perfect—Varhely, Buda Pest, Carnuntum, and so forth. Their proper function is to convince the beholder of the reality of ancient life, quite as much as to increase his knowledge of it. An ancient model of an ancient building is better than a modern model, for it is more accurately vivid; but the material question is the vividness, and not the accuracy' (p. 331).

Surely, upon these principles Professor Sayce, who believes in the historical position of Abraham (which, apparently, Professor Driver does not), is quite justified in attempting to give to the age of Abraham and the other patriarchs the proper colouring and surroundings, as they can be ascertained from material monuments; for this is to make history 'accurately vivid,' instead of rejecting everything for which there is no positive confirmation from the monuments. Such a position (which, if we mistake not, is Professor Driver's, but not that of the other essayists in this volume) is to try to make archæology do more than its proper function of illustrating history. It is to make 'authority' dependent upon, not co-ordinate to, 'archæology'; and that, as we have tried to show, is not the general tendency of this volume.

We may now turn to a more detailed consideration of Parts I. and III. of this book; for in a Review of this kind the theological position is necessarily the most important, and we are bound to ask ourselves whether we feel that the Old and New Testaments have suffered any damage by the tests to which they have been put by the essayists. Our line of argument hitherto has been (1) that, on the whole, archæology is confirmatory, not subversive, of the traditional position; (2) that archæology is intended to be supplementary to and

illustrative of history ; (3) that our authorities are to be trusted unless they can be proved to be wrong ; and (4) that the discoveries of archæology are not necessarily to be regarded as infallible, both because of a certain 'subjectivity' underlying some of them (p. ix), and because we have evidence of 'restorations' at certain periods (p. 176), which make us suspicious of hasty conclusions. Our feeling is that while Professor Driver has made a strong effort in these essays to prove that archæological researches tell in favour of rather than against the conclusions of the Higher Criticism, yet he has not succeeded in destroying the historic position of the Pentateuch, nor has he convinced us that we are to give up our confidence in the books of Daniel and Chronicles. In other respects Professor Driver has stated the evidence of the monuments clearly and fairly, and he has taken great pains to illustrate words and names, customs and places. Our disagreement with him is due much more to his tone and attitude towards those from whom he differs, and his assumption of the late date of the Pentateuch, than to any use that he has made of the inscriptions. We do not hold a brief for Professor Sayce, who is made the scapegoat of those who take the traditional view—for we think that Professor Sayce sometime gives our case away, while he professes to uphold it—but we should have preferred the absence of any controversial tone from Professor Driver's essay. The change, to which we have already alluded, that we experience when we reach the smoother waters of the Gospel age is most refreshing. Mr. Headlam delights us, and we feel that we can trust our Christian tradition. We propose therefore to take some examples drawn from Parts I. and III. in order to test, if we can, the conclusions which have been drawn respecting them. In the Hebrew Scriptures we shall take (1) the story of Creation ; (2) the history of Joseph ; (3) the case of Manasseh ; (4) the capture of Babylon. In the Christian writings we may examine what Mr. Headlam has to teach respecting (1) the accuracy of St. Luke as a historian ; (2) the Church in Phrygia during the second century ; (3) the teaching of the Primitive Church. After this we shall be able to draw some lessons for our own consolation.

(1) The cosmogony of Genesis i.-ii. 4 has been for many years (since the discoveries of Mr. George Smith in 1872-1876) compared with the creation-tablets of Chaldæa, and it has often been inferred that the writer of Genesis drew his knowledge from these sources ; but, at any rate, it has been said that 'the Biblical cosmogony is, in its main outline,

derived from Babylonia' (p. 15). Professor Driver is careful to point out that the texts of these inscriptions are of two different dates and languages. There are both a Sumerian text—belonging, it may be, to 4000 B.C.—and a Semitic text, which Professor Sayce dates about 700 B.C.; and 'these texts shew that different representations of the course of creation were current in Babylonia' (p. 14). The only question that arises is, At what period did the writer of Genesis obtain his knowledge? Professor Driver admits that 'these elements were not derived *directly* from any known Babylonian source' (p. 15), but that 'the Babylonian myth must have been for long years transplanted into Israel' (pp. 15, 16); and he presents us with three views: (i) the traditional, viz. that it came with Abraham from Ur of the Chaldees; (ii) the critical, viz. in the time of Ahaz, when intercourse between Judah and Assyria was renewed; and (iii) the view which has been based upon the evidence of the Tel-el-Amarna tablets, and advocated by Professor Sayce and others, that this knowledge of Babylonian lore was due to the long influence of Babylon upon Canaan, and that the Israelites gained it upon taking possession of the land. We have said above that we hold no brief for Professor Sayce, and we cannot see that anything is gained by this position: it is as much a conjecture as the modern critical view which takes the eighth century B.C. for the composition of certain parts of the Pentateuch. Professor Driver does not condescend to discuss the traditional view, simple and logical as it is, because he regards the 'early narratives of Genesis' as 'not historical,' but 'analogous to allegory and parable' (p. 35); and he takes the view of the Higher Critics as pretty well assured. We have two remarks to make about these creation-tablets of Babylonia, and we shall use the words of other writers:

(i.) 'Babylonian mythology from its nature passed through various stages of development and corruption in the course of generations. It has come down to us in a comparatively late stage,' 'largely from Assyrian tablets belonging to the reign of Assurbanipal (Sardanapalus) of the seventh century B.C.'¹ 'Even in the Babylonian legend of creation, we still find traces of this grand conception [the One God] in the statement that there was a time when the gods had not been called into being.' 'The discovery of these Chaldean legends seems decisive as to the fact that the author must have had Chaldean materials before him, and apparently at a time when they

¹ Rev. F. Watson's *The Book Genesis a True History*, p. 62 and note. (S.P.C.K. 1892.)

were not debased and degraded by the introduction of the puerile polytheism which now forms so large a portion of their contents.'¹

Our contention is that here we have an example of that kind of 'restoration' in the seventh century B.C. in Assyria which Mr. Griffith has shown to have taken place in Egypt about the same period. We quote only one sentence: 'It is certain that in the XXVth Dynasty the archaistic tendency set in suddenly and strongly' (p. 176).² (ii.) The opinion of Professor Schrader³ will sufficiently declare what we hold respecting the origin of those parts of the Pentateuch which have a Babylonian origin:

'I am also led to the obvious conclusion that the Hebrews were acquainted with this legend [of the Flood] at a much earlier period [than about 800 B.C.], and that it is far from impossible that they acquired these and the other primitive myths now under investigation as far back as in the time of their earlier settlements in Babylonia, and that they carried these stories with them from Ur of the Chaldees. The time when these legends as well as the Creation-story were remoulded in the spirit of Hebrew antiquity, must of course be placed subsequent to the migration of the Hebrews from their Babylonian home.'⁴

We can see no alternative between this, the earliest period of contact with Babylonia, and the period of the exile for the source of this knowledge, and Professor Driver by no means claims a *post-exilic* origin for these early narratives (cp. pp. 15, 16).

(2) The history of Joseph (Gen. xxxix.-l.), according to Professor Driver, shows a marked familiarity with Egypt, and nearly every detail can be illustrated from the monuments; but they 'do not help us, except indirectly, to fix the date of Joseph' (p. 51). The name of the Pharaoh is not mentioned in the Bible narrative, and manners and customs are not confined to one age only. Apparently Joseph's elevation took place under one of the later Hyksos kings. The names Potiphar, Zaphenath-pa-aneach, and Asenath have not been found as early as Joseph's age, 'and though future discoveries may correct the inference, it is impossible not to feel that it creates a presumption against their being

¹ Dean Payne-Smith's 'The Mosaic Authorship of the Pentateuch,' *Present Day Tracts*, No. 15, pp. 17, 25. (R.T.S.)

² We recommend our readers to weigh carefully what Mr. Griffith has said about 'restorations' and the effect upon the authority of Herodotus (pp. 176-7); they may serve to modify the absolute claim which is often made for the accuracy of the Assyrian annals.

³ Quoted by Rev. F. Watson, *The Book Genesis*, p. 66.

⁴ *Inscriptions of the Old Testament*, i. p. 54 and note.

historical' (p. 52). The land of Goshen, which has been identified by M. Naville with Kesem, or Geshen (LXX—'Gesem of Arabia'), was not a province in Joseph's time, but marshland. 'It is plain that the writer of Gen. xlvii. 11 must have transferred to the age of Joseph relations which did not begin to exist till long subsequently' (p. 54). Professor Driver sums up his conclusions on pp. 66, 67, which may be expressed in his own words: viz. 'the Egyptian inscriptions tend to show that the Biblical traditions respecting Joseph embody a genuine nucleus of historical fact' (p. 67). How very different is the conclusion of Mr. R. S. Poole (quoted by the Rev. F. Watson, *ut supra*, p. 60), who is quite as trustworthy a critic as Professor Driver in archæological matters:

'The Egyptian documents emphatically call for a reconsideration of the whole question of the date of the Pentateuch. It is now certain that the narrative of the history of Joseph and the sojourn and Exodus of the Israelites, that is to say the portion from Gen. xxxix. to Ex. xv., so far as it relates to Egypt, is substantially not much later than B.C. 1300; in other words, was written while the memory of the events was fresh. The minute accuracy of the text is inconsistent with any later date.'¹

Professor Driver has to our thinking made too much, both in Joseph's case and elsewhere, of the absence of corroborative evidence from the monuments, especially of the *non*-mention of the *name* of either of the Pharaohs in the Book of Exodus as 'evidence that the narrative is not the work of a contemporary hand' (p. 68, note): he seems to expect that the Hebrew documents would be dated year by year exactly, in the way that the Assyrian annals were kept, and he presses the argument of Chronology too far (cp. pp. 32, 33).

(3) The case of Manasseh will afford us an example of how Professor Driver treats a statement of the Bible, against which there is no particle of evidence, but which, on the contrary, is rendered highly probable by the circumstances, and by analogy from the monuments themselves. In 2 Chron. xxxiii. 11-13 we are told that Manasseh was carried captive to Babylon, and was presently restored to his kingdom. This historical notice is not mentioned in 2 Kings, and is therefore held by some to be *unhistorical* (p. 115). The inscriptions do not decide the question: they show that it *might* have happened, not that it actually *did*; for in the case of an Egyptian prince—viz. Necho, king of Memphis and Sais, who was taken captive—we find that Assurbanipal

¹ *Contemporary Review*, xxxiv. 707.

treated him kindly, and sent him back to his kingdom and reinstated him (p. 116). Now, because there is no monumental evidence that this was done for Manasseh, Professor Driver is suspicious of the Chronicler's statement, and argues that the connexion of this unsupported statement with the account of Manasseh's repentance goes to show that the Chronicles are merely "Haggadah," or edifying religious narrative, rather than history proper' (pp. 115, 116). This is the kind of position so often taken up in this essay, an attitude of *non possumus*—as much as to say, where a statement can be proved from the inscriptions it may be accepted; where it stands alone it must be regarded as suspicious until it has been corroborated: that is, to our minds, not a fair way of treating 'authority.'¹ In regard to Manasseh's case, we think that Professor Sayce has said everything that is necessary to show that the Chronicler's statement is trustworthy,² and, as Professor Schrader has pointed out, in this case the suspicions of the Higher Criticism are unfounded. We cannot understand Professor Driver's conclusion that 'no amount of evidence respecting other kings taken captive to Babylon and afterwards released can neutralize the special difficulties attaching to the particular case of Manasseh' (p. 144): this looks to us like prejudice only towards the Chronicler.

(4) The capture of Babylon has received new and full elucidation from the inscriptions, and we are compelled to modify some of our old notions both respecting Cyrus himself and the circumstances of the capture; but at the same time we have gained some points. It is quite true that we must give up the idea that Cyrus was a monotheist, that the waters of the river were diverted, that there was any siege, and that Babylon was at that time made a desolation; but we have learned that Cyrus was popularly known as 'King of Persia,' although strictly 'King of Anshan,' and we have confirmed the historical position of Belshazzar, although we know him now to be Nabona'id's son, 'the king's son,' and his father's general. But when Professor Driver proceeds to tell us, upon the slender evidence of the inscriptions, 'that the Book of Daniel is not the work of a contemporary hand, but springs from a later age, in which the past was viewed in a dim and confused perspective' (pp. 126-7); and that the inscription (p. 128: Cyrus's proclamation, the so-called 'Cylinder Inscription')

¹ Cp. Headlam, p. 360, quoted above.

² *The Higher Criticism and the Verdict of the Monuments*, pp. 458-461.

'shews that, although the general thought of the fall of Babylon before Cyrus, expressed by the Hebrew prophets of the Exile (Isa. xiii.-xiv. 23, xl.-xlviii., Jer. l.-li.), was fulfilled, yet the details by which they pictured it as accomplished did not, in many cases, correspond to the event' (p. 129),

we feel bound to raise our voice against the sweeping way in which the evidence of the Old Testament is treated, whenever it does not fall in with the interpretation of the monuments. We know, of course, that Professor Sayce has treated the Book of Daniel in much the same way as Professor Driver,¹ but he is careful to bring out any points in its favour which are supported by the inscriptions. Surely a great deal too much has been made of the omission of Nabona'id's name from the Bible, and of Belshazzar being called 'son' of Nebuchadnezzar and 'king of Babylon' in the fifth chapter of Daniel, for at least we have from the monuments a confirmation of the statement that Belshazzar was 'slain' on the capture of the city (p. 126). We acknowledge that 'Darius the Median' continues to present a difficulty, but this unknown name can scarcely destroy the historical character of the Book of Daniel, nor prove that it springs from a later age. There are other considerations which uphold the historical character of the book, in spite of its late admission to the Hebrew canon, but we cannot discuss them here. It is well known that our notions of the taking of Babylon have been largely coloured by the accounts in Herodotus, and we have been accustomed to read into the Hebrew prophets things that were not there; and now that Herodotus has been shown to be in error, there is a tendency to discredit the statements of the prophets—that is to say, what they describe poetically has been taken literally, *e.g.* 'Bel boweth down,' &c. (Isaiah xlv. 1), as if it meant that Cyrus destroyed the gods of Babylon, or 'That saith to the deep, Be dry,' &c. (Isaiah xlv. 27), as if a diversion of the river must be meant. But Mr. Griffith has told us (p. 202) that Nebuchadnezzar had built a great wall from the Tigris to the Euphrates at Sippara, and intended to ward off attacks from the north by flooding the country above it. He continued this defence on the east of the Euphrates, behind Babylon, by a great wall and artificial marshes.

'Cyrus' trick of diverting the stream and entering along its bed may have been practised in reality for overcoming this outer defence at Opis and at Sippara, instead of at Babylon, as Herodotus represents.

¹ *Higher Criticism and the Monuments*, pp. 524 sqq.

... It is quite intelligible that after such a disaster to the country the capital should have opened its gates to Gobryas' (pp. 202, 203).

It is interesting to observe how sometimes, if we wait a little, what has been hastily pronounced wrong will be corroborated by new evidence. Perhaps Herodotus may not be so worthless after all. Perhaps in the case of the taking of Babylon we may not have to give up so much as we have been asked to do. Then, again, does Isaiah xli. 1, 2, mean anything more than that Bel and Nebo have 'passed under the yoke of a foreign conqueror'?¹ And is it necessary to insist that the Hebrew prophets, when they foretell Babylon's destruction, can refer only to the capture by Cyrus? This is what Professor Driver appears to assume (p. 129). We are inclined to believe that the Hebrew prophet often sees the whole range of a nation's history spread out before him, and does not stay to distinguish the nearer and the more remote; and so we find no difficulty in applying 'the magnificent description of the death of the last Babylonian monarch on the battlefield, and his descent into the under-world which we read in Isaiah xiv.,' to Nidinta-Bel,² and the siege and destruction of Babylon to Darius, son of Hystaspes, the real founder of the Persian Empire. That is to say, we think that in the interpretation of the prophetic books we ought not to be bound down by a hard and fast rule, either to interpret their language with absolute literalness, or to limit their range of vision to this or that one period. Professor Driver is as conscious of this as we are, and therefore we regret the more that he has made the assertion above—viz. 'yet the *details* by which [the Hebrew prophets] pictured [the fall of Babylon] as accomplished did not, in many cases, correspond to the event' (p. 129).

When we pass from Part I. to Part III.—that is, from the Hebrew to the Christian literature—we feel that we have got into another atmosphere, and can breathe freely; for, besides the difference of tone and the absence of controversy, we realize that the purpose of the essayist is constructive, and that he views archæology as supplementary to the written records. Mr. Headlam is also constantly laying down principles and criteria, some of which have obviously a wider application than to the particular case which is before him. We have quoted or referred to one of these more than once, viz. it [St. Luke's accuracy] 'certainly forbids us to adopt the

¹ Sayce, *Fresh Light from the Monuments*, p. 150.

² *Ibid.* p. 151.

attitude assumed by many critics that a statement in the New Testament must be wrong unless it can be proved to be right' (p. 360); and we have made use of the principle for another purpose. But here is another, which might well be applied to the remarkable knowledge of Palestinian geography which is exhibited in the Pentateuch, viz.:

'It is an almost infallible sign of a later or a forged document, that it blunders in the minor points of local government and geography.' 'If, then, we find that the accuracy of a work in geographical and administrative details is largely corroborated by inscriptions, it is strong presumptive evidence of its historical value as a document' (p. 338).

We cannot help setting this over against a statement of Professor G. A. Smith, quoted with approval by Professor Driver, in reference to the topographical accuracy of the Old Testament, viz.

"that a story accurately reflects geography does not necessarily mean that it is a real transcript of history." "While we may have other reasons for the historical truth of the patriarchal narratives, we cannot prove this on the ground that their itineraries and place-names are correct" (p. 148).

No wonder, then, Professor Driver holds that 'exploration in Palestine' . . . 'has contributed but little towards solving the great historical problems which the Old Testament presents' (p. 148). We think otherwise, supported, as we hold, by Mr. Headlam's canon.

One more of these principles, laid down by Mr. Headlam, may be quoted with advantage, viz.:

'Literature has generally preserved for us what is most valuable; archæology gives us what is commonplace and unimportant: yet the commonplace may often enable us to get a safer and deeper insight into historical questions than what is intrinsically more valuable' (p. 363).

We feel that such a canon fully justifies Professor Sayce and others (p. 149) in trying to reconstruct and illustrate the age of the patriarchs from monumental sources.

But we must turn now to the Christian literature, and inquire what archæology has done to supplement our knowledge about the early days of the Church. Mr. Headlam enumerates (1) the discoveries made in the Egyptian desert, the papyrus fragments, and the contents of the rubbish heaps of Oxyrhynchus; (2) the inscriptions and other monumental remains;

¹ *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, p. 108.

and he shows how both these have their value, either as illustrative or critical. He points out, too, how the Acts of the Apostles can be checked and illustrated from our improved knowledge of imperial and provincial organization, and how much the religious guilds permitted by the State contributed to the growth of Christianity in the Roman Empire. He touches briefly upon the fragments of the Gospels found in the Fayûm, and the Gospel of Peter [concerning which he has an amusing comparison to make with a certain popular 'Life of Christ' (p. 344)], and the Logia discovered by Messrs. Grenfell and Hunt in 1896; and he has some interesting examples of *libelli* (i.e. certificates of having sacrificed), belonging to the Decian persecution, to tell us of (p. 347). But it is when he examines the Acts of the Apostles by the light of the inscriptions that the real purpose of his first chapter is seen, viz. to test St. Luke's accuracy as a historian; and the light now thrown upon the words 'the first of the district' (Acts xvi. 12), in relation to Philippi, by the use of the word *μειρίς* in documents found in the Fayûm (p. 350), is most valuable. And the evidence of local knowledge at both Philippi and Thessalonica, as Mr. Headlam shows, is dead against any theory of the Acts being written in the second century. The accuracy of the historian is likewise tested in relation to the date of Christ's birth upon the lines of Professor Ramsay's treatise, *Was Christ born at Bethlehem?* and it is shown conclusively that the periodical census, which began in 9 B.C., was carried out in Palestine under Herod the Great about the year 6 B.C. (p. 359). The second chapter is concerned with Phrygian inscriptions, and the object is to show that the Christian Church was very considerable and influential in Phrygia during the second century, and quite distinct from the Montanist heresy. By far the most valuable point established in this chapter is the verification of Avircius or Abercius, bishop of Hierapolis in Central Phrygia, by Professor Ramsay's discoveries, and his identification with Avircius Marcellus, the leader of the Anti-Montanist party between 190 and 200 A.D., who was known previously only from Eusebius (v. 16) and a notice by Symeon Metaphrastes (pp. 367-73). The other inscriptions discussed are interesting for the light that is thrown upon the large numbers of the Christians in Phrygia, and the figurative language which they were compelled to employ so as not to excite heathen enmity. Many of the inscriptions given would be quite intelligible to the members of the Church, while they would pass unnoticed by the heathen

population. Christianity was not as yet a *religio licita*, and therefore only by means of burial-clubs could the Christians act in concert (pp. 382-4). It is remarkable, too, how, about the year 314 A.D., there appear inscriptions showing 'a series of high priests,' just after the last persecution of the Church, which exhibit 'an imitation of Christian language'; for this corroborates a statement of Eusebius (for which no reference is given) that 'Maximin had organized a heathen priesthood on the analogy of the Christian hierarchy' (pp. 387-8). Mr. Headlam infers therefore that in Phrygia the Christians 'were not only actually but relatively numerous,' and that 'Christianity spread early, so as to be, not the religion of a small body of persons removed from the life of the place, but of a section of the population' (p. 392). He does not believe in the modern view that Montanism represents 'primitive Christianity asserting itself against a dominant ecclesiasticism,' but rather that it was 'the Phrygian character asserting itself under Christian forms,' and that, of itself, it witnesses to 'the widespread character of Christianity in the district,' to which the inscriptions also testify (p. 393).

The last chapter, on 'the Catacombs at Rome,' deserves to be printed and published as a separate pamphlet (pp. 396-422); it is thoroughly sound and interesting. He insists upon their being 'definitely Christian,' 'the work of Roman Christians,' 'excavated for the purpose for which they have been used,' 'constructed according to a definite plan by a body of professional diggers,' apparently 'organized into a guild, and incorporated to some extent in the Roman clergy'; 'the catacombs were not made for the purposes of concealment,' though so used in the Diocletian persecution. After pointing out that the provision of these burial places (p. 398) was in some cases the work of the rich, in others of some burial-guild acting for the whole body of members, he says that the inscriptions 'help to bring out the importance in early days and the widespread character of this side of Church organization. It enabled the Christian community to exist as a legal body even when Christianity was an illegal religion, and to hold property for the purpose of burial' (p. 400). Mr. Headlam attributes five cemeteries to the latter part of the first century, four others to the second century, and that of St. Callistus to the third. They were used continuously till the peace of Constantine, and often afterwards, but cemeteries above ground were then purchased, and in the middle of the fourth century pilgrimages to the Catacombs began, and Pope Damasus (366-384 A.D.) de-

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voted himself to their adornment and improvement. In 410 A.D (Gothic invasion) the use of the Catacombs ceased (pp. 400-402). We cannot follow Mr. Headlam's discussion of the inscriptions, fascinating as the account is, but we must hasten to his conclusions respecting the importance of the evidence supplied by the Catacombs and their contents, and we shall give it in his own words :

'In the first place, the Catacombs add little or nothing to the evidence of the Fathers ; they present it only in another form. We may, or we may not, approve of prayers for the dead ; but the Fathers teach it, and the Catacombs suggest it. We may doubt whether St. Peter visited Rome ; but the Catacombs and Fathers both imply that it was the fixed belief of the Roman Church at a very early age that he did. The Catacombs show how large a part Baptism and the Eucharist played in the early Church ; but so do the Fathers, from Hermes [*sic*] and Ignatius onwards. In the second place, much that is in the Catacombs, being symbolical, can be interpreted just in accordance with the prepossessions with which we approach such symbolism. . . . And then, thirdly, modern controversial questions largely turn on distinctions which were not present in the mind of the early Church. . . . It is not as controversial documents that the Catacombs are valuable. It is to take us out of controversy. It is because they represent to us the life, or rather a phase of the life of the early Church. . . . They exhibit to us its abiding faith in the Resurrection, its intense concentration of mind on the Person of its Redeemer, its life permeated by the symbolism of the two great Sacraments' (pp. 420-1).

We have quoted enough to show how much Mr. Headlam has to teach us from archæology respecting the beliefs and practices of the early Roman Church ; we hope our readers will study the whole of his essay.

Our conclusions upon the whole volume must be very brief, for we have tried to make the essays tell their own tale.

We have no cause to be disappointed at the results of archæological research. We believe that, on the whole, the traditional view of the Bible has gained by being tested with the new evidence, and we think that another twenty years of patient research and study will confirm its position, much in the same way as Schliemann's views twenty years since upon prehistoric Greece, after being ridiculed, have been amply justified (p. 226). We look forward to further excavations, especially in Palestine, for the Tel-el-Amarna tablets encourage us, and we hope that before long the site of Kirjath Sepher (or Kiriath-sopher, as it apparently should be spelt, p. 70) may be identified and made to disclose its treasures.

We are quite as desirous as Professor Driver and Mr. Griffith (pp. 152 and 218-9) that systematic excavation should be carried on, and we can readily echo the sentiment of the Hebrew Professor that 'to the open-minded lover of truth, whether [the results of archaeology] correct or confirm [present opinions], they will be equally welcome' (p. 152).

ART. X.—DEAN LIDDELL.

Henry George Liddell, D.D., Dean of Christ Church, Oxford.
A Memoir. By the Rev. HENRY L. THOMPSON, M.A.,
Vicar of St. Mary the Virgin, Oxford, sometime Student
and Censor of Christ Church. With Portraits and Illustrations. (London, 1899.)

THE Memoir of the late Dean of Christ Church, for which we have to thank one so eminently qualified for the task as the Rev. H. L. Thompson, will be heartily welcomed by very many Oxford men because of personal friendship or acquaintance, or because of the services rendered by the late Dean to Christ Church and the University, or even perhaps in some cases because of the recollection of a dignified figure and handsome face which it is impossible to forget. But it would be a great mistake to suppose that the interest of the Memoir will be confined to these. To say nothing about Old Westminsters, Liddell's name is known wherever the use of the best of Greek Lexicons has extended, and there is much in the memoir which deserves the attention of any educated and thoughtful student of biography.

Henry George Liddell was born near Auckland in 1811. His father, the Rev. Henry George Liddell, was a younger brother to Lord Ravensworth; his mother was a niece of the Earl of Strathmore. When he was eight years old, he was sent to a private school, described by Mr. Thompson as 'a rough place, with little kindness, unintelligent teaching, the frequent use of the cane, and the inevitable bullying' (p. 3). At the age of twelve he went to the Charterhouse, which, like his former school, he 'detested' (p. 5). There he came to know Thackeray, and was confirmed by Bishop Blomfield. He left in 1829, being at that time—in the words of the MS. autobiography he wrote for his children, which, unfortunately, ends at the year 1834—'a fair grammar scholar, but with very little classical reading.' He had read 'four or five Greek

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plays with Porson's notes, two or three books of the *Iliad*, a little Pindar, Cicero's Offices and some of his Orations.' He had learnt by heart the Georgics of Virgil and the Odes and Epodes of Horace, and had 'also read most of the Satires and Epistles.' 'Greek prose was almost untrodden ground,' Herodotus and Thucydides he knew only by name. He had read the Apology of Plato, 'devoured a large quantity of English literature,' and 'amassed a good deal of general information' (p. 11). In 1830 Liddell entered into residence at Christ Church; in 1833 he took a Double First; in 1836 he became Tutor of Christ Church; he was ordained deacon at the end of the same year, and priest two years later; in 1845 he was appointed Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy, Censor of Christ Church, and Whitehall Preacher; and in 1846 he became Proctor. In September 1846 he began work as Headmaster of Westminster, and in 1855 returned to Christ Church as Dean. He resigned that high office in 1891, having refused the Deanery of Westminster ten years before.

The Memoir does not ignore the Dean's private life. The bright happiness of the home of his boyhood, the triumphant joy with which he shot his first stag, his grief at his sister's death in 1838, his deep affection for his wife and children, the care taken to spend some part of every day with them, even when the demands upon his time were most pressing, his simple tastes and abstemious habits, the courtesy which did something to make up for his lack of 'small talk' while it added to his powers of conversation on the many subjects of which his knowledge was both wide and accurate, the pathetic death of his daughter Edith, and the quiet closing days of his life, are all touched on with delicacy and skill. And Mr. Thompson has done well in adding to the excellent illustrations contained in the book reproductions of four of the famous 'blotting-paper sketches,' with the drawing of which it was the custom of the Dean to beguile the weary meetings which filled up much of the time of his university life.

Mr. Thompson has performed his task with befitting seriousness and dignity. But he has not thought it necessary to exclude some of those humorous elements which make a biography so much more readable. It is delightful to have an old epigram about a former Dean of Christ Church and a former Warden of All Souls recalled to mind:

'Gaisford and Sneyd each other's lectures seek:

The one learns manners, and the other Greek' (p. 138).

The excellent story of Dean Gaisford's two letters to Lord

Grenville in connexion with his appointment as Regius Professor of Greek is told in Dean Liddell's own words (pp. 138-9). The examples of the Westminster boys' epigrams include one on the thesis '*Scribimus indocti doctique*,' which ran—

'Two men wrote a Lexicon, Liddell and Scott ;
Some parts were clever, but some parts were not.
Hear, all ye learned, and read me this riddle,
How the wrong part wrote Scott, and the right part wrote
Liddell' (p. 109).

There is an entertaining account how the Dean, through beginning to speak without turning round from his desk, inflicted a severe rebuke, intended for some one else, on a gifted undergraduate who was then of blameless character and, as his distinguished successor, was destined to impart to the governing of Christ Church valuable features which in Dean Liddell's time it lacked (p. 171). And, if there is an element of sadness in the record of Dean Stanley laying down in the University pulpit as the 'first rule' for 'abating' the 'evils of theological controversy' the maxim 'Never condemn a book unless you have read it,' and in the evening of the same day describing a recently published volume on Church History as 'not worth much' and then adding 'indeed I haven't read it' (p. 185), we are able to enjoy without any such drawback the inscription which Dean Liddell wrote for the 'earlier statue' of Dean Fell when it was removed from Christ Church to 'quiet seclusion in the garden of Nuneham Park':

'Effigies quam aspicias viri optimi qui cur homuncionibus quibusdam displiceret ipsi nesciebant in Aede Christi minio semel atque iterum illita hoc in recessu requiem obtinuit A.D. 1887.'

The 'modern statue' of Dean Fell which, by Liddell's gift, took its place in Christ Church, bore the inscription—

'Johanni Fell
H. G. L.
Decano Decanus
MDCCCLXXVII' (p. 164).

One service which this Memoir renders is to show the importance of Dean Liddell's rule as Headmaster of Westminster. At the time of his appointment many improvements and reforms were needed. For much which was carried out with great wisdom, the Dean and Chapter deserve part of the credit, and the Headmaster was greatly helped by the Under-

master whom he found, the Rev. T. W. Weare, and the assistant masters whom he himself chose. When all this has been allowed for, it remains that the work of the Headmaster was of the very highest value. Mr. Thompson gives a very interesting account of it from the pen of the Rev. James Marshall, who was assistant master for nearly thirty years, and adds some reminiscences from other sources, from which we may quote a description of the Headmaster's teaching power :

'Gradually, to the feeling of awe was added that of affection, as the boys rose in the school and came under his personal instruction in the Sixth Form. For he was an admirable teacher : thorough, clear, suggestive, stimulating ; exacting in the care which he demanded in the preparation of book-work, but singularly interesting in the instructiveness of his comments and the wide range of his illustrations. He was not a mere textual scholar, but an historian and statesman. His Juvenal lesson still lingers in the memory as a model of what a lesson should be ; the boys were not only well drilled in the text and allusions, but were referred to the best modern satires, and indirectly led to an appreciation of much of the noblest English literature. He was fond of poetry, and taught the elder boys to recite it well. During a portion of the year there were "speeches" in the great school-room on Friday mornings at the end of the lesson, in the presence of all the boys, when the members of the Sixth Form stood up by the Headmaster's table and repeated passages of English poetry which had been previously selected. On one occasion, when the present Vicar of St. Peter's, Bournemouth, had recited the whole of Gray's *Elegy* with faultless taste and without a single mistake, an emphatic "Thank you, Fisher," gave an apt expression to the feeling of all the listeners, and a more than ample reward to the reciter.

'In those ancient days, a rudimentary knowledge of Hebrew was most wisely required of the elder boys who were candidates for the Universities. Liddell taught this subject in a very interesting manner, although it was generally believed that he had acquired all his knowledge in the short interval between his appointment as Headmaster and his entering on his office' (pp. 106-7).

The great Greek Lexicon had been begun while Liddell 'and Robert Scott were still Bachelors of Arts, perhaps as early as 1834.' The first edition of it was published in the summer of 1843, three years before Liddell became Headmaster of Westminster. But, as may be seen in a moment by a cursory glance at the different editions, the publication of the first edition meant anything but the completion of the arduous toil of the task. The 'summer of 1843,' writes Mr. Thompson,

'marks the completion of only the first stage in an undertaking which was continued almost to the close of his life ; the eighth edition

being published, after careful revision, in 1897. The Lexicon was his constant companion in term and in vacation. His spare moments were regularly devoted to the task of revising, correcting, and enlarging its pages, and bringing it up to the level of advancing scholarship. For many years with Scott as his coadjutor, and then for many years unaided, he continually endeavoured to make the bulky volume as perfect as possible; and to this unremitting care is due the permanent success of the work. There has been no room for a rival: it has never become out of date' (p. 65).

Even the first edition of the Lexicon was the outcome of most strenuous work. Until it was published there was no Greek-English Lexicon which approached either adequacy or scientific method. A valuable, though not sufficiently methodical, Greek-German Lexicon existed, the work of Professor Schneider of Breslau; and an improvement of this, so far as the vocabulary of Homer, Hesiod, and Herodotus is concerned, had been published by Professor Passow, also of Breslau. Passow's work was taken as a foundation by the two English scholars, but it was necessary that they themselves should add the most exact study of the Greek writers, and the most careful use of many lexicons and indexes to the materials which they found in Passow. It was their custom to meet in Liddell's rooms and 'work away from seven to eleven each night' (p. 73); Liddell 'resolutely gave up to the work all his Long Vacations, with the exception of that which followed his sister's death' (p. 74); and a letter written during the Long Vacation of 1842 shows how much of his time was given to this work:

'I get up,' he writes, 'at 5 every morning, work hard till about 6.30 or 7, have a cup of coffee and a bit of bread, work hard till about 11, have breakfast, work hard till 2, go out with Vaughan or alone, walking or skiffing, dine at 5, work a little at night, and have tea (if any) with Vaughan, and go to bed at 9.30. I have got through a good deal of work, and hope that, so far as the Lexicon goes, I have broken the neck of it. We are going merrily along, and the printers, as well as myself, seem not a little glad that we are nearer the end than the beginning' (p. 75).

Mr. Thompson tells us that

'sometimes Liddell's older friends, who had known the range of his artistic tastes, and remembered the rare promise of his younger days, were inclined to regret that he had devoted so much of his life to the drudgery of Lexicography' (p. 81).

Among these friends was Mr. Ruskin, who wrote of Liddell as one who had disappointed his hope, as 'a man sorrowfully under the dominion of the Greek *ἀνάγκη*,' in

whom 'the prosaic and practical element' had 'prevailed over the sensitive' (pp. 30, 81). Some very interesting letters from the same great art critic, printed in the Memoir (pp. 216-28), show how highly he regarded the Dean's judgment. It is, indeed, impossible to say what splendid use Liddell might have made of the time spent on the Lexicon during a period of sixty-three years. It is no less impossible to estimate the value of the continuous labour which culminated in the magnificent monument of learning and industry which is afforded by the last edition of 'Liddell and Scott.' It is hard to picture, even in imagination, any work of scholarship which could be better worth doing or better done.

The Memoir contains little which bears on Liddell's theological opinions. That little comprises what is of great interest. In 1836 Liddell in a letter to his father, after speaking favourably of Dr. Hampden's personal character describes him as 'unhappily distinguished for very strange, undefined, and almost unintelligible notions on theological subjects' (p. 32). In the same year he did justice to the high motives by which Pusey, Newman, and others who opposed the appointment of Dr. Hampden were actuated, and condemned as 'shocking and unchristian' the attacks made upon them by Dr. Arnold in his famous article in the *Edinburgh Review* (p. 35). Writing on the same subjects at the age of eighty-two, after reading these letters of his younger days, he described them as 'on the whole' 'moderate and impartial' (p. 36). Mr. Thompson tells us that he was 'untouched' by the Oxford Movement (p. 41), though 'he was an occasional attendant at the meetings of Dr. Pusey's Theological Society' (p. 42),¹ translated 'some passages' from St. Ignatius for the *Records of the Church* (p. 43), and in a sermon preached in 1890 bore impressive testimony to the high gifts and character of Cardinal Newman and Dr. Liddon (pp. 42-5). His interest in the 'Martyrs' Memorial' appears from a letter in 1838 to have been merely architectural (p. 45). He was Select Preacher for the first time from 1842 to 1844, and the subject of a sermon in 1844 was 'Unity, not Uniformity,' 'an attempt to persuade people to agree to differ,' in which he was assured by Dean Gaisford that he had 'handled the matter so as not to appear a partisan, or to attack any persons specially' (p. 52). When he was Vice-Chancellor he took great pains in the selection of the preachers of university sermons, and the list of his appointments contains such different names as those of Pusey, Liddon, the present Bishop of Lincoln, Stanley,

¹ This is mentioned also by Liddon, *Life of E. B. Pusey*, i. 337.

Jowett, and Mr. Stopford Brooke (p. 235). Mr. Thompson does not dwell at any length on the Dean's own sermons. He mentions Sir Henry Acland's 'most enthusiastic admiration for Liddell as a theologian' and insistence on 'his richly-stored mind, his well-balanced judgment, his uncontroversial temper, and wide charity;' he quotes Mr. Goldwin Smith's testimony to the 'one or two very able sermons of a liberal and philosophical kind' which the Dean preached 'in the midst of the theological fray at Oxford between the Oxford school and its opponents;' and he himself refers briefly to the 'very remarkable sermon on the philosophic basis of the doctrine of the Real Presence,' preached in Michaelmas Term, 1867 (pp. 246-7). Towards the end of his life Liddell wrote two terrible sentences about the treatment of the Prayer Book by the Disestablished Church in Ireland:

'I think it is a pity that our Irish Church did not avail itself of the opportunity to make some greater alterations in the Liturgy. The high doctrines of the sacraments might well have been relaxed, and with such relaxation much of the sacerdotal stiffness of Pusey, &c., might have been abated' (pp. 275-6).

Had his theological opinions been drawn out at length, it would probably have been our duty to express no small amount of dissent. As to the reality and earnestness of his personal religious life, there is happily no room for controversy or question. The 'early Abbey' for the Westminster boys (pp. 112-13) was representative of much besides; 'reading the Bible' was 'the only thing in which' he could 'find lasting relief' after his sister's death (p. 49); and his pathetic language at the time of his ordination as deacon (pp. 40-1) and as priest (pp. 49-50) was a sign of the high spiritual tone which, if it was sometimes unduly concealed, marked his personal character in his long life.

Dean Liddell will be longer remembered as an administrator at Christ Church and for his University policy than as a theologian. On one point, at least, those who differ most about this important part of his life will probably be agreed—as to the earnestness of his desire to be perfectly just, and the habitual success with which he gave effect to this desire. To this feature of his character Mr. Thompson repeatedly refers. 'Inflexible justice' (pp. 169, 245), 'grand and' 'rare impartiality' (p. 245), 'entire impartiality and clear sense of justice' (p. 232), are among the phrases which testify to this high quality. And one passage seems to us so well calculated to remove misunderstandings which have been some-

what widespread that we will venture to quote a great part of it at length :

'*Harsh*, perhaps, never ; but *stern* words, often, at least in his earlier days. Many men who were undergraduates during his long reign would, if asked their impression, recall this special characteristic, that he was stern. It was not that he was naturally severe ; we know that he was gentle and tender-hearted ; but he was shy and reserved ; there were traditions of the Decanal office not associated with suavity of demeanour ; he was the official mouthpiece when fault had to be found ; and he was always sparing of praise. The result was that the more industrious members of the College sometimes felt that they scarcely received their due meed of commendation and encouragement, while the less deserving experienced justice at his hands, untempered by leniency. . . . Men did not understand that beneath that cold and imperturbable presence there lay hid sympathy and tenderness which would have gladly found expression under different circumstances. . . . A less strong, less dignified, less majestic figure would have suffered from this sternness of demeanour ; but Liddell's straightforward simplicity and aristocratic bearing atoned for much, and, especially in his later years, he was universally venerated, while his manner became gentler, and his whole attitude towards undergraduates grew to be more fatherly, sympathetic, and genial. And when some young man who had gone through the experience of undergraduate days at Christ Church was exalted to the position of Tutor, he came to appreciate much that he had not known before, and to regard the Dean with profound and affectionate respect. He discovered that his chief always made the most generous allowance for errors of judgment and immaturity of knowledge in the young Tutor ; that he gave to him the utmost encouragement and the wisest guidance ; and that he always supported the authority, even if privately he could not always commend the discretion, of every member of the educational staff. And so as the years passed, and Censors and Tutors came and went, there was one judgment which never faltered, one experience which extended over many generations ; a pillar of strength on which all came to rely with implicit confidence and grateful unanimity' (pp. 169-72).

But, apart from the strength and justice of the Dean's rule, it is necessary to devote some space to the marked and definite policy which he supported and carried out at Christ Church and in the University. He was one of the commissioners under the first Oxford University Commission in 1850. He was absent from only one of the eighty-seven meetings of the Commission. He had already taken interest in the subject of University Reform. The recommendations of the Commissioners were not in every respect what he himself wished carried out ; but he, like the other members of the Commission, approved of the 'spirit and tendency' of 'all the more important' (p. 127). The chief reforms recommended were

'the revival of the Ancient House of Congregation, upon a reformed basis, as an effective legislative body; a reconstruction of the Professorial system, so as to give it a leading place in the educational machinery of the University; the relaxation of the obligation to take Holy Orders as a condition of the tenure of Fellowships; the removal of local and other restrictions on the tenure of scholarships and Fellowships; the distinction between Nobleman, Gentleman Commoner, and Commoner; and the introduction of a new class of students not belonging to any College or Hall' (p. 126).

Part of the outcome of the work of this Commission was the Ordinance of 1858, which made important changes at Christ Church.

'The Dean and Canons were still to be the sole governing body, the sole administrators of the property; but in place of the large body of students appointed—except the Westminster men—by a system of private nomination, there were now created twenty-eight senior studentships and fifty-two junior studentships, twenty-one of the latter to be connected with Westminster School. All the rest, both senior and junior, were thrown open to public competition. The senior students would rank as fellows of colleges—but without the real position and authority of fellows—the junior students, as scholars. The canonries were reduced from eight to six. In order to secure an effective and impartial electoral Board, the election of students, whether senior or junior, was placed in the hands of the Dean, six canons, and six senior members of the Educational Staff. Thus, for the first time, the students had equal powers with the canons in this important matter; and the system of private nomination was abolished for ever. But the appointment of the college officers (Censors and Readers) still rested with the Dean and canons; and their authority, in all matters connected with the property of the College, was in no respect curtailed' (pp. 142-3).

Carrying out other recommendations of the Commissioners, the Ordinance of 1867 abolished the distinction between Noblemen, Gentlemen Commoners, and Commoners (pp. 175-6). In the same year the 'Christ Church Oxford Act' vested the 'government of the Foundation and the disposal and management of its possessions and revenues' in the hands of the Dean, canons, and senior students (pp. 144-5). And in 1868 a new departure was taken in University matters by

'the establishment of a class of students unattached to any college or hall, but in all other respects members of the University, and subject to proper supervision in regard to studies and discipline' (p. 198).

Of the whole line of policy inaugurated by the Commission of 1850, and carried out to further issues by the Commission of 1877, Dean Liddell was the warm supporter. It

was a policy which met with strong disapproval and strenuous opposition. When Liddell wrote to tell Dean Gaisford of his appointment on the Commission of 1850 he received a chilling reply, in which it was said :

'As to the Commission itself I feel, in common with almost everyone both at Oxford and Cambridge, that it is a measure which can be productive of no good, and may eventually breed discord and disunion, and destroy the independence of those bodies' (p. 128).

At the time of the Ordinance of 1858 Dr. Pusey wrote :

'I have done what I could towards retaining the old Christ Church. *Fuit Illium*. The Commissioners, with yourself and Dr. Jacobson, will be responsible for the new' (p. 143).

For good or evil, the changes thus advocated and thus opposed have become accomplished facts. The policy of Dean Liddell is that which has triumphed. The Oxford of to-day differs in innumerable respects from the Oxford of the period preceding the first University Commission. It can hardly be denied that there have been great gains. It may well be suspected that much has been lost. For many weak points in the completed changes, and for some forebodings which have been strikingly fulfilled, we may refer to an article which appeared in our pages more than eighteen years ago.¹ And even in those many features in which the events of the last fifty years have been productive of much good, it is needful to remember that in the work of reform, the criticism and resistance of the more conservative party are not seldom as necessary to an ultimate success as the zeal and enterprise of those who are bent on the removal of abuses and the introduction of what is valuable as well as new. In the carrying out of needed reforms it was much that among those largely responsible for them Dean Liddell, with his high character, strong will, and unflinching justice, should have great influence. It was much also that in the opposite camp, doomed though it was to failure on many specific issues, there was the vast knowledge and conscientious judgment of Dr. Pusey.

Mr. Thompson has produced an admirable Memoir of his distinguished friend. Here and there we have noticed a slip which the author will doubtless himself correct in the second edition. We should have liked to see a reference to the graceful consideration by which, at the restoration of the

¹ See *Church Quarterly Review*, April 1881, pp. 201-42, 'Recent Fortunes of the Church in Oxford.'

cathedral the sandstone slab on Mrs. Pusey's grave was left undisturbed.¹ Two or three sentences more would, without entering into a painful controversy already sufficiently discussed, have done fuller justice to the Dean's share in the solution of the difficulty about the endowment of the Regius Professorship of Greek than the brief note on page 185. And we miss some reference, which need not have been a long one, to the Dean's action about the portrait of Pusey.² All this, it may be said, can be found elsewhere. Still, if our regret at what seem to us omissions is hypercritical, it is hypercriticism in the interest of that which Mr. Thompson has at heart.

The Memoir ends with a comparison of the late Dean with some of the most distinguished of his predecessors, at the conclusion of which Mr. Thompson says :

'Dean Liddell, as we have seen—if this brief memoir has not failed in its purpose—may worthily rank with the greatest of his predecessors, in regard to learning and intellectual power. His devotion to Christ Church was unsurpassed ; his services to it were singularly great and various ; and his majestic bearing, high authority, and unswerving rectitude raised him to a very lofty position among the rulers of Oxford. Humble and reverent, nor caring for or seeking praise, he lived a long life of singular integrity ; he might have been assigned a higher place than any of his predecessors, if he could have thrown off his shyness and reticence, and allowed himself to show and express how warmly he shared the interests of those over whom he was set, how keenly he rejoiced in their successes, and how eagerly he desired to encourage their efforts and to repress with a strong hand the idleness and extravagance which in every generation are apt to prevail among the wealthier undergraduates of our Universities.

'Assuredly it may be asserted that, as his term of office was unequalled in duration, so it was unequalled in importance. He witnessed and guided the transition from the old to the new Christ Church ; and has left a lasting memory of a rule marked by august dignity, by strenuous labours, and, above all, by dauntless equity' (pp. 279-80).

¹ See Liddon, *Life of E. B. Pusey*, ii. 104.

² *Ibid.* iv. 326-9.

ART. XI.—GALTON'S MESSAGE AND POSITION
OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

The Message and Position of the Church of England: being an Inquiry into the Claims of the Mediæval Church. With an Appendix on the Validity of Roman Orders. By ARTHUR GALTON, B.A., Curate of Windermere. With a preface on the Royal Supremacy by J. HENRY SHORTHOUSE, Author of *John Inglesant*, etc. (London, 1899.)

THREE facts give this volume an importance it would not otherwise possess, and have led to our devoting an article to the consideration of it. In the first place, it is dedicated to the Bishop of Carlisle, in recognition of his 'great kindness' to the author. Secondly, there is a preface by the eminent novelist, Mr. J. H. Shorthouse. And, thirdly, the author, though he has now been ministering for over a year in the Church of England, was, nineteen years ago, ordained priest in the Church of Rome.

It is a matter for sincere regret that a writer who has done so much good work as Mr. Shorthouse should have allowed himself to be so greatly under the sway of passionate feeling, as he evidently was when he wrote the preface to this book. Our own pages have often borne witness to the strength of the conviction with which we reject the Papal claims, and Roman Catholic writers of eminence have themselves admitted the sad 'state of personal religion in Italy, and France, and Spain'; but no rejection of Roman theology, or recognition of Rome's moral failure in many places, can justify the language of the last paragraph of Mr. Shorthouse's preface. According to him

'the Papal system never was a Church. It never was anything but a propagandist machine for extracting forced obedience and alms from an ignorant, a deceived, and a terrified world. The Papal Curia . . . always has been, and is now, the enemy of the Human Race' (pp. xiii-xiv).

Words of so great violence, and so obviously unjust, can only defeat their own end.

Mr. Shorthouse is hardly less unhappy in what he says about the Church of England than in his statements about 'the Papal system.' He makes the inquiry, 'What is the sense and what the fabric of the English Church?' His answer is,

'His Sacred Majesty, the anointed of God, the Lords temporal and spiritual, the King's Commons in Parliament assembled—that is, the entire Church. There is no antithesis here, of secular or spiritual, the entire State is the Church' (p. x).

We are fully aware of passages in the writings of Hooker which probably were in Mr. Shorthouse's mind when he wrote these astounding sentences. But, whatever value Hooker's theory of Church and State may have possessed in the reign of Elizabeth—and even at that time there was very much to be said against it—the changes which have taken place in England have certainly made it untenable. On Mr. Shorthouse's view, part of the Church of England consists of unbaptized persons, it may be Jews, it may be unbelievers; another part of it consists of those who, if baptized, are not in communion with the Church of England, and are her bitter enemies. Such a theory refutes itself. The assertion of it is tantamount to describing the Church of England as a non-Christian body. If the acceptance of it were necessitated by Establishment, it would be the immediate duty of every Churchman who remains a Christian, as the condition of his loyalty to our Lord Jesus Christ, to throw the whole weight of whatever influence he may possess into supporting a demand for Disestablishment.

Mr. Galton's book is not so wholly bad as Mr. Shorthouse's preface led us to anticipate that it would be. There are parts of it which we have read with interest, and not without agreement. There is a fairly useful summary of the objections to the Papal interpretation of St. Matthew xvi. 18 (p. 28). If the elaborate discussion of the Greek text of this verse (pp. 28–36) does not give much confidence in Mr. Galton's scholarship, it helps to bring out part of the reasons against the Roman explanation. The description of the influence of the Forged Decretals (pp. 37–42) has merits. It is of some importance that such a writer should allow that the doctrine of the Eucharist 'laid down by the English formularies' is that of 'the real presence of Christ in the Sacrament,' and the same as the Eucharistic doctrine of 'all the Eastern Churches' at the present time, and as the 'primitive belief' (pp. 42–3). There are fairly good statements on the ignorance of the mediæval Church (pp. 58–9), the results of the restriction of the view of Western Christians in the middle ages to the West (pp. 60–2), and the causes of the Reformation (pp. 65–92), which is rightly regarded as having extended from 1529 to 1662 (pp. 112–3). About the reign of Edward VI. there are useful remarks :

'Under Edward VI. the nation fell into the hands of men who used religion as a pretext for their own advancement. The extreme Protestant faction made a bad and greedy use of their opportunities. We need only remark that the extreme Reformers were never able to insert their private opinions into the official declarations of the Church' (p. 119).

There is a recognition of the standing appeal of the Church of England 'to a full and free council of the whole Church' (p. 127). And, while Mr. Galton's appreciation of Hooker, Andrewes, and Herbert (pp. 156-7) does not appear to have brought him to a position to which it might be thought likely to lead, it is at least satisfactory that it should exist.

So much it is only fair to say in approval of parts of Mr. Galton's book. In justice to our readers we must point out that, as a whole, and in many details, it cannot be commended.

Mr. Galton appears to us to have an altogether perverted idea of the history of the early Church. It may, perhaps, be due to polemical bias and to a reaction from his former acceptance of the Papal claims that he should say that there is 'not much historical foundation' for the 'tradition' 'that St. Peter was crucified in Rome' (p. 24), that it is 'dubious' 'whether St. Peter was ever in Rome' (p. 25), and that the 'bishops of Rome,' when 'immersed in temporal concerns, and soiled by the ambitions and cares of government,' 'exercised such duties as representatives of the civil authority' (p. 20). Even anti-Roman polemical bias can hardly account for the extraordinary assertions about the relation of the Emperor to the Church. 'All persons,' it is said in one place, 'clerical and secular, owned the Supreme Headship of the Roman Emperors, both in civil and ecclesiastical affairs' (p. 10). The 'undivided Church of the whole Roman Empire' is described elsewhere as 'acknowledging the Supreme Headship of the Emperor, who summoned and presided over its general Councils, making their decrees valid by his approval' (pp. 17-8). 'In the only centuries,' it is said again,

'when the whole Church was united . . . the centre and bond of unity was the throne of Caesar, who was the only Supreme Head on earth of a Church containing many nations, using many languages, and worshipping through many diverse liturgies' (p. 19).

At the end of Mr. Galton's survey of 'the thousand and odd years of Popery, from the break up of the old united Church and Empire to the beginning of the sixteenth century,' he calls attention to

'the damage caused both to States and Churches by the abolition of the old Supreme Head, the Emperor; and the usurpation of his office and authority by an ecclesiastical power' (p. 53).

Of the period 'between 323 and the close of Justinian's reign' he says:

'the Bishop of Rome was one among four or five Patriarchs, with co-ordinate and equal powers, and all recognizing the imperial supremacy, which was the bond of unity and the source of jurisdiction and of order' (p. 114).

Anything more unhistorical, or more practically mischievous at the present time, than these assertions that the Emperor was the 'centre and bond of unity' and 'the source of jurisdiction and of order,' and that his 'approval' made the 'decrees' of 'general Councils' 'valid,' it would be difficult to conceive.

It naturally follows from Mr. Galton's perverted view of the history of the early Church that he approves of the trial of ecclesiastical causes in civil courts and by the Privy Council. This is a subject which we treated so fully in a recent number¹ that we need not dwell on it at length now; but since Mr. Galton has revived an old sophistry, it may be worth while for us to recall very weighty words, in which, almost fifty years ago, it was exposed by Dr. Pusey. In speaking of legal decisions on ecclesiastical matters by the civil courts, Mr. Galton says:

'With regard to our own Established Church, the courts . . . have never defined nor altered any article of the Christian faith. They have only decided the legal meaning of the Anglican formularies; and the further question, whether the utterances or practices of this or that accused person are, or are not, in agreement with those formularies. Their decision may be right or wrong. It cannot affect the truths, which our formularies are taken to express. It can only affect the incriminated person. I cannot see that it matters who try such questions so long as they be competent; and the presumption is that lawyers, guided by trained theologians,² are likely to be the most competent. The law courts do not make the faith of the English Church. They only interpret those articles of faith which have been accepted both by Church and State as the legal expression of it' (pp. 133-4).

When a similar consideration was put forward prominently

¹ See *Church Quarterly Review*, April 1899, pp. 19-30.

² The value of this sentence, of course, depends on what the word 'guided' means, and who the 'trained theologians' are. It is obvious that Mr. Galton does not mean such a compulsory reference to, and acceptance of the decision of, the bishops as has been advocated by some.

on the occasion of the Gorham Judgment, Dr. Pusey wrote as follows in 1850:

‘The civil judges indeed disclaim deciding whether doctrines brought before them are “theologically sound or unsound.” But they claim to decide on points, as they think, not before decided, whether “certain opinions are contrary or repugnant to the doctrines which the Church of England, by her articles, formularies, and rubrics, requires to be held by her ministers.” And to this end they claim, as their office (and indeed it is essential to the other), “to ascertain” for themselves “the true meaning of the articles, formularies, and rubrics.” In a word, they hold that they might not decide what is the truth; but they might decide what, whether true or false, is to be held to be consistent with the formularies of the Church of England.

‘The exercise of this claim seems to have startled every religious body which has heard of it, abroad or in England. The English had not thought much of the principle when dormant, or not exercised on matters belonging to the very Creeds themselves. We are, above others, a practical people. We do not see things in their abstract bearings. We do not feel wrong principles until they issue in wrong actions. . . .

‘We have now seen an article in the Creed decided upon in ignorance. The very article is mentioned incidentally in the judgment. “One baptism for the remission of sins” is acknowledged by the Church.” It is quoted in proof that baptism is not to be repeated; but without the slightest apparent consciousness that it had any bearing upon the heresy upon which the court was called to pronounce.

‘Articles of the Creed then are within the range of the subject-matters whose true meaning the Privy Council has to determine. The question then is forced upon the Church, What are its qualifications for the office; and does the supremacy of the Crown “over all causes” involve the continuance of such a court to decide in matters purely spiritual?

‘A court-martial to determine a question of heresy would sound absurd. . . . Why should this seem absurd and the judgment by the Privy Council sound and good? I ask in all earnestness, In what way are Christian officers less qualified to judge on points of doctrine than the judicial members of Her Majesty’s Privy Council? . . . The disqualification alike of a naval or military officer, or of a civil judge, to decide in questions of heresy, is that they have received no commission to do it from our Divine Master. The most difficult office of the Church herself, to “determine controversies of faith,” is not to be taken as a mere by-occupation, alternating with Admiralty causes. . . .

‘The Privy Council cannot continue to be the judge of heresy in the English Church. Points of faith will not be accounted of less moment than points of honour. Civil courts are not thought the best tribunals to decide on military discipline, cowardice, and

obedience. Are the Eternal Sonship of God the Son, or the Being of the All-Holy Trinity, or the extent of Christ's redemption and of His love for all our infants, subjects less deep, less essential to our well-being or to our peace? Common-sense, natural feeling, instinctive reverence, coincide with the rules of the Church, and the practice of Christendom in all ages, which requires that matters of faith should be referred to those who are, by God's appointment, "overseers" of the Church of God, whom the Church requires to vow before God that "they will banish and drive away all erroneous or strange doctrine contrary to God's Word"—the special guardians of the faith.¹

This quotation, and indeed the whole treatise in which it occurs, deserves and will repay careful thought, and is of special value at the present time.

We do not anticipate that any words of Dr. Pusey will do more than form an additional reason to Mr. Galton for adhering to his own unhistorical view, since his enmity to the Oxford Movement is a feature of his book. He refers to a sentence of Keble's, lately quoted by Lord Halifax, to the effect that Churchmen should treat the wrong decisions of civil courts 'as dissenters treated certain Acts of Parliament, *i.e.*, to disregard them and to take the consequences,' as 'a wrong and foolish saying' (p. 139). Keble's argument on the subject he deems a 'false analogy' (p. 140); and the 'reasoning' on which it is based is to be classed among 'fallacies' (p. 141). He is guilty of the phrase, 'one of Newman's worst fallacies' (p. 161); and is so far from appreciating the strength and balance and reserve which characterised the Tractarians, that he writes of 'the excitement and excesses of the Oxford Movement' (p. 161), and 'the haste and crudeness of the Tractarian party' (p. 201).

Mr. Galton, then, is a bad guide alike about the history and constitution of the early Church and about the present needs of the Church of England. We have already referred to passages in his book about the mediæval Church in the West as having some value. These, however, are unbalanced by recognition of any other side than that upon which Mr. Galton dwells. The Western Church of the middle ages had its weaknesses. It had also its strong points. Mr. Galton has a very keen eye for the weaknesses. He does not appear to realize the strong points. In the domain of action there can be little doubt that the Papacy, in spite of many failings and sins, during some parts of the middle ages exercised a beneficial influence in preserving unity and in maintaining the faith.

¹ Pusey, *The Royal Supremacy not an Arbitrary Authority but limited by the Laws of the Church, of which Kings are Members*, pp. 192-6.

In the domain of thought, the mediæval theologians had their merits as well as their limitations. St. Thomas Aquinas, for instance, was hampered in almost innumerable ways, of which we may mention the impossibility of his possessing critical knowledge of either the Old or the New Testament; the supposition, inevitable in his time, that the Forged Decretals were genuine and trustworthy documents; the want of an uninterpolated text of the Fathers; and the exaggerated importance he attached to some lines of thought. It is possible to recognize all this, as in substance it was recognized by one of the greatest of the English theologians of the seventeenth century, and at the same time to be aware, with the same great theologian, that the scholastic writers had in some matters special qualifications for the discussion of theology, and that the scholastic methods have merits of their own.¹ We do not find fault with Mr. Galton for stating with much clearness the weakness of the mediæval theologians. That is not a satisfactory treatment which points out weakness and is silent about strength.

Nor does Mr. Galton's recognition that the Reformation extended from 1529 to 1662 (pp. 112-3) save him from a very serious blunder. In the course of his description of the work accomplished by Queen Elizabeth for the Church of England—and we agree with Mr. Galton to the extent of believing that the services rendered by the Queen to the Church were far greater than is generally recognized—he writes as follows:

‘We owe to Elizabeth the Act of Uniformity behind which there should be no appeal, either to the Prayer Books it superseded or still less to any mediæval precedents in belief and ritual. What would be thought of an army in which any officer gave himself a licence to ignore the standing orders, to defy all the existing regulations, and to drill or clothe himself, at his individual fancy, according to fashions and ways long obsolete, on the pretence that such old uniforms and postures had not been expressly and singly repealed? (p. 129).

Now, in this statement Mr. Galton, as it seems to us, ignores the course of action taken by the great and wise men who were responsible for the Prayer Book of 1662. They had to consider whether they should make terms with the Puritanism which would never have been satisfied without effecting a breach between the reformed Church of England and the historical Christian system which had survived all

¹ See Pearson, *Lectioes de Deo et attributis*, Lectio i. (*Minor Works*, ed. Churton, i. 1-9.)

the moral and theological corruptions of the middle ages. As a result of this consideration they came to the conclusion that, while much tenderness and caution were to be exercised in many directions, no terms could be made with the essential features of Puritanism. As a consequence, to quote Mr. Wakeman's clear statement of the facts, 'Puritanism had to go forth into the wilderness. The Reformation struggle was ended. The Church of England, reformed on Catholic lines and freed from Puritanism, was able to discharge her own duties to her own people in her own way.'¹ In coming to this conclusion and carrying out this policy the Church divines placed the 'Ornaments Rubric' at the beginning of their book. In so placing it, they did not refer, as the rubric of 1559² had referred, to the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity. They did not assert, as the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity had asserted, any such power of altering the ornaments of the church and the ministers as that formerly ascribed to the 'authority of the Queen's Majesty, with the advice of her Commissioners appointed and authorized under the great seal of England for causes ecclesiastical, or of the Metropolitan of this realm.' The rubric which they enacted is strikingly different in these respects from either the rubric or the Act of 1559. The Act of 1559, indeed, the penal statute by which the civil legislative body had enforced the use of the book which they revised, they placed at the beginning of their own book, of which it formed, and was intended to form, an integral part, as is shown by the pagination and by its following and being included in the table of contents. Whatever their object in so doing may have been, there can be no doubt that their own position and law were given in the rubric no less than in the Act; and that the authority of the rubric, either as to its positive commands or as to the principles which it embodied, can no more rightly be ignored than the authority of the Act included in the Book of Common Prayer. The position was that they went back behind the complications of the reign of Elizabeth,

¹ Wakeman, *Introduction to the History of the Church of England*, p. 388.

² We must remember, however, when we speak of the 'rubric of 1559,' as the *Times* has rightly observed (September 20, 1899), that, 'as a matter of fact, the Elizabethan Prayer Book was not "annexed" to the Act of Uniformity, and the Ornaments Rubric in that Prayer Book had no legislative authority, but was a mere summary of the thirteenth section of the Act, prefixed by the publisher as a sort of prefatory note.' The importance of what we have said above lies in the fact that the rubric which the printer prefixed was before the revisers of 1661.

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the time when the struggle with Puritanism was in progress with doubtful issues, and behind the Puritan domination which had characterized the greater part of the reign of Edward VI. It was their earnest desire to complete the Reformation of the Church of England on Catholic lines. One outward token of this policy was that in the 'Ornaments Rubric' they showed that their liturgical standard was that which was to be found before the Puritan influences to which the Prayer Book of 1552 was due had acquired force. To direct the use of the 'ornaments of the Church and of the ministers' of the 'second year of the reign of King Edward VI.' was to assert the continuity of the reformed Church of England with the historic Church of Christ. From the 'second year of the reign of King Edward VI.' to 1661 there had been much confusion. To get clear of that confusion, to make plain the historical and liturgical continuity of the Church of England, was one great object of the Church divines to whom we owe the Prayer Book of 1662. To say, as Mr. Galton says, that 'behind' Elizabeth's Act of Uniformity 'there should be no appeal,' is to contradict the principle on which the compilers of the present Book of Common Prayer in their wisdom acted, and to forget that both Act and Prayer Book were intended by them to work in harmony. Moreover, the Church of England needs greater freedom for the constitutional action of her synods. The first step to this freedom and to a right use of it is to be found in fidelity to the policy embodied in the Prayer Book of 1662, to the meaning of which the 'Ornaments Rubric' supplies an important key.

It is unpleasant to be obliged to notice one fact which Mr. Galton's book records. He ceased to minister in the Church of Rome because he believed that Roman Orders are invalid (p. xv). That belief he still holds and maintains at some length in this volume (pp. 219-32). Yet he is now ministering as a priest in the Church of England on the strength of the ordination the invalidity of which he asserts! It is no excuse to say that, while he 'cannot believe' 'in the validity of Roman Orders,' he has 'left the responsibility' of his present ministrations to 'the bishop,' 'submitting' his 'own opinion' to the 'belief and practice of the English Church' (p. xvi). On such a course of action it is unnecessary to say more. We have no doubt that both Mr. Galton and the Bishop acted conscientiously. Charity compels us to take refuge in *aposiopesis*.

It would be easy to go on finding fault with Mr. Galton's
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book. We have, we think, said enough to show that it will afford little, if any, help to those who wish to understand the 'message and position of the Church of England.' The Church of England, indeed, has her 'position' and her 'message'—her 'position' as the divinely appointed organ of God in this country, protected by Providence through past perils of the most terrible danger, and destined, we earnestly believe, to be brought through present and future difficulties by the same supernatural aid; her 'message' to hand on the one faith which once for all was delivered to the Saints and is enshrined in the Creeds, and to teach that union with God is to be found by means of her sacramental system. At the present time, as often before, she is passing through days of trial. As Dr. Pusey used to say, *Pejora passi*. If Churchmen now are true to their Catholic heritage, they have good reason for hoping for the continued protection of God.

ART. XII.—THE DECISION ON INCENSE AND THE HEARING ON RESERVATION.

1. *The Archbishops on the Lawfulness of the Liturgical Use of Incense and the Carrying of Lights in Procession.* Lambeth Palace, July 31, 1899. (London and New York, 1899.)
2. *The Times*, August 1, 1899.
3. *Sir W. Harcourt's Letter to the Times*, August 8, 1899.
4. *The Guardian*, August 9, 1899.
5. *Reservation of the Sacrament.* *Mr. Dibdin's Speech* at the recent hearing before the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, at Lambeth, July 1899, and some of the evidence. With Notes and Appendices. By J. S. FRANEY, Esq., B.A., Barrister-at-Law. (London and Derby, 1899.)
6. *Reservation.* A letter to His Grace the Lord Archbishop of Canterbury. By the Rev. T. A. LACEY, M.A., Vicar of Madingley. (London, 1899.)
7. *Reservation of the Blessed Sacrament for the Sick Lawful.* By the Rev. N. GREEN-ARMYTAGE, M.A., Incumbent of St. Aidan's, Boston. (London, 1899.)
8. *The Times*, July 18, 19, 20, 21, 1899.
9. *The Guardian*, July 19, 26, 1899.

THE Archbishops have 'spoken' and given their decision against the present legality of the ceremonial use of incense

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and processional lights, and a few words are needed on our part to show why we believe that loyal Churchmen should frankly accept that decision and regard the 'cause' as 'ended.'¹

In the first place we must clearly distinguish what seems to be in some danger of being confused. There is the Archbishops' decision; there are the reasons on which it is based, which the Archbishops have thought proper to make public; there are the interpretations put upon those reasons by anxious friends or aggressive enemies of the Church; and there are the possible effects of obedience or disobedience upon the Church of England in her own life and in her relation to other parts of the Body of Christ, of which she is a true and living member.

The Archbishops' decision, in our view, is morally binding on the clergy, altogether apart from the reasons on which it is based. It has been suggested² that it would have been well if the decision had been given alone, with no reasons. It is true that the Archbishops were not legally bound to give their reasons. But there is a certain kind of moral obligation to tell men who are very much in earnest why they may no longer do what they have been doing. The clergy are not children nor schoolboys, and we doubt whether the bare decision would not have called forth some clamour on the score of autocratic dealing. Allowing, however, that the Archbishops adopted the wiser, if the much more difficult course of explaining their action, we are bound to say that we consider obedience to be due to the decision as such, without reference to the reasons. We cannot imagine any more spiritual or ecclesiastical 'hearing' possible than that which has been obtained by the bold simple following of the Prayer Book. We cannot imagine any hearing under conditions of disestablishment, about which some appear able to talk so

¹ We may in self-defence say that we adapted St. Augustine's *locuta est* to our purpose, and sent it to the printer before Sir William Harcourt made use of it in his erroneous statement about the English Church Union, in which he mistook the individual opinion of Lord Halifax for the formal expression of the Council of the Union, by which alone the members are strictly bound, as Sir T. C. Hope points out in the *Times*, September 12, 1899. The *Times* itself has ceased to speak of the corporate contumacy of the English Church Union. 'We are glad to note indications that the influence, unfortunately great as it seems to us, of the English Church Union may not, after all, be directly exercised in the support of disobedience to Church authority' (September 14, 1899). The relation of the Union to its President has now become a matter of pressing interest, as Sir H. Howorth shows (*Times*, September 20).

² *Guardian*, p. 1077.

thoughtlessly, which would give the Church such entire freedom from the interference of the secular power. The decision which follows such a hearing is morally binding, we hold, on all who acknowledge the provincial authority of the Archbishops.¹ The burden of the decision lies absolutely upon the two Archbishops. If they have given it upon Erastian principles,² assuredly they will have to answer for it before the supreme tribunal of the Divine Head of the Church; for the burden is theirs, and in no sense whatever does it lie upon the shoulders of those who render obedience to the Archbishops as their spiritual rulers. Nothing can be clearer than this in the solemn claim which the Archbishops make upon the obedience of the clergy:

'We think it our duty to press, not only on the clergy that have appeared before us, but also on all the clergy alike, to submit to episcopal authority in all such matters as these. All alike have consented to the Book of Common Prayer; and the Book of Common Prayer requires all persons, not only if they doubt but if they find that others disagree with them concerning the meaning of the directions contained in the Book, to resort to the Bishop of the diocese, who may, if he thinks fit, send the question to the Archbishop for his decision. In order to give the fullest opportunity to any who diversely take any question of this kind to give reasons for their opinion, we have suspended our decision until we had heard the matter fully and learnedly argued before us; and we have now given our decision as the Prayer Book requires us to do. We entreat the clergy, for the sake of the peace of the Church, which we all so much desire, to accept our decision thus conscientiously given in the name of our common Master, the Supreme Head of the Church, the Lord whose commission we bear.'³

If we could satisfy ourselves that no ulterior aims and objects lurked behind the clamour of extremists for incense, we should not for a moment attempt to disguise our wish that the decision had been a different one, because we regard the liturgical use of incense as Scriptural, instructive, spiritu-

¹ To acknowledge the 'binding force' of the decision upon the consciences of the clergy seems to Mr. Green-Armytage (letter to the *Guardian*, August 30, p. 1181) to recognize the germs of an Anglican papacy, and to Mr. Bayfield Roberts (*ibid.* September 6, p. 1209) to acquiesce in a novel and indifferent imitation of the Roman method. But the Prayer Book itself provides for a reference to the archbishop, and this sustains the principle of the jurisdiction, although, as the *Guardian* truly observes (August 6, p. 1110), 'it may have been originally designed to meet a different need.'

² Father Puller (*Guardian*, August 30, p. 1181) says that 'full justice ought to be done to the completely un-Erastian character of the Archbishops' decision.'

³ *Times*, August 1, 1899.

ally uplifting; and eminently calculated to help people to realize the true Catholicity of the Church of England. But obedience to lawful episcopal authority is also a plain mark of Catholicity, and we have not a trace of hesitation in urging that the decision should be obeyed. There should be no difficulty about obedience in the conscience of any clergyman when he ponders the terms of that appeal—'for the sake of the peace of the Church' and in the most sacred of all names. In its claim on our obedience the decision stands entirely by itself.¹

As, however, the Archbishops have given their reasons, it is not improper to examine them, if we recollect that such an examination is to be kept quite distinct from the question of obedience. The reasons are an interesting glimpse into the archiepiscopal mind, which enables us to see how the Archbishops justified their decision to their own consciences, and how they would defend themselves when questioned by their Master upon the exercise of their sacred trust. It was argued that the use of incense was practically sanctioned by the Ornaments rubric. According to the Archbishops, it is not sufficient to show that censers were in use in the second year of the reign of King Edward VI. It must be shown also that the ceremony of using them in public worship is enjoined or authorized in the Prayer Book as it now stands. But this cannot be shown. Therefore the ceremony in question is forbidden by the Act of 1559, which clearly forbids any ceremony not ordered in the book of 1552.² At the moment this Act did not receive the assent of the Convocations of the Church, but the Church fully accepted the Act at the time, its authority was never questioned, the thirty-sixth Canon covers practically the same ground, and 'in the manuscript Prayer Book signed by Convocation on December 20, 1661, and then presented to the King, the Act of 1559 is set forth at full length in the beginning, and is thus formally adopted by the authority of the Church.' Further, 'there was nothing to prevent the use of incense for the purpose of

¹ As an example of the spirit in which we hope that the decision will be received, we cannot do better than refer to Mr. Eden's letter to his parishioners printed in the *Guardian*, p. 1083. We are pleased to see in the *Guardian* of August 16 several letters written in a similar spirit, and in the issue of September 6, p. 1197, an admirable statement from the Rev. the Hon. James Adderley.

² The *Church Eclectic* for September, p. 561 (erroneously numbered on the cover as p. 564), has an interesting 'editorial,' chiefly on the meaning of 'gesture' and 'ceremony.' The editor thinks that the case for Incense submitted to the Archbishops was decidedly weak (p. 563).

sweetening the atmosphere of a church wherever and whenever such sweetening was needed,' and 'it would always be possible, if some great occasion made it suitable for the sovereign, with the advice of the Primate, to order a great ceremonial in which the use of incense should form a part.'¹ So the Act allows, and it is very difficult to see how a charge of Erastianism can be sustained against this chain of reasoning, when the Church of 1662, which determined the law under which we now use the Prayer Book, so fully endorsed the Elizabethan Act.² The Archbishop of Canterbury himself is very clearly conscious of the rights of his office, as he shows in the brief letter which he sent from Grasmere to an impatient correspondent:

'The Prayer Book assigns to the Archbishop of the province the duty of interpreting the directions of the Prayer Book, and I call upon those who value the Prayer Book, to which they have solemnly assented, to help me in the discharge of that duty.'³

¹ *Times* Report of Archbishops' decision, August 1, 1899.

² A copious correspondence has arisen on the relation of the Church to the Act of Uniformity, and is still being continued up to the time of our going to press. But the true facts which have come to light have abundantly proved that the Archbishops made a correct historical statement when they said that the Act of 1559 was accepted and endorsed by the Church in 1662. The crucial letters on the point have been written by Mr. Denny (*Guardian*, August 16, p. 1123, August 30, p. 1182, September 13, p. 1235), Canon Hammond (*Church Times*, August 18), the Bishop of Edinburgh (*Guardian*, August 23, p. 1153, September 6, p. 1208), Dr. Bright and Sir T. C. Hope (*ibid.* September 6, p. 1208). The only extracts which need be made—though the whole correspondence deserves to be read and the matter set at rest—are from the Bishop of Edinburgh's letter of September 6: 'The Act of Uniformity of 1559 was not only set forth in full in the beginning of the manuscript signed by Convocation [December 20, 1661], but . . . it was expressly named and numbered under the heading "The contents of this book . . ." The whole manuscript, including the Act of Uniformity of 1559, exactly makes 544 pages'—and the Bishops expressly say that they subscribe to these 544 pages. Father Puller and Mr. Denny (*Guardian*, September 13, p. 1235) both think that the 'Letters of Business' militate against 'direct and explicit acceptance,' and are still unconvinced. The point which we would urge upon them is that in 1661 the Bishops did not profess to be engaged in the business of passing, revising, or putting Acts of Parliament into force. What they did was to write out the whole Act of 1559 and assent to it with their whole hearts on behalf of the Church. And we are all involved in their action, in our opinion happily. Correspondence as to 'constructive or implicit acceptance' is still proceeding. Canon Holland (*ibid.* August 30, p. 1181) usefully reminds us that the Act of 1559 rescued the Church from Puritan anarchy, although, 'as the *Guardian* leader of that date (p. 1166) observes, by somewhat 'irregular action.'

³ *Guardian*, p. 1083.

Of course prejudice and malice can read anything into the reasons given for a decision upon a complicated problem. It was only what might have been expected that Sir William Harcourt should attempt to improve the occasion for his own political ends.¹ But we are not compelled, thank God for it, to take our interpretation of the Archbishops' reasons, or of any ecclesiastical document at all, from Sir William Harcourt. If his utterances gave any proof of the existence in his breast of that charity that thinketh no evil, or if we had reason to believe that he was a diligent observer of the Prayer Book rule of life and zealously encouraged those who strove to obey all the directions of that book, we might listen with more deference to his ecclesiastical letters. As it is, we recognize in him the true note of hostility to the best interests of the Church, and Church history teaches us who is certain to be the conqueror in that warfare.² It is with more concern that we have read the interpretation which certain clergymen have so readily put upon the Archbishops' deliverance. Letters and reports of sermons and speeches have already appeared, and others doubtless will be forthcoming, in which it is assumed that the decision proves that the Church is bound hand and foot in all her spiritual activities by Parliament, that disestablishment is inevitable, that obedience will fetter posterity, that the Church is not a living body, but a dead corporation, strangled in the grave-cloths of enactments coming down from a period of emergency and panic, and we know not what besides.³ We fear that those who use such

¹ Lord Hugh Cecil answers some of the wilder passages of Sir William's letter in the *Times*, August 11, 1899, and in the same journal on the same date the Rev. J. H. Cooper pertinently calls attention to the duties of the laity to which the Act of 1559 refers. In his second letter (*Times*, September 7) Sir William returns to the red rag of Sacerdotalism, and makes what capital he can out of the Dean of Rochester's hasty withdrawal from the English Church Union, and Lord Halifax's advice to the lay members of the Union to stand by their priests.

² Tu vicisti, Galilæe!

³ *Guardian*, p. 1083. Perhaps they will listen to Dr. Pusey's words to Dr. Liddon, written in 1877 in reference to the Ridsdale judgment, and quoted by Mr. Henson in the *Times* of August 28 last: 'Disestablishment would be hopeless disruption, in which the only gainer would be Rome' (*Life*, iv. 289). Mr. Green-Armytage thinks that what he calls 'an Anglican papacy' would be a worse evil than disestablishment (*Guardian*, August 30, p. 1181). A writer in the *Guardian* of August 30, p. 1182, calls attention to the need of a spirit of humble penitence for past neglect rather than of efforts to break loose from existing obligations. He quotes *Tracts for the Times*, No. 86, on 'indications of a superintending Providence in the preservation of the Prayer Book, and in the

language are little likely to listen to what we say, but we would very earnestly implore them as priests of the Church of God to clear their minds of cant and read once more the Archbishops' decision, especially its concluding paragraph, the like of which no Erastian document ever contained.¹ We might even ask them to consider the Duke of Argyll's letter on Church government,² and reflect how impossible it is that the relation of the Church of England to the State can ever resemble that of the Presbyterian body in Scotland, as they seem to think. We trust that the solid strength and the pastoral appeal of the decision itself will not be permanently obscured by the clouds of individual interpretation which for some time may be expected to fly round about it.³

It is not well to prophesy about the probable effects of the decision, and it is too soon to do more at present. We may, however, notice one or two comments that have been made by interested parties rather than by those who have talked just for the sake of talking, who need not be taken into account. 'If incense is illegal we are cut off from Christendom.' This is a fine example of the wild talk which is always rampant in times of excitement. Such words die a natural death. But it is just worth while saying that only a certain use of incense—to wit, its liturgical use—has been pronounced to be at present illegal. As the Archbishop says—and many bitter Protestants may note it well—the Church has never spoken of incense as an evil thing, and even the liturgical use of incense is not by law permanently excluded from the Church's ritual. Let those who speak about being cut off from Christendom, and especially from the sympathy of the Eastern Church, satisfy themselves of their continued union with the whole Church by the regular use of fumigatory incense if they will, changes which it has undergone.' We earnestly commend his letter, as well as a second from him, both signed 'A Churchman,' in the *Guardian*, September 13, p. 1237.

¹ To make this perusal easy we may expressly say that the 'decision' is published by Messrs. Macmillan in a shilling pamphlet, and the full text is printed in the *Church Eclectic* for September (p. 505).

² *Times*, July 31, 1899.

³ It is just to Mr. Green-Armytage to give further publicity to his categorical denial that before the receipt of any communication from his own bishop he authorized the statement that the worship in his church would be continued as before, though we may not agree with him in his view of what is Erastian. See the *Guardian*, August 30, p. 1169. But since that communication Mr. Green-Armytage has announced the continuance of incense in his church. See the *Guardian*, September 13, p. 1240. And in the issue of September 20, p. 1283, a letter to the Bishop of Lincoln from him is published setting forth his refusal to obey.

as Father Puller urges,¹ and let them remember that the unity of the Church is not broken by the observance or disuse of any one Catholic custom, which rests upon the sanction of custom and nothing more.² The unity of the Church, as they may learn from St. Cyprian and a study of national Church life, lies deeper than that. But absurd exaggerations about the disuse of an ancient and widely spread custom cutting us off from Christendom need not lead us to forget that the customs of the family of God should be dear to all the members of the family. Some have forgotten that about incense, and we have no sympathy with them.

But, again, it is urged that the decision is the thin end of the wedge, and that logically much else must be condemned on the same principles. In the exuberance of the moment Sir William Harcourt evidently hopes in both his letters, but especially in the second, that this is the beginning of the end of the whole movement of 1833, to say nothing of the destruction of much that was most justly prized in the English Church by the great men of 1549 and the Caroline divines. The wish is father to the thought, and Sir William is famous—shall we say notorious?—for being obtrusively sanguine when he is most hopelessly beaten. But after electioneering speeches follows the poll, as for example at Derby; and after the hilarious leadership of a beaten cause there has sometimes come retirement, at least professedly, into comparative privacy; and after all this patronizing

¹ Letter in the *Guardian*, August 30, p. 1181. Lord Halifax's opinion is that incense may still be used 'in processions before the Holy Eucharist begins,' or, as Mr. Foote offensively says, 'before the Parliamentary office proper of the Holy Communion begins.' But there seems to us to be grave moral danger in drawing fine distinctions in this way, not to speak of their effect on those who look at incense from Mr. Llewelyn Davies's point of view, as a mediæval usage betraying ignorance of sanitation (*Times*, August 5), or at the whole dispute from outside, as Mrs. Humphry Ward (*ibid.* September 5), or as the working men mentioned by Mr. Handley (*ibid.* September 7). Mr. Westall's letter to the Bishop of London is dignified, but 'obedience without love' is not what we understand by full loyalty (*Guardian*, August 30, p. 1167). We must frankly confess that our moral sense is profoundly shocked—we wish to say so as plainly as possible—when we read that Mr. Ram can suppose himself to be doing his duty by using neither incense nor processional lights during the Communion service, but both beforehand, the altar being censured and lights carried in procession (*Times*, September 11). At all events, let us be honest in drawing the line between ceremonial and fumigatory use, and avoid even an appearance of violating supreme moral obligations which will excite the just contempt of Englishmen. Let us not play Balaam with our consciences.

² The last paragraph of Article XXXIV. surely covers such a matter as the mode in which incense shall be used.

attempt to show the Church of England her true duty, there may, as we trust, be an awakening to the fact that she is in stronger hands and under the direction of wiser heads than are found in the second rank of politicians. There are letters, too, as we have already noticed, in which fear betrays 'the succours which reason offereth,' fear lest the decision involved hopeless submission of the Church to the State in doctrine as well as in ceremonial; lest advantage should be taken of submission in the direction of further surrenders on our part or on the part of those who come after us; lest we lose what good we have gained. We hope that we shall be forgiven if we say that many of these letters seem to be written in the heat of the moment; that others show but a very partial acquaintance with the facts of the case in point and with the general course of the constitutional history of the English Church; and that others lose themselves in the vague mists of very foolish generalization. No doctrine is at stake under the Archbishops' decision, and no new relation between Church and State is set up by the reasons which they have given. The Church is as free from, and as much bound up with, the State as before. Any new case brought before the Archbishops under the Prayer Book will be heard, we may be sure, on its own merits, with the same impartiality, the same integrity of purpose, the same fearless attitude as on the present occasion. We sincerely trust that the steadiness of the Archbishops will prevail over the spirit which has prompted these letters, some of which seem to us to have been not only written in indecent haste, but also animated by scanty respect for the heads of the Church.

Some time is required to take account of the probable effects of such a decision,¹ and one correspondent reminds us

¹ For example, how far the principle of the decision would carry with it the condemnation of mitres, pastoral staves, various episcopal functions, fancy flower services, 'Benediction,' and the like. Any who regret the Archbishops' decision on the ground of the palpable injustice of singling out the liturgical use of incense for condemnation, while every conceivable eccentricity has been episcopally tolerated for years past, must remember that these vagaries have never been formally brought up for 'hearing.' When such a hearing takes place many popular oddities in the way of toy services, such as the *Guardian* (August 30, p. 1161) dryly observes to have been 'unknown in 1559,' will, we hope, disappear from our churches. We confess that we should regard stringency as cheaply bought if it made it impossible for a clergyman to provide as the sole Sunday morning service in his parish church hymns, the Ante-Communion service, and sermon without the Church Militant Prayer. Yet this use was actually encountered by the present writer on August 27 last. The locked churches and the omission of the daily services of the Prayer Book, which are an outrage on devotion,

that such a decision may turn out to 'give' as well as to 'take' in unexpected ways if logically pursued. He does not perhaps sufficiently bear in mind that in theology and religious affairs the function of logic, as Mozley has taught us, is strictly limited; that we are not accustomed to pursue all our ecclesiastical transactions to their logical conclusions. But he certainly makes an interesting point when he says that the Archbishops' reading of the Ornaments rubric might logically be used for the total suppression of the surplice and the restoration of the alb and vestment in the Communion Service, not to mention other possibilities which might carry the Archbishops, the clergy, and Sir William Harcourt much further than they are prepared to go.¹ We may expect showers of letters on the effects of the decision, and we have no doubt that many of them will contain instructive observations. But we trust that nothing will disguise from the English clergy what we believe to be their clear duty and their truest wisdom—to obey the decision of the Archbishops solely on the ground that it comes from them. It comes, we are well assured, out of a single-hearted desire to promote the well-being of the Bride of Christ in this land. And obedience has been made much easier by the wise letters in which the Bishops of London² and Rochester,³ for example, have laid the matter before the clergymen in their dioceses who are affected by the decision. The Bishop of Rochester in particular has hardly ever so signally exhibited his extraordinary power of looking fairly at both sides of a complicated question. Lord Halifax's address, with which Canon Carter of Clewer desires to associate himself, in the *Times* of September 6, contains some passages which seem to us to be demonstrably erroneous, and others which carry with them the force of glowing truth. It need hardly be said that we do not endorse the comments which have been made on the address in the *Times* leader of September 1, or in Sir W. Harcourt's letter (*Times*, September 7), and we are full of hearty admiration for very much that Lord Halifax has done for the Church of England. But in the face of the

also call for wholesome stringency. 'Loyal obedience and stringency all round' would be an immensely powerful lever in a Catholic direction under our present circumstances. We should surrender less than we should gain. May we quote St. Mark x. 29-30 and Philem. i. 15?

¹ *Times*, August 15, 1899: a letter signed 'F. N. Oxenham.' Mr. Adderley in his statement quoted above also characteristically sums up the gains of the decision, and Lord Halifax points out what 'impartial enforcement' would involve (*Guardian*, August 30, p. 1180).

² *Times*, August 23.

³ *Guardian*, September 6, p. 1196.

letters to which we have referred we cannot see how the four passages can stand in which Lord Halifax complains that the decision is based upon an Act of Parliament in defiance of the Church, not to say that he appears to forget the allusion to the authority of Parliament in the Ornaments Rubric. And in the *Times* of September 5 the Bishop of Chester produces facts which should lead Lord Halifax to correct his statement that 'the use of the surplice dates from the twelfth century,' though the controversy turns on a verbal point, what sense is affixed to the word 'surplice'?¹ We regret exceedingly the passage which speaks of compliance to be yielded 'grudgingly and of necessity,' and the like—a passage which seems to ignore the whole spirit of the decision, and to place weapons in the hands of enemies who are not slow to use them, as Sir W. Harcourt does in the *Times* of September 7. On the other hand Lord Halifax most justly draws attention to the effect of applying the principle of the decision all round; to the clamour which has led to the chaining down of the use of incense by a process of exclusive dealing; to the long period—at least forty years²—of its undisturbed permission, now broken by sudden stringency; to the singular argument which the Archbishops draw from the Biblical record of the Institution; and to the curious limit which they assign to antiquity. We do not attach any extravagant value, as some appear inclined to do,³ to Dr. Sanday's pamphlet on *The Catholic Movement and the Archbishops' Decision*.⁴ Dr. Sanday's interventions in Tractarian and Ritualistic controversies deserve attention chiefly on the ground that he succeeds in the literary feat of being precisely fair. He has the intellectual interest of academic detachment in the Oxford movement, and a

¹ See the *Times*, September 11, where Mr. Nightingale has an interesting letter.

² Forty-two years, says Mr. Jervois (*Guardian*, September 6, p. 1197). What would be said if a Protestant congregation were so deprived of some pet usage, unanimously beloved? if we may use an *ad hominem* argument.

³ The *Guardian*, September 13, p. 1222, goes so far as to speak of Dr. Sanday's pamphlet as 'far and away the wisest, the most timely, the most statesmanlike, the most Christian utterance that the decision has called forth.' Has the *Guardian* forgotten the Bishop of Rochester's letter, not to speak of many of the letters which we quote, and which we should say are far more valuable than Dr. Sanday's pamphlet? For once in this controversy, at least, we find ourselves in full accord with the very able if brief remarks of the *Times* (September 20) on Professor Sanday's pamphlet, which is said to be an attack 'based on mistakes,' and not likely to promote obedience.

⁴ Longmans (London, New York, and Bombay, 1899).

wholesome dislike of the practice of vulgar controversy which ascribes opinions to others which are not really theirs. We are glad to see him pointing out the distinction between Catholic and Roman (p. 5), producing some early evidence of the use of incense ceremonially and in a sacred building (pp. 11, 12), and urging the duties of justice upon his Broad Church friends and others (pp. 3, 18). But we feel that the Oxford movement has the attention of the writer from outside rather than his hearty sympathy, and we cannot think that his limited interpretation of 'none other or otherwise' is correct (p. 8). We should have thought that the correspondence in the *Guardian* on the Act of Uniformity in 1559 and its subsequent history was quite voluminous and convincing enough to enable Dr. Sanday to make up his mind, if he had not told us otherwise (p. 7). As it is, we are surprised that a great scholar should step aside so widely from his own line. The so-called 'statement of argument against obedience from' a canonist in the *Guardian* of September 20 (p. 1282) would seem to make every man his own judge on matters of Catholic usage.

It is time to turn from the 'decision' to the 'hearing.'

The Archbishops have not yet published their decision upon the subject of the Reservation of the Holy Sacrament when these lines are written, and although their opinion may be known before we go to press, we shall not forget that the matter requires careful treatment while it is still pending. There are certain observations which ought, we consider, to be made on Mr. Lacey's letter and Mr. Green-Armytage's pamphlet, and there are certain reflections which may not improperly be made upon the reports of the 'Hearing' which appeared in the *Guardian* and the *Times*. The spirit in which the *Church Quarterly Review* approaches the subject is, we trust, sufficiently well known.¹ We desire with our whole heart to be loyal to the intentions of the Book of Common Prayer as it now stands. We desire to give full weight to all that can be said on either side in regard to this particular matter of Reservation, and we trust that there will be a readiness on both sides to abide by the Archbishops' conclusion when they declare their minds upon it. Thus much we say by way of preface in the promotion of what we believe to be the true interests of the Church.

There are three aspects of Reservation which demand

¹ We had no hesitation, in October 1887, in showing the mixed value of the essay on *Reservation* by the Rev. T. W. Kempe, M.A.

consideration, the legal, the doctrinal, and the practical ; and it will be our endeavour to put what we want to say under these heads in order.

There are doubtless many important doctrinal and practical considerations which have affected the law of the Church of England upon Reservation in the past, and which should be carefully weighed in view of any proposed change in the law in the future. But it cannot be too clearly understood that doctrinal and practical considerations are entirely beside the point which has been placed before the Archbishops in the recent hearing at Lambeth. The exact nature of that point can be stated in the simplest terms. It is simply what is the law of the Church of England as it now stands on the subject of Reservation ? It is not whether doctrinal or practical reasons can be urged in favour of any alteration of existing law. Both sides agreed in their pleadings before the Archbishops that the object of their appearance was to ascertain the law, and to obtain the opinion of the Archbishops upon that point. Mr. Kempe¹ opened by observing that it was his duty to assist their Graces 'in arriving at a correct conclusion in regard to the law on this very important question.' Mr. Dibdin² said that the question which they had been summoned to discuss, and as to which the decision of their Graces was sought, was 'Whether the Reservation of the Eucharist for any purpose was a lawful or an unlawful practice in the Church of England ?' Mr. Talbot³ urged that it was 'the duty of every one concerned first of all to ascertain what the law of the Church of England was.' Mr. Hansell,⁴ last of all, said that 'the only question which was before their Graces was, "Is, or is not, the Reservation of the Holy Sacrament lawful according to the present law of the Church of England ?"' This being the admission of both parties, we find it very difficult to see how any one can deny that much of the material that was laid before the Archbishops was irrelevant, as both Mr. Kempe and Mr. Dibdin pointed out.⁵ The questions, on which so much evidence was adduced, whether the arrangements made by the Prayer Book for the Communion of the sick are adequate, and whether Reservation for the sick is desirable in the Church of England, were not really before the Archbishops at all. The admission of remarks on these points was a striking proof of the desire of the Archbishops to hear all that any of

¹ *Guardian*, p. 1026.

² *Speech*, p. 14.

³ *Guardian*, p. 1029.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 1027 ; Mr. Dibdin's *Speech*, pp. 14, 86.

the parties wished to put before them, so as to convince all that they had received full toleration and considerate hearing. And the eagerness and persistency with which these extraneous arguments were advanced show that those who used them would desire a change of law, in the event of the Archbishops' decision against the legality of Reservation. They have, therefore, an importance which may be greater or smaller according to the result of the hearing. The determination of the question of legality itself was very fully argued before the Archbishops. Only the trained lawyer and the expert will be free from surprise at the large amount of argument and evidence which was accumulated, and at the entirely opposite deductions which the respective counsel were able to draw from the facts. In addition to the study of the speeches and the examination of witnesses at Lambeth, it will be necessary to pay careful attention to the restrained language of Mr. Lacey's open letter to the Archbishop, and to the much freer pamphlet of Mr. Green-Armytage. Some reference might also be made to the more general subject of the principles upon which the Archbishops are proceeding, as Sir William Harcourt seems desirous of maintaining that the decision on the ceremonial use of incense and lights is founded on reasons which make it cut 'at the very roots of the whole system and plan of operation of the "Catholic Revival."'¹

The legal evidence involved allusion to many historical incidents, which may be said to have shown what the laws and customs of the Church have been in the past, rather than to determine the answer to the precise question what the law of the Church is now. But these historical references to the past undoubtedly throw light on existing law, and in particular the appeal to primitive practice is of special importance because the reformers' whole drift was to go back from mediæval Roman accretions to primitive and Scriptural custom. When a matter of primitive teaching was at stake the reformers did not hesitate, as Sir William Harcourt would have us to forget,² to restore any conspicuous ceremony which long-continued custom had not sanctioned, to whatever extent it might change the general aspect of the service. There is much to be said, of course, for the sound Conservative argument of long-continued custom, but Sir William must not outstrip his Tory friends in his application of it. The appeal to primitive custom, then, may fairly be made in illustration

¹ *Times*, August 8, 1899: Letter on 'the resolution of the Archbishops.'

² *Times*, August 8, 1899.

of the legal position, as being truly in the spirit of the reformers. Mr. Hansell in opening his case said that he had never met with an ecclesiastical writer who denied that Reservation for the sick 'was a custom of immemorial antiquity, reaching back to the earliest times of the Christian Church.'¹ He referred to the quotations and authorities given in Bingham,² and in particular to the passage in St. Justin Martyr which says that the Eucharist was conveyed to those who were absent. This certainly appears to us to involve the principle of Reservation, and we do not see what is gained by the Bishop of Durham's unpractical proposal to imitate what he calls this 'coincident and not subsequent administration to the absent,' and then to meet the charge that he had authorized Reservation in certain cases by saying 'I have not done anything of the kind.'³ He allowed the Sacrament to be carried out of the Church, and he believes this 'to be legal.' After referring to other early evidence, such as the story of Serapion⁴ and the thirteenth Nicene Canon, Mr. Hansell quoted two passages from Bede⁵ in illustration of Anglo-Saxon practice, and then referred to various English constitutions as applying and enforcing the practice. Though he did not base the legality of Reservation upon these constitutions, he added his own belief that they were binding in point of strict law by virtue of the statute of 25 Henry VIII. c. 19, s. 7. In support of the extent of the practice he referred to the universal custom of the Greek Church and the Episcopal Church of Scotland. Coming then more closely to the legal point, he approached the consideration of rubrics and articles, and submitted that although rubrics were in a certain sense statutory they were directory⁶ rather than imperative, and were to be construed with such adaptation as was suitable to the circumstances of the time. He contended that the sixth post-Communion rubric was framed to prevent the conversion of the surplus of the consecrated species to profane uses, and that the Twenty-eighth Article merely meant that the Sacrament need not be reserved as a necessary part of the ordinance. The Latin Prayer Book of 1560 was mentioned as 'the strongest possible evidence of the legality of Reservation,' and Sparrow's *Rationale* as

¹ *Guardian*, p. 993.

² *Antiquities*, i. 777.

³ *Guardian*, p. 1029; Mr. Dibdin's *Speech*, p. 89.

⁴ Euseb. vi. 44.

⁵ iv. 14, 24.

⁶ The illustration given was that the rubric 'Then shall follow the sermon' does not forbid the celebration of the Holy Communion unless a sermon has been preached beforehand. Compare Mr. Lacey's *Letter*, p. 51.

making clear that Reservation was regarded as perfectly legal after 1662. He did not, perhaps, sufficiently reckon with the probability that common sense is apt to take a swift stride over this argument and declare with blunt honesty that nothing can be recognized in the Latin book which is not sufficiently supported by the English book. And Sparrow's evidence is not admitted to be so clear as Mr. Hansell assumes. Mr. Macklin followed with an 'ingenious and learned argument,' as the Archbishop of York called it,¹ upon the rubrics which affect the subject. He argued that the rubric of 1662 was declaratory of the existing law, that the subject of the rubric was the proper construction of the rubric of 1552, that the need of a new rubric arose from the misconstruction of the rubric of 1552, and that the abuse to be checked and remedied was the irreverence arising from that misconstruction. He maintained that the revisers of 1661 did not intend to make Reservation for the sick illegal, and that the revisers of 1552 left it legal, as they found it, and as it had been from Justin Martyr downwards. He dealt also very ably with the impossibility of contending that disuse in itself made illegal that which was legal at common law, and pointed out that if there was disuse between 1552 and 1662 there was no need for the new rubric of 1662, while if reservation was in use between those years Cosin and his party would have been the last persons to prohibit it. It must be noted that Mr. Macklin's view of the rubrics was of a very much stricter kind than that of Mr. Hansell, or, we may add, of Mr. Lacey.² Mr. Thurnam next offered a few considerations on the formularies and practices of the Scottish Church, valuable as illustrations of the existing customs of a part of the Church which is in full communion with the Church of England, but not strictly bearing upon the legal point.

It will be convenient here to notice the historical and legal contentions of Mr. Lacey's open letter, as they form a lucid and calmly reasoned statement of the case in favour of Reservation by a very well equipped expert. Mr. Lacey adopts a middle course, dear to the Anglican mind, and often dear with reason. He does not try to prove that Reservation

¹ *Guardian*, p. 995; but Mr. Kempe afterwards urged that Mr. Macklin confused 'lawful' with 'efficacious' in his illustration (*ibid.* p. 1026). Mr. Hansell dealt further and at considerable length with the point in his reply (pp. 1029-30), his real purpose being to show that two rubrics of different dates might be cumulative and not substitutionary.

² Compare *Guardian*, pp. 994 and 995, and Mr. Lacey's *Letter*, p. 46.

is legal. He earnestly deprecates an unregulated practice of Reservation, such as inevitably must come into vogue when individual priests determine to do what seems right in their own eyes. He endeavours to show that the practice is not either explicitly or implicitly forbidden, and defends its discretionary use and proper regulation, on principles of moral theology. He takes in order the Twenty-eighth Article, the Service for the Communion of the Sick, and the rubric at the end of the Communion Service upon the Consumption of the Consecrated Elements. From the history of the language of the Article itself he concludes that it cannot be taken to contain any condemnation or to imply any prohibition of Reservation, or anything else but a statement that Reservation was no part of the actual institution of Christ (p. 17). He points out the distinction to be drawn in examining the language of the commentators between Reservation for Communion and for other purposes (pp. 15, 26). He urges that the provision actually made by the Church of England for the Communion of the sick does not imply the prohibition of Reservation, does not *proprio vigore* exclude the more effective provision. He produces evidence to show that the omission in 1552 of the modified Reservation ordered in 1549 was indeed made in deference to a theological opinion, which however, did not prevail in the Church of England. He claims that, according to the teaching of English theologians, Reservation for Communion is neither contrary to Christ's ordinance nor forbidden by the Church. In noticing a minor point, that the order for the Communion of the Sick was no more a bar to Reservation after 1662 than before that time, Mr. Lacey gives some interesting evidence to show that Bishop Sparrow's argument in the *Rationale* has been misunderstood (p. 40). The final rubric about the consumption of the Elements is expounded by Mr. Lacey rather by an appeal to the nature of rubrics than to the argument, which he regards as sound historically, that Cosin explained its true scope. The two modes both lead to the same conclusion in Mr. Lacey's view that the rubric is a reference to an ancient law which was in no respect inconsistent with Reservation (p. 50). As the Bishop of Durham believes that he was doing a legal act when he allowed the Holy Sacrament to be carried out of the Church for 'coincident' administration to the absent, we presume that he agrees with Mr. Lacey in considering that the language of the rubric does not apply to such an act at all. Mr. Lacey then concludes that Reservation does not come within

the category of things illegal. He does not claim that it is legal. It is therefore discretionary; and this conclusion brings him to the question, Where does that discretion reside? His answer will be a surprise to many; and it is outside the scope of the present part of our article—the consideration of the legality of Reservation—but we may just briefly say that Mr. Lacey considers the discretion in this matter to be included in the 'government of the Church' which is committed by the bishop to a curate in the instrument of institution to a benefice (pp. 54-5). He guards this conclusion by adding that the bishop has the power to regulate the practice, and even to forbid it in particular places.

Mr. Green-Armytage would no doubt repudiate as a slander any suggestion that his pamphlet was composed in the middle voice, and would quote the message to the Church of Laodicea to justify the disgust which the moderate man excites in his breast. But he will pardon us if we say that the first twenty-eight pages of his more popularly written pamphlet contain on the whole a very fair and precise account of the chief historical and legal evidence which we have been considering, though provocative statements are not entirely absent.

The pleadings against Reservation were opened by Mr. Kempe, and before he got well on the way, he made an observation which led to an interesting interposition on the part of the Archbishop of Canterbury, who definitely declared that the Archbishops were sitting under the section in the Prayer Book 'concerning the services of the Church.'¹ Mr. Kempe said that it was somewhat remarkable that the other side seemed almost to have overlooked the Acts of Uniformity altogether, and urged that after the passing of the Act of 2 & 3 Edward VI. c. 1, it was neither lawful to reserve beyond the day on which notice had been given by the sick man of his desire to have the Holy Communion administered to him, nor to carry the Host about, nor to hang it up in the Church. After referring to the opinion of some reformers who would carry Mr. Kempe a good deal further than many of his friends would probably like to go, he proceeded to argue that the Twenty-eighth Article was not an historical statement but an injunction upon Reservation, and that the second Act of Uniformity (5 & 6 Edward VI. c. 2) and the Prayer Book under it swept away Reservation altogether. He grounded this last contention on the fact that the new

¹ *Guardian*, p. 1026.

book gave a definite order for the Communion of the sick, and the Act applied all the provisions of the previous Act to the new book, and prohibited any other order, form, or manner of administering the Sacrament to the sick than that given in the new book. He alluded, in passing, to the restoration of the old order under Queen Mary, to decrees which would have been unnecessary and would have had no purpose if Reservation had not been previously abolished, and to the visitation articles of Cardinal Pole. He urged that the statutes of Elizabeth in 1559 again made Reservation unlawful as it was before Mary's interruption, by reviving and reaffirming the second Act of Uniformity and the second Prayer Book. He noted that the Thirty-nine Articles were submitted to Convocation in 1563, ratified by Queen Elizabeth in 1564, and sanctioned by Parliament in 1570. Finally, he dealt with various arguments connected with the pyx, the cogency of some of which appears to us to destroy that of others. For example, if the evidence of the destruction of pyxes is to prove their illegality, there is no room left for the argument that when the communicant received in both kinds the pyx would no longer be used for carrying the Sacrament. The important part of Mr. Kempe's contention, however, is that the pyx was not a lawful ornament under the Second Prayer Book, and that that book was restored by the statute of Elizabeth. He urges that the retention of the pyx under the section of the statute which is familiar to us from the language of the Ornaments Rubric would involve a practice undefined either by the statute or the Prayer Book.¹

The legal argument was very ably taken up by Chancellor Dibdin, whose most able speech has just been issued in a very convenient form with good notes and appendices by Mr. Franey.² In them will be found a most useful collection of extracts from original documents, including the 13th Nicene Canon, Peccham's constitutions, the rubrics in successive editions of the Prayer Book, passages from various Reformation controversies, the Articles, the Council of Trent, and other pertinent sources. Mr. Dibdin's view of the evidence of the first two Prayer Books was that in 1549 an attempt was made to provide for Reservation for Communion while abolishing Reservation for adoration, and that this being found to be

¹ In the *Guardian* report of Mr. Kempe's reference to Burnet's *Exposition* (p. 1027), 'Thirty-eighth Article' is a misprint for 'Twenty-eighth.'

² One or two misprints have escaped correction: for example, Brookes' for Brooke's, p. 87; Peecham for Peccham, p. 92.

impossible, in 1552 Reservation was abolished altogether. He regarded the Twenty-eighth Article as an absolute provision of Church law prohibiting Reservation, and produced evidence to show that the Article was a counterblast or an answer to a canon of the Council of Trent, and that Reservation was generally treated as passed away by the writers of the Elizabethan age and of the next generation. In fact, he had found nothing that pointed the other way, and contended that the Latin Prayer Book of Elizabeth's reign incorporated serious alterations from the First Prayer Book, made by Ales in 1551. He held that Sparrow's *Rationale* was not sufficiently clear to be quoted on either side, and that the rubric of 1662 was not primarily aimed at Reservation at all.

Among important points in Mr. Hansell's reply were his contentions that the Acts of Uniformity dealt only with open prayer, and had nothing whatever to do with ministrations in private houses; that Haddon did not slavishly insert the alterations of Ales in the 1560 Latin Prayer Book; and that it was likely that Reservation should fall into disuse when celebrations of the Holy Communion became as unfrequent as they did become.

The impression which the pleadings on both sides produce upon us is that the heart of the purely legal aspect of the matter is to be found in the Twenty-eighth Article. It is perhaps arguable whether the provision made by the Prayer Book for the Communion of the sick excludes any alternative use or not; but it is hardly likely, after the full discussions of counsel, that the sixth post-Communion rubric will be again regarded as referring to Reservation so unmistakably as before.¹ The crucial point on which the Archbishops are about to pronounce is whether the concluding statement of the Twenty-eighth Article forbids or allows Reservation. It would not be right for us at present to say what answer we should give to that question, but we must say with the utmost plainness that we shall accept and urge others to accept with entire loyalty whatever ruling the Archbishops may be guided to make on this matter.

¹ We notice, however, that Dr. Brand in a very able reply to the Bishop of Fond du Lac in the *Church Eclectic* (August 1899, pp. 433-41) considers that the rubric, which in the American Prayer Book does not substantially differ from our own, definitely excludes Reservation. He avoids the difficulty of answering the Bishop's contention that the rubric refers to all that is not required for Communion, on the part either of those present or of the sick, by refusing to take the Bishop seriously. Mr. Dibdin very expressly maintains that the Prayer Book and the rubrics 'lay down a rule which is repugnant to, and inconsistent with, Reservation' (*Speech*, p. 66).

We are as profoundly convinced of the gravity of the doctrinal and practical issues of the question of Reservation as of the desirability of keeping them distinct from the legal point, and we have much more to say on these issues than our space allows. We will take doctrinal aspects first. The relation of parts of the body of Christ to the whole is involved in the inquiry whether the Church of England has the right to forbid what was so generally practised in the early Church. Mr. Lacey, quoted Beveridge, thinks that the question is not to be lightly answered, though he passes it by because he does not believe that the Church of England has ever forbidden or attempted to forbid the practice (p. 13). Mr. Green-Armytage defiantly declares that Reservation is a part of the constitution of the Holy Church throughout all the world, and so 'not within the province of any one part of the Church to abolish' (Pref. p. viii). Mr. Hansell deprecated the disallowance of the practice as a very great departure from the custom of the universal Church, and prophesied that the result would be of the most serious and grave import.¹ Mr. Altham thought that it would be a sad thing if they had to acknowledge that in a matter of such importance the Church was unprimitive;² but he perhaps forgot that the Church herself in the Communion Service has recognized the discontinuance of a primitive practice, the restoration of which she even frankly confesses is much to be wished. No part of the Catholic Church to-day is fully primitive in the sense which Mr. Altham's argument would require; nor is it desirable that it should be so, for we are not placed in primitive surroundings. A more serious doctrinal point is, to what is Reservation likely to lead? We are fully prepared to say that the Lord Jesus Christ is to be adored with the adoration due to God alone, wherever and whenever He may be pleased to make His blessed presence felt and known, in and by the Sacrament, or in other ways and at other times. And we take His Word for it that after the consecration of the Eucharistic elements He is there to be so worshipped and adored. We say, further, that no adoration should be paid to the bread and wine, which after consecration are the visible signs of His most gracious presence, and that continual watchfulness is required lest they should be so adored instead of Him. And having said thus much, we are not alarmed when we hear of devout Christians who pay every honour to the Lord in the Sacrament of His love. But that the Reservation of the Sacrament is exceedingly likely to lead to the abuses connected with the Roman service

¹ *Guardian*, p. 993.² *Ibid.* p. 995.

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of Benediction seems to us to be plainly written upon the face of history, and Mr. Lee's evidence at Lambeth repeats the warning in a startling fashion.¹ Mr. Green-Armytage indeed, who so eagerly pleads for Reservation, does not hesitate to call Benediction 'the Roman analogue' of evening Communion (p. 3); and those who pleaded for Reservation at Lambeth were very definite in saying that they pleaded for Reservation for the sick alone. The question is whether history leads us to suppose that they will be able to keep the desires of their congregations within the limits of their present intentions. There is a further question, whether the practice of praying before the reserved Eucharist at all times and apart from Communion is or is not likely to lead to the forgetfulness of the general promise: 'Where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them.' In the Holy Eucharist our Lord vouchsafes His presence chiefly in order that we may plead the merits of His sacrifice before the eternal throne, and feed upon Him. But He is ready to manifest Himself to us in His Incarnate glory whenever we desire to commune with Him, apart from the special mode of His approach in the Holy Eucharist; and it is well that we should act upon that readiness as a general rule, and be very jealous of any practice that may appear to ignore it. Mr. Dibdin quoted some language from a small current pamphlet² which maintains that 'the chief devotional use which the faithful ordinarily desire to make of the reserved Sacrament is to go and pray before it,' and which may easily lead to the error about which we are speaking. The Archbishop of Canterbury elicited from Mr. Altham, in a question which appeared to drive that reverend gentleman into a hopeless corner, that there is supposed to be some difference between the fitness of a room for consecration and administration. Mr. Altham said something about the feeling of the sacrifice of the Lord's death which comes about at the moment of consecration; but we fail, as did the Archbishop,³ to get any clear conception of his drift. And so, lest we do him an injustice, we will not comment doctrinally on the episode.

¹ *Guardian*, p. 1029; and see the excellent report of Mr. Lee's evidence in Mr. Dibdin's *Speech*, pp. 1-13. Mr. Lee admitted that he had had a service of Benediction, but gave it up in obedience to the Ordinary (cp. pp. 80, 83). Mr. Dibdin did not forget Jewel's belief that Reservation cannot be separated from its abuses (*Speech*, p. 79), and he endorses that belief to-day (p. 84).

² *Guardian*, p. 1029; Mr. Dibdin's *Speech*, pp. 83-4.

³ According to the *Times* report the Archbishop said, 'I confess I do not understand' (*Times*, July 21, 1899).

We now turn to the practical question, How far is Reservation necessary? All the evidence at Lambeth was produced by those who thought that the observance of the practice was imperative. Mr. Dibdin said that he and his friends were able to produce any amount of evidence on the other side, if the Archbishops desired to hear it.¹ The Archbishops did not call it, and we do not see how they could if they believed that their function was simply to determine the existing law. As, however, the evidence on the other side was heard, as the Bishop of Durham seems to have found it necessary to allow coincident administration outside the Church²—academically distinguished from Reservation—and as Mr. Lacey appends some (p. 67) and Mr. Green-Armytage (p. 45) much evidence on the same side to their respective pamphlets, it is very proper that Mr. Dibdin indicated that a great body of diverse evidence is forthcoming. Mr. Green-Armytage holds, indeed, that Reservation is desirable as avoiding the consecration of the Eucharist in an unhallowed room (p. 56)—what will not be held?—and though we may not lay much stress on such arguments as that, we may freely admit that there are often many difficulties in the way of private celebrations.³ Indeed, the evidence forthcoming on this point is convincing. We may also be thankful that the need has become pressing in these days, because we recognize in its rise the result of faithful pastoral teaching on the part of the clergy, and devout response on the part of the children of the Church: the one desiring to give and the others to receive the Bread of Life and the Cup of Salvation. But for arrival at a true estimate of the position of affairs we wish that the evidence of which Mr. Dibdin spoke could be examined beside the rest. We have before us a letter from a devout woman who has worked for some forty years in a London parish, which contains some valuable testimony:

'I have been present at numberless communions of the sick and dying, and have never met with the slightest obstacle to a perfectly decent and reverent consecration, no matter how rough and irreligious

¹ *Guardian*, p. 995; see Mr. Dibdin's *Speech*, p. 86.

² The Bishop's plan involves a spare priest and a convenient distance. It would be utterly useless, for example, in the large agricultural parish in which these words are written, where there are thirty-four miles of main roads and one priest.

³ Mr. Dibdin (*Speech*, p. 17) rests the case for the justification of the English Church in directing the Eucharist to be consecrated in private houses on a passage from Palmer's *Origines Liturgicæ* (ii. 229), and he urges that the Church of England has deliberately preferred such a consecration to Reservation (p. 87).

the people in the house or the relatives of the sick person may be, and you know the roughness of — Place ; the very fact that a "Church service" is to be performed in the house seems to produce a feeling of awe, and I have often known the children sent out for fear they should make a noise, and this by parents who were not religious. It seems to me a shocking thing to deprive the sick person of the comfort of the service in the Prayer Book ; surely if he is not in a condition to participate in the service, he can hardly be in a condition to receive the Holy Communion. I cannot conceive anything more irreverent than carrying the consecrated Elements into a sick room and then and there administering them. Also, what would be the effect on relatives who knew nothing of these things ? They would look upon it as a sop, a medicine, or a charm.

We may add one other sample of similar evidence from a widely different source. Dr. Brand, who has been a rector in a district of Maryland for fifty-six years, in all this time *has never felt the need of Reservation for the sick*, and quotes the observation of an invalid negro in Baltimore, who having received the Reserved Sacrament said, 'Sir, I thank you for the blessing you have brought me, but cannot you sometimes give me the comfort of the Communion service ?'

SHORT NOTICES.

The Catholic Movement and the Archbishops' Decision. By W. SANDAY, D.D., LL.D., Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity and Canon of Christ Church. (London : Longmans, 1899.)

THE pamphlet which has just been issued under this title is the most conspicuous effort which has hitherto been made to criticize the Archbishops' 'opinion' as to the legality of incense and processional lights. The position of the writer, who stands in the first rank of English theological students and enjoys a deserved reputation for intellectual independence and detachment from ecclesiastical prejudices, gives a weight to his utterance which his opening words show that he fully realizes :

'If I am not much mistaken the English nation is at the present moment in danger of committing a serious injustice. . . . It is not a light matter to me thus to accuse my countrymen. . . . When the English nation goes wrong, I believe that it is rarely from rooted unfairness, but rather from want of knowledge,' &c.

¹ *Church Eclectic*, August 1899, p. 441. We should be glad to think that Dr. Brand's communication was being read in England, but we have not yet learned to imitate the *Eclectic* methods of 'borrowing' (see Exod. xii. 35, 36) whole articles from our transatlantic neighbours, and therefore cannot print all of it.

It is exactly this want of knowledge which the public turn to such a man as Professor Sanday to remedy. It is disappointing, therefore, to find the Professor failing at this very point, and failing so entirely as to deprive his pamphlet of value as a serious criticism of the Archbishops' opinion. He begins with some true but rather trite observations on the distinction between 'Catholic' and 'Roman Catholic' usages, and then says—surely without warrant—that the question before the Archbishops was the authoritative definition of the word 'Catholic,' but that 'they have not considered the questions submitted to them quite in this light.' The question which the Bishops referred to the Primates, and which was elaborately argued before them, was the lawfulness or unlawfulness of incense and lights in the public services of the Church of England; and although, in dealing with this question, great attention was naturally paid to 'Primitive' and 'Catholic' usage, it would have shown an almost inconceivable incapacity to grasp a practical issue if the Archbishops had floated away into academic disquisitions of what ought or ought not to be deemed Catholic, instead of deciding, aye or no, *whether the clergy who use incense and lights are breaking the law of the Church*. But Professor Sanday proceeds to discuss the Archbishops' treatment of what he considers the regrettably narrowed issue before them. He conceives them to have invented what he describes as a 'short cut' to a decision by selecting the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity and by relying on the second section,¹ which requires the Prayer Book to be exclusively used, and penalizes the use of 'any other rite, ceremony, order, form, or manner of celebrating the Lord's Supper' or other public service. The Archbishops held that the ceremonial or liturgical use of incense and lights, not being prescribed by the Prayer Book, was by this enactment proscribed. Professor Sanday seems to think that in taking this view the Archbishops hit upon a new device of their own, and he discusses the matter as if until the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity incense had been admittedly allowed in the Church of England. He says, 'The use without doubt existed in our own Church on the very eve of Elizabeth's first [*sic*] Act of Uniformity.' But in truth the Elizabethan Act is referred to because it is the latest of the series of Uniformity statutes in which the penal and prohibitory clauses are set out which are binding and operative at this day. Every judge (including under that description Archbishop Benson in the Lincoln case) who has had to consider the legality of a ceremony has come to the same conclusion on the same grounds. The language and the purpose of successive Acts show, we should have said, but for Professor Sanday, without dispute and decisively, an intention to prohibit any *ceremony* not mentioned in the Prayer Book. The conflict hitherto has not been as to this, but on two other points—namely, (1) whether the practice which happened to be in question was a ceremony, and (2) whether clergymen are bound in conscience to obey Acts of Uniformity. The first Act of Uniformity, which

¹ Throughout this review the sections of Acts are numbered according to the *Statutes Revised*. The numeration is different in the old editions.

brought in Edward VI.'s First Prayer Book, strictly tied the clergy down to the ceremonies of that Book and no other. Not only was incense not mentioned in the First Prayer Book, but the parts of the Communion Service in which, under the Sarum Missal, incense was used were entirely cut out, so that the whole context of incense was bodily removed. Instead of the clergy being left in possession of their old service books, as would have been necessary if the old practices were to go on, the old books were by statute required to be given up, in order, as was expressly stated, that the clergy might use nothing except the Prayer Book. The rigour of the enforcement of the First Prayer Book was repeated on each revision. Nothing was done to legalize the ceremonial use of incense in the later Books, unless the Ornaments Rubric had that effect, as to which a word will be said presently. So that unless incense remained legal under the liturgy of 1549 it is unlawful now. Professor Sanday's treatment of the history is, if we may say so with respect, misleading. Incense was in use, as he says, on the very eve of the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity, but only because it had been revived under Mary. No evidence of the ceremonial use of incense has been found under the First Prayer Book of Edward, and the inventories of Church goods and Churchwardens' accounts in many different parts of England all agree in a remarkable way in telling the same story. It is this: incense and censers and processional lights were laid aside as soon as the First Prayer Book came into use; they were not heard of again until Mary's accession; then they were expressly revived by injunctions, and they remained until Elizabeth's Act of Uniformity, when they at once and finally disappeared.

Professor Sanday argues that the enactment on which the Archbishops rely (1 Eliz. chap. 2, sec. 2), and which, unfortunately, they do not cite *in extenso*, does not, when properly construed, cover the use of incense; and he quotes Archbishop Benson's Lincoln judgment with approval, under the impression that it is inconsistent with the recent pronouncement. But, led astray probably by the Archbishops' incomplete quotation, he has made the extraordinary mistake of overlooking most material words and of confining his attention to a portion only of the Act under consideration. He supposes the Archbishops to have decided that the obligation to administer the Sacraments 'in such order and form' as is mentioned in the Prayer Book and none other is the only statutory prohibition of incense; and he quotes the Lincoln judgment as laying down that the words, 'order, form, and manner' refer only to the use of any service book other than the Prayer Book. But the section not only makes illegal any other 'order, form, and manner,' but also any other 'rite or ceremony' not mentioned in the Book; and Archbishop Benson in the passage quoted (*Read v. Bishop of London*, 1891 [P], pp. 77-80), which is really a discussion of the whole enactment in question, holds that although the words 'order, form, and manner' have the limited meaning Professor Sanday relies upon, the word 'ceremony' is not thus limited and applies 'to an action or act in which material objects

may or may not be used, but is not itself any material object.' Archbishop Benson actually mentions 'the carrying of lights in procession' as one of the practices which 'come under the accepted definition of a ceremony.' It was on this ground—namely, that no 'ceremony' not mentioned in the Prayer Book could be legal—that the 'mixing' of the chalice during the service was declared in the Lincoln case to be illegal, although the administration of the previously mixed chalice was declared lawful. In other words, Archbishop Benson took exactly the same view of the meaning of the Act of Uniformity as Archbishop Temple has taken, and by anticipation came to the same decision so far as Processional Lights are concerned. Incense stands on precisely the same footing.

Professor Sanday supposes the Archbishops to have been led into what he deems to be their novel and erroneous view of the meaning of the Act of Uniformity by their 'hesitation to regard omission as prohibition,' *i.e.* their unwillingness to rest their decision on the ground that mere omission means prohibition. But here again the Professor has, we venture to think, fallen into some confusion. The canon of construction that on each revision of the Prayer Book omission of something contained in the Book before revision meant the prohibition of that thing, may be right or may be wrong, but so far as we remember it has never been applied to a case of a 'ceremony' which if not mentioned in the Prayer Book is excluded by the express terms of the Act of Uniformity. The area in which this now discredited proposition has been brought into play is quite a different one. For example, the administration of the mixed chalice required by the First Prayer Book was subsequently 'omitted.' After a conflict of judicial opinion it was finally decided in the Lincoln case that omission was not prohibition in this instance, and that therefore the mixed chalice might be used; but that the mixing must not take place during the service, not because 'omission was prohibition,' but because the mixing would constitute 'an additional ceremony' and therefore be 'against the law of the Church' (*Read v. Bishop of Lincoln*, 1891 [P], pp. 29, 30).

Professor Sanday, although disclaiming a lawyer's acquaintance with Acts of Parliament, naively suggests a doubt whether the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity can be considered in force since the Caroline Act of 1662. 'It seems natural to suppose that the later Act would supersede the earlier.' Perhaps! But if the Professor had looked at the Acts before standing forth to prevent the 'English nation going wrong' 'from want of knowledge' he would have observed that section 20 of 14 Chas. II. chap. 4, expressly embodies the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity, with which it is, in effect, to be read as one statute, the penal clauses not being repeated in the later Act.

It seems to be clear, therefore, notwithstanding Professor Sanday's criticism, that all ceremonies not mentioned in the Prayer Book are prohibited, not, as he says, 'swept away by silence' nor by the application of any rigid rule that 'omission means prohibition,' but by the express and positive and unequivocal language of the second

section of the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity. But it remains for us to see whether the Ornaments Rubric does not alter the position by indirectly authorizing ceremonies otherwise forbidden.

In order to understand Professor Sanday's treatment of the Ornaments Rubric it is necessary to bear in mind one or two facts. The original of the Ornaments Rubric is a section (1 Eliz. chap. 2, sec. 13) in the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity. The second section having, as we have seen, prohibited any ceremony not mentioned in the Prayer Book, the thirteenth section enacts that such ornaments shall be retained as were in the Church of England by authority of Parliament in the second year of Edward VI. The Prayer Book to which the Act refers is the Second Prayer Book of Edward, with one or two changes detailed in the Act itself. It was not 'annexed' to the Act, and as authorized by the Act the Prayer Book contained no Ornaments Rubric. But when the Book was published a condensed form of the thirteenth section of the Act was inserted as a prefatory note, and this, slightly altered and developed, became in the present Prayer Book of 1662 (annexed to the Caroline Act of Uniformity) the Ornaments Rubric as we have it to-day. The Courts and, we believe, liturgical authorities on both sides of the great controversy which has raged for so many years round the Ornaments Rubric, are agreed that the Ornaments Rubric in the Elizabethan Prayer Book had no authority whatever, but was, as we have said, a prefatory note intended to draw attention to the statutory enactment which it summarized and to which—or rather to the whole Act of Uniformity—it expressly referred.

So far as the legality of incense and lights is concerned two points have been raised with regard to the Ornaments Rubric by the advocates for the use of these adjuncts to worship. (i.) It is urged that the Ornaments Rubric authorizes the employment of such ornaments as were in lawful use in the second year of Edward, *before* the First Prayer Book, which it is alleged was not enacted till the third year. (ii.) It is argued that, as censers and candlesticks were in use until the First Prayer Book, the effect of the Ornaments Rubric is to authorize their use now in the accustomed manner, and so to legalize the ceremonial use of incense and lights. It is obvious that the second of these points assumes the first.

The Archbishops held that it was needless to settle the first point, because on the second they were of opinion that the section which we have called the original of the Ornaments Rubric could not be construed as applicable to ceremonies. Occurring in the same Act which rigorously prohibits any ceremony not mentioned in the Prayer Book, its purpose is simply to provide what ornaments are to be used in the 'ministrations' ordered by the Book. In other words, a clergyman's duty under the Act was to use the ceremonies mentioned in the Book with the appropriate ornaments, ascertained in the manner directed by the Ornaments section.

Professor Sanday entirely dissents from the Archbishops' opinion, but unfortunately he does so on grounds which will not bear investigation. On the first point, as to the meaning of 'use in the second

year' of Edward, he is content to regard it as a moot point, and to leave it open. But this surely is impossible for those who desire to press the Ornaments Rubric as an authority for the use of censers and lights. Unless the 'second year' points to a use at a time *prior* to the First Prayer Book instead of use *under* the First Prayer Book, as has been held by the Courts over and over again, the suggested interpretation of the Ornaments Rubric as applicable to ceremonies does not assist its advocates, because there is no evidence of the use of censers or processional lights under the First Prayer Book. If, therefore, the use in the second year means use under the authority of the First Prayer Book, incense and lights do not come in. To exclude the, so to speak, received construction of the words as to the second year is a condition precedent to success in the attempt to use the Ornaments Rubric in defence of incense and lights. Professor Sanday does not profess to disprove the received construction of the words as to the second year, and is apparently unaware of the formidable difficulties in his way. Although he 'leaves the point open' he gives as his only contribution towards settling it Bishop Sandys's well known letter to Archbishop Parker in 1559, in which he refers to the Ornaments section of the Act of Uniformity, then passing through Parliament, as 'a proviso to retain the Ornaments which were used in the first and second year of King Edward VI.,' and the Professor describes this letter as a 'contemporary interpretation' of the disputed words, and in a note states that the Privy Council in *Westerton v. Liddell* 'do not seem to have had it before them.' Sandys's letter was, of course, contemporaneous with Elizabeth's Act, but it was written ten years after the 'second year of Edward,' and the reference is plainly inaccurate, for the 'first and second year' is not the 'second year,' any more than it correctly describes an Act passed in the session of the second and third years. Probably Bishop Sandys made a slip of the pen. At any rate the Professor is in error in supposing the Judges in *Westerton v. Liddell* were not aware of the letter.¹ But it is a matter for surprise that Professor Sanday should have thought this letter of sufficient importance to give, and yet have ignored (i.) Edward VI.'s diary, which describes the first Act of Uniformity as passed in his second year, and (ii.) the probably decisive fact that in 5 & 6 Ed. VI. c. 1, sec. 4 the first Act of Uniformity is definitely described as having been 'made in the second year of the King.' It would require a great deal of argument to convince the public that the Judges have all been wrong in holding that Parliament meant in 1559 the same thing by 'second year' as it undoubtedly meant in 1551.

But Professor Sanday's criticism of the Archbishops' refusal to apply the Ornaments Rubric to ceremonies is again founded on a pure mistake. He says:

'They try to make the Elizabethan Act taken with the Ornaments Rubric contradict itself; but they only do so by *assuming* the correctness of their own interpretation. The other alternative is more natural, that the

¹ Moore's *Special Report*, p. 140.

Act is consistent and the interpretation wrong. The Ornaments Rubric was itself part of the annexed Prayer Book, and if it applies to ceremonies at all, governed the ceremonies appertaining to the Prayer Book.'

The Professor does not tell us how he proposes to interpret the part of the Act which prohibits any ceremonies not mentioned in the Book, so as to be consistent with the part of the Act which it is suggested requires the ceremonies to be those in use in 1548, whether mentioned in the Book or not. But he has an ingenious way of getting over the difficulty. It is this: He says the Ornaments Rubric was part of the Elizabethan Prayer Book, as that Book was 'annexed' to the Statute. When, therefore, the section relied on by the Archbishops confines the clergy to the ceremonies mentioned in the Book, that includes the ceremonies authorized by the Ornaments Rubric, and, therefore (let us assume), incense and lights. But Professor Sanday is under a grave misapprehension fatal to his argument. The Elizabethan Prayer Book was not annexed to the Act, and the Ornaments Preface printed at the beginning of that Prayer Book had no authority, and was not part of the Book as authorized by the Act of Uniformity. It was, as we have said, a mere publisher's note summarizing the Ornaments section of the Act. It is useless after this to follow the Professor's discussion of the Ornaments Rubric any further. As handled by him, when his mistakes have been corrected, it is entirely ineffective to shake the conclusion which the Archbishops, following Archbishop Benson and the lay Judges, have arrived at, viz. that the Elizabethan Act of Uniformity prohibits any ceremonies not mentioned in the Prayer Book, and that 'Prohibition means Prohibition.' We cannot follow Professor Sanday in his somewhat fragmentary references to the use of incense in the early Church. To do so it would be necessary to invite attention to much more than the two or three citations which he has given, and the result would, we think, confirm the conclusion arrived at by the Archbishops, and, if we remember right, also by the 'Experts' who defended the use of incense at the recent hearing.

It is satisfactory to note that Professor Sanday at the end of his pamphlet has not 'really any doubt that, whether right or wrong in the nature of things, the decision ought to be obeyed.' It is perhaps a little difficult to see how the publication of a series of arguments all intended to show that the decision is 'wrong,' and the grounds of it 'untenable,' can help towards its being obeyed. But we are glad to think that, in inviting a reconsideration of the matters on which the Professor's criticism is founded, and in removing, as we venture to hope, some considerable misconceptions, we are assisting in the realization of the noble aims which Professor Sanday himself eloquently proclaims. We sympathize deeply with his concern at the 'want of knowledge' on this difficult subject, which he notices all around, and, without attempting to compete with the Professor in his great enterprise of enlightening the whole English nation, we humbly venture to offer, to any who care to listen, the considerations which have convinced us that it is the arguments of the critic and not of the Archbishops which call for revision.

The Gospel according to St. Mark. The Greek Text with Introduction, Notes, and Indices. By the Rev. H. B. SWETE, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity, Cambridge. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1898.)

Two years ago we had to point out the very serious blemishes of Professor Gould's work on St. Mark in the series of 'International Critical Commentaries,' while we readily acknowledged that it bore marks of industry and scholarship. It is now our pleasing duty to say that Dr. Swete is not less industrious and scholarly than his predecessor, and at the same time his book is free from those grave faults to which we were obliged to allude. To say this, however, is not to say enough. A commentary on St. Mark's Gospel must of course enter into some discussion of the personal history of the Evangelist, the peculiarities of his contribution to the Gospel record and its relation to the work of the other three Evangelists; and on these matters Dr. Swete has written an introduction of very high merit for the benefit of his readers, selected and compressed from masses of additional notes and dissertations which the author hopes to elaborate and issue in the future. But with a true regard to crucial matters Dr. Swete knows that these important topics occupy a subordinate place. They are helps which guide the student on the way towards the great Object of his study. They lead him to the Person Whose life is described in the fragmentary outline of each Gospel, before Whom he worships and adores. It is the conspicuous merit of Dr. Swete's commentary that amid the most careful analysis of the materials of scholarship he never allows the reader to forget that he is near to the living figure of his incarnate Lord, and that we maintain is the highest end of a Gospel commentator. Dr. Swete knows too much about the Gospels to pretend that he has achieved what is impossible—the production of a complete commentary on them, or on any one of them. But his modest way of speaking about his own work does not hide from us its excellence, and we thank him for assisting students 'to understand, and in turn to interpret to others, this primitive picture of the Incarnate Life' (Pref. p. vi). He is worthily sustaining the Regius Chair of Divinity in his University, and the appearance of the book reminds us that no great theological volume has issued from the corresponding Chair at the sister University since the days of Mozley. Will not Dr. Ince give us a volume of the sturdy lectures which he used to deliver in the Latin Chapel?

The first two sections of the Introduction, in which an account of the personal history of St. Mark and of the history of the Gospel in the early Church is given, have in part already appeared in the *Expositor*. The most interesting passages here are those which give samples of the use of the name Marcus in various parts of the Empire (p. ix), or discuss the meaning of the epithet *κολοβαδάκτυλος*, quoted by St. Hippolytus of the Evangelist (p. xxi), or examine the causes of the relative neglect of this Gospel in early times, and its place in early catalogues and manuscripts (pp. xxviii, xxx). After producing briefly the evidence which shows that the Gospel was written at Rome, probably between the death of St. Peter and St. Paul

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and the destruction of Jerusalem, and in Greek, Dr. Swete summarizes the results of enormous labour in some lists of words and phrases which illustrate the vocabulary, grammar, and style of St. Mark (p. xxxviii).¹ A table is given which enables us to compare the capitulation of Codices A and B with the paragraphs in the Westcott and Hort text (p. xlv), and an excellent conspectus shows how Dr. Swete himself has arranged the contents of the Gospel (p. xlix). This brings the reader to the consideration of St. Mark's plan and the sources from which he drew his narrative. Dr. Swete notices the characteristics of the two great sections of St. Mark on the Galilean Ministry and the Last Week at Jerusalem, observing that the first fourteen verses of the Gospel are evidently introductory, and the last twelve 'have the character of an appendix which links the Gospel history with the fortunes of the Church in the Apostolic age' (p. lii).² He is disposed to see a more continuous adherence to chronological arrangement in the first section than Mr. Turner, and although he fully recognizes the peculiar features of the second section he retains a strong sense of the unity of the work. He assumes as a working theory of the origination of the Gospel that its main source is the teaching of St. Peter, especially in the first section, and considers that allowance must be made, especially in the last six chapters, for the use of other authorities, some at least documentary. Dr. Swete does not discuss the literary problem which is presented by the first three Gospels. He contents himself with some remarks on the distinctive features of the second Gospel as compared with the first and the third as bearing upon its origin and character (p. lx). He concludes that the relation of St. Mark to the other Synoptists is that of an early but fragmentary record towards records of a somewhat later origin and more complex character (p. lxix). A short examination of the sixty-seven references in St. Mark to the Old Testament is followed by a particularly interesting description of the external conditions of our Lord's life in this Gospel (p. lxxv), and this is the porch of a more important matter still—St. Mark's conception of the Person and office of our Lord (p. lxxiv). A careful list of authorities for the text (p. xc) is the prelude to an examination of the 'alternative endings' of the Gospel. The defects of the external evidence and the internal characteristics of the last twelve verses lead Dr. Swete to the conclusion that 'they belong to another work, whether that of Aristion or of some unknown writer of the first century' (p. cv). Finally there is a brief account of existing commentaries, in which we are pleased to see that Dr. Swete has paid a tribute to the 'insight and devotion' of 'our countryman' Bede (pp. cvii-cviii). A facsimile of the Edschmiatzin MS. will be found facing p. civ, but the maps which

¹ Compare also the full list of 'Greek words used by St. Mark,' pp. 386-401.

² In the *Church Eclectic* for August 1899, p. 404, Dr. E. P. Gray pleads very earnestly and with much reason and ability against affixing any note of doubt to these verses.

are said to face p. lxxviii in the table of contents are wanting in the copy before us.

Of the detailed notes perhaps the most important are those which comment on the Christology of the Gospel. They will for the most part be found under the word 'Christ' in the index to the introduction and notes. On xiii. 32, in the course of a very valuable note which includes a paragraph, with references, upon the patristic treatment of the passage, Dr. Swete says:

'By the Father's gift all things that the Father hath are the Son's (St. John v. 20, xvi. 15), and as the eternal Word He cannot be ignorant of this or any other mystery of the divine Will (St. Matt. xi. 27; St. John i. 18). But the time of the predestined end is one of those things which the Father has "set within His own authority" (Acts i. 7), and which the Son, though He [by a misprint he] knew it as God, had no commission to reveal (St. John viii. 26, 40, xiv. 24, xv. 15)' (p. 297).

We may add to this the warning that we are not told whether there are any other matters on which our Lord imposed any similar limitations upon his human faculties, and it is more than hazardous to generalize by logic upon such mysteries as this. The note on our Lord's cry from the twenty-second Psalm is curiously deficient in that it makes no allusion to its dogmatic import (p. 363). Flowing from the conception of our Lord's Person and Work there are the passages which refer to the ministry and the Sacraments which He instituted. The mission of the Apostles, says Dr. Swete in a good note, 'was identical in its purposes with His, but secondary and dependent on His gifts' (p. 56). In the note on the great passage in xvi. 16 Dr. Swete points out that baptism is distinctly associated with salvation in the Apostolic writings, though he does not forget to add the necessary caution that 'shall be saved' is not an unconditional promise of final restoration (pp. 381-2). The passage about the blessing of little children, x. 13-16, shows that 'the youngest were not too young for His (our Lord's) benediction' (p. 207), and we are properly reminded that the incident 'seems to have been urged in support of infant baptism as early as the time of Tertullian' (p. 208). The doctrine of the Holy Eucharist is chiefly indicated in the note which gives references to the Fathers, to Hooker and Pusey upon xiv. 24. Among other notes of doctrinal importance are those on the sin against the Holy Ghost (pp. 64-5), and on the Lord's 'brethren,' where we are much surprised to notice even a slight leaning on Dr. Swete's part to the Helvidian view (p. 107). Many of the notes strike us as being extremely thin in dogmatic material. For example, the notes on the Kingdom of God (p. 13), Jewish demonology (p. 23), the leprosy (p. 26), the Transfiguration (p. 176), are of much less relative merit than those on such subjects as Pontius Pilate (p. 346) and *νάδος πιστικός* (p. 302). The dissertations which Dr. Swete one day hopes to publish will have to be very strong in dogmatic theology to make up for the disappointment which we have felt on turning to many passages, a disappointment which is all the keener because we know so well that Dr. Swete has large stores of dogmatic theology in reserve.

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The Counter-Reformation in Europe. By A. R. PENNINGTON, Canon Non-Residentiary of Lincoln and Rector of Uterby. (London : Elliot Stock, 1899.)

A MELANCHOLY interest is attached to this book from the fact that it had hardly been given to the world, when its venerable author was suddenly called to his rest. In reviewing it, however, there is not the slightest occasion to act on the *De mortuis nil nisi bonum* principle, and to deal with it more leniently than strict justice untempered by mercy would compel us to do. It is quite able to stand on its own merits, and can well afford to dispense with any adventitious interest it might derive from the peculiar circumstances of its publication. In fact, as we first read it, knowing that the author was well advanced in his eighty-sixth year, our predominant feeling was one of astonishment at the vitality, the fire, freshness and energy—we had almost said, *youthful* energy—which breathed in its every page. But, on the other hand, there was also evident a maturity of knowledge, which on such a subject it was hardly possible for a young man to possess, as it was obviously the result of many years' study. In short, it is not too much to say that the book combines, in a marked degree, the enthusiasm which belongs to youth with the ripeness which belongs to age. The subject is a singularly interesting one, but at the same time a most difficult one to deal with in the short space of a single volume of 276 pages. The very title, *The Counter-Reformation in Europe*, implies that the reader will be carried from country to country—Italy, Spain, France, Germany, England, Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden, &c.—with bewildering rapidity; that he will have names brought before him, with which, unless his reading is exceptionally wide and varied, he is quite unfamiliar; that politics and even wars, as well as theology, will have to be touched upon, for these too had their share in the 'Counter-Reformation.' That a writer, who had long passed the allotted age of man, should have grappled successfully with all these difficulties, and given us a book, which is not only valuable, but eminently readable, and indeed vivacious, is to our mind really marvellous. To illustrate the difficulties he has surmounted, we may venture to compare his work with one published ten years ago, with a similar title, 'The Counter-Reformation,' by Professor A. W. Ward, written for that excellent series, *Epochs of Church History*, of which the present Bishop of London, then Canon Creighton, was the editor. It goes without saying that Professor Ward was an extremely competent writer, and that the editor of the series was an extremely competent editor; and yet one could not help feeling that the book was too crowded with matter to be really effective. Until Canon Pennington's volume appeared, we thought this was a necessary result of attempting to deal with so large a subject in so short a space. But there is little difference between the space filled by the two writers; and, while fully appreciating the ability and industry of the earlier, we are bound to say that the later has given us a far more vivid, intelligible, and impressive sketch of the great subject.

But comparisons are proverbially odious; let us confine ourselves,

therefore, to the contents of Canon Pennington's volume. By the Counter-Reformation is, of course, meant that remarkable turn of the tide, rightly described by Lord Macaulay in his review of Ranke's *History of the Popes* as that by which 'the Church of Rome, having lost a large part of Europe, not only ceased to lose, but actually regained nearly half of what she had lost.' In accounting for the phenomenon, it will be remembered that Lord Macaulay, *more suo*, takes occasion to glorify as 'the very masterpiece of human wisdom' the Church of Rome, to which he did *not* belong, at the expense of the Church of England, to which he professedly *did* belong. It will also be remembered that Mr. Cotter Morison, in his very able monograph on 'Macaulay' in the *English Men of Letters* series, shows to demonstration how utterly fallacious the contrast is: that 'the profound wisdom he [Macaulay] ascribed to the Church of Rome existed only in his own fancy,' while, 'on the other hand, of all long-suffering Churches, tolerant and docile of contradiction to the verge of feebleness, the Church of England is perhaps the most remarkable.' Mr. Morison will hardly be suspected of an undue bias in favour of the Church of England. It is simply as an historian that he protests against the vast superiority in point of wisdom which Macaulay claims for the Church of Rome, as shown in the Counter-Reformation. One of Canon Pennington's avowed objects, as he tells us in his preface (p. viii), is to correct the errors of Macaulay; and he has done so most effectively in almost every page of his book, by showing us what the Counter-Reformation really was; and when reduced to plain prose we see that there was really nothing extraordinary in it—nothing requiring 'the masterpiece of human wisdom' to effect it at all. One of the chief causes is, indeed, highly creditable to the Church of Rome itself—that we fully admit—viz. a most vigorous and drastic reform of its own practical, not doctrinal, abuses. As Canon Pennington truly points out, the abominable corruption of the Papacy (p. 13), the actual wickedness of some of the Popes, which more enlightened times would not tolerate (pp. 17-19), the 'Babylonish captivity' when the Popes resided at Avignon, the schism of anti-Popes, the revival of a taste for ancient literature, which led to scepticism, and nowhere more than at Rome itself, were at least predisposing causes of the Reformation. After the shock which that convulsion caused, Rome wisely girded herself to set her house in order; a new religious spirit arose which led to the formation of new orders and reformation of the old (p. 35): the reform of the Mendicant Orders, notably through the Capuchin Friars (pp. 38-9), the formation of the Order of Brothers of Charity (p. 40), of the Theatines, or congregation of regular clergy (p. 414), and, far above all, of the Order of Jesuits (p. 50), were among the proximate causes of the Counter-Reformation. To these should be added the far higher character which the Popes in the age after the Reformation bore than those in the age before the Reformation, and the rise of others who were not only Christians, but saints, and who threw their influence into the scale of Rome. More mundane causes contributed to the result. Canon Penning-

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ton thinks that Macaulay greatly overrates the influence of the Jesuits : we are not sure whether this is quite made out ; it is difficult to exaggerate the influence which Ignatius Loyola, inculcating and enforcing as he did 'blind obedience as the very basis of his order' (p. 60), established ; but Canon Pennington is perfectly right when he affirms that 'the Jesuits would have been powerless without the armies of Spain and the wealth of Philip II.' (p. 56) ; and also when he refers to the terrible and unscrupulous activity and cruelty of the Inquisition ; the introduction of the 'Index Expurgatorius ;' the effects of the Council of Trent, whose decrees 'made an impassable gulf between the two parties' (p. 105), 'gave conciliar sanction to Roman absolutism ;' stereotyped belief, for 'before it many were uncertain what they ought to believe' (p. 119), as obvious and very intelligible causes of the recovery of Roman power. A still greater cause, on which Canon Pennington rightly lays much stress (see pp. 144, 226, 228 and *passim*), was the division among Protestants ; *divide et impera* is a maxim of which Pontifical as well as Imperial Rome saw the full force. We quite agree with Canon Pennington that Cardinal Allen and the seminary priests who set on foot the English Mission, and notably the Jesuit Fathers, Parsons and Campian, were the chief agents in bringing about a Counter-Reformation—so far as there *was* any counter-reformation—in England ; but we do *not* agree with him that the Laudian movement had any Romeward tendency whatever (see pp. 240–56). Of course the influence of Queen Henrietta Maria and of the Roman emissary Panzani was in a Roman direction ; but surely that influence was exceedingly slight and short-lived ; and Laud and his friends, so far from being the friends, were really the most effective opponents—effective because they opposed to it something more Church-like and definite than the mere negations of Protestantism—of whatever Romanizing tendency there was in England ; and we believe that Charles I., whatever his faults may have been, was a martyr to the Church of England, as that Church is equally opposed to Rome as to Geneva. Here we think Canon Pennington has been misled by the same Macaulay whose errors in other respects he clearly sees. This, however, is only one point of disagreement ; in other points we cordially agree with him, and only wish that his life had been spared long enough to see the success which his all but posthumous volume will, we trust, receive.

Oxford Church Text Books. 1. *An Elementary History of the Church in Great Britain.* By the Rev. W. H. HUTTON, B.D. 2. *The History of the Book of Common Prayer.* By the Rev. J. H. MAUDE, M.A. (London : Rivingtons, 1899.)

RECENT controversies show that if much has been done to spread the knowledge of the principles of the Oxford Movement, much yet remains to be done. To flood the country with a comprehensive series of cheap scholarly manuals on the more important branches of religious knowledge is an excellent proposal, and with Mr. Pullan

as the general editor of the series we may be sure that writers will be selected for the series who are in full sympathy with definite Anglican doctrine. We can cordially commend in general terms the two contributions to the series which are before us. Mr. Hutton's book appears with the title as printed above. But in the prospective advertisement he is said to be responsible for *A Church History of Great Britain*, and in an advertisement which accompanies this little volume he is said to have in the press *A Short History of the Church in Great Britain*.¹ Mr. Hutton compresses his narrative of a hundred pages into seven chapters, which treat of The Church in Britain, The Early English Church, The Mediæval Church, The Reformation, The Church under the Stewarts, and the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. He also adds a useful glossary, a chronological table, and an index of the names of persons.

Mr. Hutton opens with an excellent passage about 'the divine society which our Lord Jesus Christ founded to be the perpetual embodiment on earth of His divine purpose and the channel of His divine grace.' He is of course obliged to say that we do not know when the first Christians landed in Britain, or when the Church first sent its missionaries or set up its organization. But he is able to give a clear picture of the British Church which was already in existence when the English came to Britain. He is too open, however, to the facts of history to deny that St. Augustine is 'the true founder of the English Church' (p. 5), and he gives to Theodore and to Bede their proper places in the noble company of men who shed a glory on the early English Church. With the coming of the Conqueror the English Church submitted to new and powerful foreign influences, and thenceforth until the reign of Henry VII. we see under Mr. Hutton's skilful guidance how the papal supremacy worked itself out in the mediæval Church. The comparatively long chapter on the Reformation is one of the very best accounts of that great movement or series of movements that we have seen, and Mr. Hutton has very happily combined the scholarly and the popular elements in his narrative. The story of the Church under the Stewarts not only describes the greatness of the Caroline divines, but includes an accurate picture of the condition of the Church of England when she was outside the protection of the law. Mr. Hutton frankly recognizes that the eighteenth century was a period of deadness, though he allows room for the redeeming features which Canon Overton has taught us to bear in mind, and he pays a just tribute to the influence of the Wesleys. The concluding chapter necessarily takes the form, at least in its latter part, of a rapid summary of familiar facts rather than of a history of the century. Enough, however, is said to show the wisdom of the remark that 'we read the past very faultily if we do not learn to trust implicitly in the providence of God' (p. 89). We may here urge upon Mr. Hutton that a crying need at the present time is an

¹ The 'elementary' history is published, like the other volumes of the series, at a shilling net. The 'short' history is a larger work, at three and sixpence.

elementary English History for use in national schools which can be used as a 'Reader,' and in which the Church of England is put in her right place.

Mr. Maude's book on *The History of the Book of Common Prayer* contains about thirty pages more than Mr. Hutton's, and possibly from the nature of its subject-matter seems to us to be less likely to meet popular taste than the brightly written 'elementary history.' We gladly recognize that the book is full of accurate information, and if Mr. Maude has erred it has been because he has attempted to include too many details in so small a book. If this decreases the suitability of the book for some, it increases it for others, and the series is designed for a wide collection of readers which includes students of theology, candidates for ordination, the members of Church guilds, and the scholars of higher classes in schools. Mr. Maude has not paid sufficient attention to the significance of his initial capitals, and whereas they occur with provoking frequency where they are not wanted, it is with a slight shock that we see 'Churchmen' printed without a capital in the first line of the book. The opening chapter, entitled 'The Book of Common Prayer,' is a brief and excellent historical survey of the sources and changes of the book, terminating with an allusion, too mild an allusion, to the Act of 1872. In the succeeding chapters this preliminary outline is filled in by taking into consideration the Liturgy, the Daily and Occasional Offices, and the Ordinal. Lastly, Mr. Maude gives an account of the Scottish Liturgy, which has a strong claim to his description of it as 'one of the most beautiful and complete in existence.' There should have been included in this last chapter some general account both of the American Prayer Book and of the Prayer Book of the Church of Ireland. The chapter on the Liturgy really enables the ordinary reader to understand the structure of the service as well as its history, and Mr. Maude very properly includes a sketch of the history of the Litany in this chapter as a penitential preparation for the Holy Eucharist. We might perhaps urge that the consideration of the daily office should have preceded this chapter if the true relation of Mattins and Evensong to the Eucharist was to be set forth in the arrangement of the book. In this as in other respects it is difficult to improve upon the Prayer Book, though we are at one with Mr. Maude in his desire to put the Eucharist in its right place as the first service of the Church. We hope that the chapter on the Daily Office will make at least two things quite clear, that the old offices of Sext, Compline, and the rest are 'fulfilled' in the Matins and Evensong of the English Church—*verbum satis sapienti*—and that 'those who are bound to be loyal to the book of Common Prayer can hardly commit an act of greater unfaithfulness both to its letter and to its spirit than by the omission of the daily office' (p. 76). In considering the occasional offices Mr. Maude begins with Baptism and Confirmation, and confines himself chiefly to the history rather than to the doctrinal aspects of their relation. He takes occasion to allude to the fact that the Confirmation Office is short, and the reminder is sorely needed in the case of many clergymen who distend the service

by an outrageous number of hymns, and in the case of bishops who weary the candidates by a very long address, or even what is worse by two addresses, often a mere recapitulation of matter which has been persistently inculcated in the time of preparation. We must not complain that Mr. Maude has kept too closely to his purpose of writing a 'history' of the Prayer Book, but we confess that we should have been glad to see, when he was treating of Holy Matrimony, some allusion to the wholesome stringency of the marriage laws of the Church of England, both in regard to the prohibition of unlawful unions, and the indissoluble character of a lawful marriage. He has lost a great opportunity of pointing out that the Table of Kindred (relationship by blood) and affinity (relationship by marriage) establishes two great marriage principles of the Bible—first, that blood and marriage relationships are regarded by God as of equal importance; and secondly, that the marriage of those who are three or less than three steps of relationship apart is unlawful. We wish this the more as we observe that Mr. Maude has not hesitated to devote some space in treating of the Communion of the Sick to a passage which much too confidently declares that there is nothing in the present rubrics to forbid the reservation of the Sacrament after a private celebration for the Communion of other sick persons, that reservation was regarded as lawful in 1560 because the Latin Prayer Book allows it, and that it is 'certainly' not forbidden by the sixth post-Communion rubric (pp. 103-4, cp. p. 111). Similarly in the section on the Burial of the Dead we regret that the disciplinary provision of the opening rubric has not received the attention which was due to it. These and other omissions lead us to say that Mr. Maude has treated the history in a spirit of academic intellectualism, and has not dealt with the Prayer Book as a living practical book. Yet a history of the Prayer Book should be able to show how the religious life of the English Church is bound up in vital union with it in the past, and never more than now. The brief allusions to the Athanasian Creed (p. 77) and the Communion Service (p. 110) fall far short of what is needed to meet current perplexity. We shall indeed be sorry if this volume, thoroughly satisfactory in some respects, is allowed to stand as the sole manual upon the Prayer Book in the series. We do not blame Mr. Maude for its defects, for he has evidently, and hardly anywhere more than in the chapter on the Ordinal (p. 111), felt himself to be restrained within rigid lines of treatment, and we have sufficient confidence in Mr. Pullan to believe that he will secure a practical addition to his series from some clergyman of wide and long pastoral experience, who shall be able to show the true work and place of the Prayer Book in the hearts of English Churchmen. In a few additional notes the student will find extracts from Pliny and St. Justin Martyr, the Sarum Canon of the Mass, a short and accurate statement of various views upon the doctrine of the Holy Eucharist, and a list of books recommended for further study—a list which is not altogether satisfactory or complete.

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The English Reformation. A Lecture, with a Preface and Notes. By the Rev. W. H. HUTTON, B.D. (London : Rivingtons, 1899.)

MR. HUTTON has dedicated this lecture 'to William Bright, D.D., Regius Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Canon of Christ Church, Oxford, with homage and affection,' and in his notes he renders honour to the other great Oxford historian by quoting from the Bishop of Oxford's Charge 'the weightiest words that have been said on the subject of confession for many a day'—words which Mr. Hutton is sanguine enough to hope that all loyal Churchmen will accept with complete agreement (p. 40).¹ The lecture, we are told in the preface, was delivered by request of the Bishop of London to the London Diocesan Branch of the Church Committee for Church Defence and Church Instruction, an organization which may profitably bear the word Reformation in mind as helping its excellent workers to remember that when the Church is cleansed by her own sons she is most truly defended. Mr. Hutton's lecture has been attacked by Roman Catholics, and in his comments on the controversy in the preface he is led by his confidence in his own position to reply in rather a light tone. But it would be difficult to mend Mr. Hutton's words when he proceeds to comment upon the Incense and Reservation controversy, and says, writing before he has read the comments of others, that 'the principle of obedience to constituted authority, so strongly emphasized in the English Reformation, is one of the true marks of the historic Church,' and that 'opposition to this principle has led invariably and inevitably to heresy and schism' (Pref., p. xvii).

The great merit of Mr. Hutton's lecture is that he has, for the most part, resisted the temptation to pursue the bypaths which perpetually diverge from the main road, and has succeeded more than many others who have lectured on the Reformation in adhering closely to the real question at issue. He asks, What was the Reformation? and, Did it affect the continuity of the great national institution which is the grandest factor in our national history? What was the Reformation? 'It was,' says Mr. Hutton, 'a long movement, beginning when Henry VII. sat on the throne and ending when the first Parliament of Charles II. confirmed and ratified the constitution of the Church as it was established—for it had always been established—by law' (pp. 4-5). It lasted from about 1485 to 1662, and Mr. Hutton, taking occasion on the way to point out that Henry VIII.'s divorce had little to do with the real root of the Reformation (p. 10), gives a very clear account of the salient points of the movement. Starting from the direction of public attention to gross

¹ We did our part, in our last number, in endeavouring to extend the usefulness of Dr. Stubbs's weighty Charge. But we have been informed by a regular reader of our pages that he applied in vain to the Clarendon Press for a copy. If the Bishop will hide his light under a bushel and not allow the Charge to be circulated in pamphlet form, we can only refer to the excellent report of it which appeared in the *Guardian* of May 24 last.

monastic scandals, clerical ignorance, and papal extortions and abuse of patronage, the Reformation continuously progressed until it cast off the Pope's jurisdiction, and gave us an English Service and an open Bible. Mr. Hutton does not say, but we—who have been recently standing among the ruins of some of the fair Cistercian abbeys of Yorkshire—are constrained to add that some good seed was rooted up by the servants of the Divine Householder when they were gathering up the bundles of tares which the enemy had sown. But did this work, admitting that some of it was impatiently executed, break the continuity of the Church of England, the national Church, which is the representative of the Church of our Lord Jesus Christ and His Apostles in this land? Mr. Hutton answers this question by looking at it first legally and externally, and then as regards doctrine and discipline. He shows that historically it is absolutely impossible to assert that the continuity was broken, for the laws of Church and State go on speaking of the English Church as before—all Church property passed as before from rector to rector or from vicar to vicar, with no new law transferring it from one body or person to another. When a bishop died, his successor was appointed in the legal way to fill his place. Pole succeeded Cranmer, and Parker succeeded Pole, and the legal forms distinctly stated the vacancy and recognized the succession (p. 19). Bramhall has 'not the least doubt that the Church of England before the Reformation, and the Church of England after the Reformation, are as much the same Church as a garden before it is weeded and after it is weeded is the same garden' (p. 3); and the Church of England, as every lawyer and historian knows, does claim to-day to be the same body which, as a branch of that One Holy Catholic Apostolic Church of which we speak in the Creeds, was founded on English soil by St. Augustine in 597 (p. 4). But the argument may be shifted to doctrine and discipline; and, putting aside points such as the invocation of saints, which no one would seriously urge as affecting continuity, Mr. Hutton proves that the vast majority of the English clergy in the sixteenth century saw no break of continuity in the entire repudiation of the Papal jurisdiction by the Convocations in 1534, nor in the second repudiation at the accession of Elizabeth. It is equally difficult to show that the repudiation of the doctrine of Transubstantiation, only fully and finally defined for the Church of Rome in 1563, involved any breach of continuity. And as for Holy Orders, the Church of England, both in fact and in declared intention, has emphatically continued them, and is unmoved by the Pope's recent but almost forgotten pronouncement.¹ The fact is, says Mr. Hutton, doctrinal continuity 'consists in loyal adherence to the Creeds and the Canons of the undivided Church' (p. 27). The point of discipline is even more easily answered. The Church of England has never repudiated the canon law; the disciplinary powers of bishops and of ecclesiastical courts are recognized in her official formularies; she enjoins fasts, and she allows confession. We must keep on insisting

¹ For 'pointed' read 'pointed out' in line 10, p. 27.

that the continuous life of the Church of Christ in our land was not broken at the Reformation, and such lectures as Mr. Hutton's show us on what firm historical ground we stand when we so maintain.

'We are proud of our historic Church; we are proud of the long line of our bishops—evangelical, apostolic, learned, saintly. We are proud to obey the Church and obey the bishops. We believe that it is God Who has given to us both Church and bishops, and that our loyalty to them is but part of that absolute and unquestioning loyalty which we everyone of us desire, by His grace, to pay to Him Who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life' (p. 33).

We endorse these words, and they express the hearty loyalty, we are persuaded, of thousands of Churchmen at the present time. Will the divinely steered Ship be driven on to the rocks by a few wilful and obstinate men, when the majority are loyal to the supreme commands of the Master? Surely not.

Asiatic Studies: Religious and Social. By SIR ALFRED C. LYALL, K.C.B., D.C.L. (London: John Murray, 1899.)

THERE are two volumes of these *Studies*. The first was published in 1882, and is now re-edited. The second consists of a number of essays whose principal subject is religion. Religion in India, religion in China, primitive religion *passim* are their topics. The last paper is a forecast of the future of the yellow races, *a propos* of Mr. Pearson's famous forebodings. We will confess that we have found great pleasure in reading them; their style is lively and refreshing; humour is rarely absent; every point is aptly illustrated; a rich multifarious experience is made available for us by a keen observer of men and manners, who brings to bear on whatever subject he touches the energies of an acute, independent, cultured mind.

All the papers have been published before, and their dominant ideas have filtered into public circulation. Distrust of the philosophic savant is one of them:

'He is prone to overstrain his theories, to use the same weight and measure for all his facts, to lay stress on superficial resemblances, and in other respects to suffer the disadvantages which beset every judge, however able and learned, who is obliged to take evidence at second hand' (p. 239).

The reviewer quotes with approval Miss Kingsley's dictum that the first thing before starting to hunt the religious idea in West Africa is to burn all one's notions about sun myths and the worship of elemental forces (p. 241). The review of Mr. Frazer's *Golden Bough* is in effect a masterly exposure of theory run mad. Professor Max Müller and the philologists are met with crucial facts of observation that destroy our confidence in their generalizations. Sir Alfred is by way of being a euhemerist. In India, at any rate, deities are of human origin. Yet when in West Africa Miss Kingsley finds a clear line of demarcation existing between ghosts and gods, and lays down that 'West Africa has not deified ancestors,' he accepts her observation. His cardinal principle is that an ounce of fact is worth

a pound of theory. He will not abandon his principle even for a theory of his own. On page 271 he pricks with a pin the bubble of much modern philosophy-making :

'It is not safe to borrow the terms of physical science, or to rely upon analogies which it suggests ; as, for instance, when we are told that differences of belief may be compared to the variations of organisms, so that whatever varieties of belief are not favoured by their environment will perish, while the rest will survive. These are in fact rather metaphors than sound analogies ; you could not lay out the history of religion on such a theory.'

In the Rede lecture (p. 256) we are given a study of Natural Religion from observations of India. The Natural Religion of Butler is the religion that reason might extract from observing nature. It is this religion that the English Government have some thought of embodying in the curriculum of the Indian schools. But Sir Alfred means by the term religion in a state of nature, growing up spontaneously out of the free play of man's fears and hopes. 'I mean a religion that has not yet acquired a distinctive form and a settled base, but is constantly springing up and reproducing itself under different shapes in diverse species' (p. 293).

The inveterate belief in the migratory soul is the foundation stone, Pantheism the crown of the natural structure, and nowhere will the general reader gain a clearer idea of the comprehension of multitudinous idolatries under a single philosophic scheme than in the perusal of these volumes. The toleration of the Pantheist philosophers of the West, as we know it in the case e.g. of the Stoics, and the combination of a transcendental idealism with the recognition of every species of black and white magic, such as we find in the Neoplatonism of the schools when Christianity wrestled with it and overthrew it, is a fact of experience in the India of to-day.

There is indeed a very close relation between the political attitude of the early Empire towards all religions and that so amusingly sketched for us by Sir Alfred as at this moment existing in China. In China the State holds friendly relations with and a controlling power over a multitude of religions which, even in their ultimate analysis, are an irreducible three. Confucius, Buddha, and the Taoists are all identified with the State's administration and with the reigning dynasty. The humours of the *Yellow Gazette* are as entertaining as they are instructive. The danger of this course is seen by Sir Alfred :

'Probably nothing is more perilous to a government that has incorporated the elder and milder religions into its system, and has soothed them and lulled them into a tame and subordinate officialism, than an assault upon those very religions by a wild and ardent faith suddenly blazing up in the midst of them' (p. 141).

Only 'a great ruler like Constantine may have the address and foresight to save, his government by going over to the winning side in time' (p. 141).

The three letters 'from Vamadeo Shastri,' with which the second

series commences, are of great value both to the missionary and the statesman. It is made clear that the problem before the former is the intellectual overthrow of Pantheism. 'The one commodity we shall never be persuaded, even by its cheapness, to import from Europe, is a religion' (p. 23). 'Your creeds unquestionably inculcate very high morality, but they are beginning to fail in a *a priori* certainty' (p. 24). 'Vishnu and Siva will not descend to the level of ministers of public instruction' (p. 25). 'The innermost religious idea of the Hindus has for ages been the supreme unimportance, if not the nothingness, of this particular stage of existence' (p. 38).

In all these passages the thought is implicit that modern Christianity, the Protestantism of the bazaars, has been transforming itself into a mere system of rational ethics, whose end is to make this world comfortable. Europe has at this moment no other religion to offer. But if Pantheism is to be overcome, it must be met on the same field and with the same resources as gave Christianity the victory in the age of the Creeds.

To what extent is, or was, State support essential to such a victory? Sir Alfred appears to think that even the determination of dogmas is alien, offensive, impossible, to the Hindu mind—that at any rate only by a continuous exercise of State authority for many ages could it be forced upon the people. For the authority of the State in religion is again one of their natural beliefs; they instinctively look for its exercise. But India has been ruled by the British on the principles of Macaulay. 'The State has no more to do with theology than a gas company has' (p. 28). 'Yet the position that religious belief has everything to do with the conduct of individuals, and nothing to do with the conduct of governments, is foreign to the traditions of Asiatic kingcraft, and would in India be thought hard to defend' (p. 29). The inevitable result of the secular State in India must be to gradually divorce religion altogether from conduct, and to discredit religion in the eyes of the people, the issue being full of dangers for the State itself as State.

We have only briefly indicated the problems with which these letters deal—to discuss them fully exceeds the limits of our space; but we have said enough to show that the matters treated are of vital import. Perhaps in the intellectual pleasure of reading criticisms so acute the thought does sometimes emerge that a skilled diagnosis is not of itself a cure.

Neo-Malthusianism. By R. USSHER. (London: Gibbins and Co., 1898.)

A USEFUL book to possess for reference. It contains innumerable statistics of population and birth rates, with quotations from all the principal authorities on the extent and perniciousness of the evil it deals with. Malthus found the cause of the miserable standard of living among the poor in excessive population, and proposed to limit it by more prudence in marriage. The Malthusian theory itself is rather doubtful. It is the quality of the population rather than the quantity that is the main factor. Unhappily this book discloses a

state of things in which the quality is bad and not the quantity only too great. The statistics and conditions of child-marriages are appalling. It is among a people, a mass, of which such child-marriage is the habit, that the doctrines of Neo-Malthusianism have spread like a plague. The strange fact is that their propagation has never succeeded when it was avowedly and openly in the interest of vice. Ardent social reformers of the stamp of Mrs. Besant have done the work, and the propaganda has had money at its back sufficient to set in circulation masses of tracts and cheap literature. It is not only among the proletariat that the mischief is done. The limitation of the number of children in a family is felt as a need when a social standing has to be kept up. The teaching has in this way found open ears among the professional classes, clerks, small tradesmen, and wherever a position has to be maintained. And again, in the world of fashion and luxury the inconveniences of child-bearing as interfering with pleasures have led to the same result. Infanticide and abortion come within the reach of the criminal law, but the practices recommended by Neo-Malthusianism are outside its range. We gather that the initiative is mainly with women, and that doctors are habitually consulted by married women of all classes as to the means to be taken. If so, the medical profession have to a large extent the matter in their hands; as far, at any rate, as the results are traceable in physical disease, it rests with that profession to give warning and instruction. Social reformers, again, may be convinced of their error; the propaganda of tracts dried up, and a counter-propaganda took its place. Here and there one may be moved by the demonstration of injury to the race, constituting a moral check. For readers of this Review, and for the clergy generally, the problem is whether religion can be effectually appealed to. We do not altogether hold with describing the reluctance to speak on such subjects as the reluctance of a false delicacy, nor if there were only the gauntlet to be run of malicious misrepresentation, would we, theoretically at least, shrink from it. But we very much doubt whether it is the province of the clergy to enter into the physiological details, without which interference would be useless. All that can be said is generally that marriage has child-bearing for its end Divinely given, and that when that end is of malice intent frustrated, *there is sin*. We may also lay down the principle that if there is to be speech on such a subject, the more direct, scientific and matter of fact it is the better; and, we will add, the form of a pastoral issued to many has advantages over private exhortation unless the latter is specifically called for. It is probable that the Mothers' Guilds might with care be made of use. This volume does not keep the religious motive clearly enough before the mind to be of direct service to the Church in such a work.

Outside Neo-Malthusianism also it travels over the whole field of the 'social evil' and its manifestations; and it is evident that when the age of marriage for a man is fixed at thirty, and of a woman at twenty-five, religion must have a voice in all that period of temptation which intervenes between early puberty and those ages.

As literature Mr. Ussher's work has not, and is not intended to have, any value; while in estimating its value as a statement of fact, we ought to remember that continual attention to a plague spot is apt to increase its proportions to nightmare scale. Juvenal drew Rome truly, but with falsehood in his truth.

The Ascent through Christ. By E. GRIFFITH JONES, B.A.
(London: James Bowden, 1899.)

THIS is a 'study of the Doctrine of Redemption in the light of the theory of Evolution.' From the preface (p. i) we gather that the theory of Evolution is merely the principle of Development, and the study of the doctrine of Redemption is the 'study of certain spiritual facts which cluster round the mystery.' These facts are 'Sin and the correlative theory of the fall of man, the Person of Christ, the Atoning Death and Resurrection, and the New Life in Him' (p. i), 'together with such subsidiary problems as radiate from these focal centres.' Such problems are *e.g.* those connected with the Higher Criticism and the Virgin Birth, and the book is in effect a general summary of the position of advanced theology on the lines laid down by *Lux Mundi*. To our mind it contains too much rhetoric, and too little scientific precision, as one would expect from a treatise whose facts are also theories and problems which cluster round mysteries. The writer is a man of deep culture and wide reading. This displays itself in a multitude of snippings, paragraphs, and mottoes. One from Oliver Wendell Holmes takes precedence even of the title-page: 'The hardest and most painful task of the student of to-day is to occidentalize and modernize the Asiatic modes of thought which have come down to us closely welded with mediæval interpretations.' On page viii the purpose is more clearly expressed: It is to 'remodel the contents of the author's faith in accordance with such of the principles of the theory of Evolution as seemed safely established.' This involves (page ix) 'a frank acceptance of the doctrine of human development as it is now universally held among reputable anthropologists.' Wallace is followed, not Darwin, and the physical nature of man is separated from the rational and moral. As the physical nature of man includes a neural system with which consciousness is coincident, stronger evidence than that supplied in this volume will be needed if the writer's position is to be maintained. Dogmatic statements of what animals are or are not, can or cannot do, are of little value; as *e.g.* that 'brutes are mere bundles of associated sensations' (p. 60), or that 'duality in self-consciousness is absolutely missing in the sense consciousness of the highest animals' (p. 61). 'So far as can be scientifically ascertained,' the author adds; but there is and can be no scientific evidence that it is missing. Objectively there is little to distinguish men from animals; and Evolution is above all things an objective view of Nature.

The writer stakes the existence of the Christian Faith on the issue of his inquiry. There is 'trepidation at the possibilities of a shattered faith in the storm and tangle ahead.' And yet, on p. 70,

'a heart whose personal grasp of the truth of God is steadfast and unwavering' is a condition *sine qua non* of success. From so ambiguous a platform little can be expected but a mutilation of both Evolution and Christianity. The frank acceptance *e.g.* of myth, legend, and allegory in the Scripture records, while holding to their inward, mystical, spiritual truth, avails not. When the moral of the parable and the significance of the allegory are drawn out, Evolution proper will have none of them, and pays as little heed to the new ultimatum as to the old. Neither is Evolution a baby to be won by prattling in a baby dialect. Degenerations, arrested developments, excurrent stems, reversions to type, environments, cells, fissions, embryos, may run out at the mouth, but while the effect is to 'cumber religion with much biological rubbish,' it is not to convert Evolution into a friend. We will take, as our space allows, but one illustration. The doctrine of the Incarnation is directly at variance with scientific Evolution, and indirectly also, through the necessity of providing a theory for the Higher Criticism under which our Lord could be ignorant of it and yet Divine. Stress is laid on His perfect Human Nature, and, to our thinking, the Divine is obscured. *E.g.* :

'It is true that there was behind all this human weakness—at least at times, for the *consciousness of Deity was apparently an intermittent, or at least a variable, factor in His experience*—an occasional conviction that He might have drawn on infinite resources of succour and help had He chosen to do so' (p. 331).

The Godhead lies, then, in a kind of nebulous mist at the back of the conscious life, if persistent in being, not persistent in action or consciousness, a *verbum quiescens*. On p. 333 this *verbum quiescens* seems to have slipped away altogether.

'Just as we are told that the embryo recapitulates in the preliminary stages of the individual life the whole history of the race, so we may reverently say that in the stages of growth of the perfect life as seen in Jesus from the cradle to the cross, we see the pathway that would have been followed by the race if, instead of falling into sin, it had retained its innocence and gone on to perfection.'

In that case there would have been no Redemption needed; the Cross would not have appeared in the life, which is throughout conditioned by redemptive necessities. Again, the comparison of a whole human life to an embryo is bewildering. The true thought required for the analogy is that the embryo (we say it because we are forced) of our Lord recapitulated what, but for the Fall, would have been the history of mankind. It rose *i.e.* to the level of the first Adam, but *no higher*. The miracle of the Incarnation will then be that by the Divine interference an embryo, conceivable possible under certain antecedents, came into being although those antecedents were absent, and though other antecedents contradicting them at every point were present. Such a theory flies as straight in the face of every postulate of Evolution as in the face of Christian dogma. The Child conceived by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin

Mary is by Christian dogma the Word of God in Person, holy without qualification, and at an infinitely higher level than any race or creature. Even the childhood of our Lord manifests in its preliminary stages not the life of any unfallen Adam, but the life of God. He was born with the category of Godhead, just as we are born with and use from and before the moment of birth the categories of reason.

To deny the Divine Personality is of course no part of the kenoticist's programme; but he has two tendencies, one to reduce that Personality to a nebulous aura intermittently emerging in consciousness, the other to commingle it with a human personality; e.g. 'the Pre-existent Logos took shape in a human person' (p. 268); only 'the essence of the Personality was Divine' (p. 268); and 'a single personality neither wholly Divine nor wholly human' (p. 288, footnotes; quoted from Clarke) are phrases that indicate the thought.

All this appears to us to disturb points settled by the Church, and to throw the whole doctrine of the Incarnation open for fresh determination. There is a discussion on the 'Virgin Birth' on the lines laid down by Canon Gore; but such a passage as the following indicates another line of thought struggling for expression:

'The foreshadowings of the coming Redeemer in the Old Testament are a kind of embryonic Christ, heralding and giving pledge of what shall in the fulness of time appear in the Flesh. The very centuries were in travail with the Son of God, who was also the Son of Man, and when the period of gestation was complete the womb of Time brought forth "the Firstborn of every creature"' (p. 325).

There are not many steps from explaining the Virgin Birth as an accommodation to our understandings, to striking it out altogether. Faith in an embryonic Christ whose mother is Time is, however, not exactly a Christian creed. Neither will Christ immanent in creation satisfy Evolution if He also transcend creation. Evolution requires resident forces without sophistry. It is a working hypothesis which excludes God from consideration. God is a suspect to it—is the *deus ex machina* of the playwright. The Christian theory of grace tramples on this hypothesis at every turn. Not only is the Incarnation a new departure, but the energy of the Holy Spirit in regenerating, feeding, helping each believer individually, acts, as it were, on a system of new departures. There is no restoration and uplifting of the human race by a single act, so that a new human nature is constituted, which can become hereditary and enter into the continuous germplasm of the race. Rather while nature moves on to its dissolution by frost or fire, the force from above enters at right angles, and transfers individuals to the new body, which is of Christ, not Nature.

We are not, then, much in harmony with the trend of this book. It does not seem to us to be scientific or precise enough, but it fairly represents the present confusion of rational theology. It covers the whole ground, provides the reader with all the current words of Theism, and is written with an earnestness that gives some dignity and beauty to its style.

Remnancy, or Evolution's Missing Link. By E. W. BEAVEN.
(London: A. H. Stockwell and Co., 1899.)

REMNCANCY is the name of Adam's mother. Evolution has fathered and mothered a strange progeny. This is the strangest we have encountered. The writer's style is bewildering. The dignity of his subject impels him to poetry, now disguised to the eye as prose, now naked and unashamed.

'Then out of matter is the spirit evolved—though how these teachers do not say—and lo! they view the clay-formed creature thrust, by Evolution's ever upward trend, to life immortal! All the atoms work by earth impelled and earth's environment, to lofty doings and divinest thought!'

'Men have laboured to find it, and oftentimes think
They've alighted at last on the long-missing link
'Tween the monkey and man's elevation;
But of specimens none can the scientist show
To decide the descent of the human so low,
Through a mongrel commingled creation' (p. 10).

There are 243 pages that leave no doubt of the poet's stamina. Fiction also abounds. It flashes across the horizon like a train in Bradshaw that neither starts nor arrives but calls everywhere on the road. Just when a three-volume novel at least is in sight, it fizzles off in poetry or padding. Mr. Beaven is a staunch upholder of the literal text of Scripture. 'I write in defence of the Book of Books' (p. 1). 'By that proud sacrilegious invader called the Higher Criticism—the greatest apostasy of the age—the Bible is being terribly torn to pieces' (p. 2). On the other hand, he is a staunch evolutionist.

'Do I hear a doubting reader ask, regarding Evolution's methods here advanced, Where are thy proofs? Then I would first enquire, Who art thou, friend? What is thy creed? Dost thou belong to that fast-diminishing minority whose untutored minds must still uphold the instantaneous make of man? If so, I ask thee in return, "Where are thy proofs?" "Canst thou from Nature aught advance to prove this hurried mode? Or bringest thou the Bible text as evidence that thy belief is true? From neither source wilt thou adduce the proofs of hasty build"' (p. 65).

To combine the literal text of the Scriptures with the theory of Evolution requires some ingenuity. Our author's method is the imaginative reconstruction of environment coupled with a very determined precision in interpreting the letter. Days are days, but 'practically eternal' days, and if man was formed of the dust of the earth he was formed in the right evolutionary plan. Physically he is developed from a germ, but apes are not in the same line, are not even excurrent stems from his stock. With the physical there is also a psychical development, and even a moral one, such as animals may reach, 'for the moulding of man to a rational and spiritual character must be the special work of the Almighty Maker's hand' (p. 79). Remnancy is the last of this pre-Adamite human kind. Of her Adam was born by a Virgin Birth. Adam gave birth to Eve by 'fission.' The physiological process is described and accounted for. During it he

slept on a bed of boughs from the *Lac Vite* tree ; he slept and dreamed a chapter or two ; while he slept the baby Eve is born to him unconscious, and nourished for a while on the *Lac Vite* leaves. Remnancy, who, although she sang like a nightingale, could not talk, and was no companion for her son in his adult years, dwelt apart in a bower of her own, acting as a kind of nurse to the rare sick animals. Animal nature on the earth was gentle and good—there were death forces but no disease—only in the waters did the monsters teem, and an alligator ate Remnancy's father while bathing—on land all was harmony and love, and even Death was Sleep's own brother. Still there were accidents, and Remnancy was a great herbalist and bone-setter, her bower an Arcadian Jain hospital. Her favourite companion was a doe that had once been a fawn with a thorn in its foot. Adam, as we said, was sleeping and dreaming, baby Eve lying on the *Lac Vite* leaves by his side ; to them enters Remnancy, carries off the child, gives her to the doe to suckle, rears her for twenty-five years, then brings her to Adam. Her rôle was then complete. The missing link disappears, to perish perhaps in the great catastrophe of nature that accompanied the Fall. The story of the Fall introduces a conception strange to Scripture, and not, we think, demanded by Evolution. Adam ate because Eve ate, being morally bound to cleave to his wife. A little novelette from another planet tells us how Daman and Veve in Vinarth had the same trial. Daman was angry with Veve for eating, repelled her, took out a writ of divorce-ment. He was left in the garden, but for his rigour was abandoned by God. He grew to great wisdom, became a scientific evolutionist, and finally on a careful analysis of the tree came to the conclusion that there was no poison in it, and ate deliberately. Thus he fell, and fell beyond redemption. Mr. Beaven is apparently not only a poet and a Bible Christian, but a teetotaler, a vegetarian, a millenarian, and many other things. All these isms come floating in on wings of rhyme and text and story. The book is a strange mixture. A farrago of nonsense and impiety? Well, yes. But there are grains of salt—so many grains of salt that—is it a skit, a parody, burlesque? If so, of whom, of what? Mr. Beaven wears the cap and bells, but yet has wisdom in his folly. If ever we lecture on Evolution in Hyde Park, we will think of Remnancy.

The Divinity of Our Lord Jesus Christ from Pascal. A Commentary by WILLIAM BULLEN MORRIS, of the Oratory. (London : Burns and Oates, Limited, 1898.)

THE real purpose of this book is to contrast the teaching of the master mind of a great thinker who was, by conviction, on the side of revelation with the new philosophy which parades its unbelief. We have one great fault to find with the author's presentation of the subject, viz. that we have too little of Pascal himself in his own words, a great deal about Pascal from one point of view, and far too much about other great thinkers, *e.g.* St. Augustine, Sir Isaac Newton, Lord Bacon, Kant, Hegel, Häckel, and others, which overshadows the real subject of this study. In fact, we have here a

commentary which overloads the text, and makes us long to be allowed to know what Pascal himself felt and taught. We do get some extracts from the *Pensées* and from other writings—e.g. 'the Mystery of Jesus' and his 'Prayer in Sickness'; but if we analyze the fourth chapter, that on 'Our Lord Jesus Christ,' the longest but one in the book (pp. 84-135), it will be seen that we are justified in making these strictures. Fourteen pages are introductory; then Pascal's views are stated (pp. 99-104); then follows a comment on his opinions; and the last sixteen pages are devoted to the discussion of other minds, including Cardinal Newman and St. Teresa, who have points in common with Pascal. The last chapter (ch. v.), on 'The New Unbelief,' is almost entirely occupied with the consideration of Kant, St. Augustine, and Mr. Gostwick's *German Culture and Christianity*, a book upon which Mr. Morris bestows high praise (pp. 166-173). Still we are grateful for the scraps of information which we can gather from this commentary on Pascal. For example, his system in leading men to belief in Jesus Christ is very clearly stated (pp. 14, 15):

'Starting with the idea of a Creator, and ever active Governor of the World, he comes to Christ as the centre and end of prophecy fulfilled, and the possessor of gifts exceeding even the imagination of man; and then he leaves the mind with one of two alternatives: to deny all, or to confess all.'

We are told also that 'it was Pascal's intention, interrupted by his death, to have put aside every other study and interest, that he might devote ten years to a work on Christian Evidences' (p. 7). The following extract from the *Pensées* contains a very striking thought: 'The Church has had as hard a task to prove that Jesus Christ was man against those who denied it, as to prove that He was God: appearances were as strong one way as the other' (pp. 113, 114); and we are delighted with this remark, viz. 'Pascal's principle that Jesus Christ is to us the centre of all truth in heaven and on the earth runs like a thread of gold through his speculations on everything in which the soul of man is concerned' (p. 104). But the importance of this book, in our opinion, lies in chapters ii. and iii., where Pascal's argument for belief in Jesus Christ from the history of the Jews and the prophecies is brought out. Pascal was no Jew-hater (p. 58), and he found in the fact that the Jews carefully preserved all through their history a Book which was in itself an abiding witness to their own unfaithfulness to God, a strong proof of the truth of that history upon which the Christian religion was built. Again, Pascal laid great weight upon the cumulative force of the prophecies (pp. 75-82), and found in them, as fulfilled in the Christian Church, 'the greatest of the evidences for Jesus Christ' (p. 70), in comparison with which our Lord's miracles were of little importance to after ages, though 'of primary importance' 'in His lifetime and in the first stage of the life of the Church' (p. 70). Both these classes of evidence have been taken too little account of in modern times. There are, however, a few things in this book which we regret, viz. (1) the unnecessary stigma which is inflicted

upon Protestant writers, while their evidence is largely employed ; (2) the exaggeration of the value of the 'lay-intellect' because Pascal was a 'layman and no theologian,' and the assertion that in England 'the most popular, and perhaps the most authoritative, advocates and expounders of Christian truth' have been laymen (Preface, p. xv, and p. 45) ; (3) the attempt to drag in the cultus of the Blessed Virgin Mary (p. 94) into the discussion of Pascal's testimony to our Lord Jesus Christ ; and (4) the foolish parade of a 'Parliament of the dead and gone,' all 'laymen,' in a chronological table, where the 'believers' are set forth over against the 'unbelievers' (pp. 186-187). Such a list proves nothing of any value, because in the case of the believers the 'intellectual sovereigns' are selected from six centuries, while the unbelievers are confined to just over two hundred years. What we should like to have is a handy edition of Pascal's *Pensées*, with just enough editing to guide the reader in understanding the full force of his argument for belief in Jesus Christ ; in the present volume we are told much about Pascal's method, but not enough about Pascal himself.

Short Studies on Vital Subjects. By the Rev. P. W. DE QUETTEVILLE, M.A. (London : Eliot Stock, 1898.)

In the preface the author complains that in Christian teaching the dogmatic has been too often put first, whereas the ethical is of more importance. Accordingly in these studies he has attempted to eliminate the dogmatic altogether, and the result is that we have a series of addresses, often couched in tender and graceful language, but without anything which can be laid hold of and carried away. There is a kind of colourless mediocrity running through the whole series, even where the writer might have been definite and forcible. For example, No. X., 'The Sainted Dead,' is the kind of vapid commonplace which is often written by good people when they hear of a relative's death ; No. XVII., which is a plea for the Sunday rest, would not have the least effect upon anybody who thought Sunday might be given up to recreation ; there is no argument in the address, nothing to make one feel that Sunday observance is a witness both to our redemption by Christ Jesus and to our hope of everlasting life. And No. XXV., which is entitled 'The Good Soldier,' and is addressed to soldiers, if a trifle more vigorous than some, strikes us as too long and elaborate, but it certainly interested us in a way that none of the others did. Our chief complaint against Mr. de Quetteville's teaching is that he ignores the doctrinal side altogether. There are some fundamental truths which must be insisted upon, and without which Christian ethics are groundless ; and we believe that Christian behaviour and Christian temper are encouraged, and certainly not hindered, by a strong insistence upon a definite belief in the Person of Christ, the Catholic Church, and sacramental grace. A colourless Christianity is never likely to convert the world.

Highways and Byways in Donegal and Antrim. By STEPHEN GWYNN, with illustrations by HUGH THOMSON. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1899.)

AUTHOR and illustrator have here combined to present us with a delightful book, the acquisition of which will never give a moment's discontent to the purchaser, unless it be at that difficult moment when he debates whether to bring with him so excellent a guide-book, or leave it unsoiled on his drawing-room bookshelves at home. We suppose all our English readers are by this time aware that Ireland is not dependent on Killarney for appearance, like a dandy who spends all his available money on one diamond ring. We are of opinion that it is rather on her coasts and cliffs that her most characteristic scenery is to be found. It is also by this time commonly known that the Irish people are, with all their defects, a good set-off to their land. But scarcely the most simple of tourists can expect to find much remaining of genuine Irish character among the Killarney guides and boatmen, who have for so many years been studying the weaknesses of strangers of all races that they have acquired a kind of cosmopolitan stamp themselves. Mr. Gwynn conducts his readers and followers through some of the best of those coasts and cliffs, so beautiful in themselves and so characteristic of Ireland; not all of them to be sure, for he does not touch the sheer black cliffs of Clare, nor yet those of North Mayo, lower in height, but full of beauty where, at Downpatrick Head and away towards the Stags of Broadhaven, you can row into those coloured sea caves, almost as beautiful as Capri, though in different tints, and see the seals swimming out under the boat. In respect of the study of Irish character too, Mr. Gwynn is truly an excellent guide. His own style, ever ready for pathos or for fun, but never for vulgarity, sets the mind in the proper attitude both for enjoying his own tour and attracting the ready sympathy of the native; and Mr. Thomson can make both pathos and fun to flow from his pencil as the brother artist sheds them from his pen. We fear that the episodes from the sad history of Ireland which are interwoven with the tour will hardly win an interest like that which the old castles and churches of England awaken. We do not realize the heroes well enough, nor are the remains so grand or beautiful as to awaken our sympathy. But nobody can be wearied with antiquarian details so sparingly imparted, and the English traveller learns that events of real human interest did actually take place on the ground where he treads. Sometimes they were not very creditable to his own race, and account for a good deal of the ill-feeling with which England in the abstract is regarded, and which contrasts so strongly with the good humour and kindness which the Englishman and the Englishwoman will everywhere find.

A certain English lady was expatiating to a chance Irishman in a railway carriage upon the civility which she had met with in Ireland, and especially from the railway porters. The Hibernian replied that he didn't think they were anything particular. But he got out and sauntered along the platform at the next station asking the

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porter each time he passed him, 'Porter, does this train go to Thurles?' The porter replied with decreasing politeness as the suspicion grew on him that he was being made game of; but the querist took his seat in the carriage and said to the lady, 'Suppose we try how your notion works,' and calling over the same porter he repeated the same question, and received for reply, 'Och, go to the devil!' So may the best deserved reputation of poor Paddy be sacrificed to the larks of a compatriot. But let us not be too hard on the joker; perhaps the good lady had displayed some air of patronage. Pat cannot stand that any more than John Bull can; but where the latter retorts by something cross, his neighbour 'takes a rise.'

But there is one form of patronage, and that the very worst, which Irish people will not openly resent, however they may draw it out by their inventions—that of careless giving, by which the Anglo-Saxon, and most of all the American, traveller has spoiled of their self-respect the poor of many a country. Mr. Gwynn makes a strong attempt to protect his beloved peasantry from an injury which we shall not call well meant, since it is inflicted by the self-indulgent for the sake of self-glorification. There are some parts of Ireland, in the south and among the western islands, where we fear the harm is done past recall. But the Donegal peasantry are not of these. They are not only apt to learn, but honestly willing to repay as they can monetary obligations when conferred by such good friends as those whose proceedings Mr. Gwynn describes, and it is a great pity that we should not be willing to give them the opportunity of doing something for us without payment. They will do it willingly, and the brother of low degree will rejoice in that he is exalted and the rich in that he is made low.

The tour begins at Ballyshannon, very near to Bundoran, the sea-side resort for many counties and now better provided than before with hotel and lodging-house advantages. There may be enjoyed beautiful walks both in the country and along the coast towards Mullaghmore, where Lord Palmerston persuaded the Austrian pine to grow in the sandy soil, and the picturesque groups of kelp-burners may be seen extracting iodine—Mr. Gwynn tells a good story thereanent—and the artist may study the Atlantic rollers rushing on at the natural bridge. These waves are sometimes rude to bathers, and one day two girls saved themselves from being carried out to sea only by clinging to one another. 'Bedad,' said an old ecclesiastic, 'it's well nayther o' those girls was there alone, or they'd both have been drowned.'

The road from Donegal to Carrick was of course in its great features much the same as Mr. Gwynn describes when we traversed it more than thirty years ago; but bicycles were undreamt of, nor had the local railway reached so far. The hotel at Carrick was a very good place, but its primary object was that of a shooting lodge for the great Mr. Thomas Conolly, then lord of the whole country side, and we doubt not as willing as a good many other Irish landlords to be very kind to his tenants if improvidence on his

own part and that of his ancestors had left him the means. Slieve League we saw twice. It requires, as Mr. Gwynn well says, light to bring out its glories, and those who stand before it on a dull day with a tame sea must come back and see it when it can be seen. But what can be demanded of any scene or any being either in heaven or earth, but a power to respond to God's light with a thousand beauties of colour and form.

Glen Columbkille is at the very back of the world, but the painters had found it out even at the earlier period of which we speak. There were at that time but two beds for strangers in the Glen: one of them was engaged by a London artist, to whose accidental absence for the night we owed it that we had a bed at all. It was at Ardara that an excellent Belgian artist of our acquaintance used to fix his summer quarters. Mr. Gwynn does not mention the strange legend which Mr. Griffith—then parson of the district—recorded in the *Dublin University Magazine*, that the Pretender, in the period after Culloden, found a temporary hiding-place in this Irish glen.

The reader will be amused by the bouquet of Donegal stories, which bear the local stamp. It was from the same region that the old servitor came who exalted the intelligence of a terrier dog, who 'bore malice like a Christian.' But the difference between the matter-of-factness of the North and the piety and politeness of the South is marked by comparison of Mr. Gwynn's story of the parishioner who said that her pastor's wife was 'as or'nary lukkin' a wumman as iver A set eyes on,' and the estimate which an old cook made in our own hearing of the personal charms of her successor: 'She's a very ordinary person—glory be to Him that made her.'

The Gap of Barnesmore carries us over to the little town of Stranorlar, the original home, if we do not err, of the great orator Isaac Butt, the predecessor of Parnell, possessed of double his talents, but little of his perseverance or success. At least, we remember that in a speech delivered a few months before his death, he said that whenever he heard the verse 'My days are swifter than a post,' he could not help thinking of the little old pony that in his early days brought the post to the town of Stranorlar, and saying to himself that his days might be slow enough and still swifter than that. But the post in these days is swift enough, even in the most distant parts of Ireland. Concerning which we have a true story to tell, which illustrates the dove-like simplicity of the Irish peasant, on which whoever counts will some day experience a great surprise. An Irishman of no great social standing in his own town, obtained a contract from the Post Office to carry the mail by car to a place at some distance in the same county, and an old friend of his, whose bag he carried on a day's shooting, was curious to know how he had worked the business. 'The Lord is good to the struggling man,' said he. 'He is, Tim; but tell me how you did it.' 'Well, I'll tell your honour. When the notice came out for tindhers, I wrote to Post Office for a form to sind one in; and I said that as I

was a poor, innocent boy, I might spoil one, and would they send me two, and they did. An' I filled up one o' them for sixty-two pound, and posted it at the office where the people lived that had the contract before. An' maybe I forgot to seal it. And I filled up the other for forty-two pound, and sealed it, and posted it myself in the other town. And the other people tinkered for fifty-two, but I got it for the forty-two, and, would you believe it, your honour? the first of my tinkers never went in.' He is doing the work well, and some day will probably be a prosperous man.

But we are telling too many of our own tales. The reader will find many better than ours in Mr. Gwynn's attractive pages.

Horæ Synopticae. Contributions to the Study of the Synoptic Problem.

By the Rev. Sir JOHN C. HAWKINS, Bart., M.A., Honorary Canon of St. Albans. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1899.)

WE have to thank Sir John Hawkins for a book of great value. We have often expressed our opinion that the great need at the present time with regard to the criticism of both the Old and the New Testament is not to formulate theories but to collect and arrange facts. In contrast to most of the books and articles published in England bearing on what is called the 'synoptic problem,' the work now before us is devoted to the evidence on the subject with very slight reference to any theories which the facts he has collected may have led the writer to form. On this point Sir John Hawkins writes in his preface:

'The sub-title is "Contributions to the Study"—rather than to the solution—"of the Synoptic Problem," because I have only been trying to help in that preliminary process of collecting and sifting materials which must be carried much further than it has yet been before we can be ready for the solution of the problem—or, as I would rather express it, of such parts of it as are not now insoluble. For, while it seems to me on the one hand that there are some aspects of it as to which we are not likely to advance beyond statements of conflicting probabilities, unless there are some fresh discoveries of documents in Egypt or elsewhere, on the other hand I believe that not a few conclusions—and those of the most important kinds—are likely to be made so clear and so practically certain by the patient and careful investigations of the language of the Gospels which are now being carried on, that before very long they will meet with general acceptance.

'My object, then, has been to collect and to exhibit facts with as small an admixture of theory as possible' (pp. v-vi).

We confess to being less sanguine than Sir John Hawkins as to the probability of any sound conclusions being speedily reached. But it is right to thank him for the care with which he has, wherever possible, kept out even indications of a 'working hypothesis' or 'inferences,' and has 'suppressed, or at least reserved for another opportunity, some more detailed hypotheses and conjectures which' have 'occurred to' him or have 'been recalled to' him 'in the course of the preparation' of the present volume (*ibid.*).

Another valuable feature of the book is that the materials which it contains were compiled for the author's 'own use,' that is, they

are the results of genuine study undertaken for the purpose of investigating truth. The publication of them is due to the advice and encouragement of so competent a judge as Dr. Sanday; and Sir John Hawkins mentions that Dr. Sanday has 'read the proof-sheets of the book, and has made many helpful and valuable suggestions' (p. viii).

Horæ Synopticæ contains carefully arranged and accurate lists of the words and phrases of the synoptic Gospels and notes on their characteristic features. One of the most valuable sections is that entitled 'The Historic Present in Mark.' The lists given in this section extend over nearly six pages, and we may quote the statement which is prefixed to the lists as affording a good instance of Sir John Hawkins's method of summarizing results and the tentative way in which he suggests inferences in those cases in which he allows himself to refer to them.

'It will be seen,' he says, 'in the following lists that the "historic present" is very frequent in Mark's narrative, comparatively rare in Matthew's, and extremely rare in Luke's. This usage accounts for the numerous occurrences in Mark of λέγει instead of εἶπεν (since εἶπεν has no present in use), which constitute a large proportion of the cases in which Matthew and Luke agree against Mark.'

Now, if (as we see was probably the case in other matters) Matthew and Luke made this change of phraseology from Mark, they were only preferring a usual to an unusual mode of expression. For it appears from the LXX that the historic present was by no means common in Hellenistic Greek; if, for instance, we take the verbs which Mark most frequently uses in this way, viz. λέγει, λέγουσιν, and ἔρχεται, ἔρχονται, it will be found that they are thus used in this one short Gospel considerably more often than in the whole of the historical books of the Old Testament. The only books besides Mark in which this usage is common are Job in the O.T. and John in the N.T. But it occurs frequently in Josephus.

In several cases the historic present gives to this Gospel something of the vividness produced in the parallel places of Matthew and Luke by the use of ἰδοὺ, which is never employed by Mark in narrative' (pp. 113-4).

This book will be valued by students of the language of the Gospels as suggesting useful lines of investigation and as helping them to correct and supplement their own lists.

We are sure that Sir John Hawkins does not intend the slightest irreverence in referring to the Evangelists by their names without the prefix St. It is a practice which always jars on ourselves, and, we believe, on many others also.

Doctrine and Development. University Sermons. By HASTINGS RASHDALL, D.C.L., M.A., Fellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford, author of *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*. (London: Methuen and Co., 1898.)

THESE sermons are not unmarked by the ability and knowledge which may be expected in any work from Mr. Rashdall's pen. They show, moreover, a desire to make religion practical and to present what the writer thinks to be the Christian Faith in such a form that, under the conditions of modern life, it may appeal to the intellect.

Yet we are unable to commend the book. Its chief aim is a reconstruction of Christian theology which may treat as open questions matters on which the Universal Church is committed to definite belief. It is pervaded by confusions of thought and expression which are extraordinary in a writer of Mr. Rashdall's power and extend to the fundamental truths of the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and our Lord's Person and Natures. It is marred throughout by an insolent tone which suggests an explanation of some of its worst faults. Any influence which it may possess is likely to be of a harmful character.

The Passover of the New Covenant. A Theological Treatise by Professor DR. WATTERICH. Translated by the Rev. T. ARCHIBALD S. WHITE, M.A., Chaplain of All Saints' Church, Baden-Baden. (Baden-Baden : Emil Sommermeyer, 1898.)

THIS is a translation of the strange but interesting and thoughtful book by the Old Catholic priest, Dr. Watterich, entitled *Das Passah des neuen Bundes*. In it Dr. Watterich traces at some length the preparation for the Eucharist which is recorded in the Old Testament; shows how the teaching and actions of our Lord's ministry led up to the institution of the Sacrament; and, putting aside both tradition and modern definitions, explains what he believes to be the Scriptural teaching on the Eucharist. We are not fond of books which attempt to discuss theology *de novo* and ignore the traditional teaching of historical Christianity; but we are bound to say that Dr. Watterich's work not only is an interesting Biblical study, but also contains valuable thought. His general position may be seen from the following quotations:—

'The new Paschal sacrifice must have Its Paschal sacrificial meal, and indeed It must, like the ancient one, have the Paschal Lamb Itself as the object of the food. The Crucified Himself must become a meal of sacrifice, meat and drink. Without Him as a meal the fulfilment of the ancient Passover is patchwork, a very sham; the truth is wanting to it. Without the sacrificial meal the sacrifice is aimless and without result. Not before the sacrificial meal is the sacrifice (of the cross) of advantage to those for whom It is offered. Not before the meal (of which the sacrifice Itself is the meat and drink) does the sacrifice become the property of those for whom It is designed. No full redemption without Jesus the Crucified, and Him as a meal of sacrifice' (pp. 44-5).

'Having regard to the (solid) form of bread more nearly resembling flesh, and to the (fluid) form of wine more nearly resembling blood,—Jesus could call His glorified corporeity present in bread by the name "Flesh," and the glorified corporeity present in the wine by the name "My Blood."¹ But the reason why He did it lay deeper. We have seen that Jesus rose glorified from the grave with His wound-prints. The retention of His wound-prints not only proves that He willed to wear them as the trophies of His conquering death; it proves more. It proves that He will continue His atoning work, His entry for us before the Father, in a living and continuous way. It proves that He will

¹ The first half of the sentence which precedes this quotation is not happily expressed in the translation. A careless reader might understand it to have exactly the opposite meaning from that which Dr. Watterich evidently intends.

always without wearying make it available and carry it through even for the deliverance of the last generation and the last individual man. It proves that, without hanging on the cross, He will remain the Crucified One even to the end, at every moment so truly and freshly working for us, outwardly and inwardly, corporeally and spiritually taking His stand on the lofty height of His atoning and loving obedience, as in the terrible hours of Gethsemane to Golgotha. . . . The Body with Its fresh wound-prints, as a sacrificial Body, is glorified and present. The whole eternally inseparable divinely human Person¹ of the Redeemer, on the never-more-to-be-abandoned cross's height of saving love, which glorifies the Father, is there!

'And the glorified Crucified One is not merely there as an offered, sacrificed Paschal Lamb, so that He would only be passively our redemption with the Father. But His passivity is, as on the cross, highest energy, and only by means of this extreme energy, this grand activity—our redemption. He is sacrifice and High Priest at the same time, and that particularly in His Presence in the Paschal meal. We should not represent the honour of His redemption rightly if we exalted merely the passive side of His sacrificial life, or exhibited it in any way as the only one. His sacrifice is at the same time itself a High priestly act, indeed only by means of this—a sacrifice. . . . No more and no where, either on earth or in heaven, is He present otherwise than as the "intercessor at all times acting for us"' (pp. 126-8).

The Doctrine of the Lord's Supper cleared from Certain Misconceptions. By JOHN JAMES STEWART PEROWNE, D.D., Lord Bishop of Worcester, Hon. Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge. (London: Elliot Stock, 1898.)

THIS volume is practically a reprint of part of the Bishop of Worcester's primary visitation Charge. The object of it is to condemn the doctrines of the real objective presence of the Body and Blood of Christ in the Holy Eucharist and the Eucharistic Sacrifice. The Bishop of Worcester describes his work in these terms:

'I have gone back to the simplicity of Holy Scripture, to primitive antiquity, to the writings of our great divines, to the teaching of our own Church. I have shown that the Tractarian doctrine of the Eucharist as held and taught by Dr. Pusey and his followers is novel, and can in no sense be termed Catholic. No doubt it leans towards Rome, though it is not Roman. But it starts from the same disregard of Holy Scripture as the Roman doctrine, and is tainted by the same rationalizing process' (Preface, pp. viii-ix).

The great argument of the book is that since the Eucharist is connected by our Lord Himself with His death, any idea of a presence of His risen, ascended, and glorified Body is absurd. This point the Bishop refers to again and again in apparent ignorance or forgetfulness that all theologians who believe in the Eucharistic presence of the risen, ascended, and glorified Body of Christ, regard the Eucharist as possessing its meaning because this glorified Body is that which has passed through death. This single fact carries with it the refutation of the book before us; and it is

¹ The phrase 'divinely human Person' is apparently intended to express an orthodox meaning. As a phrase, however, it is not satisfactory.

unnecessary that we should devote space to any of its details about Eucharistic doctrine or to its strangely unhistorical treatment of the subjects of evening Communion and fasting Communion. Only, we must express our surprise that even the Bishop of Worcester can have recourse to the hopelessly unsound argument that the fewness of the references to the Holy Eucharist in the Bible shows that

'Holy Scripture does *not* make the Holy Communion the centre and pivot of the Christian life' (p. 22).

The Constitutional Authority of Bishops in the Catholic Church. Illustrated by the history and Canon Law of the undivided Church from the Apostolic Age to the Council of Chalcedon, A.D. 451. By the Rev. A. THEODORE WIRGMAN, D.D., D.C.L. (London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans Green and Co., 1899.)

A FULLY accredited Roman Catholic writer, speaking of the authority of the Roman Pontiff, has said: 'Ad solum Romanum Pontificem, vi sui primatus spectat, concilia œcumenica cogere, iis præsidere, eaque confirmare.'¹ Dr. Wirgman's treatise will enable the reader to test the historical value of this assertion. There is also a special fitness in the appearance of the volume at the present time, when attention is being called to the constitutional action of English bishops; and although we cannot here go into the vexed question of the binding authority of the whole body of Canon Law, there will be no dispute that the period covered by Dr. Wirgman's inquiry throws much light upon the growth of episcopal jurisdiction in the undivided Church. And further, the book closely affects the procedure of ecclesiastical affairs in those parts of the Church which are less intimately associated with the State than the Mother Church in England.

Dr. Wirgman divides a learned and thorough historical survey, on which a long article might justly be written, into four parts. First he considers the development of constitutional episcopal authority in the Apostolic age, from the Scriptural standpoint that the threefold Apostolic ministry is of divine origin and authority, and is the appointed channel of sacramental life and grace, and that the Church came first and Christians afterwards. The first chapter is a satisfactory examination of the evidence of Holy Scripture upon the position of St. Peter among the Apostles. He was *primus inter pares* until his martyrdom, which Dr. Wirgman dates about A.D. 85, when St. John became the Primate Apostle 'by virtue of the pre-eminence accorded to him in the Gospels and Acts.' Dr. Wirgman therefore concludes that 'the principle of primatial order and authority is clearly traceable during the Apostolic age' (p. 40), and in a few notes at the end of the chapter some passages are quoted from other writers in illustration of this principle. In the Apostolic age the authority of the bishops was 'constitutionally limited by the principle of Primacy on the one hand, and by the central idea of

¹ Schouppe, *Elementa Theologia Dogmatica*, i. 191.

the unity of the whole body of the faithful on the other' (p. 53). The two chief witnesses of the sub-apostolic age are St. Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius. The Church followed the general lines of the civil divisions of the Empire, and organized centres of Church life followed from Apostolic missionary labours. In St. Clement's Epistle Dr. Wirgman sees an authoritative assertion of the true principle of Primacy and Church order, of which Vaticanism is the perversion and exaggeration (p. 62). He finds there, too, the power of ruling and ordaining, given to the highest order of the ministry, the principle of Apostolic succession, of development from above, and the first mention of the layman as such.¹ In Ignatius, passing by the abundant evidence of the plain facts of Apostolic succession and episcopacy in general, he finds that the bishop is not an absolute monarch; he does not administer discipline or give decisions without consulting his priests; he does not act in autocratic isolation. The priests, on the other hand, do not act apart from him, and can appeal to the universal Episcopate and to the whole Church against any misuse of his powers. In fine, the close of the sub-apostolic age exhibits the germ of later constitutional relations of the Church and her ministry. The notes at the end of this chapter contain a useful discussion of the legitimate primacy of the Roman See, and an excellent comment on the vagueness of Dr. Hort's view of the imperial unity of the Church, and the plain historical statement of Professor Ramsay (pp. 87, 94). In the first note (the type of the title of which is defective) Dr. Wirgman names certain collateral causes which contributed to the 'primacy of the Roman Church: the number of its clergy and people, its wealth and charity, the purity of its faith, its services to the whole Church as a centre of unity,² the imperial greatness of Rome as a centre of government, and the position of Rome as the one Apostolic see of the West.

The most difficult stage of the inquiry is the period between the sub-apostolic age and the Edict of Milan, the period of the *Ecclesia pressa*, a time of much disorder, of undue assertions of the legitimate primacy of Rome and of the unlawful exercise of individual episcopal authority; a time, too, of the exercise of patriarchal and metropolitan rights in the great sees of Christendom. Here Dr. Wirgman reviews the case of the heretic Marcion, the Paschal controversy, the action of Demetrius in the case of Origen, the interdependent relations of the patriarchal sees on various occasions, St. Cyprian's position in North Africa,³ and the earliest Canon Law on the constitutional authority of bishops. The Episcopate appears as a great corporation in which each bishop is an individual share-

¹ On the right of the laity to assent in the election of bishops, see later, p. 142.

² Dr. Wirgman refers *principalitas* in the famous passage of St. Irenæus to the pre-eminence of the Church as a centre of unity, following Palmer rather than Father Puller (p. 90, cp. p. 113).

³ There are 'three clear instances of St. Cyprian's action which show that he knew nothing of the claims of the Roman Patriarch to be the infallible autocrat of Christendom' (p. 163).

holder, whose actions are reviewed by metropolitical synod, by the consultative voice of his clergy and the assent of his laity.

The longest, though not the least familiar, stage of the inquiry is the last, from Milan to Chalcedon. We shall not traverse the details of this part of the ground. But we can quote a short passage which will show what conclusion Dr. Wirgman draws from the history, and we can say in general terms that the importance which he is inclined to assign to metropolitical dignity is at all events partly preserved from the danger of Popery by the number of Metropolitans which he contemplates. The responsibility of each bishop for all his actions, judicial and administrative, to the universal episcopate of the whole Church

'finds its due and orderly development in the principle of primacy in its regular gradations. . . . As the Diocesan Bishop rules, with the counsel of his priests and the assent of his laity, in his diocesan synod, so does the Metropolitan rule in his province. In cases of appeal the bishops of the province sit with the Metropolitan as judges and not merely as assessors. If an appeal should be made from the Metropolitan and his com-provincial bishops to the Patriarch, the same process is repeated. The chief bishops of the patriarchate aid him in deciding the appeal' (p. 285).

Sketches and Studies in South Africa. By W. J. KNOX LITTLE, M.A., Canon Residentiary of Worcester, Vicar of Hoar Cross. (London, 1899.)

It is difficult perhaps to do full justice to such a work as Canon Knox Little's *Sketches and Studies in South Africa* because of the glaring and very irritating faults by which it is disfigured. In the first place its author is utterly indifferent about the style of his compositions, and the reading of over three hundred pages of the baldest slip-slop becomes most tryingly wearisome. In the second place, Canon Knox Little is tautological in the highest degree, and not only repeats his thought, but his mode of expressing it, *usque ad nauseam*. Thirdly, the pages of the book are marred by the useless multitude of phrases and words which are inserted between inverted commas, although they are pointless as quotations, and the writer's meaning is not made a whit the more impressive by them. Fourthly, it is difficult to restrain a feeling of impatience at the elaborate assertion of platitudes, and the earnest insistence on the obvious, in which the writer indulges. The Canon holds too ostensibly a brief for Mr. Cecil Rhodes and against the President of the Transvaal, and he knows neither restraint nor measure in urging his opinions. Even those in fullest sympathy with him may question whether his hero is 'the greatest of Imperial statesmen' (p. 20), and whether the epithet 'unprogressive' need be applied interminably to the Boers. Among other blots we may notice a considerable amount of peevish padding, and not a little innuendo, which at times seems hardly worthy of the writer's position as a dignitary of the Anglican Church. It would be easy to give illustrations of these blemishes, which, although trifling when taken singly, in the mass tend largely to spoil the tone and character of the book. Many of them are in-

dications of culpable haste ; others betoken a curious confusion of thought and a lack of that clear insight which enables a man to grasp things firmly. A brief quotation will afford an example of the Canon's manner.

'Whereas our Lord said He came "to send fire upon the earth," some of the Church's modern rulers seem to think that *their* vocation is to work the pumps of the fire engines. We felt this the more because the silly hubbub called the "crisis in the Church" was going on while we were in South Africa, and, viewing it from a distance, we realized its pettiness and unfortunate features' (p. 306).

We pass over the gibe at the episcopate, and the doubtful compliment to the Canon's friends, that their energies are being squandered over 'a silly hubbub,' and will only notice the advantage that 'distance' is implicitly asserted to enjoy in accurately 'realizing features,' as Canon Knox Little phrases it. Does he repudiate the well-worn adage, 'Cœlum non animum,' &c.? Would he seriously have his readers believe that a passing jaunt across the water to South Africa naturally or necessarily engenders that fuller detachment of mind and impartiality of judgment which will enable a keen adherent of either side to see things in truer perspective and proportion?

From the manner of these *Sketches and Studies* we turn to the consideration of their contents. The volume is divided into three parts, the first of which, entitled 'Narrative and Descriptive,' need not detain us long. Canon Knox Little shows no capacity for such definite description as places a country vividly before the eyes of his readers. His sketches lack individuality and originality. It is not a special note of South African scenery that 'the most striking effects of light and shade over mountain and sea are, perhaps, in the early morning or late evening' (p. 29). Nor do we find in the descriptions of either cities or provinces, or in the narrative of the writer's interview with Mr. Kruger and of the nature of the Transvaal Government, any addition to what all the world knew already. The two subsequent parts—termed respectively 'Historical' and 'General'—are devoted to a record of England's relations with the Cape Colony and the adjacent territories, of which they provide a fairly useful summary, but hardly a masterpiece, based on a complete acquaintance with the best and most accessible authorities. In these divisions of his work Canon Knox Little's partisanship is displayed with so much intemperance as seriously to damage the cause he desires to further. He brings abundant evidence, as do all recent writers on colonial questions, of the great injury done to both Imperial and colonial interests by the want of a uniform colonial policy and by a government from Downing Street uninfluenced by adequate knowledge or by the mature opinion of able officials on the spot ; and, despite all past mistakes, of the strong loyalty of the colonists to the mother country ; and he strongly urges the confederation of the South African States under the suzerainty of England as the only remedy for the prevailing distrust and consequent delay in developing a land of great promise and vast possibilities.